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Since the first meeting of the International Conference on the History of the Lan-
guage Sciences in Ottawa in 1978, Konrad Koerner has been a dominant figure in 
the history of the study of language. His own immense list of scholarly publications, 
the journal he founded (Historiographia Linguistica), the triennial international 
conferences and the important monograph series have provided an institutional 
structure and an intellectual perspective for this research area. Even those who 
have disagreed with one of his stances or another are quick to acknowledge the 
vital role he has played in promoting the historiography of linguistics. 
Modern attention to the history of linguistics might be dated to a spectacular 
failure, Noam Chomsky’s attempt to trace, in Cartesian Linguistics (1966), the ori-
gins of his approach to linguistics to the Grammaire générale et raisonnée of Arnauld 
and Lancelot (1660). More importantly, though, the relationship between the whole 
of Chomskyan linguistics and its predecessors and competitors has frequently been 
described in hyperbolic terms – a ‘revolution’, to start with, and then ongoing ‘counter-
revolutions’, ‘revolts’ and ‘wars’.  The weapons are words, and contentious rhetoric 
has been the hallmark of linguistic discourse since Chomsky’s review of Skinner in 
1959. Fortunately, the only real casualties in these events are egos.
These conceptions of linguistics from 1950 to the present have naturally 
aroused great interest among historians of the discipline, even as we recognize 
the dangers of writing a history of almost contemporaneous events. In 2002 Kon-
rad Koerner published his chapter on “The ‘Chomskyan Revolution’ and its His-
toriography”, a reprise of his 1983 article in Language and Communication and 
part of a continuing dialogue between himself and John Joseph on this topic 
(see Joseph 1991, 1995; Koerner 1983, 1989, 1999). It seemed therefore a fitting 
 tribute to  Konrad Koerner, on the occasion of his 70th birthday, to ask a number 
of  distinguished scholars to comment on this theme. 
John Joseph notes in that 1995 review article that all linguists want to consider 
themselves revolutionary, and he describes Noam Chomsky as a “Serial Revolu-
tionary” (1995: 380). Historians of linguistics, as the pieces in this volume attest, 
also like to see themselves as revolutionary. The history of linguistics provides us 
with perspective on the wide variety of goals a science of language can have, the 
different types of data that become relevant depending on the goal, and the diverse 
methodologies that best suit the goals and the data. Different histories also have 
different goals, data and methodologies. 
xii Chomskyan (R)evolutions
The contributions of this volume challenge the fundamental bases for linguis-
tic theorizing in the past sixty years and encourage all of us fascinated by the phe-
nomenon of language to think in new ways about this most human trait. This is 
why we study the history of our discipline, a lesson we have all learned through 
our association with Konrad Koerner and the rich institutions that he has helped 
to create for this discipline. The seventeen articles that follow are a fitting tribute 
to Professor Koerner’s passion for linguistics and its histories.
It deeply saddens us all that Malcolm Hyman, a contributor to this volume, 
passed away before he could see the fruit of his labor in print. He was far too 
young, and had far too many talents to meet such a fate. His boundless intelligence 
and curiosity will be much missed among his friends and colleagues in the history 
of linguistics.
This volume would have been impossible without the encouragement and 
assistance of John Joseph and, at Benjamins, of Anke de Looper. It has been a 
pleasure and an honor to work with them on this project. On the practical side, the 
project would have been equally impossible without the supreme professionalism 
and expertise of Karen Lichtman, she who returned corrected bibliographies from 
deep in the jungles of Guatemala, among many other miracles. I am also deeply 
appreciative of my administrative assistant, Marita Romine, whose efforts free me 
from many snares of academic administration. 
The writing and editing of books like these require many evenings and week-
ends planted in front of a computer screen surrounded by books. Not to diminish 
the sacrifice of the authors and editors, we should recognize that the real sacrifice 
in such endeavors is performed by those we love. For this reason, I dedicate this 
book to the love of my life, Jo Kibbee. 
Chomsky’s Atavistic Revolution  
(with a little help from his enemies)
John E. Joseph
University of Edinburgh
The Oxford English Dictionary defines Modernism as a “movement characterised 
by a deliberate break with classical and traditional forms or methods”. This is 
borne out by examination of how ‘modern’ linguists have routinely established 
an ironic distance between their own work and what went before. The exception 
is Chomsky, whose ‘atavistic’ revolution, harking back to putative early modern 
roots, broke all the rules in terms of the stance one could take toward intellectual 
predecessors in the wake of modernism. It showed how “a deliberate break 
with classical and traditional forms or methods” could be brought about by, 
not ignoring traditional methods, or taking an ironic distance from them, but 
reinterpreting them with a greater time depth. The ultimate irony lies in how 
Chomsky’s opponents forced an ironic distance on him, turning him into a mere 
garden-variety modernist — and by so doing, helped to guarantee the success of 
his generativist programme.
atavism. Resemblance to grandparents or more 
remote ancestors rather than to parents.
modernism. Movement characterised by a 
deliberate break with classical and traditional 
forms or methods.
revolution. 1. A single act of rotation round a 
centre. 2. An instance of great change or 
alteration in affairs or in some particular thing.
— Oxford English Dictionary (abridged)
1. Modernism and ancestry
For over a quarter of a century E.F.K. Koerner (1983, 1989, 2002) has not merely led 
the charge in denying that what is commonly referred to as the Chomskyan Revolution 
in linguistics was a revolution at all. He has been the charge, a one-man brigade, with 
others gradually lining up safely in the rear. Lagging still further behind to clear up 
after the horses, I argued in Joseph (1991, 1995) that no revolution, whether political or 
 John E. Joseph
academic, would ever qualify as such by the strict criteria Koerner was demanding. Revolu-
tions are above all rhetorical, a matter of belief and linguistic performance, always with 
partial continuity of methods, agenda, institutions, even personnel. In any event, what 
is the point of carrying on an argument that boils down to how one defines the word 
‘revolution’ in one of its metaphorical senses?
My inclination in such a case is to follow common usage and continue to speak 
of a Chomskyan Revolution. But casting about for an alternative that might satisfy 
Koerner, one word that suggests itself is ‘modernism’. As defined above, it implies a 
deliberate break with traditional methods — with the emphasis on deliberate, since, 
again, the break will never be more than partial. If to call something revolutionary 
implies not just great change but scientific progress, labelling it modernist does not. 
It designates a limited period, a few decades either side of the two World Wars. The 
style and thought of the period embodied an ideology of progress, but today the term 
is a historical designation and implies no judgement as to whether any enduring 
progress was actually achieved.
Certainly Chomsky has been neither a traditionalist in the usual sense, nor a post-
modernist, whatever that means. So Chomskyan Modernism would seem an apt 
term — except that modernist is a label we associate with the generation before his, that 
of Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949), those contempo-
raries of Le Corbusier and Stravinsky. This is despite the fact that Sapir never broke 
from the methods of his teacher Franz Boas (1858–1942) to the same extent as Chomsky did 
from the Bloomfieldians and Sapirians. As for Bloomfield, he effectuated a very modern-
ist break through his behaviourist-framed distributionalism, yet insisted privately that 
the influence of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) was on every page of his 1933 
book Language (Cowan 1987: 29; see Joseph 2002: 135).
Further on I shall consider in more detail how these figures and others relate to 
the previous linguistic tradition. But it first has to be pointed out that, even if the 
deliberateness of Chomsky’s break was greater than that of the generation before him, 
he did not cast it as a rejection of classical and traditional forms or methods, but as a 
return to them. It was the Bloomfieldians, in his view, who were the modernists, and 
who had set linguistics on the wrong track. Chomsky was bringing about a ‘revolution’ 
in the first, most literal sense of the word, the completion of a circle. An atavistic revo-
lution: a return to an understanding and methods more akin to those of his intellectual 
grandparents and remote ancestors, as he understood them, than of his parents.
That might still qualify Chomsky as a ‘late modernist’, since atavism and mod-
ernism are by no means diametrically opposed. One thinks of the pre-Raphaelites, 
those supreme early modernists who broke with contemporary practice by a deliberate 
return to the style of pre-modern masters. They trumped the authority of their teacher’s 
generation by an appeal to a still higher authority, long-ago artists whose genius their 
teachers vaunted even while sneering at their primitive techniques. In Stravinsky’s case, 
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he managed a second modernist revolution in mid-career by abandoning his earlier 
expressionism for a neo-classicism that harked back to the 18th century; these works 
remain firmly in the canon, unlike those of his third, non-atavistic atonal phase. This 
ambivalence toward historical authorities is what makes intellectual atavism a powerful 
means for a modernist break — again a revolution in the literal sense, regardless of 
whether we choose to call it one metaphorically.
Looking across the wide range of journals and books in a range of academic fields, 
both humanistic and scientific, the normal state appears to be one in which individuals 
situate their enquiries within some framework that is already in wide use, sometimes in 
direct competition with an alternative framework though more often simply ignoring 
rival approaches. This is in line with the positivist ideal of a steady accumulation of 
rigorously controlled observations gradually adding either to the scope of the model, 
by showing how it accounts for new data and cases, or to its precision, by excluding 
data and cases previously assumed to be covered by it.1
In these conditions, it is typical for the attitude toward the field’s past to be 
one of simple progress. Figures from the past will be regarded as further from the 
truth the further back they are in time — with the proviso that, as argued by Cram 
(2007), an ‘ebb tide’ effect can make figures from the immediate past temporarily less 
authoritative than those a bit more distant. The most revered figures will be those 
who rethought the framework itself or made discoveries of such magnitude that they 
validated or reshaped the framework. Their importance relative to one another is a 
balance between the impact they had and their point on the timescale, so that, of two 
figures who had a roughly equal impact, the more recent one will be treated as more 
authoritative, except among antiquarians, or unless nationalistic or other identity 
1. There was a time not long ago when it would have been necessary to ascribe this view to 
Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1996). That time is past, not because Kuhn’s work has ceased to be 
authoritative, but because its impact on the history of science has been so profound. It is now 
hard to imagine that anyone could have been startled by Kuhn’s contention that sciences do 
not simply progress from darkness to light, but are shaped by social, political and rhetorical 
forces. This is not to say that Kuhn (1962) has become some sort of bible, its every statement 
exactly what one would repeat today as truth. It is, for example, oddly uniformitarian — ahistorical, 
in other words — in its assumption that we could or would want to apply a single model of 
development to all of science, across vastly different cultural contexts. Kuhn was not a trained 
historian, but a physicist who became a philosopher. His aim was to break the stranglehold 
which a single, simple idea of positive science had in the modernist period, and to do so he 
harked back to Copernicus as his perfect model. It worked because of the way in which the 
Copernican revolution had been singled out and idealised in modern science, as one of a 
handful of paradigm cases along with Newton, Darwin and maybe Einstein, though there was 
still some residual nervousness about Einstein in that time of nuclear paranoia.
 John E. Joseph
motives are in play, or if the figure has achieved fame well beyond the field that claims 
him or her as its identity marker.
For the practitioner working in the present, the appeal to the past is central to the 
argument from authority, which is the main valve controlling what I like to call the 
‘economy of dreams’, the limited degree to which any new work is allowed to innovate 
rather than reproduce existing knowledge and still find acceptance from the ‘gatekeepers’ 
of the field, the journal reviewers and editors, grant reviewers and boards, hiring and 
promotion committees. We face the paradox that our work is considered particularly 
valuable insofar as it is original and novel — yet is evaluated within a system that exists 
in order to keep novelty to a critical minimum, so as to limit the imagination and fantasy 
of any individual and constrain it to the shared dream of the group.
So how do practitioners in an academic field manage this economy of dreams? In 
part, rhetorically, through how they position their findings and conclusions relative 
to the field as a whole. It is here that the ancestral giants play a crucial double role. 
First, as authorities to whom one can appeal, and in so doing perform one’s mastery 
of the field’s past. Secondly, as figures who, by virtue of being remote in time, both 
allow and demand that much more interpretation to make their work meaningful in 
the present context. The remoteness is, as noted above, generally viewed as signifying 
distance from the truth as built up by later methods. But this creates a sort of rhetorical 
release valve in the plumbing system of dreams. An innovation that might otherwise 
be rejected as excessive within a conservative field can be made acceptable by claiming 
that it is actually part of the field’s heritage — what it has always believed, even if it has 
temporarily forgotten that it believes it — by tying it to an authoritative figure from the 
past. Texts written by that figure can usually be interpreted and contextualised in a way 
that appears to support whatever present-day view one is upholding. That is the advantage 
of intellectual atavism, but also its disadvantage, since one’s opponents can equally well 
reinterpret and contextualise the same texts in their own favour. To continue with my 
dubious plumbing metaphor, this sort of atavism is a lead-pipe cinch; but the softness 
that makes lead so pliable is also what makes it so poisonous.
. Ironic distance
In the modernist period, atavistic rhetoric faced a further obstacle in the imperative to detach 
practice from tradition. In academic terms, the rejection of tradition can take a number of 
forms, all of which amount to a sharp and deliberate revaluation of the currency of scholarly 
work. The old does not become worthless, but its value is adjusted downward relative 
to the new. At the same time, what was marginalised in the past is sometimes brought 
to the centre, and vice-versa, which is another way of revaluing the currency.
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The need for detachment complexified the paradox. It did not eliminate the 
motives for appealing to the past, but required practitioners to perform rhetorically 
their simultaneous understanding of how the past was both right and wrong. The 
principal rhetorical means for this performance was what is sometimes called ‘ironic 
distance’ or ‘ironic detachment’, where the irony lies in the ambivalent relationship 
between the modern writer and the ancestral authority figure, rather than in any 
overt sarcasm in the language used. Sarcasm is in fact one possible way of achieving 
the distance, though not the one most commonly found in academic discourse in 
the modernist period. Returning to the analogy of pre-Raphaelite painting, there was 
never any question of mistaking it for work from the 15th century.2 Nor could any 
musically literate person hearing Stravinsky’s Pulcinella (1920) for the first time con-
fuse it with compositions by Pergolesi and his contemporaries from 200 years earlier, 
whose themes inspired it. The melodies may be borrowed, the harmonies authentic, 
but the driving rhythm, strongly contrasting dynamics and rich orchestration create 
the ironic distance that makes Pulcinella an unmistakably modern composition.
The lack of awareness of how ironic distance functions in academic writing can be 
seen in a 1998 exchange between Margaret Thomas and a foursome led by Susan Gass. 
Thomas contends that the field of Second Language Acquisition (SLA) suffers from 
ahistoricity. SLA ignores the wide range of studies from earlier decades and centuries 
which supply it with an impressive pedigree. In a highly defensive response, Gass et al. 
attempt to deny the charge. Much as arguments over Chomsky’s impact boil down to 
definitions of ‘revolution’, here the debate is ultimately over what does and does not count 
as ‘modern’ and as ‘history’. The argument offered by Gass et al. for why their field is not 
ahistorical is, for me, and no doubt for Thomas, a perfect demonstration of why it is.
[W]e do not wish to deny premodern texts, only to say that they do not seem to 
have played an informing role in the development of the field of SLA. It is only 
in the ‘50s, ‘60s, and ‘70s that we begin to see a flurry of intellectual activity that 
converges on a coherent body of scholarly work — a body of work that begins to 
ask the important how and why questions of second language learning to which 
widely accepted methods of analysis are applied. (Gass et al. 1998: 412)
The authors are right to recognise how historicity is linked to continuity. Without that 
criterion of having “played an informing role in the development of the field”, interest 
in the past can be simply antiquarian — not a bad thing to be, though neither is it the 
. The same is not always true of the neo-Gothic style which the pre-Raphaelites precipitated. 
The cathedral near our house which most visitors assume to be medieval is actually a product 
of the 1870s Gothic Revival; and I myself thought that the wooden chest in our bedroom must 
be Jacobean, until I became familiar with this particular brand of Victorian atavism.
 John E. Joseph
same as being historicist in a continuist way, something which Gass, Thomas and I all 
agree is much richer. But what do Gass et al. mean by “deny premodern texts”, if not to 
say that “they do not seem to have played an informing role”? To deny that they exist? 
That would be lunacy. The authors are first of all introducing a surreptitious distinction 
of modern and pre-modern, treating it as a given when it is in fact not only subjective 
but circular within a discussion of historicity. What is modern is what is continuist 
with today’s work, and that continuity, they resolutely claim, does not extend back 
beyond the 1950s. This shallowness of time depth is precisely what Thomas means by 
ahistoricism. The criteria for continuity are evident in the rhetoric used by Gass et al.: 
converges, coherent, body of work, important questions, widely accepted methods.
We can see that history begins for them with an institutional recognition extending 
into the present time, which is a perfectly modernist view. It is as though the past of an 
academic field divides into a preterite (like English wrote) and a present perfect (have 
written), where the former is used in the context of a time period that does not include 
the present, the latter in one that does. I wrote five pages this morning is what one says 
in the afternoon, a time when one might also say I have written five pages this afternoon. 
For the continuist Thomas, history starts at daybreak, and ahistoricity means imagining 
that it only started at noon. For the discontinuist Gass, until noon there is nothing 
coherent to write a history about, so to speak of ahistoricity is absurd.
To substantiate their insistence on disciplinary coherence, Gass et al. structure a 
history of SLA that traces it back to a 1967 article by S. Pit Corder (1926–1990), and they 
point to work since then that recognises this lineage. They are right to identify Corder’s 
article as a breakthrough event. However, they fail to appreciate how even those within 
the lineage they trace ironically distance themselves from Corder, even while claiming 
to extend his heritage. This example by Antonella Sorace, a former student of Corder’s 
and sometime collaborator of Gass’s, is a textbook example of ironic distancing:
While Corder’s theories clearly were on the right track, they had a speculative flavour 
that, with hindsight, is easy to ascribe to a lack of conceptual and methodological 
tools for analysis; like other early second language theorists (e.g. Krashen 1981), 
he was in a sense ‘ahead of his time’, which meant that many of the innovative 
concepts he proposed could not receive either a full theoretical interpretation, or 
an empirical validation, until much later. (Sorace & Robertson 2001: 264)
Undoubtedly a sincere tribute to Corder is intended.3 The ironic distance arises through 
a rhetorical imperative for constant reassurance to ourselves and our paymasters that 
we are achieving progress — an enduring modernist heritage.
. More doubtful is whether Corder would have appreciated being bracketed together with 
Krashen, whose approach was very different from his own, or whether Krashen, closer in age 
to Sorace than to Corder, did not feel ambivalent about being treated as a historical figure 
while still academically active.
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One can look into any work on linguistics from the late 19th century onward that 
contains discussion of historical predecessors and find instances of ironic distance. The 
first ‘modernist’ linguistic work is arguably that by William Dwight Whitney (1827–1894), 
and no small part of what qualifies him for the label is his very abrupt disjuncture from the 
multiple traditions that feed into his understanding of language. Alter (2005: 71–76) 
has shown for example that the Scottish philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710–1796) and 
 Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) had a shaping influence on Whitney’s thought, in par-
ticular through the Rhetoric (1776) of George Campbell (1719–1796), a foundational 
book in Whitney’s studies (see also Joseph 2002: 30–32). But it gets no mention in 
Whitney’s work, which gives brief attention only to a handful of 18th-century figures 
who are treated as either dealing in “speculations” or adding piecemeal “facts and first 
classifications” to create a sort of puzzle that then more or less solved itself. Linguistics 
came into being, he writes,
by the suggestive and inciting deductions and speculations of men like Leibniz 
and Herder, by the wide assemblage of facts and first classifications of language 
by the Russians under Catherine and by Adelung and Vater and their like, and by 
the introduction of the Sanskrit to the knowledge of Europe, and the intimation 
of its connections and importance, by Jones and Colebrooke. No one thing was 
so decisive of the rapid success of the movement as this last; the long-gathering 
facts at once fell into their proper places, with clearly exhibited relations, and on 
the basis of Indo-European philology was built up the science of comparative 
philology. (Whitney 1875: 317–318)
He does go on to give the familiar litany of German names — Friedrich Schlegel 
(1772–1829), Franz Bopp (1791–1867), Jakob Grimm (1785–1863) and those who fol-
lowed them — along with just three non-Germans, Rasmus Rask (1787–1832), Eugène 
Burnouf (1801–1852) and Graziado Ascoli (1829–1907), who he says “have most right to 
be mentioned on the same page with the great German masters” (ibid., p. 318). Yet even 
this tip of the hat to his predecessors calls for the requisite modernist ironic distancing.
But while Germany is the home of comparative philology, the scholars of that 
country have, as was hinted above, distinguished themselves much less in that 
which we have called the science of language. There is among them (not less 
than elsewhere) such discordance on points of fundamental importance, such 
uncertainty of view, such carelessness of consistency, that a German science of 
language cannot be said yet to have an existence. (ibid., pp. 318–319)
Whitney’s 1867 book had been so thorough in its ironic detachment that its German 
translator, Julius Jolly (1849–1932) felt obliged to add two chapters tracing the history 
of historical-comparative linguistics in detail.
Whitney’s modernism was no small part of why he was so ‘revered’ by Saussure 
(see Joseph 2002: 44), who followed Whitney’s lead in ironically distancing himself 
from the Germans. Saussure’s Mémoire (1879) on the original Indo-European vowel 
 John E. Joseph
system opens with a “Review of different opinions put forward on the system of a’s”, 
briefly tracing the history of treatments of the subject from Bopp, to Georg Curtius 
(1820–1885) and August Fick (1833–1916), to August Schleicher (1821–1868), and 
warning readers that
No subject is more controversial; opinions are almost infinitely divided, and 
rarely have the various authors given a perfectly rigorous application of their 
ideas. (Saussure 1879: 1, my translation)4
When he paid to have this book printed Saussure was a student at Leipzig, just turned 
twenty-one and yet to receive any university degree. One of the “various authors” whose 
intellectual rigour he was questioning was Curtius, his university’s senior professor of 
comparative linguistics. The young man in a hurry was so impelled by the double 
imperative, first to locate his system at the endpoint of the evolution of the disci-
pline, and secondly to establish its complete originality, that he badly mismanaged the 
economy of dreams. The result was a life-long alienation from the German linguistics 
establishment that helped shipwreck his career. This is a danger inherent in distanc-
ing oneself too far from the immediately preceding generation, as Chomsky would 
rediscover 80 years later, though in career terms he would stay nicely afloat however 
stormy the seas.
Much safer was the sort of historicism undertaken by Sapir in his master’s thesis 
on Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). Early on he displays a scholarly humility 
absent from Whitney and Saussure before him, and most other linguists after.
Despite the vast accumulation of linguistic material that has been collected since 
Herder’s time, and the immense clarification that has been attained in linguistic 
conceptions, processes, and classifications, we cannot today make bold to 
assert that this problem is satisfactorily answered, or apparently in a way to be 
satisfactorily answered in the immediate future. (Sapir 1907: 110)
By the end, however, Sapir is fiercely staking out his ironic distance from the subject 
of his thesis.
Contradictions even of no small significance and lack of clearness in the terms 
used will have been noticed in the course of our exposition of Herder’s essay […]. 
Setting aside faults in the essay itself, it is evident that the new vistas of linguistic 
thought opened up by the work of Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt, and the more 
special labors of Bopp and Grimm, speedily relegated Herder’s treatise to the 
limbo of things that were. (ibid., pp. 139–140)
. “Aucune matière n’est plus controversée; les opinions sont divisées presque à l’infini, et les 
différents auteurs ont rarement fait une application parfaitement rigoureuse de leurs idées”. 
Examples could be drawn as well from the Cours de linguistique générale (Saussure 1916), but 
I have confined myself to a text which Saussure himself published.
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For the rest of his career Sapir would be the ultimate modernist of the period’s major 
linguists, discussing no predecessors at all in his book Language (1921) or in any of his 
widely-read papers.
Bloomfield’s approach to his intellectual ancestors is, by contrast, more muted and 
immediately balanced. One gets the impression that his decision to discuss a particu-
lar predecessor already reflects a judgement that his work is valuable, and the ironic 
distance comes in quite matter-of-factly. Of Whitney (1867, 1875) he says that “today 
they seem incomplete, but scarcely antiquated, and still serve as an excellent intro-
duction to language study” (Bloomfield 1933: 16). Hermann Paul’s (1846–1921) great 
work of 1880 is judged by Bloomfield (ibid.) to be “Not so well written as Whitney’s, 
but more detailed and methodical”, adding that “students of a more recent generation 
are neglecting it, to their disadvantage”. Yet when the next sentence delivers the ironic 
distancing, it is pitiless:
Aside from its very dry style, Paul’s Principles suffers from faults that seem 
obvious today, because they are significant of the limitations of nineteenth-
century linguistics. One of these faults is Paul’s neglect of descriptive language 
study. […] The other great weakness of Paul’s Principles is his insistence upon 
“psychological” interpretation. (Bloomfield 1933: 16–17)
A subtler form of distancing is found in Bloomfield’s earlier review of the Cours de 
linguistique générale, which ends as follows:
I should differ from de Saussure chiefly in basing my analysis on the sentence 
rather than on the word; by following the latter custom de Saussure gets a rather 
complicated result in certain matters of word-composition and syntax. The essential 
point, however, is this, that de Saussure has here first mapped out the world in which 
historical Indo-European grammar (the great achievement of the past century) 
is merely a single province; he has given us the theoretical basis for a science of 
human speech. (Bloomfield 1924: 319)
This appears at first to move from an initial distancing toward an out-and-out compli-
ment. But the compliment turns somewhat back-handed when one realises how little 
importance Bloomfield accorded to a “theoretical basis” divorced from practical appli-
cations (see Joseph 2002: 139).
Again, examples from the modernist period could be multiplied ad infinitum. All 
those cited, from Whitney to Sorace and Robertson, illustrate the general principle 
of how figures closer in time — in Whitney’s case, Bopp and Wilhelm von Humboldt 
(1767–1835) — are taken as closer to the truth than those more remote, even by just 
one generation. Sapir though shows an awareness displayed by none of the others, least 
of all the young Saussure, that the first and perhaps most valuable lesson gained from 
historicity is the realisation that any sense we may possess of being the first to arrive at 
the truth is an illusion that will last only until the next generation falls victim to it.
1 John E. Joseph
. The exceptional Mr Chomsky
All these modernists reject tradition either by ignoring their predecessors or keeping an 
ironic distance from them, in varying degrees and using a range of rhetorical devices. 
It is so much a part of the fabric of modernist discourse that to find it virtually absent 
in the writings of just one linguist is stunning. To be precise, Chomsky’s early work is 
very much concerned with distancing itself from the generation of his teachers, and 
from their principal master, Bloomfield. But it does this in an unprecedented way, 
by wholeheartedly embracing tradition, as represented by a series of figures prior to 
Bloomfield whose approaches he perceives as being closer to his own understanding 
of language than what was being professed in the 1940s and 1950s. Not a ray of ironic 
sunlight separates Chomsky from his claimed ancestors.
In Joseph (2002: 147–150) I have shown how in the early 1960s Chomsky’s search 
for an intellectual ancestor took him back first to Saussure, then to Humboldt.5 This 
shift can be traced through the various versions of the address Chomsky gave to the 
Ninth International Congress of Linguists in 1962. He first presents his own work as 
fitting within “the classical Saussurian framework” (Chomsky 1964: 512), and while he 
notes two ways in which his approach differs from Saussure’s, they are treated neither 
as insurmountable obstacles nor as progress from his predecessor’s relative primitive-
ness. Saussure is discussed as though he were Chomsky’s contemporary. Even when 
Chomsky’s subsequent reading takes him back a further hundred years to Humboldt 
(1836), in whom he discovers a far more deeply kindred spirit, he does not distance 
himself ironically from Saussure.
Through the later versions of this paper he maintains his earlier remarks about 
Saussure, though they come to be dwarfed by the growing amount of far more glowing 
admiration of, first Humboldt, then René Descartes (1596–1650), Gérauld de Cordemoy 
(1626–1684) and the authors of the Port-Royal grammar, Claude Lancelot (c.1616–1695) 
and Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694). This is the ‘Cartesian’ linguistic tradition that 
Chomsky identifies as culminating with Humboldt, before subsequently being undone 
by the line that extends from Whitney to Bloomfield and his followers. Subtly, Chomsky 
comes to detach Saussure from his earlier linkage of him to Humboldt, and to associate him 
instead with Whitney and the anti-Cartesian-Humboldtian-Chomskyan line. Finally 
Chomsky (1965) will cut himself off from Saussure absolutely: the three mentions of 
. This is a fitting opportunity to answer Koerner’s (2002: 138) question about the basis for 
statements I have made concerning Chomsky’s “earliest” published references to Saussure; it 
is that I spent untold hours in the Georgetown University Library in 1989–90 digging out and 
reading through all of Chomsky’s early publications, with much appreciated guidance from 
Koerner & Tajima (1986).
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him occur in conjunction with the words “reject” (p. 4), “naïve” (pp. 7–8), and worst of 
all, “taxonomic” (p. 47). The preface to the book begins:
The idea that a language is based on a system of rules determining the interpretation 
of its infinitely many sentences is by no means novel. Well over a century ago, 
it was expressed with reasonable clarity by Wilhelm von Humboldt, in his 
famous but rarely studied introduction to general linguistics (Humboldt, 1836). 
(Chomsky 1965: v)
Those whom this encomium inspired to read Humboldt’s book were surely taken aback 
to find that whatever rules had determined Chomsky’s interpretation of “introduction 
to general linguistics” were idiosyncratic, and accorded only remotely with what one 
expected of such an introduction in the wake of Saussure (1916), Bloomfield (1933) 
and the more recent textbooks by Henry A. Gleason Jr. (1917–2007; 1955) and Charles 
F. Hockett (1916–2000; 1958). Nor would they have had an easy time working out 
where Humboldt said anything about a system of rules determining interpretation. 
Never mind; the point is that, when Chomsky transfers his allegiance, it is completely. 
If he agrees with a predecessor on the basics, he does not quibble about particulars. 
In the original version of his International Congress of Linguists paper, written when 
his loyalty still lay with Saussure, Humboldt is criticised, along with Paul, for failing to 
take account of “creativity” in language production (Chomsky 1964: 512; cf. Chomsky 
1964: 22). Such criticisms of Humboldt now disappear, and he no longer has a positive 
word to say about Saussure.
It is necessary to reject his [Saussure’s] concept of langue as merely a systematic 
inventory of items and to return rather to the Humboldtian conception of 
underlying competence as a system of generative processes. (Chomsky 1965: 4)
Come Cartesian Linguistics (1966) and Saussure has been air-brushed from history 
almost entirely. The name appears twice in a list of those — including Paul, Bloomfield, 
Otto Jespersen (1860–1943), Hockett and “many others” — “who regard innovation 
as possible only ‘by analogy’ ” (p. 55), and are responsible for the fact that “Modern 
linguistics has […] failed to deal with the Cartesian observations regarding human 
language in any serious way” (p. 12).
Cartesian Linguistics is an extraordinary book in any number of ways. One of its 
claims to uniqueness lies in how these figures from a past that would seem as remote 
as it is possible to be from M.I.T. in the 1960s are discussed as if they were active mem-
bers of its faculty. The book is a condescension-free zone for linguists before Paul. It 
stays true to the programme announced in its Introduction:
I will limit myself here to […] a preliminary and fragmentary sketch of some of 
the leading ideas of Cartesian linguistics with no explicit analysis of its relation to 
current work that seeks to clarify and develop these ideas. The reader acquainted 
with current work in so-called “generative grammar” should have little difficulty 
in drawing these conclusions for himself. (Chomsky 1966: 2)
1 John E. Joseph
The continuity between his own work and that of his 17th-century predecessors, in 
other words, is so complete as to be self-evident.6
. Love your enemies
The demolition of Chomsky’s claimed intellectual pedigree came in two waves. Salmon 
(1967) was the first to cast serious doubt on Chomsky’s historical framework. Her review 
is a tour de force, a virtual encyclopaedia of relevant works from the medieval period 
onward; Chomsky’s book necessarily ends up looking very thin indeed by compari-
son. Treating Chomsky’s argument seriously, Salmon acknowledged that he limited 
his claims of a ‘Cartesian’ tradition to imply only the sharing of certain key ideas that 
derive from Descartes. She showed however that even with these limitations the Carte-
sian categorisation made little historical sense. The key ideas in question were already 
present in medieval grammars and treatises on language, and this was known to those 
who revived them in the 17th century, independently of Cartesian philosophy. She 
showed too that British linguistic enquiry was not so monolithic as Chomsky tended 
to portray it in his occasional references, and that the Bloomfieldian approach, 
which assumed language to be arbitrarily structured rather than grounded in any 
innate, universal mental principles, was no 20th-century innovation but had its own 
17th-century counterparts.
Robin Lakoff’s 1969 review of an annotated facsimile edition of the Port-Royal 
grammar, while not citing Salmon’s review, drew a similar conclusion about the earlier 
provenance of the ideas Chomsky ascribed to Descartes. Lakoff ’s review focussed 
as much on Minerva (1587) by Franciscus Sanctius (1523–1601) as on Port-Royal. 
Despite some concern about “doing violence to the thoughts of ” these predecessors, 
she “would state definitively” that they were “in some sense, generative grammarians” 
(R. Lakoff 1969: 346). The review thus upheld the basic historical framework put forward 
by Chomsky, but differed from him greatly on what belonged where within the frame-
work. The fact that it appeared in Language — a journal which carried no review of 
Cartesian Linguistics until the book’s reissue in the present decade (Falk 2005) — and 
was written by someone who had until recently been associated with Chomsky’s 
transformational-generative grammar, meant that the criticisms stung, even if the overall 
thrust was supportive. Finishing off this first, historically-oriented wave, Aarsleff (1970), 
again in Language, dwelt on figures Chomsky did not discuss, particularly John Locke 
. To be clear, I am passing no judgement here about the validity of the claimed continuity; 
on that question, see Koerner (2002: 131–150).
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(1632–1704), and Aarsleff ’s own hobby-horse, Condillac (1714–1780).7 Idiosyncratic 
in its focus and vitriolic in its tone,8 Aarsleff ’s piece redeemed most of the damage 
done by Lakoff the year before, since it only adds credibility to one’s position to have 
an opponent appear irrational.
The really serious critiques came in a second wave, starting with an article by 
John Searle in the New York Review of Books, where he had the following to say about 
Cartesian Linguistics.
Chomsky is really making two claims here. First, a historical claim that his views 
on language were prefigured by the seventeenth-century rationalists, especially 
Descartes. Second, a theoretical claim that empiricist learning theory cannot 
account for the acquisition of language. Both claims are more tenuous than he 
suggests. Descartes did indeed claim that we have innate ideas, such as the idea of 
a triangle or the idea of perfection or the idea of God. But I know of no passage 
in Descartes to suggest that he thought the syntax of natural languages was 
innate. Quite the contrary, Descartes appears to have thought that language was 
arbitrary; he thought that we arbitrarily attach words to our ideas. Concepts for 
Descartes are innate, whereas language is arbitrary and acquired. Furthermore 
Descartes does not allow for the possibility of unconscious knowledge, a notion 
that is crucial to Chomsky’s system. Chomsky cites correctly Descartes’ claim that 
the creative use of language distinguishes man from the lower animals. But that 
by itself does not support the thesis that Descartes is a precursor of Chomsky’s 
theory of innate ideas. (Searle 1972)
The readership of the New York Review of Books was on the order of one hundred times 
that of the most widely read linguistics journal, Language. And being a philosopher — 
indeed the new heavyweight champion of the philosophy of language — Searle could 
be expected to know a thing or two about Descartes. What he wrote was devastat-
ing for Chomsky’s perceptions and claims of continuity. Eight months later the same 
. When in 1988 Aarsleff did something similar in his introduction to a translation of Humboldt 
(1836), Cambridge University Press soon issued a second edition with a new introduction 
that was actually about Humboldt. All this is a pity because, at his best, Aarsleff is an inspiring 
historian of linguistic ideas.
. For example: “I do not see that anything at all useful can be salvaged from Chomsky’s version 
of the history of linguistics. That version is fundamentally false from beginning to end — because 
the scholarship is poor, because the texts have not been read, because the arguments have not 
been understood, because the secondary literature that might have been helpful has been left 
aside or unread, even when referred to” (Aarsleff 1970: 583). For his part, Chomsky attributes 
the end of his engagement with the history of linguistics to what he sees as Aarsleff ’s intel-
lectual dishonesty (Barsky 1997: 105), claiming that the flaws so vehemently denounced in 
Aarsleff ’s article are absent from Chomsky (1966) but abound in Aarsleff (1967).
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periodical published a letter to the editors arguing that Searle actually did not go far 
enough in distancing Chomsky from his claimed intellectual ancestors.
Chomsky’s account of so-called Cartesian linguistics is as inaccurate as his portrayal 
of structural linguistics. Searle has criticized Chomsky for inaccurately interpreting 
Descartes’ writings, but he ignores the devastating critiques of Chomsky’s treatment 
of the Port Royal grammarians and of Locke that have appeared in the linguistic 
literature. Chomsky claims in Cartesian Linguistics that Cartesian rationalism gave 
birth to a linguistic theory like transformational grammar in its essential respects. 
He bases his claims on the Grammaire Générale et Raisonée by Antoine Arnauld 
(a disciple of Descartes’) and Claude Lancelot (a language teacher), published in 
1660. The Grammaire Générale followed a series of other grammars by Lancelot, 
the most extensive being his Latin grammar.
  Chomsky appears not to have read this Latin grammar (an English translation 
of which was in Widener Library) but Robin Lakoff studied it and published 
her findings [R. Lakoff 1969]. She discovered that in the introduction Lancelot 
credited all of his interesting findings to Sanctius […]. In short, what Chomsky 
called Cartesian linguistics had nothing whatever to do with Descartes, but came 
directly from an earlier Spanish tradition. Equally inconsistent with Chomsky’s 
claims is the fact that the theories of Sanctius and the Port Royal grammarians 
differ from the theory of transformational grammar in a crucial way. They do not 
acknowledge the existence of a syntactic deep structure in Chomsky’s sense, but 
assume throughout that syntax is based on meaning and thought. Chomsky has 
steadfastly opposed this position from his earliest works straight through to his 
most recent writings. (G. Lakoff 1973)
Lakoff was here doing more here than questioning Chomsky’s historical knowledge 
and interpretations. The last two sentences portray Chomsky’s Cartesians as forerun-
ners of generative semantics, the approach based precisely on that belief “that syntax is 
based on meaning and thought” which “Chomsky has steadfastly opposed”. It is a hard 
blow indeed to be told that your own grandparents are working for the enemy.
Chomsky’s (1973) reply to Lakoff ’s letter took aim at a discrepancy between the 
conclusions drawn by the two Lakoffs, with Robin basically endorsing the Cartesian 
framework and George discrediting it. He chastised them both for failing to mention 
the footnote to the introduction of Cartesian Linguistics which stated that
Apart from its Cartesian origins, the Port-Royal theory of language […] can 
be traced to scholastic and renaissance grammar; in particular, to the theory of 
ellipsis and ‘ideal types’ that reached its fullest development in Sanctius’s Minerva 
(1587). (Chomsky 1966: 97, n. 67)
Chomsky insisted further that his views on language had been distorted by George 
Lakoff. But he did not address the charge that his claimed link with the 17th century 
was spurious. Ostensibly the misrepresentation of his views removed any need for this, 
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yet it is striking all the same that, from this point forward, he would not develop the ‘Cartesian’ 
connection further. With Language and Mind (1968) the emphasis began shifting toward 
David Hume (1711–1776), who would come to be Chomsky’s most frequent reference 
by the time of Reflections on Language (1975), as Humboldt retreated to the back-
ground. The allegiance to his ‘Cartesians’ was never given up, however. They never 
became the target of Chomsky’s criticism.
By now the atavistic revolution was over, in the sense that Chomsky was no longer 
focussed on developing historical links. Victory had been achieved over the Bloomfieldian 
generation, now retired and starting to die off. Despite the competition from generative 
semanticists and other rivals, Chomsky himself was becoming the ultimate authority 
on linguistics — and a more run-of-the-mill modernist on the rhetorical level. For 
example, when Saussure resurfaces at a couple of points in Language and Mind (1968; 
see Joseph 2002: 152), it is in the standard pattern of invoking his authority by calling 
him “the great Swiss linguist”, then creating ironic distance by showing how Saussure 
supposedly limited linguistics to segmentation and classification (p. 17). From this 
point on, Chomsky’s discussions of earlier linguists tend increasingly to treat them as 
historical figures, not timeless intellectual contemporaries.
We can never know for certain whether the success of Chomsky’s programme would 
have been diminished if his enemies had not done him the service of discrediting the his-
torical framework he had worked so hard to construct. It was, however, a crucial part 
of the economy of his dreams, something that bought him credibility in an early phase 
of his career when he needed it desperately. Had the framework endured in a more 
robust form, it might have limited his claims, or rather those made on his behalf, to be 
the most original, the most ‘revolutionary’ linguistic thinker of the 20th century. By 
undoing it, his opponents brought about the equivalent of financial deregulation. For 
half a century one linguist’s dreams would know no limits beyond those he imposed 
on himself.
. Conclusion
Chomsky’s atavistic revolution was revolutionary in more than its approach to lan-
guage. It broke all the rules in terms of the stance one could take toward intellectual 
predecessors in the wake of modernism. It showed how “a deliberate break with classi-
cal and traditional forms or methods” could be brought about, not by ignoring tradi-
tional methods, or taking an ironic distance from them, but reinterpreting them with 
a greater time depth. The ultimate irony lies in how Chomsky’s opponents forced an 
ironic distance on him, turning him into a mere garden-variety modernist — and by 
so doing, helped to guarantee the success of his generativist programme.
1 John E. Joseph
The broader question of whether Chomsky brought about a revolution in linguistics 
may, as I said at the outset, be a matter of semantics. ‘Atavistic modernism’ offers a 
possible alternative for those who want to stay unambiguously neutral by avoiding 
any endorsement that ‘revolution’ may seem to them to imply. But that Chomsky 
revolutionised the rhetoric of the field is an observation which I doubt even Koerner 
would dispute, though he does not believe, as I do, that revolutions are rhetorical first 
and foremost. While this paper has done no more than scratch the surface where 
Chomsky’s rhetoric is concerned, I hope to have pointed the way toward what should 
be, in the decades ahead, a three-faceted project for the history of modern linguistics, 
as we strive to understand the sources of Chomsky’s linguistics, the verbal means 
through which he manufactured consent among a critical mass of linguists, and 
the complex reception of his work, so complex in fact that enemies could end up as 
unwitting collaborators.
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The equivocation of form and notation  
in generative grammar
Christopher Beedham
Department of German, University of St Andrews
Generative grammar is a misguided approach which makes two interrelated 
errors. Firstly, the generativists seem to believe that you can do science by 
assumption or postulation alone; the assumptions are never tested, because that is 
not the point. Secondly, the generativists seem to believe that notations are forms. 
They ‘formalize’ their assumptions in a notation, in the belief that by doing so 
they are producing formal theories which are scientific and explanatory. In fact, 
all they are doing is expressing the figments of their imagination in their own ad 
hoc notation, thus engaging in a process which is pseudo-scientific and trivial.
The above critique is illustrated by the passive in English. It is shown that 
various problems raised by a voice analysis of the passive – deriving passives from 
an underlying active – are explained by analysing the passive as an aspect. Both 
these descriptive accounts of the passive are shown to be formal and explanatory, 
with notation and generative style assumptions playing no role in them 
whatsoever. Three generative accounts of the passive are then presented, all of 
which formalise the voice analysis, each with its own idiosyncratic assumptions, 
each with its own ad hoc notation, a notation consisting of symbols borrowed 
from mathematics, computer science, and logic, combined with a mixture of 
abbreviations, mnemonics, and drawings. It is argued that the generative accounts 
are notational variants of the voice analysis, an analysis which has been shown to 
be incorrect. It is further argued that the way to correct the voice analysis is not to 
construct ‘formal models’, but to seek a solution within descriptive linguistics, of 
which the aspect analysis is an example.
The paper concludes with a brief mention of ‘the method of lexical 
exceptions’ as an example of a reinvigorated data oriented, descriptive and 
Saussurean linguistics.
1. Introduction
In generative grammar the linguist constructs a formal model which explains, it is 
claimed, why some sentences of a language are grammatical and others not, how sen-
tences mean what they mean, and how children acquire their first language so quickly 
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and so easily. Generative grammar began with the publication of Chomsky 1957 and 
still exerts a fundamental influence on theoretical linguistics today (see Chomsky 1995, 
1986; Martin et al. (eds.) 2000; Bresnan 2001; Radford 2004; Sag et al. 2003; Lyons 1991; 
Gazdar et al. 1985). And yet it is highly controversial, evoking a huge amount of criti-
cism and censure, especially in its early days (see Gross 1979; Lamb 1967; Hall 1987; 
Putnam 1967; Harman (ed.) 1982; Bolinger 1960; Robinson 1975; Hammarström 1971; 
Beedham 2005: 61–105).1 But what exactly is wrong with generative grammar? The 
answer, in a nutshell, is that the generativists confuse form and notation. There are two 
fundamental errors in the generative method. Firstly, generativists seem to believe that 
the mere act of assuming or postulating something makes it real. Secondly, they seem 
to believe that the notations in which they express their assumptions are formal both 
in the natural language sense and the mathematical sense. Hence their theories pur-
port to be formal explanations of language structure, and when you add the innateness 
hypothesis to the mixture, they even purport to be models of the mind. The truth is 
that they are nothing of the sort. In this paper, to see why, we will examine the passive 
construction in English. It is well recognised that the passive played and continues to 
play a major role in the development of generative grammar, so it is a good construc-
tion to put to the test. We will look at some descriptive (i.e. non-generative) accounts 
of the passive, then some generative accounts. We will then compare the two types of 
explanation, to see how they differ and how they are similar, and where the generative 
accounts go wrong.
. Linguistics and language teaching
 Before we begin let me just say briefly where the origins to my descriptive approach to 
linguistics lie. I am first and foremost a language teacher, a foreign language teacher, a 
German teacher, and it is from the insights gained in learning and teaching a foreign 
language that my interest in grammar arose. A consequence of this is that my gram-
matical analyses are both theoretical and practical at the same time. They are theoreti-
cal because grammar is by its very nature a theoretical subject,2 and they are practical 
because the ultimate test of whether they are valid or not is whether they are taken 
up by pedagogical grammarians and incorporated into their grammars and  language 
1. For two very different accounts of the history of generative grammar see Koerner 2002 
and Newmeyer 1986.
. Grammar is concerned with theoretical notions such as sentence, verb, subject etc., 
notions which apply to all actually occurring verbs and subjects etc. in actual texts (spoken 
or written).
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courses for students. To say that pedagogical grammars are useful to theoretical lin-
guists is an understatement. A pedagogical grammar is a wonderful thing, because 
what it is is a summary of all the scientific knowledge we have about a particular lan-
guage, expressed in a way which students can understand. And it does all this as a 
by-product of its main purpose, without intending to, without realising it, and without 
caring about it. All the more useful is it, that way.
Of course, the question needs to be asked, what scientific knowledge? What counts 
as knowledge here? And that is the point. The writers of pedagogical grammars pick 
and choose from what is on offer, and obviously they pick explanations which they 
think work, and leave out those explanations which they encounter in the theoretical 
literature but which they think are not valid. In making their choices they have one big 
motivating factor, and that is, when the student asks, “why does the verb go here,” or 
“why does the adjective have that ending,” they want to have an answer. (It goes without 
saying that it has to be an answer which the students can understand, for which the 
prerequisite is that the pedagogical grammarian himself understands it). For theoreti-
cal-descriptive linguists, pedagogical grammars play a major role both at the start and 
at the end of our work. They both provide us with problems to solve, when questions 
arise to which there is no answer, neither in theoretical works nor in pedagogical gram-
mars; and pedagogical grammars confirm that the problem has been solved when they 
incorporate an answer proposed by a theoretician. One of the indications that there 
is something wrong with the generative approach is that generative grammar has no 
relevance for or applicability to language teaching (Lamandella 1969).
3. The passive in English
3.1 Two descriptive accounts of the passive
We will look here at the passive in English, because generative grammar arose and con-
tinues to exist primarily on the basis of English. We will focus on the actional passive, 
and not touch upon the statal passive. The passive in English is formed with be + V-ed, 
as exemplified in 1 below:
 (1) The room was painted by my wife.
That much is data.3 Let us move now to theory. Firstly, we need to know what be + V-ed 
means. In attempting to answer that question a rather unusual feature of the subject of 
3. It is data to a sentence-grammarian, though not to a corpus linguist. In its purest versions 
corpus linguistics does not consider the invented sentences of the sentence-grammarian to be 
data, it only considers attested utterances in real texts (spoken or written) to be data.
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passives becomes immediately apparent. The most common role for subjects is agent, 
but the subject of passives is patient, i.e. the entity designated by the subject is affected 
by the action of the verb (Quirk et al. 1985: 741; Fillmore 1968: 25) or created by the 
action of the verb (Conrad et al. 1975: 193). The problem of the passive is sometimes 
summarised by asking why the subject of passives serves as the patient. Secondly, we 
need to know what are the constraints on the occurrence of be + V-ed, i.e. with which 
verbs can it appear and from which verbs is it precluded. In other words, what is the 
syntax of the passive (syntax in the sense of combinatorial possibilities)?4 And thirdly, 
we need to know which grammatical category the passive belongs to, i.e. is it a tense, 
voice, mood, aspect, etc.
Let us start with some descriptive answers to those questions, before we look at 
some generative answers. The first descriptive answer we will look at is the traditional 
voice analysis of the passive, i.e. the practice of deriving passives from an underlying 
active (see Quirk et al. 1985: 159–171). For as long as anyone can remember grammar-
ians have proposed that passives have a meaning roughly equivalent to what has come 
to be called ‘an underlying active’. The underlying active of 1 would be 2:
 (2) My wife painted the room.
There is a difference of theme/rheme organisation between the two sentences – in 1 
the room is theme, whereas in 2 my wife is theme – but in essence the two sentences are 
synonymous, according to this account. Moreover, this ancient analysis explains why 
the subject of passives is patient by proposing that we derive a passive from its under-
lying active. Taking the derivation of 1 from 2 as an example, the subject my wife in 2 
is demoted to the object of by, the object the room in 2 is promoted to subject, be +V-ed is 
introduced, and by is introduced. It is now clear why the subject of passives is patient. 
Usually the patient of a sentence is the grammatical object. The reason why in passives 
the thing designated by the subject is patient is that it started out as an object, in the 
underlying active. When it arrives as subject of the passive it retains the meaning it had 
when it was object in the underlying active, i.e. patient. The verb is said to have two 
‘voices’, the active voice and the passive voice, and we call this account of the passive 
‘the voice analysis’.
4. The term syntax has three meanings in linguistics: (i) word order; (ii) combinatorial 
possibilities; (iii) a synonym for generative grammar. In the present paper we use the term 
syntax mostly in the second meaning, combinatorial possibilities, unless indicated otherwise. 
Syntax as combinatorial possibilities is equivalent to the structuralist tenet that a language is 
a system whose elements are determined by their place in the system. Here we have a particu-
larly awkward and ironic example of the often-commented upon phenomonen of ‘systematic 
 ambiguity’ in Chomsky’s writings and in generative grammar.
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As regards constraints on the occurrence of the passive, in other words the syntax 
in the sense of combinatorial possibilities of the passive, the voice analysis says that all 
and only transitive5 verbs can form a passive. Transitivity as the criterion for passiviz-
ability follows from the decision to derive passives from an underlying active, during 
which process the object of the active becomes subject of the passive. Obviously, for 
that to happen there has to be an object in the first place.
Regarding which grammatical category the passive belongs to, as the name implies 
according to the voice analysis the passive belongs to the category ‘voice’. This again 
follows from the decision to derive passives from the active. The category voice and the 
term ‘active’ are both designed specifically to cater for the passive, i.e. for the form 
be + V-ed. Transitive verbs are said to have two voices, the active and the passive 
(Quirk et al. 1985: 162).
The second descriptive analysis we will examine is the analysis of the passive as an 
aspect of the verb, not a voice of the verb. In order to do that we will first adumbrate 
some problems which arise from the voice analysis of the passive. The most striking 
problem is that there are five formal differences between actives and passives, and 
yet they are supposed to be (cognitively) synonymous. The differences are that the 
subjects appear in different places in the sentence, as do the objects, two extra words, 
be and by, are introduced, and the verb changes from finite to non-finite, the 2nd 
participle. The notion that those five big formal differences can happen with no effect 
on meaning is contrary to common sense, not to mention structuralism, in which the 
bilateral sign, consisting of signifiant (form) and signifié (meaning), is indivisible, i.e. 
there can be no difference in form without a difference in meaning (Saussure 1983; 
Tobin 1990; Bolinger 1977). The five formal differences between actives and passives 
suggest that there must also be a difference in meaning between the active and the pas-
sive, a semantic difference more substantial than merely a theme/rheme difference.
Another problem for the voice analysis of the passive is that some transitive verbs 
cannot (easily) form a passive, e.g. to resemble:
 (3) a. The current banking crisis resembles the Wall Street Crash of 1929.
  b. *The Wall Street Crash of 1929 is resembled by the current banking crisis.
5. A transitive verb is followed by an object. In languages with a case system there is a narrow 
definition of transitive verb which covers objects in the accusative case only, and a broad 
definition which incorporates objects in other oblique cases, e.g. dative, genitive. For some 
linguists a verb has to be passivizable to be transitive, e.g. phrasal verbs in English which can 
form a passive may be said to be transitive (because they form a passive). This is fine if you 
are only discussing transitivity, not the passive, but it leads to circularity if you are trying to 
understand the passive in terms of its relationship with transitivity: only transitive verbs form 
a passive; but how do you know if a verb is transitive?; because it forms a passive. See Hopper 
and Thompson 1980.
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Such verbs are commonly listed, but the voice analysis is unable to provide an expla-
nation as to why they do not form a passive. The problem is compounded by the fact 
that some tinkering with a sentence can often render an ungrammatical passive gram-
matical, and even the classic non-passivizable transitive verb to resemble can be made 
to passivize:
 (4) Mary isn’t resembled by any of her children.
  (Halliday 1967: 68, quoted in Huddleston 1971: 94)
Once again, the voice analysis cannot say why this is so.
The final problem to be mentioned here is that the voice analysis has to come up 
with a whole new grammatical category, ‘voice’ (and ‘active’), to treat the passive, be  
+V-ed. In other words, the passive, the construction be + V-ed, is not put into relation 
with any other part of the grammar, it stands alone, isolated. Be as the passive auxiliary 
is a unique element in the grammar, and V-ed as the passive participle is also a unique 
element in the grammar. Once again, this is contrary to structuralism. According to 
structuralism a language is ‘un système où tout se tient’, a system where everything 
hangs together (Meillet 1893: 318–319).6 If everything is connected, why is the passive, 
with its be and V-ed, not connected to the rest of the grammar? Clearly, if an analysis 
were found which used only already existing categories in a language, i.e. which estab-
lished links between the passive, be + V-ed, and other parts of the grammar without 
the need to postulate new parts, that analysis would be preferred.7
There is such an analysis, and that is the analysis of the passive as an aspect (Beedham 
2005: 33–60). According to this account the passive, be + V-ed, is an aspect of the type 
Auxiliary + Participle, like the perfect, have + V-ed, and the progressive, be + V-ing, 
in English. The meaning of be + V-ed is that it expresses an action and the state which 
ensues from that action, i.e. it means ‘action + state’.8 In the meaning ‘action +  state’ the 
6. On the history of this famous quotation see Koerner 1999.
7. We will add two more problems associated with the voice analysis, one from German and 
one from Russian. German is capable of forming a passive from an intransitive verb, e.g. Es 
wurde getanzt lit. it was danced ‘there was dancing’. Such passive sentences should not exist, 
because there is no object in a mooted underlying active to become the subject, and indeed 
they have no subject (es is a place-filler here, not a subject). But in German they do exist. How 
is it possible?
In Russian there is a constraint which is well-known but which under the voice analysis has 
no explanation. Russian has two constructions traditionally called passive: byt’ ‘to be’ + passive 
participle, and a reflexive construction with -sja ‘self ’. The byt’-passive is restricted on the whole 
to the perfective verb, the reflexive passive to the imperfective verb. The question is, why?
8. The theoretical background to this paper is Saussurean structuralism (Saussure 1983, 
1972; Koerner 1973; Joseph (Ed.) forthcoming, Sanders (Ed.) 2004; Helbig 1983: 33–45). 
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entity designated by the subject of the passive is affected or created by the action of the 
verb, i.e. it is semantically speaking patient (Poupynin 1996: 133; Abraham 2000: 151). 
The syntax (in the sense of combinatorial possibilities) of the passive is that to form a 
passive a verb has to be telic, i.e. it has to have a built in end-point, capable of becoming 
the state part of the meaning ‘action + state’. Atelic verbs do not form a passive, because 
they do not have an end-point in their semantics which can become the end-state of 
the meaning ‘action + state’.
The aspect analysis of the passive explains the three above-mentioned problems 
caused by the voice analysis. Firstly, the reason for the formal discrepancy between the 
passive and the active is that there is a semantic discrepancy, i.e. passive and active are 
not synonymous, viz. whilst the active expresses only an action the passive expresses 
an action and the state which follows from that action. Secondly, non-passivizable 
transitive verbs are atelic, i.e. they lack an inherent end-point in their semantics which 
could become the state part of the meaning ‘action + state’ of the passive. Evidence 
in support of this view is provided by the resultative perfect. The resultative perfect 
in English is a variant of the perfect which expresses an action and the result which 
emerges from that action, as seen in 5:
 (5) She has broken the doll.
In 5 an action is carried out whose result is that the doll is now broken. The result ensu-
ing from a resultative perfect can often by expressed by a statal passive in the present 
tense, as here, ‘the doll is (now) broken’ (Leech 1971). To be interpreted as a resultative 
perfect a verb needs to be telic, as just mentioned for the passive, i.e. it needs to have 
an inherent potential end-point in its meaning which can become the result part of the 
meaning ‘action + result’. The verb to break in English has that potential end-point in 
its meaning, and consequently lends itself to a resultative interpretation in the perfect. 
A verb like to live, in contrast, is atelic, it does not embody an end-point, and hence in 
a perfect will be interpreted as a continuous perfect, as shown in 6:
 (6) I have lived in Scotland for 25 years.
Here the implication is ‘and I continue to live in Scotland’: it is a continuous per-
fect, not a resultative perfect. It could not be interpreted to mean something like ‘I 
lived in Scotland with the result that Scotland is now lived in (by me).’ That would not 
make sense.
 Although Saussure does not say this (John Joseph, personal communication), a consequence 
of structuralism in my view is that form determines meaning. In the context of our current 
discussion, then, the voice analysis of the passive creates the meaning of synonymy with the 
active, whilst the aspect analysis of the passive creates the meaning ‘action + state’. On the 
relationship between language and reality see Beedham 2009.
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Given the similarity in meaning between the actional passive – ‘action + state’ – 
and the resultative perfect – ‘action + result’ – and their identical syntactic behaviour, 
viz. they each require a telic verb, one would expect that they are precluded from the 
same verbs. And that does indeed turn out to be largely the case. In research carried 
out in Leipzig from 1976–1978 I used dictionaries and native-speaker informants to 
identify all the non-passivizable transitive verbs of English and German and tested 
them for their ability to form a resultative perfect. It was found that approximately 
two-thirds of the non-passivizable transitive verbs in each language also did not form 
a resultative perfect (Beedham 1982: 59–74, 92–113). Furthermore, it was found that 
amongst the one-third of verbs which did not fit the correlation, there was invariably 
something special about their lexical semantics which caused them to behave differ-
ently from the two-thirds majority. Our verb to resemble is a verb which fits the cor-
relation, i.e. it forms neither a passive – see 3 above – nor a resultative perfect – see 7 
below:
 (7) The current banking crisis has resembled the Wall Street Crash of 1929.
Sentence 7 cannot be interpreted as a resultative perfect, to mean something like some 
resembling went on which led to a particular result, viz. the Wall Street Crash is now 
resembled (by something). That would make no sense whatsoever. It could be inter-
preted as a different kind of perfect, e.g. as an experiential perfect – at some point in 
the past the current banking crisis resembled the Wall Street Crash of 1929 – but not 
as a resultative perfect.
It is accepted in linguistics that the perfect in English is an aspect of the type Auxiliary 
+ Participle. It is also now accepted that Auxiliary + Participle aspects react to the lexical 
aspect of a verb, e.g. in British English the progressive is incompatible with stative verbs: 
He knows the answer but *He is knowing the answer (Palmer 1974: 70–77). What we are 
seeing here is that the passive behaves like the perfect: it is sensitive to lexical aspect, 
like the perfect, and indeed needs the same lexical aspect as the resultative perfect 
needs, viz. telic, for it to work. The fact that the passive behaves syntactically like the 
perfect is the most telling evidence in support of the view that the passive belongs to 
the same category as the perfect, viz. Auxiliary + Participle aspect. Furthermore, the 
passive is sensitive to the same lexical aspect as the resultative perfect because the two 
constructions are so similar in meaning: ‘action + state’ and ‘action + result’. Note also 
the morphological similarity between the passive and the perfect: be + V-ed and have 
+ V-ed. The passive and the perfect are morphologically similar, semantically similar, 
and syntactically similar; therefore we can say that the passive, like the perfect, is an 
aspect of the type Auxiliary + Participle.
The other part of the non-passivizable transitive verb problem, the fact that the pas-
sivizability of a verb varies from sentence to sentence, also receives a clear explanation 
from the recognition that the passive is an aspect, and the explanation is that aspect is 
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compositional (Verkuyl 1972, 1993). The aspect of a sentence is not determined by the 
verb alone, but by other elements in the sentence as well: the subject, the object, and 
adverbials. If the passive is an aspect it is therefore entirely natural that its possibility 
of occurrence is determined by the type of subject, object of by, and adverbials with 
which it occurs. There are several elements in sentence 4, our rare example of a passiv-
ized to resemble, which are well known for influencing aspect: in particular negation 
and indefiniteness. They influence passivizability because the passive is an aspect of 
the verb, not a voice of the verb. The syntax of the passive is determined by lexical and 
compositional aspect, not by transitivity.9
The third problem of the voice analysis discussed above was that the voice analysis 
proposes a whole new category, ‘voice’ (including ‘active’), just to deal with the passive, 
be + V-ed. It does not link be + V-ed in with anything else in the grammar. We have 
already said enough to show that the aspect analysis does link the passive, be + V-ed, 
to other parts of the grammar: it lives up to the aspiration of language as a ‘système où 
tout se tient’. It uses categories and phenomena which are already there in the gram-
mar and quite well known. English has two recognised aspects of the type Auxiliary 
+ Participle, the perfect and the progressive, and we add the passive to that already 
established grammatical category:
Perfect: have + V-ed
Progressive: be + V-ing
Passive: be + V-ed
The morpheme be of the passive is already there in the progressive, and the mor-
pheme V-ed of the passive is already there in the perfect. The processes needed to 
explain the passive, viz. the sensitivity of Auxiliary + Participle aspects to lexical and 
compositional aspect, are already there in the grammar. This is ‘syntactic generalization’, 
‘minimalism’, and ‘formal’ in a real and practical sense, as opposed to catch-phrases of 
generative grammar.10
9. Transitivity is relevant in that it affects compositional aspect, but only in that sense is 
transitivity relevant to the passive.
1. The explanations to the problems of German and Russian mentioned in fn. 7 are as 
follows. The German intransitive verb tanzen ‘to dance’ can form a passive, Es wurde getanzt, 
because passivizability is determined by lexical/compositional aspect, not by transitivity. The 
sentence Es wurde getanzt must have a compositional aspect which is compatible with the 
German passive. I cannot say yet precisely what that aspect is, but what one can see and say 
immediately is that sentences of this type in German always involve intensity – Es wurde 
laut gesungen ‘there was loud singing’, Es wurde viel gelacht ‘there was much laughter’ – and 
intensity is a nuance which crops up frequently in studies of aspect. Once again an aspectual 
factor is seen to be at work on the passive, corroborating the view that the passive is an aspect 
(Beedham 1987).
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Thus we see that out of the two descriptive accounts of the passive which we 
have examined, the voice analysis raises a host of questions and problems, which are 
answered and solved by the aspect analysis. We therefore conclude that the passive, be 
+ V-ed, is an aspect of the verb, not a voice of the verb.
Before we move on let us first clarify what counts as ‘formal’ in descriptive linguis-
tics. Form in the descriptive sense is based on contrast in a substance. The substance of 
language is sound. The contrasts you get are of two kinds. There is contrast in the order 
of sounds – John hit Bill as opposed to Bill hit John – this is syntactic form (syntax in 
the sense of word order); and there is contrast in the phonological shape of a sound – 
Latin dominus (Nom.) ‘master’ versus dominum (Acc.) – this is morphological form. 
To give an example, the subject of a sentence can be defined formally or semantically. 
Formally, the subject in an SVO language is the noun phrase occupying the first posi-
tion in the stylistically neutral sentence. Semantically, the subject is usually the agent 
or performer of the action expressed by the verb. Notice that the definition of form 
here, in descriptive grammar, does not involve a notation. Notations have nothing to 
do with the concept of form in descriptive grammar. The notion of form was funda-
mental to our presentation of both accounts of the passive in descriptive grammar, the 
voice analysis and the aspect analysis, but we never once needed to rely on a notation.
3. Three generative accounts of the passive
We are now ready to turn to some generative accounts of the passive in order to elu-
cidate the generativists’ confusion of form and notation. We will examine an account 
of the passive presented in Radford 1997 based on Chomsky’s Minimalist programme 
(Chomsky 1995, 2005), an account of the passive by Joan Bresnan within Lexical-
Functional Grammar, and an account of the passive which appeared in the journal 
Linguistic Inquiry. In generative grammar the semantic roles of noun phrases, i.e. 
agent, patient, etc., are known as theta roles. In 8a and 8b the noun phrase the students 
has the same theta role, viz. patient:
 (8) a. They arrested the students.
  b. The students were arrested.
If the Russian byt’-passive is an aspect of the type Auxiliary + Participle, meaning ‘action + 
state’, then the reason why it is compatible with the perfective but not the imperfective aspect 
is clear. The imperfective aspect views an action from within, whereas the perfective aspect 
views an action from outside it, with an overview over the whole of it (Wade 1992: 257–312). 
Thus only the perfective aspect has a view of the result or resulting state of an action. In other 
words, the perfective aspect is telic, whilst the imperfective aspect is atelic. Therefore only 
the perfective aspect is capable of expressing the state part of the byt’-passive’s ‘action + state’ 
meaning (Бидэм 1988; Schoorlemmer 1995).
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According to Radford (1997: 342–343) if we assume that Universal Grammar corre-
lates thematic structure with syntactic structure in a uniform manner, it follows that 
two noun phrases having the same theta role with respect to a given verb must occupy 
the same underlying position in the syntax. This assumption is known as the uniform 
theta assignment hypothesis, or UTAH for short. If we adopt UTAH it follows that 
passive subjects must originate in the same position as active complements. But if that 
is so, how does the complement the students in 8a end up as the subject in 8b? Radford 
suggests that the noun phrase the students, which in keeping with Minimalism he calls 
a determiner phrase (DP), is raised in a successive cyclic fashion to become first the 
subject of the passive participle arrested and then the subject of the auxiliary be, in 
each case leaving a trace t of itself in its former position behind, as shown in 9 (where 
TP stands for tense phrase):
TP
DP T′
the students T VP
were DP V′
(2) t V DP
arrested t
(1)
In 9 the students originates as the complement of the passive participle arrested, then 
undergoes ‘passivization’, i.e. movement from being complement of arrested to being 
its subject, leaving a trace t behind in its former position, and finally undergoes ‘rais-
ing’, i.e. movement from being subject of arrested to subject of were, again leaving a 
trace. This, then, is the formal-syntactic explanation for how the subject of passives is 
interpreted as patient, not agent. Moreover, the claim is that this formal(ized) structure 
(9)
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must be in the child’s head when the child is born, i.e. the (generative) grammar of 
language is innate. Furthermore, under Pinker 1994’s interpretation the grammar of 
language (including by implication the formal(ized) structure shown in 9 or its equiva-
lent in other models), is in our genes: it is a human genetic endowment. Generative 
grammar claims to be a linguistic, mathematical, psychological and now even genetic 
discipline all at once.
Bresnan 2001 rejects Chomsky’s serial and configurational approach in favour 
of a relational approach in her model, Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG), whose 
inception was motivated in large part by dissatisfaction with other generative treat-
ments of the passive. LFG assumes three parallel structures: argument structure (e.g. 
agent, patient), functional structure (e.g. subject, object), and categorial structure 
(e.g. noun phrase, verb phrase). All three structures carry equal weight in the gram-
mar: one structure does not serve as a deep structure for the others. Furthermore, 
there are no movement rules in LFG. Instead it posits relations between structures; 
the relations between the three structures are made explicit in the model’s relational 
design. The relational design of LFG allows it to handle what the generativists call 
non-configurational languages, by which they mean highly inflected languages with 
little syntax in the sense of word order. Bresnan notes that whilst in the active the 
subject is agent, in the passive the subject is patient, with the agent expressed in an 
optional prepositional phrase. In Chomsky’s configurational design of Universal 
Grammar, this remapping of roles to functions is carried out by movement rules. 
In the relational design of Universal Grammar, on the other hand, the remapping is 
characterized as follows:
active passive
R < x y > R < x y >
s o (OBL) s
⇔
Here the mapping of agent (x) to subject (s) or oblique (OBL) and of patient (y) to 
object (o) or subject (s) are indicated relationally (R), not by means of transformations 
and movement rules:
This characterization abstracts away from the language particular realizations of 
subject, object, and oblique (OBL) relations, which may be configurational or 
nonconfigurational.
In LFG, relation changes are thus lexical alternations in predicate-function 
mappings. (Bresnan 2001: 26)
(10)
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Now, in Bresnan’s model, this is why the subject of passives is interpreted as patient: 
the grammar contains the relational structure shown in 10. Bresnan (2001: 29) gives 
the analysis shown in 11 and 13 of an active-passive pair of sentences in Malayalam, 
a non-configurational Dravidian language spoken in southern India, which translate 














the child V NP
worshipped the elephant
(11)
Let us now turn to a generative account of the passive which attempts to treat the 
crucial problem of non-passivizable transitive verbs, and which will reveal in a par-
ticularly clear manner the confusion in the generative method of form and notation. 
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Wilkins 1980, following Chomsky’s Extended Standard Theory of the time, assumed 
that passives are derived by a single rule of NP-preposing, given in 12:













the elephant I VP
was V PP
worshipped by the child
(13)
In this account the Greek letter delta Δ stands for a dummy subject in the active. The 
object noun phrase in the active is moved to subject position, filling the position pro-
visionally held by Δ. It retains the meaning it had in object position, viz. patient. Now, 
in this model, this is the explanation for why the subject of passives is patient: it is 
because the grammar contains the structure shown in 13. Wilkins then takes us a step 
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further and tackles the question of how to explain why some verbs which have an 
object in the active do not allow that object to be preposed, i.e. why some transitive 
verbs are non-passivizable. Here she proposes that transitive verbs are marked in the 
lexicon as having an optional subject (i.e. in the active), formalized as in 14:
 (14) +(NP) —
The brackets around NP indicate that the subject is optional. Thus the subject of a 
transitive verb can be demoted to object of by to allow the object to fill the position 
previously occupied by the original subject. But some verbs have an obligatory subject, 
formalized as in 15:
 (15) +NP —
The absence of brackets around the NP in 15 indicates that the subject is obligatory, and 
cannot be moved. These are the non-passivizable transitive verbs. The formal explana-
tion for why some transitive verbs cannot form a passive is this: they are marked in the 
lexicon as having obligatory subjects which cannot move to make way for a preposed 
object, as shown in 15.
3.3 The descriptive side of generative grammar
Generative grammar has two sides to it, a descriptive side and a uniquely generative 
side consisting of assumptions and the formalization of those assumptions. In the 
above three generative accounts of the passive, the descriptive side to all of them is the 
derivation of the passive from an underlying active, or ‘the active-passive relationship’, 
as the generativists prefer to call it. Thus descriptive grammar and generative gram-
mar do have something in common, viz. descriptive grammar. It is this factor which 
goes a long way to answering the question: how did we get into this mess? In footnote 4 
we spoke of the systematic ambiguity of much of Chomsky’s terminology, including 
one of the very names of generative grammar, the term ‘syntax’. Another example is 
the term ‘formal’: sometimes generativists use it in the descriptive sense, as presented 
above in Section 3.1, sometimes in a uniquely generative sense to mean notational. 
This is what I am calling here the equivocation of form and notation. It is through this 
double-sided nature of generative grammar, a descriptive side and a uniquely generative 
side, that many data and descriptively oriented linguists have been misled into thinking 
that there might be something to the generative approach.
4. Form and notation in descriptive versus generative grammar
We have looked at two descriptive accounts of the English passive, and three genera-
tive ones. We are treating the passive as a test case for how well the generative method 
performs, because the passive was a crucial construction in the beginnings of genera-
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tive grammar and still is crucial to it. Let us now look back at the five accounts and 
examine the role of form and notation in them. First off it is easy to see that all three 
generative accounts have ‘formalized’ (to use their terminology) the wrong descriptive 
analysis. They have all taken the voice analysis as the basis for their models, and indeed 
it is common practice in generative grammar to refer to the active-passive relationship 
as ‘data’, to be explained in a formal model. But we saw in Section 3.1 that the passive, 
be + V-ed, is not a voice of the verb, it is an aspect of the verb. Analysing be + V-ed as 
a voice of the verb raises a long series of problems and contradictions, none of which 
arise when treating be + V-ed as an aspect of the verb, and none of which are solved 
by recasting the voice analysis in a generative model. We saw in Section 3.1 that the 
active-passive relationship is theory, not data. The data is the morphological form be 
+ V-ed. How you analyse that data is the theory, whether as a voice (the active-passive 
relationship), an aspect, or whatever. Descriptive linguistics is itself a theoretical and 
analytical discipline, putting forward theories and analyses.
But if descriptive linguistics is itself a theoretical discipline, what are the ‘theo-
ries’ of generative grammar? To answer that question let us look more closely at the 
three accounts presented in Section 3.2. Each account makes different assumptions. 
The Minimalist account assumes that the subject of passives starts off in underlying 
structure in object position and is ‘raised’ twice, each time leaving a trace, to end up 
as subject in surface structure. The LFG account assumes that semantic roles, gram-
matical relations and constituent structure are three equally important givens in the 
grammar, and it is the relations between them that are fundamental and provide expla-
nations. Wilkins’ version of Chomsky’s Extended Standard Theory assumes a single 
rule of NP-preposing, and that verbs are marked in the lexicon as having an optional 
or an obligatory subject.
Furthermore, each account uses its own notation. The Minimalist account uses 
the tree diagram shown in 9, with upper case letters of the Latin alphabet, arrows to 
indicate movement, and a lower case letter written in italics. The LFG account uses 
upper case letters, e.g. R to indicate a relationship, angled brackets to indicate semantic 
roles, square brackets on a tree diagram to indicate clusters of morphological proper-
ties, and arrows on a tree diagram to indicate which clusters of morphological proper-
ties go with which constituents, as shown in 10–12. Wilkins’ account uses upper case 
Latin letters, one Greek letter, one symbol taken from mathematics, a double arrow to 
indicate ‘transformation’, and rounded brackets to indicate optional versus obligatory, 
as shown in 13–15.
We are told by the generativists, or perhaps more accurately it is implied, that by 
using a notation the method is formal, both in the linguistic sense and the mathematical 
sense. I have to disagree with that. I would like to meet the mathematician who would 
agree that by borrowing symbols from mathematics, computer programming languages, 
and formal logic, and combining them with a mixture of abbreviations mnemonics and 
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drawings, you achieve anything that resembles mathematics (see Gross 1979: 874–875; 
Section 1.2 ‘The Ascent of the Formalism as Explanation’ in Givón 1979: 3–22). And as 
regards formal in the linguistic sense, we encountered ‘formal’ frequently in our dis-
cussion of the two descriptive accounts of the passive in Section 3.1, without ever using 
a notation, as mentioned at the end of that section: e.g. the five formal differences 
between active and passive, the form be + V-ed, the formal similarity of passive, per-
fect, and progressive, etc. In descriptive linguistics form is defined as contrast in a sub-
stance, as mentioned above at the end of Section 3.1, in which notations have no part 
to play whatsoever. Chomsky famously dismissed generative semantics as a notational 
variant of his own theory, but he should realise that any generative grammar is at best 
a notational variant or reformulation of the descriptive analysis which it embodies, at 
worst a fairy-tale of formalizations. Wilkins’ explanation of non-passivizable transi-
tive verbs is a particularly telling example of the emptiness of the generative rhetoric. 
We saw above in Section 3.1 that some verbs are transitive yet do not form a passive 
because they are atelic, and the passive is an aspect which requires a telic verb, i.e. one 
with a potential end-point capable of becoming the end-state of the passive’s meaning 
‘action + state’. Wilkins’ explanation of non-passivizable transitive verbs is that they are 
marked ‘+NP —’ in the lexicon. The descriptive account is formal, explanatory by any 
normal understanding of the word ‘explain’, and accessible to anyone with a modicum 
of familiarity with grammatical terms and concepts. The generative account, on the 
other hand, is notational, not formal; and is in no way explanatory, at the very least 
because it remains oblivious to all the aspectual factors surrounding the passive which 
were discussed above in Section 3.1; and is accessible to no one except other followers 
of the faith.11
Another good illustration of the way in which generative grammar mistakes nota-
tion for form is the practice of some generativists to ‘formalize’ the notion of agent by 
writing the English word agent in upper case letters of the Latin alphabet, thus AGENT. 
Let us be clear about this: to write down on paper the notion of ‘agent’ as AGENT is not 
formalization, not mathematics, not explanatory, and not scientific. It is a trivial and 
eccentric thing to do. The formal side of ‘agent’ is – to take a formal-syntactic (syntax 
11. It is, of course, entirely possible to formalize the aspect analysis of the passive genera-
tive-style in a model. But anyone who did that would be missing a crucial inference of the 
aspect analysis of the passive, viz. that it shows us that the generative practice of ‘explaining’ 
the problem of the passive by ‘formalizing’ it is misguided methodologically. Incidentally, 
Schoorlemmer 1995 commits two errors in this respect: she formalizes her own aspectual 
analysis of the Russian passive (whereby I agree with her aspectual analysis (Beedham 1998) 
but not its formalization (Beedham 2001)); and she advocates both her aspectual analysis 
and the voice analysis, not realising that her own aspectual analysis explains in itself why the 
subject of the be-passive is patient, thus rendering the voice analysis otiose.
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in the sense of word order) definition in SVO languages – initial position in the stylis-
tically neutral sentence, as mentioned at the end of Section 3.1 above. The formal side 
or ‘formalization’ of the notion agent is not AGENT.
We see here the two pillars of the generative method, assumptions or postula-
tions and the ‘formalizing’ of those assumptions in a notation. The assumptions are not 
hypotheses in the scientific sense, since they are never tested empirically. Obviously, 
we cannot accept the generative version of empirical testing, which is to construct a 
grammar in order to explain a set of data, and then run the grammar to see if it gener-
ates the sentences it was constructed to generate. The assumptions are the mainstay of 
the method: assume is what generativists do: for generativists, to assume is to explain. 
Once you have accepted that you can do science by assumption, the number and type 
of assumptions you can make is endless. One generative grammarian published a book 
called Thirty Million Theories of Grammar (McCawley 1982) – many a true word spo-
ken in jest. The assumptions are given an appearance of reality, and indeed of higher 
mathematics and advanced science, by being expressed in a notation. But assumptions 
are not explanations, and notations are not formal, i.e. the generative method does not 
lead to formal explanations.
5. The model-building approach in other sciences
Linguists are entitled to ask, if the (mathematical) model-building approach does not 
work in linguistics, does it then also not work in other sciences, notably physics? The 
answer is that there are scientists in other disciplines, including physics, who reject the 
mathematical model-building approach in their discipline. I strongly recommend two 
works on physics and scientific method to linguists, Dingle 1972 and Theocharis and 
Psimopoulos 1987. You will find there many of the hallmarks of the generative method 
criticised, though admittedly not all, since in its equivocation of form and notation, 
generative grammar exceeds even the worst excesses of theoretical physics criticised 
and warned about in those two works. Dingle says that from the 18th century there 
has been a movement in science away from data and observation to postulation and 
hypothesis, until we have reached the point today where physicists assume that every-
thing in mathematics exists in nature. But that is manifestly not the case, says Dingle, 
who himself used to work in this ‘theoretical’ way, until he turned against the method. 
Some mathematical entities and operations exist in nature, i.e. have a counterpart in 
nature, but others do not. For example, in mathematics 1 + 1 = 2. But in nature it is not 
always the case that the addition of one object to another object results in two objects. It 
does if you add one apple to another apple, i.e. you get two apples. But if you add one drop 
of water to another drop of water you don’t get two drops of water you get one (bigger) 
drop of water. If we add one idea to one idea we may get a philosophy (Dingle 1972: 125). 
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In mathematics there are minus numbers but minus objects do not exist; the number 
pi does not exist in nature, nor does the square root of 3 – these are mathematical 
abstractions. And yet theoretical physicists construct elegant mathematical models of 
the universe – those parts of the universe which cannot be examined empirically, such 
as the origins of the universe or subatomic structure – and assume that their models 
will by definition, or at least by the methodology used, have a counterpart in nature. 
In the history of science we have moved, says Dingle, from the observation of nature 
to the tentative (mathematical) formulation of hypotheses (i.e. a hypothesis might be 
true) to the belief that any (mathematically formulated) hypothesis must necessarily be 
true. In linguistics generative grammar commits the same fallacy but takes it further in 
that it is not really a mathematical discipline, rather it is a notational indiscipline whose 
adherents believe that their notational models exist in the human mind or even in the 
human genome. One might say of generative grammar:
By denying truth and reality, the [theoretical approach] reduces science to 
a pointless, if entertaining game; a meaningless, if exacting, exercise; and a 
destinationless, if enjoyable, journey. The aim of the game is just to play; the 
object of the exercise is merely to keep one busy; and the purpose of the journey 
is but aimless wandering. (Theocharis & Psimopoulos 1987: 597)
Except that the quotation refers to theoretical physics. The generative method is falla-
cious, but it is a fallacy which is found right across science today.
6. The way forward
6.1 Data, descriptivism, and structuralism
Having considered in Section 3.3 how we got into this mess let us conclude by thinking 
about how we get out of it. Despite its apparent success, generative grammar has been 
criticised by innumerable people from the outset. And yet the generative approach has 
survived it all. Why? The answer is because the criticisms were either wrong or did not get to 
the heart of the matter. One criticism frequently made is of Chomsky’s distinction between 
competence and performance: the argument is made that linguists should study per-
formance, not competence, e.g. texts or speech acts. But the competence-performance 
distinction is in essence the same as Saussure’s langue-parole dichotomy, and (sentence-)
grammar (i.e. including the descriptive approach) is by its very nature firmly embedded 
in langue, albeit supported by studies of parole. Other critics of generative grammar have 
concentrated their attacks on the innateness hypothesis, i.e. the claim that a generative 
grammar is innate to the human species and that children are born with a genera-
tive grammar already in the brain. But the innateness hypothesis was added later to 
the generative enterprise, in Chomsky 1959 and 1962, some years after the method 
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itself – the construction of mathematical models to explain the structure and semantics 
of sentences – was established in Chomsky 1955 and 1957. One prominent group of 
generativists within computational linguistics who rejected the innateness hypothesis 
whilst using the Chomskyan method wrote very forcefully about this:
In view of the fact that the packaging and public relations of much recent linguistic 
theory involves constant reference to questions of psychology, particularly in 
association with language acquisition, it is appropriate for us to make a few 
remarks about the connections between the claims we make and issues in the 
psychology of language. We make no claims … that our grammatical theory is eo 
ipso a psychological theory. … Our general linguistic theory is not a theory of how 
a child abstracts from the surrounding hubbub of linguistic and nonlinguistic 
noises enough evidence to gain a mental grasp of the structure of a natural 
language. Nor is it a biological theory of the structure of an as-yet-unidentified 
mental organ. (Gazdar et al. 1985: 5)
The innateness hypothesis is a red herring as regards the erroneous nature of genera-
tive grammar.
The core of the generative method is the belief that one can do science by assump-
tion alone, together with the equivocation of form and notation. It is on these two ele-
ments of the Chomskyan approach that we should concentrate, in order to bring out 
the error of the generative method and put linguistics back on the firm foundation of 
data, descriptivism12 and Saussurean structuralism.
6. The method of lexical exceptions
The aspectual analysis of the passive given in 3.1 was arrived at using a particular 
method of research which I call ‘the method of lexical exceptions’ (Beedham 2005: 
153–164). The method involves taking a grammatical rule or construction which is 
formally present in (preferably) two or three languages – in this case the passive with 
be + passive participle, in English, German and Russian – and which has a substantial 
set of unexplained (lexical) exceptions, in this case non–passivizable transitive verbs. A 
second construction is sought which has the first construction’s unexplained exceptions 
(or most of them) as its unexplained exceptions. In this case the second construction 
turned out to be the resultative perfect. The syntactic13 correlation thus discovered 
1. Hopefully it can be seen from this paper that descriptive linguistics is analytical (i.e. 
theoretical) and explanatory, it is not taxonomic, as the generativists claim. It has to be said 
that the term ‘descriptive’ is thus misleading. However, it is a term in common currency and I 
do not propose to suggest changing it.
13. Syntax in the sense of combinatorial possibilities.
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throws up hitherto unnoticed similarities between the first and the second construc-
tion, allowing the first construction to be given a new analysis which explains various 
problems associated with the old analysis. In this case the passive was re-analysed as 
an aspect of the type Auxiliary + Participle, with the meaning ‘action + state’, which can 
only occur with telic verbs or in telic sentences. The method is based on language as a 
Saussurean system whose elements are determined by their place in the system.14
I am currently attempting to use the method again, this time on irregular verbs in 
English, German and Russian, e.g. the verb drink drank drunk in English (Beedham 2005: 
107–133). Thus far the discovery has been made that the vowel + consonant sequences 
(VCs) of the irregular verbs, e.g. in drink the VC [Iŋk], tend not to occur on structurally 
comparable regular verbs, and thus serve as phonotactic markers of ‘irregular’ con-
jugation. For German it has been discovered that 74% of separable prefixes contain a 
strong verb VC. Given that prefixes in German make a verb perfective, this discovery 
suggests that the German strong verbs may also be perfective (Beedham Ms). This 
research is on–going, but its aim is to find rules for the formation of the ‘irregular’ 
verbs and a meaning for them (e.g. perfective or resultative, perhaps), distinct from 
the meaning of the regular verbs. The Saussurean point here is the indivisibility of the 
linguistic sign, i.e. no difference in form without a difference in meaning.
I hope that other linguists will try out the method of lexical exceptions on their 
own rules and constructions in their own languages, and indeed this process has 
already begun. In 2007 a summer school and conference on the method was held at the 
University of St Andrews, Scotland (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/modlangs/events/
pastevents/). Warwick Danks has recently submitted a Ph.D. thesis, co-supervised by 
the author and Catherine Cobham, Dept. of Arabic, in which he has attempted to 
apply the method to Modern Standard Arabic (Danks 2009). Danks 2009 presents evi-
dence which suggests that the vowel–lengthening verbal patterns in Modern Standard 
Arabic – patterns III and VI – have in broad terms atelic aspectual meaning, rather 
than simply the mutual/reciprocal meaning usually attributed to them as their most 
common meaning. One of the consequences of this is that passive participle forms 
from patterns III and VI are rare (it is already well recognised by Arabic grammarians 
that the Arabic participial passive has a statal or resultative meaning). In September 
2009 Vivika Cairns started a PhD, supervised by the author, in which she is attempting 
to apply the method of lexical exceptions to irregular verbs in German and Russian. 
Also in September 2009 Daniel Honert started a PhD, co-supervised by the author 
and Kormi Anipa, Dept. of Spanish, in which he is attempting to apply the method to 
14. Language as a system, compositional aspect, and syntax as combinatorial possi bilities are 
really three ways of saying the same thing. They all find their instantiation in the sentence.
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English, German, and Spanish. And Gregory 2006 presents arguments and examples 
which indicate that the Spanish passive has aspectual characteristics similar to those 
sketched above for English.
A return to data-oriented descriptive linguistics, and further testing of the method 
of lexical exceptions, will require the recognition that the generative model-building 
approach is fundamentally misguided. We hope to have shown in the present article 
that the essence of the generative fallacy is the generativists’ belief that you can do sci-
ence by postulation alone, made possible by their equivocation of form and notation.
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Chomsky’s paradigm
What it includes and what it excludes
Joanna Radwańska-Williams
Macao Polytechnic Institute
“Remember that you are a human being
with a soul and the divine gift of articulate speech […]”
George Bernard Shaw, Pygmalion1
In the structuralist tradition, the semiotic nature of the linguistic sign was seen as 
grounded in the psychological association between sound and meaning. On the 
one hand, this association is arbitrary, since sound and meaning are dissimilar in 
nature; on the other hand, the language system as a whole is partially motivated 
through various associations by similarity, which group paradigmatic relations 
and are a factor in semantic change. The system relies on the social fact of 
language use as the guarantor of the stability of conventionalized form-meaning 
associations, but also as the agent of change, which is a slow disruption and 
restructuring of the stability of the system.
The article discusses evidence for the semiotic nature of language from 
the domain of poetic iconicity, which heightens and highlights the possibility 
of non-arbitrary association between meaning and form. The importance of 
the dimension of language use is also discussed with reference to Mufwene’s 
(2001, 2005, 2007) ‘uniformitarian’ theory of language contact, according to 
which idiolectal contact is the linguistic locus of social interaction and language 
change. It is argued that, in discounting language use, i.e., ‘linguistic performance’ 
and ‘E-language’, the Chomskyan theoretical framework is incomplete as an 
account of the nature of language.
A paradigm, according to Thomas Kuhn’s (1970 [1962]) definition, is ‘a prevailing 
 consensus of opinion’ among the practitioners of an academic discipline. It is less clear, 
1. Retrieved February 9, 2009 from http://classiclit.about.com/od/pygmaliongbshaw/fr/
aa_pygmalion.htm.
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however, what constitutes the boundaries within which the consensus of opinion 
should prevail. The consensus is the result of either a critical mass of ‘conversions’, or a 
change of generations, among members of an academic community. Again, what pre-
cisely delimits the boundaries of the community? Are the boundaries national, institu-
tional, or are they delimited by the nature of the phenomena that constitute the object 
of study of the discipline?
In this article, I am concerned primarily with the last of the above criteria — the 
nature of the phenomena of language — and only secondarily with the social bound-
aries of the cultural transmission of knowledge constrained by national and institu-
tional traditions. My approach is primarily epistemological, secondarily social.
From the point of view of epistemology, a paradigm — the prevalent consensus 
of opinion — is necessarily opinion about something, the object of study. In the study 
of linguistics, broadly conceived, that something is language. Even at this juncture 
the delimitation of ‘study’ becomes problematic. To inject a little social dimension, 
the slightly different terms for ‘linguistics’ in different national languages indicate the 
boundaries of the problem. In German, it is ‘Lingwistik’ and ‘Sprachwissenschaft’ — 
thus, the object of study, etymologically speaking, is both language and speech. In 
Russian and Polish, it is both ‘lingvistika’/‘lingwistyka’ and ‘jazykoznanie’/‘językozn
awstwo’, where the latter term, etymologically speaking, can be roughly paraphrased 
as ‘the sphere of knowledge about language’, and it remains ambiguous (since Russian 
and Polish do not have an indefinite article) whether the object of study is language 
in general (‘human language’, as Chomsky would have it) or a particular language/
family of languages. While this may seem like quibbling over terminology, already the 
problem of boundaries is evident. If ‘speech’ is explicit in the definition of the aca-
demic discipline, then surely experimental phonetics is within the scope of its study. 
If studying a particular language or languages is as important as studying language in 
general, then surely a systematic description and comparison of particular languages 
is within the scope of its study. These are areas of study that have been of focal con-
cern to many linguists over the course of the history of linguistics, but not within the 
Chomskyan paradigm. Which brings me to the question posed in this article: what 
does Chomsky’s paradigm include, and what does it exclude?
The simple answer, which I hope to explore in greater depth, is that it includes a 
focus on human language, conceived as Universal Grammar, and it excludes the study 
of the phonetic properties of speech, the semiotics of the linguistic sign, and of the 
many aspects of language use and language variation. To what extent this approach 
has generated a ‘prevalent consensus of opinion’ among the practitioners of linguistics 
is a social question. However, I shall try to address it through the prism of the episte-
mological question — what insight has Chomsky provided into the nature of language 
(what is included?), and has this insight served to narrow the scope of the discipline 
(what is excluded?)
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1. Universal Grammar
Commentators on Chomsky’s political thought have pointed out a common 
ground with his linguistic thought — his universalism, the belief in the equality of all 
human beings, and also in the uniqueness of the human being as a biological species. 
Peter Hallward (2008: 9) comments:
It is no accident, notwithstanding dramatic differences in outlook and orientation, 
that the most forceful proponents of a prescriptive politics tend to ground its 
conditions of possibility in autonomous, “auto-poetic,” and extra-political 
faculties or capacities — Noam Chomsky in a mental-cognitive faculty, Gandhi 
in a spiritual faculty, Sartre in a faculty of imagination or negation, Rancière in 
a discursive capacity, Badiou in a capacity for unabashedly “immortal” truth. It 
is precisely the autonomy of such capacities that is at issue in the divergence, for 
instance, between Chomsky and his more conservative student Stephen Pinker, 
a divergence that is as much scientific as it is political. For Pinker our “language 
instinct” evolved more or less smoothly as an adaptive solution to the pressures 
imposed by natural selection; for Chomsky language comes to function at an 
essential distance from any coordination with nature, that is, at a distance from 
principles other than those of a critical autonomy itself. It is this distance that 
underlies our ability to think rather than simply behave.
Chomsky’s argument for the existence of a uniquely human ‘language faculty’ goes back 
to his critique of behaviorism. Language is not acquired by imitation and reinforcement, 
he argues, because of the ‘logical problem of language acquisition’ or the ‘poverty of the 
stimulus’: small children are not given systematic instruction in their native language and 
are usually not provided with the ‘negative evidence’ of error correction. It is paradoxical 
that small children acquire their native language fluently by age 4, at a time when they 
may still be cognitively daunted by tasks such as tying their shoelaces or counting to 10.2
In the popular introductory linguistics textbook by Fromkin & Rodman (1998), 
this capacity of small children for language acquisition is vividly illustrated by means 
of a Mother Goose nursery rhyme:3
This is the farmer sowing his corn,
That kept the cock that crowed in the morn,
2. I witnessed good evidence of this just this Christmas (December 2008), when my niece, 
aged 4 and 1 month, and already competently bilingual in French (her mother tongue) and 
Polish (her heritage language), was trying to count to 10, and had mastered the count from 
1–5, but counted randomly on the other hand when trying to reach 10; her problem was 
clearly cognitive/numerical, not linguistic.
3. Text retrieved on February 9, 2009 from http://www.amherst.edu/~rjyanco94/literature/
mothergoose/rhymes/thisisthehousethatjackbuilt.html; I did not have Fromkin & Rodman 
1998 at hand when writing this paper.
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That waked the priest all shaven and shorn,
That married the man all tattered and torn,
That kissed the maiden all forlorn,
That milked the cow with the crumpled horn,
That tossed the dog,
That worried the cat,
That killed the rat,
That ate the malt
That lay in the house that Jack built.
It is argued that children have no difficulty understanding this poem, which is in fact a 
very complex sentence with many relativized embedded clauses, and that they delight in 
language play. By the ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument, children have not received any 
systematic instruction in the grammar of complex sentences, and indeed, they may not 
even have encountered a sentence of the order of complexity of the sentence of this poem 
prior to encountering the poem, and yet they have no difficulty in understanding it. There-
fore, in the Chomskyan argument, the child’s cognitive construction of the internalized 
grammar of his/her language (or, the I-language) is instinctually predetermined by the 
human genetic endowment, a ‘language faculty’ containing a ‘universal grammar’ which 
provides the basic rudiments of language structure and which constrains (by means of 
‘principles and parameters’) the nature and number of choices that need to be made when 
internalizing the grammar of a particular language. When encountering the input of his/
her native language, the child’s brain is able to make these choices quickly and efficiently.
2. Language use
The Chomskyan ‘paradigm shift’ in theoretical perspective on language study consisted in 
what Chomsky (2006: ix) has called the ‘cognitive revolution’ — a recasting of the understand-
ing of the nature of language structure. In Chomsky’s view, which is socially contextualized 
within the historical tradition of American linguistics, the ‘structuralist’ (pre-Chomskyan) 
approach to language study did not admit any predetermined categories of language struc-
ture, but was descriptively driven by the data of field work. Chomsky claims that
The prominent linguist Martin Joos hardly exaggerated in a 1955 exposition 
when he identified the “decisive direction” of contemporary structural linguistics 
as the decision that language can be “described without any preexistent 
scheme of what a language must be.” (Joos 1955: Chapter 3, note 12, quoted in 
Chomsky 2006: vii)4
. Chomsky (2006) does not give the complete bibliographical information for this citation; 
the citation may perhaps be Joos (1957); cf. the article by Thomas (2002).
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However, this view of the structuralist perspective on language structure is something 
of a caricature. The structuralist categories of description, such as the phoneme and 
the morpheme, were arrived at as a result of a mass of comparative observation of 
language data. The study of language typology was taxonomic, somewhat analogously 
to the biological sciences’ classification of different species. The intent of Martin Joos’ 
remarks, I think, was that the taxonomy should not prejudice the description of real 
data, since new, as yet undescribed languages could always be discovered and new or 
unexpected categories emerge from the description. To take an example, some lan-
guages have noun classifiers, a grammatical category not present in Indo-European 
languages: in Bantu languages, these appear as agreement markers, while in Chinese, 
as count words (measure words, liàngcí  or )5 used between the numeral and 
the noun (Aikhenvald 2003: 8–9). This is the kind of category that might be missed by 
a typologically predetermined description that does not proceed inductively. Thus, the 
structuralist anthropological procedure was inductive, but that need not invalidate its 
theoretical categories.
In the cognitivist perspective, the categories of language structure are mental 
rather than physical or social. Any physically observable language fact — pronuncia-
tion, lexical item, word order — is interpreted in terms of mental categories of knowl-
edge that enable its acquisition by the human brain. Paradoxically, the human brain 
is a physical entity, but it is not directly the object of study. The object of study — 
the structures of the linguistic aspect of the mind — is not directly accessible. Also 
paradoxically, the language that is produced by the human organism — speech — is 
also not the object of study. Chomsky (1965: 3–4) insists that linguistics should study 
‘language form’, not ‘language use’, where language form is understood as an idealized 
‘native speaker competence’:
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a 
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly 
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory 
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or 
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.
[…] We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-
hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language 
in concrete situations.) […] The distinction I am noting here is related to the 
langue-parole distinction of Saussure; but it is necessary to reject his concept of langue 
as merely a systematic inventory of items and to return rather to the Humboldtian 
conception of underlying competence as a system of generative processes.
This insistence on the idealized study of language form seems to throw out the baby 
with the bath water. The ‘baby’ is observable language data, while the ‘bath water’ is 
. Retrieved on February 9, 2009 from http://digchinese.com/measure-words.
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Chomsky’s dismissal of descriptive methodology. However, in terms of the central 
question of this article — the extent of the Chomskyan paradigm shift — the attempt 
to throw out the baby with the bath water has resulted in the failure of the Chomskyan 
paradigm to provide a comprehensive account of language, i.e., of the set of phenom-
ena under the purview of linguistics as its object of study. Other linguists have rescued 
the baby, creating new subfields such as sociolinguistics and discourse analysis, operat-
ing with entirely different categories of description than the Chomskyan framework.
My criticism of Chomsky as not adhering to observable language data may seem 
unfair. Chomsky has avowed the empirical nature of his approach. The touchstone of 
sentence structure is its grammaticality according to ‘native speaker intuition’ — a 
methodology Chomsky may well have inherited from the ‘bath water’ of American 
anthropological structuralism and its use of ‘native informants’ in determining the 
phonemes and morphemes in a structuralist description of a language. I do not mean 
that sentence structure is unobservable. Rather, I mean that Chomsky’s insistence 
that language use is not the object of language study (linguistics) seems logically fal-
lacious. In terms of the ‘prevailing consensus of opinion’, it has created a fragmenta-
tion within the field of linguistics, a kind of crisis of identity, where many different 
‘kinds of linguistics’ are practiced side by side and sometimes have little to say to 
each other. In the state of the art of the discipline, there is no consolidated paradigm 
which encompasses all the phenomena of language. Since we are used to the state of 
the art, it is difficult to step outside of the contemporary scene. Therefore, a historical 
comparison may be instructive.
3. The social and semiotic nature of language in the structuralist tradition
According to Chomsky’s own admission, quoted above, the distinction between ‘com-
petence’ and ‘performance’, ‘language form’ and ‘language use’, can be traced back to 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s distinction between ‘langue’ and ‘parole’. In the structuralist 
tradition, the system was both psychological and social. It was psychological because 
of the symbolic ‘association’ between sound and meaning — the signifier and the 
signified in the linguistic sign, and the ‘paradigmatic relations’ between morphemes 
within word families and inflectional paradigms. It was social because the association 
between sound and meaning, being arbitrary, is dependent on social convention as 
the guarantor of its stability. In the synchronic dimension, ‘langue’ is the language 
system, the relational structure of language, abstracted from ‘parole’ as the agent of 
variation and change. Abstracting ‘langue’ as a synchronic system allows for the study 
of its relational structure, held as a constant, a slice of time, just as a sagittal section 
of the human anatomy allows for the study of the relative positioning of anatomical 
organs — facilitating morphological study. However, this synchronic abstraction of 
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the ‘langue’ was for Saussure only one of the dimensions of language — the other 
being diachrony and ‘parole’. ‘Parole’, language use, language as activity and speech, is 
the psychological and social reality of language, the interface between the individual’s 
participation in the system and the system itself, which slowly changes as a result of 
this participation. Language changes because social convention changes. In their daily 
negotiation of meaning, individuals interact. Different idiolects, understandings and 
misunderstandings, pronunciations and mispronunciations, accents and dialects, lan-
guages and language codes, enter into the daily process of contact and interaction in 
language use. Saussure’s metaphor of the chess game is but a tiny microcosm of lan-
guage and its multiple interactions — a chess board has 32 pieces and 64 spaces, which, 
mathematically speaking, produces a very large number of configurations, but how 
many elements does a language have? It is indeed remarkable that the system changes 
as slowly as it does, maintaining a relative stability of association between sound and 
meaning over the span of each generation. Nevertheless, language change and lan-
guage use is a preeminent reality, a necessary condition (sine qua non) of the existence 
of language.
In logic, there is a difference between a necessary and a sufficient condition. 
Chomsky emphasizes the uniqueness of the human biological endowment. It is true, 
as attempts to teach human sign language to chimpanzees and gorillas have shown, 
that an animal does not fully function at the cognitive level of a human being, even 
if it masters some elements of human symbolic communication.6 It does not acquire 
the entire system that human beings are capable of acquiring. But that seems to be 
begging the question. Admittedly, our genetic endowment is a necessary condition for 
the existence of language; a human being cannot acquire language without having a 
human brain and being a human being. The argument is somewhat redundant: a logi-
cal paraphrase of this proposition is that a (biological) entity cannot acquire (human) 
language without being a human being. But a necessary condition is not the same as a 
sufficient condition. In order to acquire the full system of language, is being a biological 
human being a sufficient condition? No, as the rare cases of ‘feral children’ have shown, 
social interaction is needed for acquisition, and without it, the capacity for acquisition 
seems to atrophy after the ‘critical period’ (Lightbown & Spada 2006: 17–19). It seems 
that biological endowment alone is not sufficient; it needs to be coupled with social 
interaction for sufficient conditions for the acquisition of language to exist. But if the 
social dimension of language is essential for the existence of language, then we cannot 
simply discount it as less theoretically important, an afterthought in linguistic theory, 
as Chomsky’s position seems to imply.
. For video clips of Koko the gorilla using human sign language, see http://www.koko.org/
world/signlanguage.html, retrieved on February 2, 2009.
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In my opinion, Saussure never intended the study of language to be only 
the study of synchrony and ‘langue’, to the exclusion of diachrony. In the words of 
Konrad Koerner (1995: xxxii):
Contrary to what the ‘vulgata’ text of the Cours suggests, Saussure did not plan to 
divorce synchrony from diachrony to the extent that these become two separate 
compartments of language study as we find it practiced in Bloomfield’s Language of 
1933 and the work of his followers down to the present day, Chomsky included.
The postulation of ‘langue’ was a heuristic abstraction to facilitate the comparison of 
language and languages across time. In the nineteenth century, the goal of linguistics was 
an account of language change. It is against this backdrop that questions of the nature of 
language — what is it that changes, and how does it change? — came to be asked.
According to Konrad Koerner (1973: 148–165; 1986; 1995), some of Saussure’s con-
ception of language goes back to the thought of the Polish linguist working in imperial 
Russia, Mikołaj Kruszewski (1851–1887). These historical roots were strongly (even 
polemically) emphasized by Roman Jakobson (1967: xxiv, quoted in Radwańska-Williams 
1993: 168):
The second part of [Saussure’s Cours], “Synchronic Linguistics”, especially its 
last chapters, definitely has its source in the abovementioned synthetic work of 
Kruszewski’s.
The “abovementioned synthetic work” refers to Kruszewski’s ‘course in general linguis-
tics’, given to students at Kazan University and defended as his doctoral dissertation, 
Očerk nauki o jazyke [An outline of the science of language]7 (1883). Considering 
Kruszewski’s influence, it is worth taking a closer look at these historical roots of struc-
turalist theory.
If Chomsky had been Kruszewski’s contemporary, he may perhaps have sensed 
in Kruszewski a kindred spirit, for Kruszewski throughout his life was obsessed with 
discovering the scientific laws of language. Even before he embarked on his study of 
linguistics, he wrote to his mentor, Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1888–1889: 138–139, 
quoted in Radwańska-Williams 1993: 15):
Does linguistics have some single general law which would apply to all the 
phenomena it investigates, and what namely is that law? A general law […] 
without which, as logic correctly maintains, science is not science. Is there not 
any work or article where linguistics would be examined from the standpoint of 
logic, in the manner in which, for example, other sciences are examined at the 
end of the second volume of Mill’s Logic?
. Available in English as Outline of Linguistic Science in Kruszewski (1995).
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Kruszewski adopted the associationism of John Stuart Mill (1843) as the grounding 
for his theory. According to Mill, the categories of experience were structured through 
mental associations: association by similarity and association by contiguity. Similar 
experiences associate with each other in human memory, as do experiences which 
occur together (association by contiguity). Kruszewski adopts this insight to explain the 
semiotic nature of language. Sound and meaning are dissimilar, but they are remem-
bered together because of their co-occurrence in the linguistic sign (association by con-
tiguity). Syntactic relations are also based on contiguity, the co-occurrence of words in 
the stream of speech. On the other hand, morphological relationships are structured by 
similarity. For Kruszewski, morphological relationships include not only grammatical 
paradigms, but also derivational word families (Radwańska-Williams 1993: 69–133).
For Kruszewski, the basic element of language is the word as a linguistic sign, an 
association between phonetic form and conceptual meaning. At the same time, he 
recognizes phonetic form as being the physical aspect of language. Thus the nature of 
language, in Kruszewski’s conception, is dual — it is psychophysical; moreover, it is 
semiotic, in its association between these two dimensions. Like Chomsky, and draw-
ing the criticism of his mentor Baudouin de Courtenay (1888–1889), Kruszewski does 
not focus on the social dimension of language. Rather, he focuses on the structuring 
principles of language and on the explanatory principles of language change conceived 
as semiotically motivated change in the structure of the system:
According to Kruszewski, the linguistic system consists of structural families 
of words, systems of types. The structural families constitute grammatical 
categories which correspond to a similarly organized representation of objects 
and phenomena of objective reality. Kruszewski conveys a deep belief that 
structural systems, the systems of types, are connected and correlated with 
processes of typification, that is the ability of human thinking to classify and 
generalize objects and phenomena of the objective world into definite systems 
or types of concepts (qualities, properties, features, etc.). (Berezin 2001: 222, 
quoted in Radwańska-Williams 2002: 398)
In Kruszewski’s theory, the explanatory principle of language change is “perintegra-
tion”, defined as “the law of correspondence of the world of words to the world of 
thoughts” (Kruszewski 1883: 68, quoted in Williams 1993: 82).8 Through association 
by similarity, the similarity of phonetic form is perceived by the speakers, and paradigms, 
word structure and word meaning tend to be reordered/restructured so as to make 
similarity more transparent. Under this tendency, Kruszewski (1879, 1995: 153–172) 
subsumes the phenomena of ‘analogy’ and ‘folk etymology’. On the other hand, through 
. A slightly different translation is given in Kruszewski (1995: 99): “the law of the corre-
spondence between the world of words and the world of ideas”.
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association by contiguity, high-frequency vocabulary may preserve morphological 
irregularity, a tendency which was reiterated by Kuryłowicz and has also been called 
Kruszewski and Kuryłowicz’s law (Berezin 2001: 225, cited in Radwańska-Williams 
2002: 399–400).
A central phenomenon which Kruszewski aims to explain, in the context of 
19th century linguistics, is that of sound change. His account is quite different from 
that of his contemporaries. Kruszewski agrees with the ‘neogrammarians’ Osthoff & 
 Brugmann (1878) that the discovery of regular ‘sound laws’ places linguistics on a 
par with the natural sciences, but disagrees about the nature of the phenomena. For 
Kruszewski, the only ‘sound laws’ are those which operate in the static (Saussure’s 
‘synchronic’) dimension of language. They are the laws of phonetic accommodation, 
what we would term in the 20th century as phonological laws or processes, such as 
assimilation. For Kruszewski, these are part of the physical nature of language, a con-
sequence of the functioning of the organs of speech. The ‘Kazan School’ of Mikołaj 
Kruszewski, Jan Baudouin de Courtenay and Vasilij Alekseevič Bogorodickij, based in 
Kazan  University in Russia, developed a rich tradition of experimental phonetics, going 
back as far as the 1880s, to study the physiological properties of speech (Radwańska-
Williams 2006: 365–369). On the other hand, according to Kruszewski, historical sound 
laws such as Grimm’s law are the morphophonemic vestiges of static phonetic accom-
modation. If the process of accommodation is no longer operative in the language, the 
regularity of morphophonemic sound correspondences can be disrupted by psycho-
logically based processes such as analogy and folk etymology, which are grounded in 
the mechanisms of the psychological association of sound and meaning.
. Iconicity as evidence of the semiotic nature of language
One of the insights of structuralism, at least in the lineage that can be traced from 
Kruszewski and Saussure to Roman Jakobson, is that language is a semiotic system. 
The idea of the semiotic, in its broader sense, extends beyond the commonly accepted 
concept of the symbolic nature of language, i.e., the arbitrary association of sound and 
meaning. As Saussure (1986: 131)9 observed, the arbitrariness of language is limited 
by ‘relative motivation’:
Everything having to do with languages as systems needs to be approached, we are 
convinced, with a view to examining the limitations of arbitrariness. It is an approach 
which linguists have neglected. But it offers the best possible basis for linguistic 
studies. For the entire linguistic system is founded upon the irrational principle that 
. This quotation, and Saussure’s position vis-à-vis the problem of the ‘naturalness’ of language 
first posed in Plato’s Cratylus, is discussed by John Joseph (2000) in Limiting the Arbitrary.
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the sign is arbitrary. Applied without restriction, this principle would lead to utter 
chaos. But the mind succeeds in introducing a principle of order and regularity into 
certain areas of the mass of signs. That is the role of relative motivation.
Kruszewski would have expressed the same idea of motivation as the association by 
similarity between word forms, resulting in inflectional paradigms, derivational word 
families, and various other patterns in the lexicon, and motivating change by the prin-
ciples of analogy and of the reinterpretation of etymological meaning and semantic 
relationships. An implication of Kruszewski’s position is that a system that would be 
entirely arbitrary (remembered by the contiguity of co-occurrence), would pose too 
much strain on the memory. Thus, while the nature of the physical speech signal and 
mental thought is dissimilar, and their coupling is arbitrary, the system of language 
which encodes their coupling seeks to limit the extent of its arbitrariness. To put words 
into Kruszewski’s mouth, language, through semiotically motivated language change, is 
something like a self-regulating system. The self-regulation is not volitional on the part 
of any individual participant in the system, but is motivated in its aggregate tendency, 
because of the principle of the ‘correspondence of the world of words to the world of 
thoughts’. Language, as a tool with which we are able to represent and manipulate real-
ity, seeks a state that is optimally homologous to our thoughts about reality. By reality 
I mean, loosely speaking, the referent in the world, to which the signifier points or 
refers. Language allows us to manipulate the signified conceptually, thereby represent-
ing our potential manipulation of entities in the world. A simple example would be an 
imperative: “Give me that book” is a directive for action (potentially) performed on an 
object in (non-verbal) reality.
The opposite of arbitrariness is iconicity, which can be defined as a similarity 
between form and meaning (in Saussure’s terms, between signifier and signified), or 
more narrowly speaking, between form and referent (since meaning, being a mental 
entity, is abstract and not inherently similar to anything that is physically existent.) 
In Jakobson’s insight, Saussure’s terminology is somewhat limited if we are to account 
for the whole range of iconicity in language. Kruszewski’s terminology, we may add, 
was somewhat too mentalist, from the perspective of the behaviorist bent of psychol-
ogy in the first half of the 20th century. Therefore, Jakobson adopted the terminology 
of the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce, as well as his own  functionalist perspective 
on language, to account for a wider range of iconicity. Masako Hiraga (2005), in her 
theoretical framework for the study of iconicity, advocates the continued relevance 
of Jakobson’s analysis of language and poetry to contemporary linguistic theory:
Jakobsonian analysis has been criticised on the grounds that it excludes the 
role of the reader (Fish 1996 [1973]; Attridge 1996 [1987]; Weber 1996). But if 
Jakobsonian methodology is put in the new context of cognitive poetics with its 
emphasis on the conceptual processing of both the writer and the reader, the status 
and the rigour of Jakobson’s argument must be re-evaluated. (Hiraga 2005: 23)
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Jakobson conceived of Kruszewski’s two mental dimensions, association by similarity 
and association by contiguity, as two dimensions of language — the ‘axis of selection’ 
and the ‘axis of combination’ (Waugh 1985: 149–153). Language, it may be inferred, 
is a morphophonemic system of lexical resources; it is ‘langue’, in that it is a system 
bound by social convention, and it is mental, to the extent that the speaker can acquire 
it, remember it and draw upon it. However, defining language in terms of ‘selection’ 
and ‘combination’ gives it a behaviorist angle appropriate to early 20th century psy-
chology — it skirts the issue of mental entities by emphasizing the action the speaker 
can perform upon them. It also bridges the gap between language use and language 
form: action is use, system is form.
A very interesting confrontation between language use and language form is in 
the domain of poetic iconicity. The poetic function of language, in Jakobson’s (1960: 
358, quoted in Hiraga 2005: 46) definition, “projects the principle of equivalence from 
the axis of selection into the axis of combination.” That is, elements of language which 
in and of themselves, taken as discrete lexical items, may be considered arbitrary, 
acquire a non-arbitrariness in their mutual relational patterning in the context of a 
poetic text. In a poem, the sound reinforces the meaning. The iconicity is not just a 
matter of the traditional rhyme and/or metric form of the poem, be it sonnet, haiku, 
etc., but typically is individual to each poem, the poem’s own specific subtle coupling 
of meaning and form, and functions on many levels, not just the phonological one, 
but involving what Hiraga (2002, 2003, 2005: 52) has termed the “interplay between 
metaphor and iconicity.”
This “interplay of metaphor and iconicity” works through the coupling of mean-
ing with the patterns of lexical/phonetic selection and repetition (Hiraga 2005: 46–50). 
As an example, let’s examine the iconic coupling of meaning and lexical selection in 
Robert Frost’s (1920) poem, The Road Not Taken (Radwańska-Williams 2009).10
On the conceptual level of meaning, as remarked by George Lakoff (1993: 238), 
the poem is an instantiation of the common cognitive metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. 
In the poem a choice in life is represented as a choice between two roads (Radwańska-
Williams 2009). ‘Life’ and ‘death’ are not mentioned by name in the poem, but are 
implied through the visual evocation of the cognitive metaphor. The image of the 
 ‘yellow wood’ strikingly evokes both light and shadow (cognitively associated with life 
and death). At the moment of choice, the speaker hesitates and ‘looks down’ one of the 
roads (the one not taken), then chooses the other one, though not yet fully aware of 
the consequences of his decision. At the moment of speaking/writing, however, he is 
already aware that the decision was the right one, as implied by the phrase “and that 
has made all the difference”.
1.  For the text of the poem, please see the Appendix.
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This metaphorical/conceptual level of the poem is iconically reinforced through 
the sound symbolism of lexical/phonetic repetition. As an example, take the repetition 
of “Two roads diverged” (line 1, line 18), and “and I -/I” (lines 18–19). The fact that two 
roads diverged is repeated twice, iconically reinforcing the number two. The prefix 
di- means “two”. The divergence is metaphorical for a critical decision in the life of an 
individual — a choice between two life paths, or, metaphorically speaking, two differ-
ent persons that he could have become; this is iconically reinforced by the bifurcation 
of the “I” (of the self) in the ellipsis at the juncture of lines 18–19:
 (18) Two roads diverged in a wood, and I –
 (19) I took the one less traveled by,
 (20) And that has made all the difference.
The phonetic choices in the lexical items function at the subliminal level: the prefix 
di- is homophonous with the word die, which, although not mentioned explicitly in 
the poem, is invoked as the moment of death, the final accounting of one’s life choices. 
The divergence is also subliminally echoed in the final word of the poem, ‘difference’, 
in the phonetic similarity of diver[…] and differ[…].
Iconic patterning has been called ‘subliminal’ by Jakobson (1987b). It is not clear to 
what extent the poet is consciously aware of the pattern. Nevertheless, it is an imprint 
of the mind of the poet, a trace of the process of creation. In a tightly structured poem 
such as Frost’s, it is part of the conceptual whole, like glue holding together meaning 
and form.
While Jakobson drew the concept of iconicity from Peirce, in Peirce’s original con-
ception iconicity was triadic rather than binary. In Peirce’s semiotics, the sign is not a 
dyadic binary relation between form and meaning, but a triadic relation between the 
form, the meaning, and the interpretant — or, in Peirce’s terminology, the representa-
men, the object, and the interpretant. Without an ‘interpretant’, there is no representa-
tion (Peirce 1955: 99):
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of 
that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which 
it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its 
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, 
which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to 
be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean 
in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which 
we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he 
recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think of anything, 
say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself 
during that time, that is to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at 
each instant of the interval a new idea.
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The concept of the ‘interpretant’ is somewhat ambiguous, because strictly speaking, 
the ‘interpretant’ is not the interpreter, i.e., the human being understanding the mean-
ing, and yet, in the case of language, the human being is present in the act of interpreta-
tion (Liszka et al. 2000: 2589–2588):
[A] sign is not just a two-termed relation between itself and what it refers to or 
represents, but involves a third aspect, the interpretant or system of interpretants, 
by which means it continues to develop meaning, provide information, and grow 
in significance for its sign users. The interpretant is not to be confused with sign-
interpreters or semiotic agencies, but is the significate effect of a sign on any 
such agency.
In my loose construal of Peirce, to take some liberty with his terminology, the ‘inter-
pretant’, in the case of language, could be conceived as including the meaning (let’s say, 
interpretant1), and the individual grasping the meaning (let’s say, interpretant2), and 
the social convention of language which makes the representation of meaning pos-
sible (let’s say, interpretant3). With respect to the complex iconicity of a poem, I would 
argue that Peirce’s triadic conception helps to explain the phenomenon of poetic ico-
nicity. The interpretant — the mind of the poet, interpretant2 — is able to forge links 
between different verbal elements (in Saussure’s terms, signifier/signified couplets) to 
create a complex web of meaning, interpretant1 — which (re)enters the life of language 
and by virtue of the verbal elements’ participation in a socially shared symbolic system 
(interpretant3) is grasped anew in various interpretations by the readers of the poem.
Many poems have now been analyzed within the framework of iconicity and 
cognitive poetics (Freeman 1995, 1997, 2000, 2007a, 2007b; Hiraga 1994, 2002, 2003, 
2005; Jakobson 1960, 1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c; Radwańska-Williams 1991a, 1994, 
2000, 2009; Ross 2000; Shapiro 1998; Violi 2000). That even a single poem is suscep-
tible to such an analysis is proof that there is something remarkable in the structure of 
language and in our ability to draw upon its resources. This something is a profound 
semiotic capacity of language. Surely, this merits closer scrutiny in linguistic theory. 
And yet in Chomsky’s conception, such a phenomenon, belonging to the realm of lan-
guage use, would be beyond the pale of the object of investigation of linguistic theory.
The phenomenon of poetic iconicity can be seen as a challenge to Chomsky’s 
theoretical perspective because the non-arbitrary coupling of meaning and form at 
the discourse/textual11 level necessarily includes the sentence level. The sentences that 
11.  I concede that the poet may be working with the written rather than the spoken medium, 
which would allow for a greater degree of reflection and feedback. However, (1) Chomsky does 
not claim that his syntactic theory excludes written composition — indeed, many of the example 
sentences quoted in the syntactic literature were probably ‘generated’ in written form; (2) poetic 
composition is not an entirely conscious written process, but often occurs in a contemplative or 
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make up a poem — for example, the highly iconic lines 18–20 quoted above — were 
cognitively generated by the poet. This means that, at a sentence level, a feedback loop 
must be available between (a) conceptual meaning, (b) lexical selection, and (c) pho-
netic form. But, as pointed out by Seuren (2004: 51–96), in the Chomskyan frame-
work the modular ‘architecture of the language faculty’ does not allow for a feedback 
loop between meaning and form. Seuren (2004: 57–61) characterizes this as a non-
motivational view of the nature of language, which he terms the ‘random generator 
model’. In the Chomskyan framework, the syntactic component is regarded as central 
or most important. The syntactic generation of the structure of the sentence involves 
‘lexical insertion’ of words from the lexicon. Once the syntactic structure is generated, 
it ‘interfaces’ with ‘phonetic form’ on the one hand and ‘logical form’ or the ‘logical-
conceptual interface’ on the other hand. Although the directionality and temporal 
sequence of this interfacing is highly unclear, these linguistic modules are conceived 
of as separate from the generation of the syntactic structure itself. In other words, it 
would be very difficult to explain, in the Chomskyan framework of sentence genera-
tion, how poets come up with such iconic couplings of meaning and form, where the 
whole poem seems to be glued together in one indissoluble whole. In the Chomskyan 
model, word choice, i.e., lexical insertion, does not directly interface with the ‘pho-
netic form’ nor with the ‘logical/conceptual’ level of the whole sentence. It is therefore 
difficult to explain how poets can simultaneously access the phonetic and conceptual 
form of the entire sentence while generating the sentence and forge the strong iconic 
form-meaning links.
. The goals of linguistic theory
In the ‘minimalist program’, the most recent version of Chomsky’s theory, the conception 
of language form has been reformulated as that of I-language. What does Chomsky 
mean by I-language, and how does he envisage the scope of linguistic theory? In the 
evolution of Chomsky’s thought, there has been a progressive narrowing of the vision 
of the goals of linguistic theory, vis-à-vis the question of the inclusion or exclusion of 
language use, now termed the E-language.
‘E-language’ can be defined as “ ‘external language’ as manifested in actual 
instances of (written or spoken) language performance”,12 “a collection of sentences 
even trance-like mental state, an extreme example of which is the famous alleged composition 
of the poem Kubla Khan by Samuel Taylor Coleridge under the influence of an opium-induced 
dream (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kubla_Khan, retrieved on August 13th, 2009.).
12.  http://www.hw.aca.uk/langWWW/icsla/ICSLAGLO.htm, retrieved on October 7th, 2008.
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understood independently of the properties of the mind, and in this sense contrasted 
with I-language” (Crystal 2008: 164). By contrast, ‘I-language” is “ ‘internalized lan-
guage’, a term suggested by Noam Chomsky to refer to a language viewed as an element 
of the mind of a person who knows the language, acquired by the learner, and used by 
the speaker-hearer” (Crystal 2008: 236).
According to Chomsky (2006: 173), the ‘minimalist program’ adopts a ‘biolinguis-
tic’ approach to the study of language, asking the questions of (1) “the extent to which 
apparent principles of language […] are unique to this cognitive system”, and (2) “how 
much of language can be given a principled explanation, whether or not homologous 
elements can be found in other domains or organisms.” As the object of study, a lan-
guage can be defined as an I-language:
[I]f we adopt the biolinguistic perspective, a language is a state of the faculty 
of language — an I-language in technical usage, where “I” underscores the fact 
that the conception is internalist, individual, and intensional13 (with an “s”, not 
a “t”) — that is, the actual formulation of the generative principles, not the set it 
enumerates. (Chomsky 2006: 175)
Thus, according to Chomsky, the object of study of linguistic theory is the nature of the 
faculty of language viewed as part of the human intellectual capacity, human “cognos-
citive powers” (Chomsky 2006: 178), i.e.,
[…] the human capacities for creative imagination, language and other modes 
of symbolism, mathematics, interpretation and recording of natural phenomena, 
intricate social practice and the like, a complex of capacities that seem to have 
crystallized fairly recently, perhaps a little over 50,000 years ago, among a small 
breeding group of which we are all descendants — a complex that sets humans 
rather sharply apart from other animals, including other hominids, judging by 
the archeological record. (Chomsky 2006: 175–176)
A particular language, such as English, is not so much studied for its own sake but as 
an instantiation of the human capacity for language (viewed as Universal Grammar), 
as “a state of the faculty of language”, a mental state (I-language), rather than as any set 
of language data; it is studied for the sake of “the actual formulation of the generative 
principles, not the set it enumerates.”
13. Compare the definition of  “intensional philosophy” used in computing: “A description of 
properties, e.g., intensional equality, that relate to how an object is implemented as opposed to 
extensional properties which concern only how its output depends on its input. (1995–01–12)” 
The Free On-line Dictionary of Computing. Retrieved February 02, 2009, from Dictionary.com 
website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/intensional.
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An I-language is a mental entity, not a social entity. To paraphrase Chomsky, I think 
he would claim that an individual speaks according to ‘English’ generative principles, 
i.e., according to the instantiation of English generative principles in the individual’s 
I-language, but that it is meaningless to say that s/he speaks ‘English’ as an ontologi-
cally existent entity. Chomsky’s perspective denies the ontological status of what in 
the structuralist tradition is termed as language as ‘social fact’, and thus removes the 
scientific legitimation of the study of the social aspects of language. Chomsky’s idea of 
‘principles and parameters’ in Universal Grammar provides an account of the presence 
of language variation (as parameter setting), but denies the importance of the study of 
variation as a goal in itself, apart from the evidence it provides for parameter setting.
. Language variation, diachrony and the biological perspective
The Chomskyan theoretical framework, from its inception, has been predicated on 
the model of the idealized speaker-hearer “in a completely homogeneous speech 
community” (Chomsky 1965: 3). Chomsky holds all the variables of speech constant. 
Speech, ‘parole’ in its dynamic aspect, gets discounted altogether. It is postulated that 
the ‘native speaker’ acquires the system of his/her language perfectly, as if s/he were 
born with it (though not de facto born with it), eliminating any interfering vicissitudes 
of life history, such as change of place of residence or of caregivers (and hence of the 
input), bilingualism or multilingualism. It is assumed that the system, once acquired, 
remains perfect and static — once a native speaker, always a native speaker — and 
does not undergo any language shift or attrition, or language change of the system 
itself, to which the speaker might accommodate. It is also assumed that, once acquired, 
the system (language competence) is what matters as far as linguistic data are con-
cerned (accessed through native speaker intuition about grammatically well formed 
sentences), and speaking itself — ‘performance’ — is irrelevant, since it is by its very 
nature imprecise and imperfect.
Chomsky’s ‘idealized speaker-hearer’ has been satirized by sociolinguists as a 
“homunculus” (Schlieben-Lange 1974, cited in Paradowski 2008). In the brain of this 
homunculus, linguistic competence resides, and only its structural properties are wor-
thy of study. In this conception, one may see an interestingly odd biological reification 
of Saussure’s ‘langue’ — the language system itself, divorced from diachrony and ‘parole’. 
For Saussure, ‘langue’, the possibility of the synchronic study of the language system, 
was also an idealization, but I don’t think that he meant to discount the dimension of 
diachrony altogether. Saussure’s intention was apparent from the very beginning of 
his professional work as a linguist, in the Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles 
dans les langues indo-européennes (1879). Examining the synchronic system and the 
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relationship of its elements to each other enables the linguist to describe its structure 
more precisely, indeed, to predict structural elements — in Saussure’s case, to postu-
late missing elements in the reconstruction of proto-Indo-European, which were to be 
confirmed many years later by Kuryłowicz’s (1927) internal reconstruction of Hittite 
(Radwańska-Williams 2002: 402–404; 2006: 378–379). Saussure does not discount the 
social dimension; the stability of language as a system of signs is ensured by social con-
vention, i.e., by the continued and continuous use of the system by its speakers.
I believe that in his biological reification of language as a system, Chomsky dis-
counts the social dimension. The parameters of time and space — historical and geo-
graphical extent — are discounted. They do not figure in the life of the individual 
speaker or the “homogeneous” speech community. Therefore, language variation and 
language change are discounted. The language system in the brain of the homunculus 
is supremely static.
Little wonder, then, that having posited no need for an account of change as part of 
a speech community extending across time and space, Chomsky draws far-reaching 
conclusions about human evolution. The evolution of language, as the key to the 
human ‘cognoscitive’ endowment, must have been relatively instantaneous:
The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans 
would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide 
the operation Merge, at once laying a core part of the basis for what is found 
at that dramatic moment of human evolution: at least in principle; to connect 
the dots is far from a trivial problem. There are postulations about the evolution 
of language that postulate a far more complex process: first some mutation that 
permits two-unit expressions, perhaps yielding selectional advantage by reducing 
memory load for lexical items; then further mutations to permit larger ones; 
and finally the Great Leap that yields Merge. Perhaps the earlier steps really took 
place, though there is no empirical or serious conceptual argument for the belief. 
A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap 
was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed 
with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring 
and coming to predominate. (Chomsky 2006: 184)
Like Athena, language sprang fully formed from the head of Zeus — or from a pro-
to-Adam. This is Chomsky’s biological perspective, but I think it ignores some facts 
about human biology. For one thing, in articulatory phonetics it is argued that the 
‘descent of the larynx’ is an important evolutionary adaptation for speech, allowing the 
human vocal mechanism a much wider range of sounds, and hence making possible 
the  ‘double articulation’ of language — its ability to combine phonemes, a small set of 
distinctive sounds, into words, a large open set of symbols (Lieberman 1984, cited in 
Seuren 2004: 18). For another thing, there is a whole complex of human anatomical 
characteristics: a larger skull accommodating an enlarged cortex; an opposable thumb; 
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upright posture; a change in the position of the hips accompanied by a modified birth 
canal and resulting in a baby (whose large skull is made partly of cartilage, to pass 
through the birth canal) being born without yet having undergone the development 
necessary for an upright posture, and without the larynx having descended down the 
throat; and hairlessness, the “naked ape” (Morris 1967) — that surely could not have 
been the result of a single spontaneous “rewiring” of the brain or of the genetic code. 
It is not language alone that is uniquely human, but the whole complex of anatomical 
features taken together. And this complex, taken together, suggests a history — and 
no doubt, also a geographical extent of some kind — leading to the adaptations that 
anthropologists know well: man the toolmaker, able to use his hands for various pur-
poses, while only the feet are used for locomotion; able to communicate precisely, 
among other purposes, for the cultural transmission of the skills of making tools and 
other cultural artifacts; man the maker of clothes and shelters, which obviate the need 
for thick body hair; woman, the nurturer, who is able to take care of children that are 
born helpless and bring them up to adulthood; and humans, social animals, whose 
entire lifestyle, made possible by these anatomical adaptations, revolves around the 
sense of belonging to a social group.
If we accept Chomsky’s idea that the goal of linguistic theory is not the description 
of particular languages, but the explanation of the ‘human endowment’, does his model 
of language really provide a full explanation? I would argue that it is a partial explanation 
(conceding that language is a part of our genetic endowment), but not the whole story. 
Even from the biological perspective, it fails to explain the nature of language fully.
This can be seen more clearly if we confront Chomsky’s idea of what language is 
with an entirely different theoretical perspective. An excellent account of the dynamics 
of diachrony is provided by Salikoko Mufwene’s theory of language contact.
Language contact, Mufwene (2001, 2005, 2007) argues, is the result of population 
contact. He draws upon the analogy of ecology — population biology — to explain the 
dynamics of human language. He advocates a ‘uniformitarian’ (2007: 75) hypothesis of 
creolization, whereby the genesis of creoles should not be regarded as different in kind 
than the formation of any language varieties, but as an example of the same process of 
structural differentiation which is always the result of language contact, an aspect of 
the restructuring of human populations. Seen in this light, the code — language struc-
ture — is rooted in language use, in human interaction: “the current literature has usu-
ally omitted to consider population structure as an ecological factor that can account 
for structural differences” (2007: 81). Moreover, Mufwene (2007: 86) argues that the 
locus of language contact is ultimately inter-idiolectal, since population interaction is 
the aggregate of individual interactions:
To the extent that contact, situated at the idiolectal level, is acknowledged as 
a critical ecological factor in the actuation of change, the distinction between 
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externally and internally-motivated change becomes simply sociological, and 
the distinction between changes induced by contact and those independent 
of contact becomes misguided. Moreover, like evolutionary biology, genetic 
linguistics (which could also be called evolutionary linguistics) has everything 
to gain from being interested in issues of language vitality, which can then deal 
with the demise of languages by structural erosion or by language shift and with 
the emergence of new varieties. In all these cases of language evolution, the 
action of competition and selection among competing variants and/or systems 
is evident.
Recasting Mufwene’s argument in Saussurean terms, we can see that ‘langue’ is ulti-
mately the outcome of an aggregate of individual acts of ‘parole’, when these are 
considered in diachronic perspective as the agents of the evolution or ‘speciation’ of 
language varieties, i.e., the formation of different structural systems. From the point of 
view of implications for the evaluation of Chomsky’s theory, Mufwene’s argument is 
significant in that it offers an entirely different ‘genetic’ perspective on language than 
that offered by Chomsky. In Mufwene’s perspective, language structure is rooted in 
language variation. While Chomsky’s idealization of the ‘native speaker’ assumes that 
the individual acquires linguistic competence — the internalized knowledge of the 
language system — statically in abstraction from any variation,14 Mufwene’s argument 
implies the opposite — each individual is dynamically embedded, throughout his/her 
shifting lifetime, in a web of social interactions of language use that affect language 
acquisition, and, in the aggregate and over the long run of space and time (geographi-
cal and historical extent), also affect language structure, the code itself.
. Historiography as Metatheory
It is controversial whether paradigms in linguistics, as well as in other human and 
social sciences, can replace each other completely. Chomsky, in his reconstruction 
of the development of his paradigm, seems to imply that this is the case. While he 
looks for antecedents of his thought in the philosophical tradition, e.g., of Descartes, 
he denies the relevance of pre-1950s linguistics to linguistic theory today, seeing the 
“cognitive revolution” (Chomsky 2006: ix) that came about as a result of his rebuttal of 
Skinner as a watershed and a paradigm shift.
1. For my criticism of the Chomskyan concept of the native speaker, see Radwańska-Williams 
2008.
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In contrast, as argued by Konrad Koerner (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; 
Radwańska-Williams 1993: 1–13), the history of linguistics can be seen as a layering of par-
adigms and approaches. The enterprise of linguistic historiography is the examination of 
the complex web of relationships in the intellectual history of the discipline. This enterprise 
makes accessible for us, in the present, the entire gamut of thought about language that has 
existed in the past. It can highlight currents of influence and it can make possible the 
discovery of relevant insights. For example, I have argued that the thought of Mikołaj 
Kruszewski is a covert paradigm in the history of linguistics, an undercurrent that has 
exercised a subtle influence on the discipline, in its transmission through the thought 
of Roman Jakobson and the structuralist tradition (Radwańska-Williams 1991b, 1993, 
1996, 2002, 2006).
The nature of language as a phenomenon may preclude a tidy replacement of 
paradigms. Even in a discipline as naturalistic as theoretical physics, the picture has 
become notoriously complicated, because it has turned out that the material universe 
itself has a dual nature — as matter and energy — and possibly more than a dual 
nature, with the dimensions of space and time being elastic (e.g., they disappear at the 
central point or ‘singularity’ of a black hole15) and, at least according to Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle, the observer — c.f. Peirce’s interpretant? — also playing a role 
not only in the observation, but possibly in the nature (the state) of the observed.16 In 
the case of language, even Chomsky disavows a reductionistic naturalism: “confidence 
in ‘reduction’ to the little that is understood is not necessarily appropriate” (Chomsky 
2006: 174). In the Chomskyan paradigm, the language faculty is modular, with syntax 
being the core component, interfacing with semantics (the logical/conceptual inter-
face) and phonology (phonetic form). As pointed out by Seuren (2004), Chomsky’s 
view of the architecture of the language faculty is somewhat inconsistent: on the one 
hand, he adheres to a “random generator” (Seuren 2004: 57–61) rather than a media-
tional view of the centrality of syntax, but on the other hand, he insists that syntax 
makes possible the creative power of human thought. From the latter position, it is 
difficult to see how syntax could make possible the creativity of human conceptual 
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_singularity, 
and http://cosmology.berkeley.edu/Education/BHfaq.html, retrieved on February 2nd, 2009. It 
is postulated that at the center of a black hole, matter becomes infinitely dense.
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
qt-uncertainty/, retrieved on February 2nd, 2009. Strictly speaking, the uncertainty principle 
is not simply an instance of the ‘observer effect’ that the observation affects the observed 
(known in anthropology and the social sciences), but of the nature of physical reality at the 
quantum level being different than (our epistemological construct of) reality at the macro-level 
according to the ‘classical laws of motion’.
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expression without mediating the semiotics of thought — the association between 
concept and phonetic form.
Thus language, even as conceded in the Chomskyan paradigm, has a triadic nature. 
Moreover, as I have argued above, the dimension of social variation and diachrony is 
essential, not accidental, to language as a phenomenon. Thus, mysteriously, language 
is even more than a triad, or more accurately, a double triad, like a four-dimensional 
polygon, projecting the triadic semiotics of thought into the fourth dimension, which 
is space-time, the dimension/extent/extension of social life.
This exponential triadic conception of language is in contradiction to Chomsky’s 
claim that E-language (external, extensional language) is non-essential to the nature of 
the phenomenon, and therefore outside the scope of linguistic theory. But perhaps this 
correction is long overdue. At least one cannot fault Chomsky for having sought ever 
more precisely to define the terms of his genetic theory. Thus the above conception of 
a double triad can also be recast in Chomskyan terms, but taking care to point out that 
(1) E-language is essential, not accidental (in the philosophical sense of essence and 
accidence17), and (2) that in the semiotic triad of I-language, linguistics has been more 
successful so far in defining the formal terms of the triad, the language code, i.e., in 
the Chomskyan paradigm, the axis of phonology-syntax-semantics, than in defining 
the relationship between code and thought, and defining the nature of thought. The 
relationship between code and thought is itself triadic, in that the interpretant, psyche/
spirit/volition (interpretant2), is the 3rd term, freely directing thought to whatever one 
wills, or, if not exactly directed, the thought arising spontaneously as reaction to/inter-
pretation of the world. Possibly, we have a triple triad.
Peirce would be happy if language could be shown to be a triple triad. However, 
given the multidimensional nature of language, it may be difficult to attain a ‘unified 
theory’ of language, just as it has been found difficult in theoretical physics to provide a 
‘unified theory’ of the material world,18 one that would marry Einstein’s theory of rela-
tivity and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and unify the account of the four forces of 
physical nature — electromagnetism, the strong and weak nuclear forces, and gravity.
As articulated in the structuralist tradition, including the work of Mikołaj Kruszewski, 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, the nature of language as a complex 
phenomenon is psychophonetic, semiotic, and social. For Chomsky, the nature of lan-
guage is mental/cognitive, genetic and biological. It is possible that these two perspec-
tives can complement each other, or rather, that the historically examined intersection 
between them can yield a more unified view of the entire scope of the discipline.
1.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence, retrieved on February 2nd, 2009.
1.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_field_theory, retrieved on February 2nd, 2009.
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Firstly, Chomsky’s theory of the genetically determined human language faculty 
has served to focus the scope of linguistic inquiry on the biological uniqueness of 
human beings. Paradoxically, this biological uniqueness, as pointed out in the quo-
tation from Hallward (2008) at the outset of this paper, sets human beings, and the 
human capacity for language, at a distance from the rest of the natural world. I think 
that this distance is maximized by Chomsky’s emphasis on syntax. Our closest natu-
ral relatives, chimpanzees and gorillas, have been shown not to have the capacity for 
syntactic structure of the kind demonstrated by the nursery rhyme The house that Jack 
built, i.e., the property of recursion and relativization that makes human language a 
vehicle for the precise expression of complex and abstract thought, displaced in space-
time from the ‘here and now’. And yet the animal studies have shown that the great 
apes are capable of acquiring some of the vocabulary of human sign language, i.e., 
of acquiring a rudimentary lexicon of linguistic signs. They do have a rudimentary 
 semiotic capacity. To that extent, human beings are not biologically unique. By argu-
ing that pre-1950s linguistics is no longer relevant to linguistic inquiry, Chomsky sets 
aside the structuralist insights into semiotics and thereby excludes an area of inquiry 
into the nature of language that is essential even for the biological question itself, as 
posed by Chomsky, the question of the extent to which human beings are unique and 
the extent to which it is language that makes them unique in the natural world and/or 
sets them apart from the natural world.
Secondly, Chomsky’s exclusion of the domain of language use from the scope of 
linguistic inquiry has done a disservice to linguistics as a profession. The study of lan-
guage use has continued in various subfields of linguistics, for example in discourse 
analysis, poetics, and sociolinguistics, and yet these subfields have been to some extent 
perceived as marginalized, on the periphery with respect to what is perceived as the 
hard core of linguistics, centered around generative syntax and to a lesser extent, gen-
erative phonology. In the Chomskyan perspective, there seems to be a subtle equation 
or conflation between the ‘genetic’ and the ‘mental’: human beings have unique genes 
and unique minds, and it is language that makes them unique, ergo, what is (uniquely) 
worthy of study is that aspect of the phenomenon of language, complex/relativized 
syntactic structure, which is correlated with the unique capacity of the human mind 
for generating sentences. This does not directly serve to explain how the sentences 
come to be meaningful, which, I think, touches on the semiotic question — how lan-
guage form is associated with meaning — and on the social question, as articulated 
in structuralism, of language as a ‘social fact’, the social fact of a shared system being 
the stabilizer and guarantor of its meaningfulness. The emphasis on language as a 
mental entity also excludes large bodies of language data — speech, discourse and 
text — as ‘external’ to the mind, merely the ‘excretions’ of the brain. But language 
data are the only directly observable access we have to language. One can study the 
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electrical  pattern of  neuronal activation in the brain, or the psycholinguistic response 
time to verbal stimuli, but the direct data accessed in such studies are the electrical 
patterns or the response times. In the typical socially meaningful linguistic exchange 
between speaker-hearers, signers-seers, or writers-readers, it is language data that are 
exchanged — bits of speech (or of sign language), discourse and text. Language use is 
the basic stuff of the fabric of human society. Chomsky is fond of saying (metaphori-
cally) that language is like an organ of the body. Taking up that metaphor, one could 
say that studying language form without studying language use is like studying the 
anatomy of the heart without studying the cardiovascular system of blood circulation. 
The heart makes circulation possible, and syntax makes possible the generation of sen-
tences and hence the expression of complex and abstract thought. But the life of the 
body is sustained through the circulation of blood, and the vitality of human society is 
sustained through the exchange of language. Just as cardiology studies both heart and 
blood, linguistics should study both language form and language use.
Finally, Chomsky’s conflation of the genetic and the mental, coupled with his 
exclusion of the social, has served to marginalize what had traditionally been a cen-
tral area of language as a phenomenon — the dimension of diachrony. Granted that 
language is (in part) a biological phenomenon, the human species does not change 
through time as fast as society changes. Language, as an integral part — the lifeblood 
— of society, changes through time. On the micro level, as shown by Mufwene, dia-
chronic change can be traced to language variation, which has a geographical (spa-
tial) extent as well as various vertical or cross-sectional sociolinguistic layers. Thus 
the dimension of diachrony is in large part social, although the passage of time is 
a physical phenomenon. The pace of social change sets us apart from the natural 
world, where animal societies, to the extent that they change, change at a biological 
pace without the overlay of linguistic heritage and with little if any cultural transmis-
sion. Language change is a part of human uniqueness. Indeed the existence of differ-
ent languages and dialects is a sort of cultural speciation unique to humans. Human 
beings tend to think of their identity not primarily as “human” (vs. “chimpanzee”, 
“gorilla”, “lion”, “gazelle”, etc.) but as linguistic/ethnic/regional/national (Chinese vs. 
Japanese vs. Indian vs. American, etc). In today’s globalized world, identity bound-
aries are blurring, but they are still potent. The historical existence of and formation 
of different languages is an essential part of our identity as human beings. Historical 
linguistics, going all the way back to 19th century comparative grammar, has exten-
sively studied diachronic change. The historical study of language deserves to be a 
central part of linguistic inquiry.
Chomsky is such a towering figure that one hesitates to point out lacunae in his 
thought. I have tried to do so from an epistemological perspective, which, I hope, 
objectifies my criticism. The question which I hope to have addressed is that of the 
boundaries and scope of the discipline of linguistics and of the complex nature of the 
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phenomenon of language. I have argued that the apparent failure of the Chomskyan 
paradigm to encompass the full scope of linguistics is due to his exclusion of two 
 significant areas of language as a phenomenon: the semiotic nature of language, and 
the dimension of language use and language variation.
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Appendix
The Road Not Taken
by Robert Frost19
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other, as just as fair,
And having perhaps the better claim,
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same,
And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I –
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.




The young revolutionary (1950–1960)

“Scientific revolutions”  
and other kinds of regime change
Stephen O. Murray*
I find it curious that “revolution” is such a positively valued label in the history of 
science. Innovation and novelty are, I realize, highly valued, both in academic fields 
and in other realms, which accounts for the widespread claims put out on at least a 
weekly basis that someone or another has “revolutionized” something or another. In 
his morphology of “scientific revolutions,” (or, I suspect in “revolutions in cosmological 
models”) Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) contrasted “revolutionary” science with “normal” 
science. The former connotes “bold,” the latter “boring,” and people understandably prefer 
to be thought of as bold rather than boring, as making leaps to new understandings 
rather than incremental steps.
Kuhn himself wrote of the high cost of “retooling” conceptually, and of the dif-
ficulties of convincing those accustomed to a set of assumptions that they have been 
using to discard those assumptions and ways of working. Kuhn (1970: 150) quoted 
German physicist Max Planck’s pungent generalization: “A new scientific truth does 
not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather 
because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that is familiar 
with it.” That is, most of those already established in a science or any other field are not 
willing (or able!) to “retool,” do not “radically” rethink the bases of their field.
With pitched generational battles during the late 1960s in the United States and 
western Europe, Chomskian linguists retroactively elevated what had seemed in 1957 
as an incremental advance of the transformational syntactic method of Zellig S. Harris 
(1946, 1951) by his most famous student, Noam Chomsky, as a “revolution.” One early 
leader of the theory group told me: “ ‘Our’ little Kuhnian revolution was in some ways 
actually more typical than his physics case” (Robert Lees, personal communication, 
26 April 1977), while Leiber (1975) hailed Chomsky “Einstein of linguistics.”
*In addition to my gratitude to Konrad Koerner for encouragement over the course of many 
years to my sociological approach to theory groups in linguistics (and for causing the discus-
sion of what “grammar” meant to the predecessors of neo-Bloomfieldians), and to Douglas 
Kibbee for inviting me to the fest and for enhancing the readability of this chapter; I would 
like to  acknowledge the guidance and encouragement of this line of work by Keith Basso, Regna 
Darnell, John Fought, John Gumperz, Dennis Magill, Robert Nisbet, and William Samarin, 
way back when I was a graduate student.
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The neo-Bloomfieldian generation (of which Zellig Harris was a particularly distin-
guished member) mostly focused on phonology (phonemic analysis) and morphology 
and did not have much stake in or commitment to any method or theory of syntactical 
analysis. That is, they were not working in any particular “paradigm” of syntactical 
analysis or — with the exception of Harris — on syntactical analysis at all. Making syn-
tax the focus of linguistics was a radical change, and in this sense of trying to explain a 
class of phenomena that formerly had been peripheral, it would be difficult to dispute 
that there was a “Chomskian revolution,” albeit one that began with Harris’s work, 
not with the “revelations” of Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957). It is necessary to 
stipulate that neo-Bloomfieldians did not regard syntax as unimportant. Rather they 
had mostly postponed trying to figure out syntax until after they were satisfied they 
had explained the more basic/elemental “levels” of phonology and morphology (levels 
they believed were distinct). They maintained a taboo on mixing “levels” of analysis, 
condemning violations of this taboo by Kenneth L. Pike or anyone else who used data 
from one level in analyzing another.
My sense of the late 1950s is that neo-Bloomfieldians generally believed that phonemic 
analysis was well established, and had only to be deployed on sound patterns of lan-
guages not yet analyzed, and that the tools for laying out morphological structures was 
also well established, so that the time to tackle the complexity of grammar had arrived. 
The approach of Chomsky (1957) was pleasingly (to neo-Bloomfieldians) formalist and 
mathematical-looking, and was not perceived as a threat to structuralist linguistics in 
its American incarnation.
The middle-1950s in the USA were a time in which there was considerable interest 
in and work on “grammar” as grammar was and had been understood in the linguistic 
anthropology tradition of Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Whorf; that is, in 
obligatory grammatical categories in natural languages, particularly the unwritten ones for 
which anthropological linguists were writing grammars (as well as dictionaries). Especially 
during the Whorfian vogue of the early 1950s, grammar (grammatical categories) was 
already a central concern — and one very directly related to cognitive processes (so 
that a “cognitive revolution” was not possible).
Before returning to senses in which there was one or more “Chomskian revolution” 
and the lure of the “revolutionary” label during and after the 1960s, I am going to review 
traditions of grammatical study available by the mid-1950s. There was much that was not 
explained — indeed, much that was not even asked — in theories of grammar (and descriptions 
of grammars). These were not “anomalies” in Kuhn’s sense of the term, because there was 
no generally accepted “paradigm.” There may have been an expectation that the method-
ological dogma “text reveals structure” would someday account for syntax, but I don’t 
think that anyone in the mid-1950s thought that there was a remotely finished edifice of 
syntactic theory, though there were certainly traditions that believed that “grammar” (albeit 
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not in the sense of what “grammar” encompassed in any of the waves of Chomskian 
“revolutions”) was a “window to the mind” (of those raised in particular language cultures). 
Moreover, simultaneously with the work of Harris and Chomsky, others in the US were 
approaching theorizing syntax, including Kenneth Pike and André Martinet and (two 
of whose work Chomsky was unarguably aware during the late-50s), Victor Yngve and 
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel).
1. The unsatisfying state of grammatical analysis, ca. 1955
1.1 Boas
Franz Boas (1858–1942) was a German-trained Columbia University anthropologist who 
fostered work on North American Indian tribes and languages He was the prime mover 
of institutionalization of anthropology within American universities in the late-19th and 
early 20th centuries, and actively involved with two younger scholars whose ideas are 
discussed below (Edward Sapir and Leonard Bloomfield) who, with Boas and others, 
founded the Linguistic Society of America in 1924 and sought to raise standards of 
linguistic description and analysis and to professionalize linguistics in US universi-
ties (see Murray 1994: 121–25; 2001). For Boas, the classifications that are obligatory 
in a particular language provide insight into how users of each language are predis-
posed to think. In the Herderian tradition, Boas was interested in showing the particu-
lar “genius” of each particular people, as their thought processes are revealed in their 
language’s “inner form,” that is, in mapping the world through differing obligatory and 
optional grammatical features such as gender, number, animateness, definiteness, tense, 
or aspect. Boas (1911: 20) reasoned, “Since the total range of personal experience which 
language serves to express is infinitely varied, and its whole scope must be expressed 
by a limited number of phonetic groups, it is obvious that an extended classification of 
experience must underlie all articulate speech,” and continued,
Since ideas must be expressed by being reduced to a number of related ideas, the 
kinds of relation become important elements in articulate speech, and it follows 
that all languages must contain formal elements. . . In each language, only a part of 
the complete concept that we have in mind is expressed. Each language has a peculiar 
tendency to select this or that aspect of the mental image.” (Boas 1911: 23, 39)
That is, in “various languages, different fundamental categories will be found” (p. 39). 
As Dell Hymes (1964: 117) explained Boas’s point, “We would be immobilized if we 
tried to notice, report, and think of all possible discriminations in experience at each 
moment.” Jakobson (1959: 140–1) provides an example contrasting the requirement 
of English that the definiteness or indefiniteness of an object must be explicit and the 
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contrasting requirement of Russian that the gender of a person and the completion or 
non-completion of an act must be specified:
To denote time or plurality, those languages which have no tense or grammatical 
number resort to lexical means. Thus, the true difference between languages is not 
in what may or may not be expressed, but in what must or must not be conveyed 
by the speakers. If a Russian says: Ja napisal prijatelju — “I wrote a friend,” the 
distinction between definiteness and indefiniteness of reference (“the” vs. “a”) finds 
no expression, whereas the completion of the letter is expressed by the verbal aspect 
and the sex of the friend by the masculine gender. Since in Russian these concepts are 
grammatical, they cannot be omitted in communication, whereas after the English 
utterance “I wrote a friend,” interrogations whether the letter has been finished and 
whether it was addressed to a boy-friend or to a girl-friend can follow.
Most of the time we rely on the discriminations to which our language is calibrated A 
language channels thought and expression by compelling that some of these must be 
made explicit in utterances. Different languages require different distinctions. What must 
be noted in one language is optional in another. For Boas (1911: 77), it is the task of the 
analyst [linguist] to discover the obligatory, but largely unconscious structures of actual 
languages. Analytical groupings (of grammar, phonology, and lexicon) “depend entirely 
upon the inner form of each language” and the analyst’s goal for Boas was to describe the 
forms of thought in a language by an analysis of the forms of speech of native speakers 
(transcribed into texts), without preconceptions about the structure of the language. In 
particular, Boas and those influenced by him who described North American languages, 
rejected forcing these languages into the “parts of speech” categories of Latin (or, more 
properly, Aristotelian) grammar (Boas 1911: 31,38,77; Sapir 1921: 117–19).
Nonetheless, in the grammatical section (pp. 14–24) of the one description of 
a language (Pochultan Nahuatl from the Mexican state of Oaxaca) that Boas him-
self provided in the first volume of The International Journal of American Linguistics  
(a journal which he founded), the categories are quite traditional: plural; possessive; 
composition (mostly diminutives directly parallel to Mexican Spanish); pronouns; 
preterite, present, imperfect, and imperative verb forms; along with the grammatical 
processes (see below) of reduplication, and composition (Boas 1917: 14–24). Those 
papers written by others appearing in the first two volumes of IJAL (between 1917 
and 1923) which were not texts, lexicons, proposed historical reconstructions, or 
phonological analyses, dealt with verb stems, prefixes, and reduplication. None 
analyzed sentences.
Generally, Boas presented massive amounts of native texts with little or no analysis. 
The lexicon listing for Pochultan Nahuatl exceeds in length the grammatical inventory 
listed, which exceeds the phonological description. The descriptions of languages in 
The Handbook of American Indian Languages, that Boas also edited, similarly neglect 
analyses of sentences in favor of cataloging kinds of particles and affixes. For instance, 
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there is less than a page on sentence structure in Frachtenberg’s (1922) description 
of Siuslawan, in contrast to 46 pages on grammatical processes and 13 thirteen on 
phonology. There are 40 pages on phonology, 202 on morphology, and none on syn-
tax in Bogoras [and Boas]’s (1922) description of Chuckchee [Chukchi]. The greatest 
exemplar of a Boasian description of a language, Sapir’s (1922) Takelma, also focuses 
on morphology, as is discussed in the next section below.1
Although all languages classify, some classify more than others. Boas (1938: 133) 
was quick to warn that there is no correlation between the amount of obligatoriness in 
a language and the degree of civilization of the language’s speakers, nor does a paucity 
of obligatory categories imply muddled, obscure speech. Distinctions which are not 
grammatically obligatory can be lexicalized. Indeed, Boas (1911: 122) suggested that 
there is an inverse correlation between the extent of obligatory classification in a lan-
guage and the size of a language’s vocabulary (lexicon).
1.2 Sapir
As a critic of simplistic 19th century schemes of human nature and of human evolution, 
Boas emphasized the differences between the focuses and the means of different lan-
guages, especially those of Pacific Coast North American native peoples, rather than 
seeking to identify universal grammatical features. Despite the considerable variation 
which he documented, Boas accepted some grammatical relations as probably universal, 
specifically, a distinction between a subject and a predicate, and between predication and 
attribution. Boas’s student Edward Sapir (1884–1939; see Darnell 1989) was far more 
interested in universals than was his teacher, and sought to order and explain diversity.
According to legend (codified by Sapir’s protégé Morris Swadesh 1939: 132), Boas 
showed Sapir, then a graduate student studying Germanic philology “by indubitable 
example from American Indian languages that there were counter-examples for every 
generalization about languages that Sapir thought to be certain and exceptionless.” The 
1. It might be argued (indeed, Charles Hockett did) that phonological sketches take less 
space just because their structures were better understood by Americanists in the first third of 
the twentieth century, so that more economical means could account for the phenomena. It is 
 impossible for me to believe that anyone considered sentence formation so transparent that the 
brief mentions in the “grammars” accounted for the range of syntactical phenomena in any lan-
guage, and permitted a similar economy of means. Rather, I would gloss an attitude continuing 
at least through the Second World War as “We’ve figured out phonology, and are progressing 
through morphology. Soon we’ll get around to syntax.” I would not attribute this attitude to 
Leonard Bloomfield. As will be shown below, he was interested in syntax early in his career (aware 
not merely of Port Royal grammarians, but steeped in Pān
˙
ini; see Bloomfield 1987 [1916]: 47, 
note 1; Rogers in Hall & Koerner 1987), and had several goes at syntax (Bloomfield 1933: 
170–206 and in Bloch & Trager 1942).
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timing for this story is off: Murray and Dynes 1986 showed that Sapir took a course 
from Boas as an undergraduate. Nonetheless, this possibly apocryphal story condenses 
the basic pattern of the relationship between Sapir seeking valid generalizations about 
language and Boas posing exceptions into one dramatic conversion experience. In reality, 
Sapir’s posing of generalizations being met by skeptical suggestions of counter-examples 
from Boas continued for the rest of Sapir’s life.
Sapir tried to bring order both in space and in time to the diversity of data on 
human languages with which he was familiar. In proposing historical links between 
what other Americanists saw as distinct languages, Sapir drew frequently upon pho-
netic laws and occasionally upon comparison of lexicon, but viewed syntactical evi-
dence as the best evidence of genetic relationship. While “borrowing” (and adapting 
the sounds in “borrowed” words) is very common, he believed that “those fundamental 
features of structure, hidden away at the very core of the linguistic complex” are nearly 
impervious to outside influence: “Language is probably the most self-contained, the 
most massively resistant of all social phenomena. It is easier to kill it off than to disin-
tegrate its individual forms” Sapir (1921: 205–6) wrote. Thus, in proposing typologies 
of linguistic structure and historical reconstructions, he drew almost exclusively on 
the core of languages — their grammars.
As for Boas, what Sapir called “grammatical categories” are the classes of mor-
phemes which must be explicit in a particular language. As Sapir (1921: 98) put it, 
there is in all languages a “tendency to construct schemes of classifications into which 
all the concepts of language must be fitted.” Gender for all objects is a familiar case. 
Such obligatory categorization make up a system of dogma surviving original expressive 
functions — form for form’s sake. Indeed,
Language is not merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items of 
experience which seem relevant to the individual, as is so often naively assumed, 
but is also a self-contained, creative, symbolic organization, which not only 
refers to experience… but actually defines experience for us by reason of its 
formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit 
expectations into the field of experience. (Sapir 1931: 578)
  To a far greater extent than the philosopher realized, he is likely to be a 
dupe of his [native language’s] speech-forms The mould of his thought, which is 
typically a linguistic mould, is apt to be projected into his conception of the world. 
(Sapir 1949 [1924]: 157)
This strand of Sapir’s thought was developed by his student Benjamin Lee Whorf 
(1897–1941; see Whorf 1945, 1956). Like Sapir, in discussing language channel-
ing the usual flow of thought, Whorf focused on differences between grammatical 
categories of genetically unrelated languages. Most of the work attempting to test 
what has come to be known as ‘the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’ has dealt with  lexical 
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 differences, rather than with the grammatical processes which Sapir and Whorf 
viewed as fundamental.2 Although both Sapir and Whorf believed that language 
makes some thoughts easier and some thoughts more difficult, Sapir thought that 
ideas could be conveyed in any language, though perhaps with difficulty (for some 
ideas in some languages).
For Sapir, a grammatical process was the relation between morphemes. “Every language 
possesses one or more formal methods for indicating the relation of a secondary concept 
to the main concept of the radical element” (Sapir 1921a: 59). For Sapir, preference for 
particular methods distinguishes types of language: “All languages evince a curious 
instinct for the development of one or more grammatical processes at the expense of 
others” (p. 60).
Sapir distinguished six main types of grammatical processes: word order, com-
position, affixation, internal modification, reduplication, and accent Word order is 
a powerful means of expressing grammatical relationships. It is relatively important 
in English, in contrast, for instance, to Latin, so that there is no grammatical differ-
ence between Hominem femina videt, Femina hominem videt and Videt femina hom-
inem. All mean “The woman sees the man” (p. 63). The relationship between words 
is indicated by case endings (an internal modification) not by word order. Languages 
with rigid word orders, such as English or Chinese, frequently also use composition 
(e.g., typewriter, blackbird, or t’ien tsz, literally ‘heaven son,’ the usual term of reference 
for a Chinese emperor). The most widely-used of all grammatical processes, according 
to Sapir, is affixing (although there are Chinese and Southeast Asian languages that 
do not use them), e.g., s added to the end of English words to indicate plurality, or in- 
prefixing a word, as in incomprehension, to indicate negation. Some languages indicate 
plurality (and/or other relations) by internal modification. For instance, the plural of 
the Bala word kitesha is bitesha, as in Arabic the plural of balad is bilad. Reduplication 
may accomplish the same function: in Washo one buffalo is gusu; the plural is gususu. 
Finally, intonation may also serve grammatical functions. In Shilluk, yit with high tone 
means ‘ear’; with low tone, ‘ears.’ Intonation as a grammatical device includes stress as 
well as pitch differences. The example Sapir gave was Navaho ta-di-gas. Accent on the 
first syllable indicates that a third male other than the speaker or the auditor is the agent 
(“He washes himself ”). Accent on the second syllable indicates the person spoken to is 
the agent (“You wash yourself ”).
In Takelma, a native Oregon language which was the first Native American lan-
guage he analyzed extensively (for his Ph.D. dissertation), Sapir described in detail three 
of his six grammatical processes: affixation (the most important, specifically suffixation), 
2. On Whorf ’s career and posthumous vogue see Murray (1982; 1994: 190–202). For a 
counter-example of the focus on lexicon, see Malotki (1983).
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reduplication, and vocalic change (viz. ablaut). He considered intonation in Takelma 
to be “of grammatical importance, but most probably a product of purely phonetic 
causes” (1912: 55). Although he described pronouns, adjectives, numerals, adverbs 
and particles in Takelma, more than half his analysis of the language deals with ‘the 
verb’ and its affixes. In his description of Chasta Costa, there is a page (1914: 334) on 
syntactic combinations of verbs. In contrast there are fifteen pages on phonology and 
43 on morphology (the traditional categories of pronouns, nouns, numerals, adjectives, 
adverbs, postpositions and verbs — in the order of Sapir’s presentation), and texts — 
with no analysis of sentences.
“Every language has its special method or methods of binding words into a larger 
unity. The importance of these methods is apt to vary with the complexity of the individual 
word,” Sapir (1921: 109) wrote. The unimportance of word order in Latin has already 
been mentioned as an example. Sapir suggested that word order and stress are especially 
important and frequent means for expressing grammatical relations. Concord tends 
to be prominent in languages not using word order for indicating relations. Concord 
is nearly always realized through the repetition of sound, as in what Sapir called the 
“relentless rhyme” of “Vidi illum bonum dominum” (I saw that good master).
Like Boas, Sapir believed that subject and predicate are the basic universal 
units: “No language wholly fails to distinguish noun and verb” (Sapir 1921: 119; also 
see 36–37), although they may be combined in a single word (e.g., Latin Vidi — I 
saw). Together, subject and predicate form sentences. Sentences express propositions. 
Underlying a particular sentence “is a living sentence type of fixed formal characteristic.” 
The habitual types are the grammar of a human language. “New sentences are being 
constantly created, but always on strictly traditional lines,” as Sapir (1921: 37) wrote of 
what later generations would call “generativity.”
Although Sapir stressed the psychological reality of what later writers would call a 
‘deep structure’ of propositions realized through particular formal patterns, he did not 
develop a theory of sentence formation for any language. He was interested in historical 
and typological comparison of the grammatical devices used by various languages, not 
with devising a theory of syntax. Models of phonology and morphology had priority 
for Sapir, as for other linguists of his generation and the following one.
1.3 Bloomfield
Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949) was, like Sapir, a scholar trained in Germanic philology 
who rejected the superiority of written languages, scoffed at the adequacy and univer-
sality of Aristotelian logical categories for delineating the constituents of speech, and 
who undertook the structural study of unwritten languages (especially the Algonquian 
languages of the Great Lakes region of North America, Burmese, and the Austronesian 
languages Ilocano and Tagalog) as well as written ones (English, German, and Russian). 
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Although Bloomfield is most remembered for phonemic work, he was very interested 
in grammatical analysis from early in his career.
As early as 1914, he unequivocally stated, “The first and original datum of language 
is the sentence (Bloomfield 1987 [1914]: 38). Similarly, in praising Cours de Linguistique 
générale (Saussure 1916), he noted, “I should differ from de Saussure chiefly in basing 
my analysis on the sentence rather than on the word” (Bloomfield 1987 [1923]: 64). 
Both in his first general book (1914), and in his first extended analysis of an unwrit-
ten language (1917), Bloomfield wrote far more extensively about grammar than 
about phonology.
In his first book, Bloomfield (1914: 60–61) had taken the Wundtian view, defining 
a sentence as “an utterance analyzing an experience into elements,” the primary ones of 
which are subject and predicate and subject and attribute. In his analysis of the Tagalog 
language of Luzon, he rejected subject and predicate as basic, or even necessary con-
stituents of a sentence.3 There are examples from Tagalog in a 1916 paper in which he 
dismissed the subject/predicate model as illegitimate equation of language and logic, 
but he appealed first to ‘single-word’ Latin and Slavic sentences (such as Veni, I came) 
and, ‘worst of all’ for the purported universal pattern:
We deny the name of sentence to such utterances as ‘Yes’ or to answers such 
as ‘Yesterday.’… Homo mortalis est, and “Maria is mortal” are propositions. 
“Maria wrote a book,” however, is a narration. ‘Wrote a book’ is not a logical 
predicate of the subject…. [English] uses for many non-logical utterances the 
same distinctive word-forms as for the expression of a logical judgment” and, 
furthermore, often inverts the ‘normal order’ so that ‘predicates’ precede ‘subjects.’ 
(Bloomfield 1987 [1916]: 47, 50–51)
3. On this, he broke with Sapir’s (1921: 119) retention of ‘noun’ and ‘verb’ as ‘essential in-
gredients’. Although Bloomfield (1917: 151) wrote that “most [Tagalog] sentences consist of 
a subject and a predicate,” he also wrote that “much of the syntax is determined by the use of 
constructions which lack subject-and-predicate structure.” (Tagalog provides something of an 
archetype of topic:comment constructions.) Perhaps reflecting the complexity more than the rela-
tive importance of the phenomena discussed, Bloomfield’s (1917) discussion of attributes  occupies 
44 1/2 pages in contrast to 8 1/2 pages for discussion of subject-and-predicate structure. In 
Kess’s (1991: 208) view, Bloomfield’s Wundtian mentalistic approach to ‘topic’ “took root and 
formed the basic paradigm for generations of descriptions of Philippine languages, which tied 
 descriptive terms like ‘focus’ and ‘topic’ to cognitive states and the speaker’s focus of attention.” 
Kess more or less endorses the one contemporary review of Bloomfield (1917) as deceptively 
arranged and phrased: “Bloomfield did make Tagalog look too different [from Latinate parts 
of speech analysis] in too many ways” (in Bloomfield 1970: 207).
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After having been pummeled for having abandoned ‘logical’ Indo-European categories 
by Blake (1919), the only reviewer of his Tagalog Texts, Bloomfield (1987 [1922]: 57), 
with the zeal of a convert, was to object to “the irrelevant subject-and-predicate notion 
of logic, controverted by his own material” in Sapir’s (1921) Language. In Bloomfield’s 
post-Wundtian view, not all utterances — indeed, probably not even the majority of 
utterances in any natural language — are propositions to be mapped as if they were 
approximations to formal logic, and subject and predicate are not among the basic units 
of Bloomfield’s later outlines for the study of language (1926, 1933, 1942). Indeed, in his 
mature synthesis in Language (Bloomfield 1933: 174), he challenged the necessity of 
binary analysis of sentences, noting that “not all favorite sentence-forms have bipartite 
structure,” let alone a subject and a predicate. “Features which we think ought to be 
universal,” Bloomfield (1933: 20) wrote,
may be absent from the very next language that becomes accessible. Some 
features, such as, for instance, the distinction between verb-like and noun-like 
words as separate parts of speech are common to many languages but lacking in 
others. The fact that some features are, at any rate, widespread, is worthy of notice 
and calls for explanation.
In working at the University of Illinois with engineering student Alfredo Viòla Santiago, 
Bloomfield found three basic relations between words in Tagalog sentences: attribu-
tion, predication, and serial relations (1917: 146). As in his later work on Native 
North American languages, Bloomfield laid out an exhaustive listing of the gram-
matical devices used in the texts dictated by Santiago. In particular, he described an 
elaborate inventory of particles. He also provided examples of sentences without the 
subject/predicate relationship he had considered universal a few years before: Taga-
log exclamations and impersonal anaphoric sentences, especially answers to questions 
and statements of meteorological conditions, such as Bumábahà (which he rendered 
as “Flood!” rather that “the water rises”) or Taginit nà (which he translated as “Summer now” 
rather than “It’s summer already”). There was no effort to relate one part of the grammatical 
description to another. Description of one kind of particle followed description of 
another kind of particle.
After moving from the University of Illinois to Ohio State University in 1921, 
Bloomfield decisively superseded his earlier Wundtian associative psychology with 
behaviorist psychology (see Murray 1982, 1994: 112–13), and abandoned any attempt 
to discern the experience underlying utterances. As he developed his own elaborate 
set of neologisms for grammatical analysis, grammar remained for him “the meaning-
ful arrangement of forms” (Bloomfield 1933: 163) through processes such as word 
order, government, concord, modulation (pitch and stress), phonetic modification 
(e.g., keep → kept), and selection (prince → princess, but king > queen, not king → 
kingess). A fundamental assumption for Bloomfield (1987 [1926]: 75) was that “each 
position in a construction can be filled only by certain forms,” so that positions have 
 “Scientific revolutions” and other kinds of regime change  
‘functional meaning’ separable from the meaning of what fills the position (‘slot’ in 
tagmemic terminology). He continued, “All forms having the same function constitute 
a form class. Examples of English form-classes are: noun-stems, number affixes, object 
expressions, finite verb expressions” (p. 76). In Bloomfield’s view it was necessary to 
analyze the form classes of a language inductively, rather than looking for Aristotelian 
or Port-Royal parts of speech in a corpus.
1. The Whorf vogue
The “Whorf hypothesis,” or “linguistic relativity,” though often reduced from the level 
of obligatory grammatical categories to examination of lexical items, came into vogue in 
the 1950s. There was prolonged discussion of Whorf “at the major anthropological con-
ference of the era (Kroeber 1953), an important conference of anthropologists and lin-
guists (Lévi-Strauss et al.1953) and a conference entirely devoted to the ‘Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis’ (Hoijer 1954)” (Hymes & Fought 1975: 999). The Southwest Project orga-
nized by the Social Science Research Council, funded by the Carnegie Foundation, 
and directed by John Carroll (editor of the main collection of Whorf writings) was not 
successful in testing the “Whorf hypothesis,” (see Murray 1994: 192–97), which, in the 
strongest form, is probably untestable (Kay & Kempton 1984).
What had seemed promising of revelation about cognition in (often vulgarized) 
Whorf had failed to pan out in the Southwest Project (a final report of which was 
never made). From within the Prague School/Linguistic Circle (see Vachek 1966; Vilém 
Mathesius (1882–1946) was the primary syntactician. His basic distinction, analogous 
to the Gestalt psychology distinction between a figure (the rheme) standing out from 
the ground (the theme), might have been clearer if he had written about the many 
topic-comment languages of Asia and the Pacific, rather than Slavic and  Germanic 
languages, (contrasting Czech and English) — even if the Czech work was as well 
known in North American during the mid-1950s as that of the Russian members of 
the Linguistic Circle of Prague (Roman Jakobson and Nikolai Trubetzkoy). Prague-
influenced French grammatical functionalism (Gougenheim 1938; Martinet 1962) 
did not excite interest or development in North America. “London School” work by 
the Polish émigré anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1920, 1923) and his student 
J. R. Firth maintained traditional Latinate categories, especially “noun” and “verb” (see 
Langendoen 1968: 65–69). Firth published no syntactical descriptions at all.
1. Echoes of Jespersen’s English grammar(s)
The Danish linguist Otto Jespersen (1860–1943) was far and away the most famous 
theorist of grammar in the first five decades of the 20th century. He published an enor-
mous body of work, including The Philosophy of Grammar (1924) and a chaotically 
discursive seven-volume work with copious examples (and non-native intuitions) 
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entitled Modern English Grammar (1904–49; condensed to Jespersen 1963). He wrote, 
“English grammar forms a system, but is not everywhere systematic” (1949 [1933]: 528). 
Many of those who have tried to use Modern English Grammar have wondered what the 
system of his analysis is, or even what the basis for ordering the constituent parts of it 
might be. As with the writings of Franz Boas, there is a seemingly endless profusion 
of details that never add up to a model of a system — nor, indeed, even to a set of 
disconnected rules.
Unlike the descriptivist Americanists, Jespersen largely ignored grammatical 
categories. He attempted to replace them as basic units of analysis with his own cat-
egories of rank, junction, and nexus, focusing on the ideas underlying sentences, not 
on the distribution of forms. What Jespersen meant by rank is easily comprehended. In 
the nominalization “an insanely stupid gesture,” gesture is primary, stupid is secondary, 
insanely is tertiary. (The quatenary rank is rare in Germanic languages, including English; 
e.g., “very insanely stupid gesture” is overkill, if not precisely redundant.)
A nexus in Jespersen’s use is a rather amorphous (but supposedly psychologically 
salient) category for combinations of two or more ideas (including a subject and a 
predicate or an object and an attribution). A junction contains a single idea. (Nexuses may 
also be ranked). For instance, “Sally found the empty cage” is a junction for Jespersen, 
whereas “Sally found the cage empty” is a nexus of “Sally found the cage” and “the cage 
was empty” (Jespersen 1937: 42; see Levin’s [1968: vii–viii] and Francis’s [1989: 82–92] 
attempts to explain Jespersen’s analysis). In various works he used different quasi-algebraic 
symbols to represent nexus, rank, and grammatical processes such as composition or 
apposition, culminating in the representations of grammatical functions in Analytical 
Syntax (1937),4 e.g., for “Sally found the cage empty,” S V O (S2 P) for subject verb object and 
subject predicate — cage being both O and (S2) Although later generations of syntacticians 
have also developed abstract representations and although Jespersen’s symbols are not 
particularly opaque (indeed, many have been reapplied independently of his usage), 
there does not appear to have been any direct influence of Jespersen’s example (as Falk 
1992 bemoans). Similarly, other than a few of his University of Copenhagen students, 
the typologies of junction and nexus or ranked nexuses have not been found heuristic 
by later generations.5
. Jespersen earlier (1889) created his own set of symbols for sounds, using Greek letters for 
the active organs of speech, numerals for the amount of opening, small letters for the place of 
articulation, and more.
. The synonymousness of nexus and junction in general English usage is an obstacle to use 
by speakers of English.
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1. The lack of help from Saussure lectures
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913; see Koerner 1973) is as famous now as Jespersen 
was during his lifetime. Saussure is widely regarded as “the father of structuralism” 
by virtue of the notes his students at the University of Geneva took between 1907 and 
1911 and published in 1916 as Cours de linguistique générale (Saussure 1974). Saussure 
advocated analyzing language not by describing discrete elements, but by showing the 
relations between elements. Whether influenced by Saussure, or independently, structural 
work on phonology by American ethnolinguists and Prague School scholars between the 
world wars proceeded to examine the sound patterns of languages in terms of binary 
oppositions (such as aspirated, not-aspirated).
There is a real sense in which Saussure produced no syntactic theory. Certainly, 
he proposed no theory of syntax as a distinct “level” of language. Indeed, he regarded 
a distinction between morphology and syntax as illusory.6 He asserted that “ ‘linguistic 
unit’ and ‘grammatical fact’ are only different names for designating aspects of the 
same general phenomenon: the play of linguistic opposition… [They] would not be 
similar to one another if linguistic signs were made up of something beside differ-
ences. But… language is form and not substance” (1964: 121–22). Saussure proposed 
two basic relations: paradigmatic (termed “associative” in the Cours ) and syntagmatic. 
Paradigmatic relations are contrasts which produce distinctive alternatives (e.g., breed 
vs. bred, French grand vs. grande, or case inflections in Latin). Syntagmatic relations 
are combinatory possibilities of at least two units (e.g, in English un + do is acceptable, 
pre + do is not; some people can throw a sheep, others throw fits, but cannot throw a yel-
low nor throw a sheepishness).
Although work after his death attempted to sort out a distinct level of syntax and 
to reveal paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures within it, Saussure made no attempt 
to include sentences within what he analyzed as “linguistic system.” The only mono-
graph Saussure published during his lifetime (1878) dealt with Indo-European vowels. 
He did not attempt to write a grammar of any language, nor does the Cours include 
a grammatical theory, or even any sustained attention to syntactical phenomena.7 In 
particular, Saussure did not attempt to analyze the sentence as a unit. He appears to 
. “The arrangement of the subunits of the word obeys the same fundamental principles as 
the arrangement of groups of words in phrases” (Saussure 1974: 136).
. There is, however, an argument that “abstract entities are always based on concrete enti-
ties. … To think that there is an incorporeal syntax outside material units distributed in space 
would be a mistake. . . The material units alone actually create the value by being arranged in 
a certain way.” He shows derision for “immaterial abstractions hovering over the terms of the 
sentence” (1974: 138–9).
 Stephen O. Murray
have regarded sentences as part of the unanalyzable parole (actual speech), rather than 
as part of langue (the system of language), which could be analyzed. Chomsky (1964: 23) 
saw Saussure as regarding la langue as
a store of word-like elements, fixed phrases, and, perhaps, certain limited phrase 
types. He was thus quite unable to come to grips with the recursive processes 
underlying sentence formation, and he appears to regard sentence formation as 
a matter of parole rather than langue, of free and voluntary creation rather than 
systematic rule.
Culler (1976: 99) elaborated this:
[Saussure] did not know how to reconcile the fact that we can produce totally 
new sentences with the fact that a language contains phrase types. What he lacked 
was a notion of rule-governed creativity. He did not realize that it is possible to 
construct a finite set of rules which will generate structural descriptions for an 
infinite number of sentences. This can be done, as Chomsky says, by recursive 
rules: rules which can be applied over and over again, such as a rule which enables 
one to attach a relative clause to a noun clause [in English], e.g., This is the dog 
that chased the cat that worried the rat that ate the cheese, and so on). [Above, I 
already staked the claim that Sapir considered generativity in this sense.]
Structuralist work on syntax by Saussure’s successors focused on classifying paradigmatic 
relations.8 Even the transformational grammar pioneered by Zellig Harris and his 
more famous student Noam Chomsky isolated paradigmatic classes (such as the noun 
phrase) on which the rules operate (to form syntagmatic patterns).
2. Syntactic Structures
Structuralism in the first half of the twentieth century focused on phonology and mor-
phology. I contend that there was no dominant — let alone ruling — paradigm in syntax 
during the 1950s. That is, there was no ancien régime to overthrow, no paradigm of 
syntactical analysis to undergo a “crisis.” (Human sciences are “preparadigmatic” in 
the view espoused by Kuhn (1962), though I think there is some sense in which there 
was a “phonemic paradigm.”)
My own earliest publication on the history of linguistics explored the absences 
of the generational warfare with the older generation rejecting the purportedly 
. One “Geneva School” figure who worked on syntax was Albert Sechehaye (1870–1946) 
whose doctorate at Göttingen, published in 1905, was on the French subjunctive tense. Saussure’s 
most famous student and one of the editors of the Cours, Charles Bally (1865–1947) wrote 
primarily about stylistics. See Koerner (1972: 299, 246–7).
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 “revolutionary” new ideas that those schooled by Kuhn (1962) expected in the his-
tory of a “revolution.”9 There was indeed — eventually — very bitter genealogical 
conflict. However, scrutiny of the historical record suggests that Chomsky and his fol-
lowers instigated the conflict rather than reacting to rejection from their established 
 neo-Bloomfieldian elders. That is, in this case, the putative result preceded the sup-
posed cause. To get ahead of the story, this analogy to a post-revolutionary “reign 
of terror” came later, and really came into relief with the rejection of phonemics 
(Chomsky & Halle 1968).
Neo-Bloomfieldian gatekeepers, particularly Bernard Bloch, who was, from 1940 
until his death in 1965, editor of the Linguistic Society of America’s official journal, 
Language, was a sponsor rather than an opponent of visibility for transformational 
grammar. Bloch accepted a long, rapturous exegesis of Chomsky’s (1957) Syntactic 
Structures (SS) and published it in Language within a few months of the book’s publi-
cation. Reviews do not usually appear in professional journals for at least a year after 
publication, and are not usually accepted from persons at the same institution as the 
book’s author, and especially not from students of the book’s author.10 Nevertheless, 
Bloch printed Lees’s (1957) unsolicited11 review of Chomsky’s first book immediately 
upon its submission.
Chomsky disingenuously recalled,
I always found him [Bloch] sympathetic, though I don’t know how interested he 
was in the work I was doing. He requested a copy of LSLT [The Logical Structure 
of Linguistic Theory] and also of MMH [The Morphophonemics of Modern 
Hebrew] and also invited me several times to speak at the Yale Linguistics 
Club. We had several discussions on these occasions. I recall them quite well, 
particularly because interest in the work I was doing on the part of professional 
linguists was extremely rare (30 May 1977 letter).12
. I submitted my article on gatekeepers and Chomsky’s submissions in the early part of 
1977. After a long delay by reviewers whose preconceptions of what must have happened 
were similar to my own initial expectations (they had particular difficulty believing that Bloch 
knew what he was publishing in Chomsky’s 1959 review of Skinner’s 1957 Verbal Behavior), 
my article was published in 1980.
1. In my view, one can be a ‘student’ of more than one scholar, and a dissertation supervisor 
is not necessarily the major influence on a graduate student (examples include Paul Postal and 
George Lakoff). The first graduate students in M.I.T.’s linguistic department began in 1961. 
Lees went to M.I.T. in 1956 to work on the machine translation project directed by Victor 
Yngve, and received a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering in 1959.
11. Lees:Bloch, 22 February 1957; Lees:author, 30 May 1977.
12. I have discussed the non-rejection by publishers of Chomsky’s early work in Murray 
(1999a.b). See Daniels (2006) on changes made in what was supposedly the 1951 text of MMH.
 Stephen O. Murray
It seems reasonable to suppose that Chomsky did know that Bloch was interested in 
his work and, indeed, was actively promoting his career. Bloch first sought reviews for 
Language from Chomsky in 1953. He had Chomsky refereeing articles for Language 
by 1954. Most tellingly, Chomsky listed Bloch as a reference. Bloch produced such 
encomia as the following.
I’m an admirer of Chomsky’s from way back, and an admirer of Harris’s of 
even longer standing; and I’m convinced that transformation theory is a tremen-
dously important advance in grammatical thinking. I expect great things of it 
(Bloch: Lees, 31 July 1959).
  Chomsky has not only contributed to the literature of structural linguistics, 
he has fired the imagination of dozens of scholars throughout the country. It is 
interesting to note that young workers in the field, especially the most brilliant 
among them, are particularly susceptible to his spell. One of the liveliest and most 
promising developments in grammatical theory in recent years is Chomsky’s 
transformation grammar. I call it Chomsky’s even though Zellig Harris was perhaps 
the original proponent. It is above all Chomsky who has developed the theory and 
has given it its current vogue (Bloch:William Locke, 26 October 1960).
Further evidence that Bloch facilitated the diffusion of Chomsky’s ‘revolutionary’ ideas 
is provided by his publication of Chomsky’s (1959) ferocious attack on behaviorism. 
Bloch’s behaviorism may not have been Skinnerian,13 but surely Bloch shared the anti-
metaphysical/anti-introspection metascience Chomsky attacked. Lest it be believed 
that Bloch somehow missed the force of Chomsky’s argument and naively accepted 
13. For that matter, the behaviorism that Chomsky attacked was partly Hullian, partly a straw 
man. It was not Skinnerian, and particularly not that of Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behavior. 
As MacCorquodale (1970: 98) noted, “The declaration of war has been unilateral, probably 
because the behaviorist cannot clearly recognize why he should defend himself.” Skinner did 
not reply to critics in psychology, either. Before Chomsky began publishing, operant condi-
tioning was already a theory group with its own institutions that could not be bothered with 
polemical exchanges (Skinner wrote me (6 Sept. 1977 letter),
I did not at the time (1947–59) know who Chomsky was. […] I have never been able 
to understand why Chomsky becomes almost pathologically angry when writing 
about me but I do not see why I should submit myself to such verbal treatment. 
If I thought I could learn something which might lead to useful revisions of my 
position, I would, of course, be willing to take the punishment, but Chomsky simply 
does not understand what I am talking about and I see no reason to listen to him.
As MacCorquodale (1970: 83) wrote, “the fact that the review has never been systematically 
replied to has become the basis for an apparently wide-spread conclusion that it is in fact 
unanswerable.” He proceeded to show Chomsky’s blatant misrepresentation of the book he 
supposedly was reviewing.
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the onslaught because it attacked an interloper from another discipline, it is useful 
to quote from the letter Chomsky wrote Bloch when he sent him the review he had 
volunteered to do:
It [Skinner 1957a] presents the kind of treatment of language that will always 
appeal to many linguists, particularly those who are influenced by the general 
tenor, if not the details of Bloomfield’s behaviorism and ‘anti-mentalism.’ Since 
behaviorism has been such an important part of recent thought, and since 
this book is after all the only serious attempt to discuss linguistic behavior in 
the manner which has often been claimed possible and necessary, it seemed to 
me appropriate to give it very serious attention. […] It would have been easy to 
concentrate on many defects in the book that stem from lack of acquaintance 
with linguistics. […] But it seemed to me that in this case this would be a mistake. 
It is not important to show that Skinner’s work is inadequate in areas where 
he has no special competence, and concentration on this would have failed to 
bring out clearly what I think are fundamental defects in his whole approach 
to language, an approach which is of course quite widely shared in its general 
outline. (27 October 1958)
Chomsky quite explicitly presented his review to Bloch as an attack on behaviorism. That 
is how it has been read by the many who have cited it approvingly (generally without hav-
ing read Skinner 1957a). Considerably fewer non-linguists would have been interested 
in the defense of disciplinary boundaries than in the attack on behaviorism. Bloch was 
neither asleep nor stupid, and embraced “this superb job of constructive destruction,” 
writing that “I thoroughly enjoyed the review” (Bloch: Chomsky, 30 October 1958).
Just contrasting the published reviews of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior and Chomsky’s 
Syntactic Structures should give pause to anyone believing the ‘Chomskian revolu-
tion’ was brought about by the rejection of Chomsky’s work by an older generation of 
Bloomfieldian behaviorists. These two 1957 books put forth radically different 
approaches to language to vie for attention.14 One was published in the US by a well-
known (53-year-old) scholar speaking from a career of success under the auspices 
of a prestigious lecture series at Harvard. His book was thoroughly behaviorist, and 
behaviorism was the accepted psychological doctrine of the then-dominant linguistic 
orthodoxy. The second book was written by an then-all-but-unknown 29-year-old and 
was published in the Netherlands. The editor in sole charge of the official journal of 
the Linguistic Society of America was an ardent Bloomfieldian , and, like Bloomfield, 
a behaviorist. Yet a combination paean/exegesis of the latter work was printed almost 
simultaneously with the book’s publication, written by a student of the author. Two 
1. Cf. also the neo-Bloomfieldian establishment’s rejection of Brown (1958) discussed in 
Murray (1994: 275–76).
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years later, a merciless attack on the former book appeared, written by not just any 
hostile competitor, but by the author of the other book.
While obsequious praise for SS appeared in the pages of Language, the book was 
not reviewed at all in Word, the organ of the counter-tradition to neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics in America (see Martinet 1994). The only linguistics paper by Chomsky 
that ever seems to have been rejected was rejected for being too neo-Bloomfieldian 
rather than for not being neo-Bloomfieldian enough. It came from André Martinet, 
who wrote me that Chomsky’s submission
was forwarded to me by Uriel Weinreich, a co-editor of Word, who favored 
publication. I was against it and adamant. The article was not rejected “because 
it was too Bloomfieldian.” In such a case, I would have sent it to Bloch. To my 
mind, it was a reaction against the self-imposed limitations of the Bloomfieldian 
approach, but one retaining all of its formalistic prejudices with a few additional 
ones. I was hardly conscious of all of this when reading the paper for the first 
time. Actually, my impression was one of utter drabness unrelieved by any glint 
indicating some hidden awareness of what a real language is.
(29 November 1977 letter)
Importantly, it was in Word, not in Language, that a critique of the early Chomskian 
notion of grammaticality was published (Hill 1961). The other founder of Word and 
major carrier of European structuralism to America, Roman Jakobson (1959) expressed 
dismay at Chomsky’s eschewal of consideration of meaning — a continuation of the 
tradition of Bernard Bloch, George Trager and Zellig Harris.15
Linguists schooled in European structuralism perceived Chomskian work as a 
continuation of Bloomfieldian principles (see Koerner 1989: 115). They did not perceive 
Chomsky as an ally, nor did neo-Bloomfieldians yet perceive him as an enemy. He was 
trained by one of the most respected of their number, and his work manifestly built on 
Harris’s work. As Dell Hymes, who also received his Ph.D. in 1955, recalled, “Noam 
was seen as Harris’s student” (1978 referee comment). Harris’s longtime collaborator 
C. F. Voegelin (1958) was troubled by the difficulties of studying languages other than 
one’s mother tongue using the principles advanced in SS, but he deemed the book an 
1. “A great deal of effort has been expended in attempting to answer the question: ‘How 
can you construct a grammar with no appeal to meaning?’ ” Chomsky (1957: 93) wrote. “The 
question itself, however, is wrongly put, since the implication that obviously one can construct 
a grammar with appeal to meaning is totally unsupported. One might with equal justification 
ask ‘How can you construct a grammar with no knowledge of the hair color of the speaker?’ ” 
Also see 1975[1955]: 87, 1965: 142.
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important contribution (and had earlier invited Chomsky to review books in the journal 
he edited, the International Journal of American Linguistics).
Even after Chomsky’s all-out attack on behaviorism, neo-Bloomfieldians were 
sympathetic to Chomsky’s linguistic work. Joos (1961), for instance, accepted Chomsky’s 
violation of the basic principle “text reveals its structure” and applauded Chomsky’s 
work as an advance in the study of syntax. Hill invited Chomsky to air his position 
at Texas conferences.
The work of Chomsky’s students began appearing regularly in Language during 
the early 1960s, while the ‘truest Bloomfieldian,’ Bernard Bloch, still edited it. Chomsky 
himself was invited to contribute to the memorial issue for Bloch. In the estimation 
of Robert Lees, whose relationship with Bloch also predated 1957, “I can’t see that he 
ever acted as an obstacle” (26 April 1977 letter). One of Bloch’s 1950s students recalled 
that Bloch “waved encouragement” at the use of symbolic logic to do semantics, but 
“didn’t feel up to doing it himself ” (R. Harris 1993: 51).
In sum, during the late 1950s and early 60s, Chomsky’s views on methodology 
and syntactic structure were perceived as new formalist positions within American 
structuralism. With elite sponsorship, Chomsky had access to publication. “In the late 
1950s, he was seen as an up and coming man, maybe blind to some things, but a force 
to be reckoned with” (Hymes, 21 November 1977 letter).
Rationalist, ‘Cartesian’ linguistics was yet to appear. Finding it in SS or in LSLT is a task of 
invention equivalent to reading “socialism in one country” into Marx’s writing. SS and LSLT 
dealt with philosophy of science themata (R. Harris 1990: 108–110), not with assertions 
about the structures of any particular language — or with ‘universal grammar.’ Although 
he had attacked behaviorism in the pages of Language, Chomsky had yet to attack 
neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics frontally. The ultra-rigorist wing of neo-Bloomfieldians 
(Bloch and Joos, if not the chronically querulous Trager) “were ready for Syntactic 
Structures. They weren’t ready… for what followed Syntactic Structures” (R. Harris 
1993:51; see Hill 1966, 1980), particularly the rejection of phonemics — which, unlike 
any syntactic theory, they did care about.
3. “Revolutions” and rhetorics of continuity or breaks
In psychology there was a transformation from behaviorist dominance to cognitive 
conceptions. This has been called the “cognitive revolution,” though the psychologist/
psycholinguist whose work I know best, Roger Brown, seems to me to have moved 
from behaviorist to cognitivist work with local (to Cambridge, MA) influences by 
Chomsky but without a dramatic (“road to Damascus”) break (see Brown 1989; 
Murray 1994: 273–82).
 Stephen O. Murray
As far as I know, Chomsky himself has never claimed to have “revolutionized” 
linguistics or even to have dominated it. (Indeed, he claims that hardly any linguists 
have ever been interested in what he’s done!) Whether it is considered “revolution,” 
“a dark age,” “progress,” “counter-revolution,” or “a reign of terror,” Chomsky-dominated 
American linguistics of the 1970s or 80s looks quite different from the neo-Bloomfieldian 
American linguistics of the 1950s. Arguments have been made that Chomsky devel-
oped the “structuralism” of Zellig Harris in general and Harris’s beginnings of formalist 
synchronic(ist) transformational analysis in particular (see Antilla 1975). A rise to 
prominence of syntacticians supplanting phonologists is pretty clear, but the question 
of how much change qualifies some development as having been a “revolution” seems 
to me impossible to specify.
In academic/scientific instances as in sociopolitical ones or religious ones, there is 
never absolute discontinuity in the realm of ideas. Thus, establishing that there was some 
continuity does not suffice to dismiss any particular case from the category “revolution.” 
Even before I read Kuhn for the first time (in 1972), I had read (a translation of) Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s L’ancien régime et la révolution (originally published in 1856). Tocqueville 
showed that many of the “revolutionary” changes in French social arrangements were 
underway before the storming of the Bastille and guillotining of the king and queen. 
Tocqueville certainly was not denying that there had been a reign of terror in what he 
insouciantly used the singular, definite article (la) to label. I had been introduced to 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America by M. Richard Zinman as an undergraduate. My 
first graduate school mentor, Robert A. Nisbet, was at that time (in the years preceding 
the US bicentennial) talking and writing about the extent to which the less fratricidal 
(but not entirely unfratricidal) “American Revolution” marked significant social (as well 
as political) change, so was a “real revolution,” not just a successful war of independence 
from a European colonial power.16
In my (University of Toronto) dissertation research I contrasted groups for 
which claims of “revolution” were made with ones claiming “continuity.” My origi-
nal contrast was between the ethnography of speaking (which stressed building on 
tradition) with ethnoscience (for which claims of being the “new ethnography” were 
made). As I extended my social history of American theorizing of language, the much 
heralded “Chomskian revolution” loomed. The leaders of the two linguistic anthro-
pology groups completed Ph.D. dissertations and took up academic positions in the 
mid-1950s, as did Chomsky, and all three groups attracted students at a time of rapid 
1. See Nisbet 1969, 1976, 1977. Nisbet had long been interested in the critique of the French 
Revolution by Bonald, Maistre, et al. and the prehistory of sociology in concerns about the 
smashing of traditional social structures (Nisbet 1943, 1966).
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growth in the size of US universities. That is, they blossomed in the same era within the 
same country’s system of universities, enhancing comparability — at least in terms of 
the zeitgeist and the era of academic expansion, particularly the Cold War National 
Defense Act influx of funding for linguistic research and creation of new positions 
for linguists that produced a demographic surge in the production of linguists 
(Murray 1980: 85).
For both contrasts to the ethnography of speaking paradigm (transformational/
generative grammar [TGG] and ethnoscience), I had difficulty in being convinced that 
discontinuities outweighed continuities. This led me to take as the dependent variable 
(the variable to be explained by social structural independent variables, which I drew 
from Mullins 1975) “rhetoric of revolution” rather than “revolution”:
Because (l) there are always cognitive continuities and shared assumptions 
between subsequent scientific paradigms, (2) no context-free indicators of 
degree of continuity have been suggested, and (3) claims of novelty seem to have 
more serious consequences for generational conflict than actual discontinuities, 
the notion of scientific revolution has been relativized here to consideration 
of ‘revolutionary rhetoric,’ i.e., claims to break with the guiding ideas and 
assumptions of past work. ‘Revolutionary rhetoric’ refers to claims (by group 
members) to major discontinuities, not to claims of persecution/rejection at the 
hands of an establishment. Choice of rhetoric (between a rhetoric of revolution 
and one of continuity) depends on the relative eliteness, professional age and 
access to recognition of group participants. (Murray 1994: 23)
The cases I examined in my dissertation (revised as Murray 1994) show that the rheto-
ric of ‘continuity’ is no more transparent than the rhetoric of ‘revolution’. The focus 
on ‘rhetoric’ of continuity/discontinuity rather than ‘substance’ is/was not intended 
to deny that ideas matter. Observing that many seemingly good ideas that might have 
been taken up for testing and development are not tested or developed (“Many are 
called [out], but few are chosen,”) and that those that are taken up do not always seem 
in retrospect to have been the best ones available at any particular time, led me to the 
view that “Good ideas are not enough” (1994: 22), a statement that is not equivalent to 
“Ideas do not matter”.
Kuhn’s comparison of “scientific revolutions” certainly does not provide any 
measure of “revolutionariness,” and Kuhn himself dropped the essentially contested 
term “revolution”. Even in his original presentation, Kuhn (1962: 91–92) noted that 
changes may seem small when viewed from outside (a paradigm).
In academic/scientific instances as in sociopolitical ones there is never absolute 
 discontinuity in the realm of ideas. In the particular instance of TGG, enumerat-
ing  continuities between the approaches of Chomsky in the 1950s and (various) 
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 neo-Bloomfieldians does not disprove that there was a ‘Chomskian revolution’ 
in  linguistics and/or in syntactic theorizing. In my first publication on history of 
 linguistics, I wrote:
Revolutions — whether scientific, religious, or political — never totally annihilate 
all facets of the preceding system and never substitute entirely novel ideas…. 
Those who believe there are qualitative differences, so that “scientific revolution” 
is a useful concept (preferably a variable) in the study of changes in science, need 
to specify criteria which have been met in at least some cases in order to classify 
changes as “revolutions.” Absolute novelty is not such a realistic criterion, nor is 
total victory. No paradigmatic community has ever been coterminous with an 
entire discipline, whether in behavioral, biological, or physical science. In spheres 
other than science we speak of “revolutions” which were partly successful or 
failures. There is no reason to expect purer cases in science than in the situations 
to which they are supposedly analogous. (Murray 1980: 84)
I have never attempted to distinguish “real revolutions” from “rhetorical revolutions.” 
Indeed, I am pretty sure that this is the first time I have transposed the noun (my 
dependent variable) with the adjective (“revolutionary”). I am disappointed by the 
lack of specification of context-free criteria for “revolution” in human sciences in the 
decades since I abandoned “revolution” as a heuristic concept, even as arguments 
continue about whether there was a TGG “revolution” and/or multiple “Chomskian 
revolutions.” In my early article I suggested three rationales of classifying TGG as a 
“revolution” — group members’ own use of the label, revolutionary rhetoric, and simi-
larities of the social characteristics of the group to other groups that adopted an eclips-
ing stance to the work of predecessors.
3.1 After the success of “revolutions”
I began with a mild expression at surprise that “revolutionary” is so eagerly sought an 
appellation. A lot of blood has been spilled in “revolutions,” the results (revolutionary 
regimes) of which have very often disappointed advocates.17 In political revolutions, 
many “revolutionaries” have been slain by the faction that prevails; it at least seems 
that this “fratricide” after a revolution “succeeds” is greater than the “parricide” of the 
1. Many of my generation were drawn to Chomsky’s ideas about cognition and language in 
part from admiring his leadership in opposing US military involvement in Vietnam. Having 
seen how the North Vietnamese dominated the unified Vietnam, marginalizing former Viet 
Cong, has not convinced me that the US should have been there, but there is a great deal in 
regimes that took power in peasant revolutions and/or ending colonial domination to disappoint 
those who had high hopes for them — including Algeria, Cuba, and Zimbabwe, and, especially, 
in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge whose atrocities were obfuscated by Chomsky and Herman 
(1977, 1979). It is not clear to me that being chastened by seeing what such revolutionary regimes 
did has reduced the attractiveness of “revolution” as an analogy for linguistics, however.
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revolution itself` (the Bolshevik and Maoist revolutions leap to mind as examples more 
recent than the French one). In linguistics and other learned societies and academic 
departments, revolutionaries are not allowed to execute past opponents or former 
allies in “making the revolution.” Thus, in an important sense, I think that “revolu-
tions” don’t happen in American academia. Members of “establishments” viewed as 
“outmoded” are not executed. Even their tenure is not retracted. Feeling bypassed 
strikes me as less serious than being jailed and executed or condemned to years in 
re-education camps.
If we are going to strain the analogy of “revolutions” from those forcibly over-
throwing social patterns and monopolizing economic and political power to the 
considerably less lethal-to-opponents reign of academic theories, it seems to me that 
the kind of recurrent purging of followers to renew the revolution during the 1970 
and 1980s bears resemblances to the new waves of revolutionary fervor (and purges) 
that Mao Zhedong (1893–1976) fomented in the last two decades of his life. Within 
the very  different worlds with radically different kinds and extents of power avail-
able, I see Mao encouraging the Red Guards as analogous to Chomsky encouraging 
or at least implicitly licensing generation after generation of zealots to attack their 
elders (even if these “elders” to a new generation of graduate students were junior to 
 Chomsky himself), especially his own comrades after they attained some status in the 
field of linguistics and the possibility of independent influence (various Lin Biaos and 
Liu Shaoqis of American linguistics).
Along with ritualized humiliation of those who had risen to high status either before 
the revolution or in the post-revolutionary regimes, the later Chomsky “revolutions” 
offered (at least nominally) opportunities for ‘sincere self-criticism’ and ‘re-education’ 
and redirection to what Chomsky at the moment found worth doing (see R. Harris 
1993; Murray 1994: 431–46). Purging former allies who might become rivals (and 
then writing them out of official histories) is a recurrent feature of ‘real’ (sociopolitical) 
revolutions and of ‘Chomskian’ ones (especially in the obliteration by incorporation 
by Chomsky of ideas of former students and his failures to mention them in his state-
ments about the development of his theories; consider the bitterness evident in Levine 
and Postal (2004)). This is a feature very hard not to notice, even to outside observers 
immune to the pain of being cast aside within the discipline of linguistics.
. Conclusions
I see “revolution” as a very problematic and not very heuristic concept, and the ardor 
with which the concept has been embraced suspect. I have not set myself up to judge 
whether there have been “revolutions” in American linguistics or how many of them 
there may have been. I think that there was a sort of unfilled niche for syntactic 
 theorizing during the mid-1950s (though not quite a “power vacuum”). If there are 
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“revolutions” in linguistics (not just rises to degrees of dominance), it seems to me 
that analogies to regimes of revolutionaries in power are licit. Whether analogies 
of post-revolutionary regimes are heuristic, I leave for other historians of linguistics 
to decide.
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In this paper, we explore when and how the work of Noam Chomsky diverged from 
that of his mentor, Zellig Harris, and identify the origins and character of their 
differences. Considering evidence that they never fully understood each other, the 
rhetorical vehicle for this exploration is speculation as to how much this divergence 
is due to differences of temperament, to “post-war” generational differences, or, 
with more importance for the field, to different conceptions of the proper conduct 
of science. A number of questions are addressed, such as: Is truth attained by 
winning arguments, or is the appropriate role of argument to do everything possible 
to prove oneself wrong? Is a theory of language a prerequisite to or an outcome of 
linguistic analysis? And what are the fundamental data of linguistics?
Here at the outset, please understand that by the use of first names in the title and 
throughout this paper I mean no affront or disrespect for either Zellig Harris or Noam 
Chomsky, but rather the intimation that we are talking about them as persons. Dis-
cussion of their respective achievements cannot entirely avoid the quasi-mythical 
personae that have become institutionalized around them in public discourse, so it has 
seemed well to place the divergences in their work more accurately in context of their 
relationship. The central theme of this paper is that they never fully understood each 
other, due to differences that we may variously ascribe to personality, or temperament, 
or cognitive style. This is an essentially irenic supposition, but to demonstrate and give 
substance to it requires several excursions into regions where it is possible that responses 
to what I say may be less pacific. Let me make explicit here, for it is implicit throughout, 
that the same considerations of comprehension and incomprehension apply as well to 
those responses. I know this does not apply to you, dear reader, whose perspicacity and 
fair-mindedness are unquestioned; it is those other readers that concern me.
I must consequently ask your patience with the cyclical structure of this paper. 
It is a truism of psychology that we understand in terms of what we have previously 
understood, and sometimes perhaps we understand too quickly. In order that they 
might insinuate themselves through this perfectly normal cognitive hedgerow, themes 
and topics recur in a recycling kind of way, each time from a different angle, with a 
different emphasis, or in a different combination.
That said, let us begin at the beginning.
 Bruce Nevin
. B’Reshit1
In 1945 or 1946, William Chomsky (1896–1977) asked Zellig Harris (1909–1992), a 
neighbor and family friend teaching and doing linguistic research as a Professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania, to take his brilliant but erratic son Avram Noam (b. 1928) 
under his wing.2 Both families had immigrated in the first decade or so of the century 
(Zellig’s family when he was four years old) from the terrible political and social condi-
tions in Ukraine to this tight-knit neighborhood in Philadelphia. Zellig had obtained 
his degrees at Penn as a specialist in Semitic linguistics in 1934 and 1936, then taught 
and continued research there, becoming Assistant Professor in 1943. Funding for war-
time and post-war linguistic research enabled him to develop a wide range of courses 
encompassing his many research interests.
It was literally the case that in the beginning years Zellig was the department, and 
its formation involved no more than bringing together, as a program in ‘linguistic 
analysis,’ a number of courses that Zellig had developed during the war years 
under the aegis of either the anthropology or the Oriental Studies Departments 
of the University. (Hiż n.d.).
He established the new Department of Linguistic Analysis in 1946 and was advanced 
to Full Professor in 1947. The concern that Mr. Chomsky brought to his friend was that 
young Noam had just entered Penn as an undergraduate, but was impatient with his 
classes, and was considering dropping out. Maybe he would move to a kibbutz in Israel. 
Noam was then about 17 years of age, Zellig in his late thirties. The Harrises essentially 
took the teenager into their family, sharing meals with him and so on. Zellig supported 
and encouraged him to study mathematics, logic, and philosophy, sponsoring him to 
. The first two words of Genesis in Hebrew, usually translated “In the beginning”.
2. Noam has said that his “formal introduction to the field of linguistics was in 1947, when 
Zellig” gave him the proofs of Harris (1951), but in the preface that was signed in January 1947 
he is credited for help with reading those proofs. Either his memory is wrong, or the preface was 
revised after the signature date. In any case, he almost certainly means the manuscript rather 
than the proofs, that is, galley proofs from a publisher, which would not have been available 
until perhaps 1950. Harris 2002.2 says the book was “completed and circulated in 1946, though 
it appeared only in 1951”, so copies of the manuscript were available. Zellig seems always to have 
had numerous manuscripts in progress concurrently, and considerable time could elapse before 
publication, particularly with the austerities of the war years. See for example (Wells 1947: 81n1): 
“The central importance of the problem of immediate constituents was driven home to me in 
many valuable conversations with Zellig S. Harris, who also let me read a number of his manu-
scripts, of which not all have yet been published.” This was his continued practice with students. 
In the late 1960s, I and other students had copies of the manuscript of Harris (1968), which we 
discussed in seminars with him, and of course copies of various papers and monographs.
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excellent teachers, including Nathan Fine (1916–1994) for mathematics, and Nelson 
Goodman (1906–1998) and Richard Martin (1916–1985) in philosophy and logic.3
What was it like, having this unusual young man in their home? One family mem-
ber4 says “He would follow you from room to room arguing, arguing, arguing you down 
to dust!” and also told me, with sadness, that they tried for many years “to establish a 
human relationship with him”. These clues, while conclusive of nothing, suggest a dispar-
ity of temperament. The aim of this paper is to explore how differences in temperament 
suggested by these and other indicators may underlie fundamental differences in their 
ways of working and help to explain the sundering of the results of their work and the 
peculiar extension of ‘graduate student amnesia’5 through an entire academic lifetime.
2. Two uses of argument
It can hardly be doubted that Noam is a master of debate. His extraordinary prowess as 
a polemicist is well documented. More, it is very important to him to win  arguments. 
3. The Wikipedia article on Richard Milton Martin has this relevant passage about an important 
influence on Noam who has been hitherto invisible in the standard accounts:
Martin was especially fond of applying his first-order theory to the analysis of 
ordinary language, a method he termed logico-linguistics. He often referenced the 
work of the linguists Zellig Harris (admiringly) and Henry Hiz (more critically); 
Martin, Harris, and Hiz all taught at Penn in the 1950s. Yet Martin was dismissive 
of the related theoretical work by Noam Chomsky and his M.I.T. colleagues and 
students. Ironically, Martin appears to have been Chomsky’s main teacher of logic; 
while a student at Penn, Chomsky took every course Martin taught.
. Who asked not to be identified.
. The phrase is Lila Gleitman’s:
I rapidly fell under the influence of Harris, whose thinking has guided the rest of 
my intellectual life. In light of that fact, I have been surprised, looking back over 
my own writings, to find that citations and references to Harris are conspicuously 
absent from most of them. … I have tried to think about why. The answer is that 
so much did Harris’s approach to language get into my skin, become the sure and 
self-evident basis of my own thinking, as eventually to feel like my own quite clever 
inventions; that is, to lead to the well-known academic malady called Graduate 
Student Amnesia. (Gleitman 2002: 209)
Needless to say, this cutely named ‘malady’ is neither universal nor inevitable, and while it is 
one of the joys of teaching (and a mark of its success) when a student makes one’s ideas their 
own, taking them in their own directions, nonetheless a failure to credit sources is wrong, as 
Gleitman obviously agrees.
 Bruce Nevin
As Bob Ingria said to me once, “If you want to talk to Chomsky, wear boxing gloves.” 
He has been called an intellectual bully,6 and has been accused of all sorts of intel-
lectual malfeasance, from incorporating the supposedly vanquished positions of his 
opponents into his own ‘revised standard view’ without acknowledgement, to pep-
pering his argument with citations and references that cannot be checked until too 
late (and which then turn out, it is said, to be not quite as represented), to outright 
lying.7 And if he cannot win, the argument or the terms proposed are dismissed as 
unimportant, or trivial, or uninteresting.8 Countless anecdotes are told, and many 
have been published. Though such testimony abounds, I will not put any weight on 
what could after all be no more than the discontent of poor losers thwarted by a bril-
liant mind. That said, I doubt that any who have engaged with or witnessed Noam in 
action would gainsay the proposition that when he does enter an argument, winning 
it is very important to him.9
. Said e.g. in Barsky, forthcoming.
7. All these points are documented in e.g. R. Harris 1993, 1998.
8. See e.g. Lin (1999) for examples.
9. Any verbatim transcript of dialog affords examples to the attentive eye. Because the issues 
and the progress of the encounter are especially accessible and transparent, and perhaps more 
importantly because the exchange is neutral with respect to linguistics, consider the interac-
tion reported in MacFarquhar (2003: 66). The situation is that Noam has invited any student 
present to articulate an opposing view. One takes him up on it. He then counters with “Suppose 
the goal is to liberate Iraq. How come it’s not proposed in the United Nations?” The student 
starts to respond, “There are a lot of answers to that, like I think —” and Noam interrupts with 
“Really? I don’t know of any” and launches into a proposal that the US should support Iran 
in an invasion of Iraq. The student tries to respond with “But —” and is cut off with “Excuse 
me....” (not everyone is allowed to interrupt) and what turns out to be a reductio ploy rolls on 
to the rhetorical question “What’s the downside?”
The student looked baffled. “Are you honestly advocating that we help Iran invade 
Iraq?” he asked. “No. You are.” […] Chomsky continued to berate the student for 
a long time, ignoring his attempts to break in. People cried out “Let him talk!” but 
to no avail. Another student stood up and called out a request that he be allowed 
to help, but Chomsky ignored him. People made loud, disgruntled noises in 
protest at this treatment, but Chomsky ignored those too. Finally, the first student 
sat down.
Other examples are documented in Huck & Goldsmith (1995), e.g. on p. 70 “Chomsky never 
directly addressed this facet of McCawley’s argument, which clearly constituted a serious 
problem for an Interpretive approach”, in R.A. Harris (1993, 1998) and elsewhere.
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Further, Noam believes that argument is the way that you arrive at truth. An 
anecdote brought this home to me.10 He and a friend were discussing the conflict of 
Israel and the Palestinians. The friend said that it was not just a matter of a rational 
negotiation of interests, and that because such intense and deeply founded emotions 
were involved it could not be resolved by logical argument. Somewhat to the friend’s 
surprise, this occasioned a pause, and as Noam thought about it he grew sad, saying 
that it may be then that it can never be resolved. This suggests that he sees argu-
ment as the only way (or at the least, the best and the most preferred way) to arrive 
at truth.11
This, I submit, is a temperament well suited to philosophical disputation. I take it 
as no accident, then, that Noam has on occasion characterized linguistics as a branch 
of philosophy, too immature yet to be considered a science.12 Let us take a brief excur-
sion to consider the other side of this distinction which he has drawn between linguis-
tics as philosophy and linguistics as science.
Science seeks truth without claiming to arrive at it. Scientists do this by inter-
rogating nature and then corroborating what they find, an inherently communal pro-
cess. The tension between individual exploration and collaborative confirmation is 
well expressed in the following excerpt from a letter that Zellig wrote to Albert Goetze 
(December 27, 1940):13
Thanks for your paper and review. I have just read them hastily, and will soon 
go over it point by point. Let me assure you that not only do I not consider it 
‘unpleasant’ but am glad of the controversy. No person, certainly not I, can be 
. As told me by a friend who asked to remain anonymous, and who didn’t want to indulge 
in psychological speculation because of not wanting to lose Noam’s friendship — a telling 
comment in itself.
. To those readers who share these assumptions — that the road to truth is by winning argu-
ments (or if you’re not as good at it as Noam is, then by agreeing with those arguments that have 
won) — I am not trying to dissuade you, nor is any denigration intended, of you or of Noam. 
After all, I only ask you to suspend disbelief, for the present anyway, that there may be alternative 
modi operandi; and I ask this not least because otherwise you may find this paper rather incom-
prehensible. Mindful attention to the kindling of counterarguments, etc. may disclose for you a 
kind of implicit meta-point of the paper concerning how that incomprehension works.
2. Although more recently he has considered linguistics to be a subpart of psychology, 
 apparently without concern for arguments e.g. in LSLT (Chomsky 1951, 1955a, 1956a, 1975) 
for the autonomy of linguistics.
3. I am indebted to Robert Barsky for bringing to my attention this and other letters pre-
served at Yale University, by way of an unpublished ms. of his that was provided for my review 
by Seymour Melman.
8 Bruce Nevin
sure of his judgments as ‘always right’; the best way to get closer to the ‘truth’ — 
after I have figured out whatever I could — is to get the divergent opinions which 
arise from a different scientific analysis. The only fun in science is finding out 
what was actually there.
The place of argument in this is important, but its role is distinctly secondary, prop-
erly relegated to the design of experiments and the interpretation of results. Indeed, 
the aim of the scientist — when doing science — is to try as hard as he can to lose the 
argument. This is because a working scientist knows the perils of wishful thinking. 
Consequently, before a finding or hypothesis is published, the scientist will, ideally, try 
to destroy it in every way that can be imagined, and when it is published, the presenta-
tion must point out its vulnerabilities and weaknesses, inviting others to devise chal-
lenges that the author failed to imagine.14 This is not for the sake of constructing an 
. “Science is not a monument of received Truth but something that people do to look for 
truth.” (Overbye 2009). Science and the arts both require patronage. Patrons expect a return 
on investment, to be sure, and too loose oversight of their beneficiaries can be exploited and 
abused. It is possible that excessive ‘enjoyment’ of military funding for linguistics in the 1960s 
contributed to poisoning the well. But critics of funded projects have too often demonstrated 
their incomprehension of the nature of science, as witness some of Senator Proxmire’s Golden 
Fleece Awards for ‘wasteful’ government spending. Science has means of internal discipline 
that are far less available to the arts, or perhaps only far less well defined, but peer review 
cannot be more free of ulterior motives than the scientists themselves are who constitute that 
peerage. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
The influence of patents and profits in the life sciences provides striking illustration. 
Roger J. Williams refused to patent any of his discoveries, notably pantothenic acid (one of 
the B vitamins), in order to ensure that no ulterior motive should undermine his integrity 
as a scientist, nor any imputation of such sully his reputation. Since patent law was changed 
in the 1980s, corporations, universities, and individual scientists now routinely patent new 
discoveries, even new living organisms and bits of DNA. A consequence is a shutting down 
of that sharing of information which is essential to science as a communal endeavor. (See e.g. 
Butkus 2009 for discussion.) The epidemic of Lyme and other tick-borne diseases provides 
a tragic demonstration of consequences that can follow. Pharmaceutical companies seek a 
circumscribed disease definition so they can more easily design drugs and get them through 
FDA trials. Insurance companies demand a narrow definition to exclude profit-sapping 
long-term treatment of patients with indeterminate responses. Diagnostic tests are designed 
to excessively narrow definitions. Researchers and physicians are paid as consultants by 
manufacturers of test kits as well as by pharmaceutical and insurance companies. And there 
are the usual all too human ego issues — my theory, my disease definition, the organism I 
discovered, etc. The devastation to sufferers of tick-borne diseases, a population exceeding 
that of AIDS victims, has until very recently been denied and relegated to baseless diagnoses 
(Epstein-Barr syndrome, fibromyalgia, neurosis) that have no effective treatment, and remains 
controversial (Weintraub 2008). It can be seen, then, that the ideals of science are serious stuff 
indeed, with serious consequences, and not ‘mere idealism’. We will see farther on that even 
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unassailable position, but in order to find out “what is actually there.” And while logic 
is important in these challenges, its import is as to whether or not one’s conclusions are 
warranted by empirical observations and sound methodology.
The operative words here are “when doing science” and “ideally”. There is no 
doubt that scientists also do philosophy, and that they energetically argue for their 
favored views as means of promoting their careers, attracting students, ensuring that 
students are recognized by others to be their students, and so on. And there are many 
corrosive influences making the ideals of science difficult to maintain in practice. 
The strengthened demand by government funding agencies and patrons of science 
in industry that deliverables of research be specified in advance and subsequently 
delivered on spec and on schedule is understandable, but at odds with the essentially 
exploratory nature of research, the role of serendipity, and so forth. This reflects a 
too-common misapprehension of the hand-off between science and engineering. A 
related corrosive influence is the social demand that the scientist be an Authority. Cer-
tainty is a cardinal requirement of engineering; uncertainty is indispensable for doing 
 science. It is too little understood that science proves nothing, and that proof is pos-
sible only for logic and mathematics. The complex interrelationships of mathematics, 
science, and engineering have obvious pertinence to the politics of science and to our 
present discussion.
It has been demonstrated many times that peer review, one of the bulwarks against 
investigator bias, can easily become instead a bulwark of shared bias. Referees become 
gatekeepers. This is the meat and contested bone of any discussion of revolutions in 
science. The ultimate safeguard of the methods and results of science therefore rests in 
the integrity of the individual researcher. Confirmation bias is a well-documented haz-
ard.15 The common or garden variety — seeing what you expect to see — can become 
greatly strengthened in science and in philosophy, because when data are fitted into 
an intellectually satisfying explanatory system, data that don’t fit may be selectively set 
aside. Thomas Huxley wryly identified “the great tragedy of science — the slaying of a 
beautiful hypothesis with an ugly fact.” Given this universal human foible, the price of 
the pursuit of an ever-expanding, ever-receding truth is vigilance of a peculiar kind, 
and to this peculiar attitude of counter-advocacy some are more alert, or more suited 
by temperament, than others.
in linguistics there are parallel effects on funding, reputation, precedence, and intellectual 
property, albeit with less dire consequences, to be sure.
No one ever said that doing science was easy.
. Hymes & Fought (1975: 172) give a striking example of Hockett’s own students mis-
reading a paper of his in consequence of their being “in the grip of preconceptions in a climate 
of opinion.”
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3. Founding a science
Zellig lived in a milieu of working scientists and mathematicians; his brother Tzvi and 
sister-in-law Susannah are immunologists; his wife Bruria Kaufmann (b. 1918) is a 
mathematician and theoretical physicist, and was Einstein’s (1879–1955) assistant at 
Princeton, responsible for helping him to clarify and simplify his restatement of rela-
tivity and his work toward a unified field theory; his close friend and colleague was the 
Polish logician, Henry Hiż; and his interest in re-founding linguistics in linear algebra 
was nourished by conversations and correspondence with mathematicians including 
Marcel-Paul ‘Marco’ Schützenberger (1920–1996), the latter’s student André Lentin, 
Max Zorn, and of course Bruria. As he pointed out in the 1986 Bampton lectures 
which became Language and Information (Harris 1988), there are two kinds of applied 
mathematics: calculational, of which there is very little in language, and the finding of 
mathematical objects in the world, of which there are many in language. His essential 
effort, developed consistently through almost sixty years, was “to see how a little math-
ematics might become linguistics,” applying set theory and linear algebra to the ele-
ments and sets of linguistic analysis.16 According to Leigh Lisker,17 Zellig was teaching 
him and his fellow students transformations as early as the late 1930s. Subsequently, 
Zellig “had conversations about transformations with many people: with Piaget, and 
the psychologist David Rapaport, with Carnap and his follower Y. Bar-Hillel, with Max 
Zorn (of the lemma) to whom [he] showed the whole system at the Indiana Linguistic 
Institute, and with others” (Harris 2002.4).18
. Lentin (2002: 1) says that Zellig approved the felicity of this phrase. Mathematical Struc-
tures of Language (Harris 1968) is the most complete expression of his effort to lay the basis 
for more capable mathematicians to identify homomorphisms, rings, and other structures, 
prove theorems, etc. One of his interests was in how language might develop additional 
capabilities; and as language is the (or an) interpretation of the mathematical structures that 
he did find, so might additional developments of the mathematics have their interpretation in 
extensions or specializations of language. See also (Harris 1962b) furthering an interest that 
he shared with Sapir.
7. In an e-mail message to the author, 1 March 2000.
8. Here, we must pause to clear up some potential terminological confusion. In abstract 
algebra, a homomorphism is termed more or less equivalently a linear transformation, 
linear map, linear operator, or linear function. (The related term ‘kernel’ is also from abstract 
algebra.) Zellig used this algebraic term ‘transformation’ quite literally and directly to refer to 
a mapping from subset to subset in the set of sentences. Noam’s subsequent use of the same 
word to refer to deformations of abstract tree structures is only related by common subject 
matter, and derives not from algebra, but from Carnap’s notion of ‘rules of transformation’ as 
a correlative of ‘rules of formation’. The role of phrase-structure grammar in the sundering 
of Noam’s work from Zellig’s is an important thread that extends beyond the scope of this 
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As we have seen one critical ingredient of the scientific temperament is scepticism. 
Another is often called curiosity, meaning by that not the idle collection of trivia, but 
rather a peculiarly focused probing behind the surface appearance of things. A letter 
that Zellig wrote to Bernard Bloch (August 20, 1949) gives some personal insight into 
this aspect of his temperament:
I get my main interest or pleasure out of consuming — in my case it’s specialized 
not into food but into subject-matter and information. It is quite important for 
me to find out what gives — whether with linguistics, or with human language, or 
with politics, or with physics.19
But while he was temperamentally a scientist, he thought of himself as a method-
ologist more than as a linguist.20 Why a methodologist? To understand this, we 
must place ourselves in the milieu of linguistics in the years before, during, and after 
WWII. Linguists were acutely aware of creating a new science.21 Problems of recur-
sion and regress then under discussion in logic and mathematics suggested that this 
paper; likewise the visual impact of branching tree diagrams in the branding and packaging of 
Generative Grammar, and in the ready identification of in-group presentations vs. out-group 
presentations.
9. It was this characteristic need to “find out what gives,” which I share, that drew me par-
ticularly to Harris, although (for this and other reasons) I was already committed to linguistics 
when I came to Penn in 1966. The talk of an interest or pleasure being “specialized” may be in 
reference to the typology of Fromm.
2. The title of the first of his several major books famously begins with the word “methods.” 
He also supposed that linguists would not be interested in his work, though people interested 
in language would be, and that his work was not part of linguistics as it is institutionally 
defined. Such remarks possibly reflect in some measure the ways in which ‘linguist’ had been 
redefined by that time in the late 1960s, and the polemics then raging. However, while he 
knew the lasting value of what he was doing, Zellig neither demanded nor expected to retain a 
leadership role in the field on the strength of what he had done in the past. Anarchism means 
no institutionalized leadership. Many espouse anarchist and libertarian principles, Zellig 
 embodied them in practice.
2. “What was at stake, in short, was the possibility of a science at all: the possibility of taking 
as problematic, exploring, and proving linguistic phenomena, rather than having inquiry cut 
off by conventional habits of explanation” (Hymes & Fought 1975: 162) .
[T]he cast given methodological ideas in the United States was probably due to their 
institutional value, combined with the common tendency of a younger generation to 
delight in shocking an established order. Extreme differentiation of ‘scientific linguistics’ 
from ‘philology’ probably had adaptive value in efforts to secure a novel place in the 
academic sun. This essential social role of the Bloomfieldian idiom goes far to explain 
its general acceptance as central reference point, even by linguists whose own work 
continued or developed ideas in conflict with it. (Hymes & Fought 1975: 117)
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new  science might be subject to unique restrictions and requirements because of its 
peculiar subject matter, language. It was obvious to them, as quickly becomes appar-
ent to any student in the sciences, that the language of scientific discourse — the very 
means of formulating and communicating hypotheses, methods, results, theories, and 
so on — is constrained or disciplined in ways that general usage is not. This is because 
in the sublanguage of the science, objects and operations are explicitly defined, either 
in common parlance or in terms of logically or methodologically prior sciences,22 with 
the consequence that sense and nonsense are sharply distinguished, as they cannot be 
in general usage. How might this affect discourse in a science whose subject matter is 
language itself? Discussions of metalanguage vs. object language, in the air since Ber-
trand Russell’s (1872–1970) tremendously influential essay “On Denoting” (Russell, 
1905) and Alfred Tarski’s (1901–83) monograph on the truth-functional semantics of 
formalized languages (Tarski 1933), informed thinking about the relationship between 
linguistic descriptions and the languages that they described:
[T]he explicit structure of statements in logic and mathematics had made it 
clear that the statements about this structure could not be expressed within 
this structure: the metalanguage of mathematics was outside mathematics. 
(See for example [Church 1956]. While the term ‘metalanguage’ as used in the 
linguistic work is an extension of the use in [Carnap 1934], it also satisfies the 
more stringent (finitary) condition for the term ‘meta’ in [Kleene 1952].) The 
structure of the metalanguage had been left undescribed, the view being that it, or 
its metalanguage in turn in infinite regress, has to be undescribed and indeed not 
fully specifiable, simply given in natural language. This conforms to the common 
view in philosophy that natural language is amorphous, or in any case not fully 
specifiable. (Harris 2002.7–8)
There were other reasons that this new science had to find its own footing. Consider 
its relationship to neighboring fields. Physics bears obvious relevance to acoustic pho-
netics, but to nothing else in language; similarly biology is pertinent only through 
physiology and the study of articulation.23 Psychology as then constituted had really 
nothing to contribute to linguistics regarding either that which was unique to indi-
vidual languages or that which was common to all.
22. In a sublanguage, such use of a prior and external metalanguage is possible, as it is not for 
language as a whole. Use of analogy and metaphor extending the distribution of a word from 
one subject-matter domain to another is very much related, as illustrated, famously, by the 
adaptations of nautical terminology in common parlance. The main distinction to be made is 
that this is a folk process, whereas definitions in science are deliberate and disciplined.
23. Setting aside undisprovable speculations about genetics as anachronisms here.
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By the time Bloomfield became a behaviorist in psychology, he was committed 
to the belief that linguistics was an autonomous science... Thus, one’s preference 
for one psychological theory or another did not matter to the linguistic analysis 
done. (Murray 1994: 121)
As Bloomfield (1933: 32) said,
The findings of the linguist, who studies the speech-signal, will be all the more 
valuable for the psychologist if they are not distorted by any prepossessions about 
psychology.... We shall all the more surely avoid this fault … if we survey a few of 
the more obvious phases of the psychology of language.
Consequently, claims that Bloomfield and other American linguists were behaviorists 
are essentially vacuous,24 and any supposed influence of anthropology or any of the 
social sciences on the methods or theories of linguistics is so weak as to be scarcely 
ever heard of.25 Rather, specialists in other fields looked to the scientific study of lan-
guage for answers to some of their difficulties, and still do. Thus, Noam’s various claims 
of providing insight from language into the nature of mind says more about the pau-
city of such insight in psychology than it does about the converse relevance of psychol-
ogy, as presently constituted, to linguistics.
At the time we are discussing, the mid 1940s, American linguists had long 
been confronted with the complex and daunting task of describing exotic languages 
in understandable and useful ways, and this task grew enormously in scope in the 
 “hothouse atmosphere of the wartime work” (Joos 1957: 108) as both demand and 
2. Even if they were in some sense adherents of behaviorism (which is debated), so what? 
The methodology and practice of linguistics took no direction from operative conditioning or 
the like, resting instead on their own foundations and grappling with the unique requirements 
attendant upon using language to describe language. The determining factor was patterning 
in language. Attempts were made to justify this preoccupation with patterning by reference 
to ‘habits’ and the like, but it came to be seen (by Zellig perhaps most clearly) that no justi-
fication is required. Even Sapir, who was very attentive to the interrelation of language with 
culture and with personality, plainly recognized the autonomy of this patterning in language, 
and affirmed (so far as he concurred with Whorf) that what influence there was went the 
other way, from language to psychology. We know now, for example, about the social motiva-
tion of sound changes, thanks to Labov, but those motivations arise out of processes of social 
identification (conformity and differentiation) and can do no more than adjust the relative 
placement of sounds within patternings of contrast whose basis is informational rather than 
psychological.
2. Pace the efforts of Whorf to intrigue students and draw them into the field with the so-called 
Whorf-Sapir hypothesis (which continues to be remarkably effective in that function even 
today). The complaint goes rather the other way, e.g. from Dell Hymes and his students, that 
anthropology and ethnology have had too little influence on linguistics. See e.g. Hymes (1971).
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funding increased for useful descriptions of languages deemed critical for the war 
effort. Bloomfield, Sapir, and their students, like Boas before them, had abundant direct 
experience of the propensity of experienced researchers, and not just new students, to 
project onto an unknown language expectations derived from their native tongue, over-
laid with whatever they had been taught in school about alphabets, grammatical catego-
ries, paradigms, declensions, and the like. They well understood the need to take each 
language on its own terms, and Sapir sent his students questing after the unique ‘genius’ 
of each language. They also recognized genetic, areal, and typological commonalities 
across languages, which in some ways simplified, but in other respects complicated and 
confused their task. Sapir conveyed his methods inductively in sink-or-swim seminars, 
disclosing the patterning in great arrays of linguistic forms. Pike, Nida, and others 
developed training materials for student missionaries. With the wartime demand for 
competent linguists and scientific descriptions of languages there emerged with even 
more urgency a critical need for guidance how to proceed when confronted with an 
unknown language in the field. It was in response to this, for example, that Bloomfield 
wrote his 1942 Outline guide for the practical study of foreign languages.26
In the pages of the International Journal of American Linguistics (founded by 
Boas in 1917) and Language (founded in 1925), published analyses of languages 
accumulated, exemplifying the more scientific methods. But to report the diversity 
of exotic language structures, linguists were devising almost equally diverse and 
exotic modes of describing them. So at the same time, in an almost parallel stream of 
articles and monographs, they searched for common theoretical and methodological 
ground. Implicit in the background was the question: which of the manifest differ-
ences between their presentations of language structure genuinely reflected the essen-
tial character or ‘genius’ of each language, and which amounted to what we might 
now call ‘notational variants’?
2. Sapir and Bloomfield obviously were strong influences in linguistics and on Zellig 
Harris. However, it is a peculiar distortion of the polemics of the 1960s to consider him a 
Bloomfieldian. Sapir thought very highly of Zellig’s work, beginning with a very positive review 
of his Phoenician Grammar (Harris 1936, the published form of his 1934 Ph.D dissertation), 
and children of Sapir have recalled that he considered Zellig to be his intellectual heir. The 
esteem was mutual. Zellig also greatly admired Bloomfield’s work, and him as a person. He 
studied formally with neither. The term ‘neo-Bloomfieldian’ is a rhetorical device equivalent to 
talk in the 1960s of the mythical ‘hegemony’ of ‘taxonomic linguistics’. Once this way of framing 
discussion is accepted, it becomes difficult to perceive the diversity that in fact obtained in the 
post-Bloomfield/Sapir era, and the spirit of collegiality in the presence of diversity — see the 
letter to Goetze quoted below for an instance — is misperceived as mere conformity.
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To address this question as part of the necessary spadework for establishing the 
mathematical foundations of the field, Zellig wrote a series of brief ‘structural restatements’ 
of language descriptions that had been published by his peers (drawing also on other 
materials that were available to him, both published and in manuscript), mapping each 
to a kind of normal form. He was careful to present these not as a prescriptive norm, but 
rather as a formal basis by which they might fairly be compared, and by which essential 
linguistic differences might be distinguished from accidental differences of organization 
and presentation.27 It should be realized that this was merely a published portion of a 
lifelong practice of reviewing and carefully analyzing linguistic descriptions written by 
others. Aside from familiarizing himself with the structures of diverse languages, the 
primary purpose was to test his methods (and, later, his emerging theory) at every stage. 
The related benefit was to avoid being hedged in by his own preliminary conclusions.
. Carnap’s rules of transformation
Noam’s divergence from Zellig can be seen at an early stage in their respective interpre-
tations of Carnap. Zellig contrasted Carnap’s enterprise with that of linguistics. Quot-
ing Carnap (1928), he says:
It is widely recognized that forbidding complexities would attend any attempt 
to construct in one science a detailed description and investigation of all the 
regularities of a language. Cf. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language 8: 
“Direct analysis of (languages) must fail just as a physicist would be frustrated 
were he from the outset to attempt to relate his laws to natural things — trees, etc. 
(He) relates his laws to the simplest of constructed forms — thin straight levers, 
punctiform mass, etc.” Linguists meet this problem differently than do Carnap and 
his school. Whereas the logicians have avoided the analysis of existing languages, 
linguists study them; but, instead of taking parts of the actual speech occurrences 
as their elements, they set up very simple elements which are merely associated 
with features of speech occurrences. (Harris 1951a: 16n17, italics added)
From the context of this footnote (which we will consider presently), we know that 
these “very simple elements” are “set up,” not in any arbitrary way, but in the very 
process of identifying points of contrast between utterances, as perceived by native 
speakers. It is these differential elements, the contrasts, which are “associated with 
27. “The justification …is... the testing and exploring of statements of morphological struc-
ture.[...] The present restriction to distributional relations carries no implication of the irrel-
evance or inutility of other relations of the linguistic elements” etc. (Harris 1947a: 47).
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[phonetic] features of speech occurrences” and thereby given a convenient and manip-
ulable representation.28
This passage (and others like it) may provide a good example of confirmation bias. 
Experience has taught me that many readers will understand here what they expect 
to read, instead of what is written. I have actually had linguists read this or other pas-
sages quoted below and say “he didn’t really mean that.” The usual expectation is that 
a relationship obtains between entities that exist as such prior to and independent of 
that relationship. A book is on a shelf. The relationship of one being on the other does 
not affect the book-ness of the book or the shelf-ness of the shelf. In the case of the 
primitive elements of language, however, it is the relationship of contrast which con-
fers upon certain phonetic features (or feature bundles, to use Bloomfield’s term) the 
status of being “what are called phonemes” (Harris 1951a: 72n28).
For Noam, however, the fundamental elements are not the contrasts of the given 
language, they are phonetic descriptors that apply universally to any language. His 
understanding of the procedures of (Harris 1951a) was that they “were essentially pro-
cedures of segmentation and classification … designed to isolate classes of phones, 
sequences of these classes” etc. (Chomsky 1975: 29). Subsequently, he took the funda-
mental elements to be predefined phonetic descriptors.
The alphabet of primitive symbols is determined by general linguistic theory, in 
particular, by universal phonetics, which specifies the minimal elements available 
for any human language and provides some conditions on their choice and 
combination. (Chomsky 1975: 5)
In the Introduction to (Chomsky 1951), Noam aligns himself with Carnap (1928):
Thus Carnap in the Aufbau,** for example, begins with a primitive relation 
between slices of experience and attempts to construct, by a series of definitions, 
the concepts of quality class, quality, sensation, etc., i.e., he tries to construct 
concepts for the most general description of experience. Similarly, it can be 
shown that the theoretical part of descriptive linguistics, beginning with three 
2-place predicates of individuals, and restricting its individuals to a tiny domain 
of experience (i.e. speech sounds*) can construct concepts such as ‘phoneme’, 
‘morpheme’, etc., which are available for a general description of that part of 
experience called linguistic phenomena. (Chomsky 1951: 1–2)
(The first footnote gives the citation for Carnap 1934; the second reads: “Or, perhaps, 
segments of magnetic tape on which speech is recorded.”) Thus, Noam is committed to 
the usual view that speech sounds, not speaker judgments of contrasts, are the primitive 
28. Adapting Bishop Berkeley’s familiar example, if a recording of an utterance in some lan-
guage is played in a forest, and no user of that language is there to hear it, what is the status of 
the sounds from the recorder?
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elements from which phonemes and higher-level elements are ‘constructed.’ He simply 
did not grasp this radical difference in Zellig’s formulation of the foundations of lin-
guistics, nor understand its importance for liberating linguistics from the strictures in 
which the philosophers felt themselves bound.29
. The Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew
Let us now return to the mid 1940s to consider again the situation as Noam was enter-
ing the field as an undergraduate four or five years before writing this. Zellig had just 
completed the manuscript of his first book (Harris 1951a), and had just published 
(1945) or was then completing (1947a, 1947b) his brief series of structural restate-
ments of descriptions by other linguists. This, then, was for young Noam the para-
digm of linguistics — on the one hand using anecdotal examples and fragments of 
language data to demonstrate methodological and theoretical points, and on the other 
hand reframing someone else’s description of a language as a way of substantiating 
such points. Noam’s Master’s thesis, Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew (Chomsky 
1951) is a ‘structural restatement’ (without citation) of materials that Zellig gave him;30 
29. Lest it be thought that the pair test is an instance of a “2-place predicate of individuals,” 
note that Carnap’s notion of ‘primitive dyadic predicate’ is satisfied if two individuals ‘resemble’ 
each other, but in the judgment of a native speaker, a repetition is categorially identical, not 
merely resemblant.
3. Barsky (2007: 148) quotes a letter
that Harris wrote to Bernard Bloch … on December 19, 1950...: “A student of mine, A. 
N. Chomsky has been doing a great deal of work in formulation of linguistic procedures 
and has also done considerable work with Goodman and Martin. Last year I [gave] 
him the morphological and morphophonemic material which I had here....”
Noam obviously also had access to Zellig’s description of the classical language (Harris 
1941a), and his dialect study (Harris 1939), which would have been useful for the historical 
validation of morphophonemics. Zellig was a fluent speaker and writer of Modern Hebrew, 
a lifelong resident part of the year at kibbutz Mishmar Ha’emek in Israel. His continued 
work on the linguistics of Modern Hebrew during Noam’s studentship at Penn is testified by 
(Harris 1948, 1951b). The closest Noam comes to acknowledging his dependency on Zellig’s 
prior descriptive analyses is in Section 1.3, “The present paper will confine itself to step two in 
the description of Modern Hebrew.” Step one he identifies as the ‘discovery’ of elements and “the 
determination of the relevant sequences, classes, sequences and classes of classes, etc., of these 
elements.” Step two, then, is “the construction of a descriptive statement based on the results 
of this process of discovery” (sic). Of course to ‘discover’ and ‘determine’ all this is precisely to 
formulate a descriptive statement, since the very definitions (or determinations, if you will) of 
all of the relevant elements, sequences, classes, etc. are statements of their interrelations. This 
therefore amounts to an acknowledgement of relying upon a prior descriptive organization 
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and LSLT (Chomsky 1955a, 1956a, 1975), from which his (1955b) Ph.D dissertation 
was extracted, employs the same sort of organization and use of data as does Harris 
(1951a). And this of course has been the paradigm of Generative linguistics from its 
beginnings to the present.31
As to transformations, Noam only experienced them as means for regularizing the 
successive periods of a discourse. “As a student of Harris’s, I participated in seminars 
on discourse analysis from the outset until leaving for Harvard in 1951, along with 
Fred Lukoff, A.F. Brown, and a few others” (Chomsky 1975: 53n77). Noam’s Master’s 
thesis has nothing of syntactic transformations in it. He applies the terms ‘transform,’ 
‘transformation,’ etc. to morphophonemic statements, in the sense of ‘rule of transfor-
mation’ borrowed evidently from Carnap:32
of the data of the language (step one) and restating it (step two). So far as I am aware, Noam 
never returned to the grammar of Modern Hebrew in any subsequent writing, not even to 
cite examples. Much later, Noam proposed (Chomsky 1969: 33) that progress in linguistics in 
the 1950s depended on someone coming along who was familiar both with the mathematical 
work on recursive systems and with the tradition of historical linguistics. This describes Zellig 
far better than it does Noam, whose work demonstrates neither interest nor competence in 
historical linguistics, but who we may suppose was familiar with Zellig’s historical Semitic 
writings, and presumably also his own father’s. Murray (1994: 228n3) reports that Noam 
dismissed his proposal that he was referring to himself as this person, calling this a “malicious 
distortion” but evidently without clarifying who he in fact did mean.
3. The literature of generative grammar relies upon anecdotal examples taken in isolation, 
and in particular, in discussions of ‘taxonomic linguistics’ from the 1960s onward, Noam has 
repeatedly (one might say obdurately) selected distributional regularities that do not generalize 
as purported demonstrations that distributional methods are inadequate. His talk about having 
to choose between a large number of alternative grammars is supported only by such fragmen-
tary examples. The choices are greatly reduced when full-coverage descriptions are considered, 
and dwindle even more under the requirement for a ‘least grammar’ articulated in Zellig’s last 
publications. Throughout his career, Zellig always aimed for and worked within a broad-coverage 
grammar. Methods (Harris 1951a), his most prominent work when Noam was a student at Penn, 
appears to have many exceptions to this generality, as it employs anecdotal examples to demon-
strate particular points, but even there considerations such as “simplicity of statement” — the very 
considerations that have been most vexing to Noam — boil down to asking what works out best 
in the grammar as a whole. The basic principle of Optimality Theory captures the spirit of this.
32. In the published Introduction to LSLT (Chomsky 1975: 37) Noam says that (Chomsky 
1951) is a nontransformational grammar. Its morphophonemic statements are ‘rules of for-
mation’ and ‘rules of transformation’ in the sense of Carnap (1934). There is no evidence that 
Noam ever understood Zellig’s origination of the notion of grammatical transformation in 
algebra. Zellig’s transformations are a property of language, Noam’s are a formal device for 
representing that property by ‘enriching’ the rules of a phrase-structure grammar. Rules of 
grammar may be widely variant in form, as a matter of notation and system, but transfor-
mations in the algebraic sense are variable only insofar as language varies, and changes, and 
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Here it will be shown how sequences of morphemes (of [word classes] M and U, 
the basic words) are transformed by the morphophonemic statement into their 
constituent phonemes. Adjunction of this set of examples to the previous pair 
gives a complete exemplification of the transformation of all possible sentences 
into phonemic sequences. (Chomsky 1951a: 59)33
And on p. 22:
The statements have the form of rules of transformation. Given a sequence of a 
certain shape, they direct you to alter the shape in a specified way. If the directions 
are followed, any sequence of morphemes, properly selected from M and U, will 
be transformed step by step into a sequence of phonemes.
In fact, syntax is presented only in a very simple manner, no more than a concatena-
tion of construction classes into larger construction classes, first elementary sentences 
ES, and then sentences, which can be either ES or (recursively) Sentence + Conn + 
Sentence.34 The concatenation possibilities within ES are represented by a table of 
the sort seen e.g. in Harris (1951a: 153,353), a notational variant of a simple phrase-
structure grammar. The discussion of sentence forms and construction forms is per-
functory, sufficient merely to provide context for the morphophonemics by sketching 
(with great optimism!) what a complete grammar might look like. The main focus, 
as the title indicates, is on a system of ‘rules of transformation’ specifying the mor-
phophonemic alternations in Modern Hebrew. Some of these statements are also in 
possibly evolves (or is modified) to develop new capacities. Zellig developed a description of 
language as a mathematical object, and of linguistic information as its interpretation; Noam 
developed a formal system, the procedural steps of which produce (many, by intention all) 
sentences of a language, and advanced the hypothesis (couched as a necessary presupposition) 
that this system describes or corresponds to the cognitive means by which speakers of the 
language produce those sentences.
33. The page references are to the manuscript, or, more exactly, to a photocopy of the original 
ms. made for me by the staff of the Rare Book and Manuscript Library in the Van Pelt Library 
at The University of Pennsylvania, catalogued as 378.748PoA / 1951.60 (RBC). This passage is 
found in Section 5 “Derivations”.
3. The form class Conn is defined by a list of morphemes. Over 30 years later (Chomsky 
1975: 169), Noam described these and the construction rules that follow “phrase structure 
rules supplemented by extensive use of long components”. The use of the string-rewriting 
(‘tag machine’ or ‘Post canonical system’) notation that Noam adapted (without credit) from 
Post (1943) is limited to the morphophonemic statements. It is known that Zellig made use 
of Rosenbloom’s Elements of Mathematical Logic (Rosenbloom 1950), Chapter 4 of which 
contains a nice summary of Post’s work. Noam could have read either or both, and there were 
developments of it elsewhere. It was Post who generalized the notion of an algorithm from its 
classical expression in arithmetic.
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table form; some are definitions of morpheme classes and subclasses; and the rest are 
ordered morphophonemic rules, as in Bloomfield’s (1939) Menomini Morphophone-
mics, cited in Harris (1951a: 236) as an instance of ‘descriptive order’ (ordered rules).35 
The demarcation between syntax and semantics is avowedly arbitrary: “It is convenient 
to consider the morphophonemic statement as being initiated at this point, although 
there is no systematic break.”36
More pertinent to our present considerations is the discussion of criteria for select-
ing the ‘correct’ grammar. They have nothing to do with the psychological capacities of 
the language user. As we have seen, Noam distinguishes (1.3) a first step, determining the 
elements and their combinations by distributional analysis, from a “second step … the con-
struction of a descriptive statement based on the results of this process of discovery [sic].”
[T]he statement of the grammar, the presentation of the results of the completed 
distributional analysis, must meet wholly different criteria which involve, 
essentially, considerations of elegance and considerations of adequacy as 
determined by the particular purposes of the grammar. (Chomsky 1951: 4)
For these criteria of elegance, he takes his authority from Goodman (1943: 107): “The 
motives for seeking economy in the basis of a system are much the same as the motives 
for constructing the system itself ” (Chomsky 1951: 5n). He elaborates on this theme 
in Section 4:
The fundamental question about this preceding grammatical statement, aside 
from the question of its adequacy in describing the facts, is: in accordance with 
what general considerations was it constructed the way it was, and, in particular, 
to what extent is an order imposed upon the statements by these considerations? 
It will now be shown that the statements are, to a large degree, ordered by the 
criteria of ‘elegance’. […] (Chomsky 1951: 47)
  The general considerations which have been regarded as relevant criteria are 
as follows:
Simplicity of statements1. 
Maximization of the number of derivations in which a statement will occur 2. 
relevantly.
3. Chapter 9 of Koerner (2002b) questions Noam’s claim that he did not know about Bloom-
field’s treatment of morphophonemics with ordered rules until much later.
3. Last paragraph of Section 2. The spelling of ‘morphophonemic’ here and in the title of 
Section 3 is inconsistent with the spelling of ‘morphoneme’, etc. elsewhere, with the additional 
‘-pho’ later inserted supra. The term seems to have originated with the Prague School. Anderson 
(1985: 113, in a section of Chapter 4 entitled “Morpho(pho)nology”) attributes the shorter term 
to Henryk Ułaszyn (1874–1956), a student of Jan Niecisław Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929), 
citing Trubetzkoy (1934: 30), then proceeds to use the short form thenceforth.
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Minimization of irrelevant applications.3. 
Maximization of similarity among statements, and amalgamation of 4. 
statements involving the same elements.
[…] 2 and 3 are applied only when 1 or 4 are not thereby violated. 1 is outweighed 
by 4 when the difference in complexity of the formulations under consideration 
is simply a matter of the addition of one or two symbols, with the structure of the 
statement remaining unaltered. (Chomsky 1951: 49–50)
This metagrammatical question of how to determine which of various alternative gram-
mars is the ‘correct’ one is the central purpose motivating LSLT (Chomsky 1955a). The 
proposed means of adjudication is “a general theory of language structure, a metagram-
mar” (Ryckman 1986: 131). For Noam, theory construction is a prerequisite to linguistic 
analysis; for Zellig, his methods neither require nor constitute “a theory of the structural 
analyses which result from” their application (Harris 1951a: 1), and a theory of language 
or of grammar is an outcome which must not be leaped at too quickly, lest it prejudice 
analysis and obscure the real properties of language behind ‘realities’ of presupposed 
theory. Noam makes the point that no observation or analysis is theory free, and this is 
true, but Zellig keeps his theoretical assumptions to a very minimum.
I have quoted Zellig to the effect that he crafted his structural restatements not to 
tell other linguists what they should do but to demonstrate the interconvertibility of 
their alternative types of description, making it possible to peel away differences that 
are merely artifacts of notation or descriptive style, thereby more clearly disclosing 
what is essentially distinct in each language.37 It was not in his purpose, in his interest, 
or in his nature to demand that others conform to one way of doing things, nor, in his 
view, was it in the interest of the developing field of linguistics to presume to have the 
final answer and attempt to squelch alternatives, because “the best way to get closer to 
the ‘truth’ — after I have figured out whatever I could — is to get the divergent opin-
ions which arise from a different scientific analysis.” (letter to Goetze quoted above).
Noam, however, frames the problem in terms of competing alternatives, and 
restatements in the Generativist literature (almost always ‘aspects’ of a grammar, that is, 
grammar fragments on a smaller scale than Harris 1947a, 1947b, are made only for the 
purpose of asserting superiority of one view over another, and deciding what properly 
belongs in the metagrammar that should guide further ‘discovery’. We see a glimmer-
ing of this even in (Chomsky 1951: 49n):
Actually, if these considerations [1–4 enumerated above] are dropped, almost 
any order can be shown to function successfully, simply by enumerating in each 
statement the cases which lead to an incorrect result, and adjoining to each 
statement a correction for each such instance.
37. An obvious extension of Sapir’s interest in characterizing the unique ‘genius’ of each 
language.
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The prospect of eliminating all criteria produces the appearance of a great number of 
alternative grammars. Then, instead of criteria for choosing one partial analysis over 
another within a single continuously refined description, as in (Harris 1951a), Noam 
frames the process as adjudicating between grammars and reducing a thus inflated set 
of possible grammars until (ideally) only one is left standing. Logically, they may be 
equivalent; practically, they are not.
From this and other discussions of that period and later, it is evident that Noam 
felt that where there are two alternative statements, one must be incorrect and the 
other correct. This is of course consistent with the difference of temperament posited 
at the beginning of the present paper. We noted earlier how the aim of the procedures 
in Harris (1951a) is to verify that conclusions, however reached, have a valid relation-
ship to the data of the language. Chomsky (1955a: I–9) offers the peculiar interpreta-
tion (citing it as Methods of [sic] Structural Linguistics) that these procedures “provide 
a practical mechanical way of validating [a grammar], i.e., of showing that it is in fact 
the best grammar of the language.” In this, Noam appears to be attributing to Zellig 
his own desire for an algorithm, albeit at this stage no longer an algorithm of dis-
covery, but rather of adjudication among alternative descriptions. As John Goldsmith 
says, “Generative grammar is, more than it is anything else, a plea for the case that an 
insightful theory of language can be based on algorithmic explanation” (Goldsmith 
2004: 1), or indeed that it must be so based in order to be ‘interesting,’ ‘non-trivial,’ etc. 
Any non-algorithmic description is dismissed as ‘vague’.38
You will look in vain for the above quotations in the published version of The 
Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew (Chomsky 1979a). In that revision, Carnap dis-
appears from sight. The growth in maturity of thought and expression, the greatly 
increased differentiation from the locutions and principles of (Harris 1951a), and 
indeed the sheer extent of these revisions, in six short months of 1951, is quite remark-
able. Noam has said (1975) that he intended to include it as an appendix to LSLT. 
It seems extremely unlikely that it was never revised for that purpose between 1951 
and 1956. Bearing in mind the extent of unacknowledged revisions differentiating 
(Chomsky 1975) from the several 1955–1956 versions of LSLT,39 it seems at least pos-
sible that the published version may include late revisions for (Chomsky 1975), or even 
later. How likely is it that Noam would send to publication any but the most recent 
revision? No wonder that it “addresses the subject right from the start in a surpris-
ingly  self-assured manner”, as Koerner (2002b: 24) says. For a detailed analysis of the 
38. On the algorithmic nature of generative grammar, and the pitfalls of an algorithmic 
 approach, see also Gross (1979:882–883).
39. Murray (1999), Koerner & Tajima (1986: 3–5, 56), Ryckman (1986, chap.3, esp. pp. 143–147n).
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 differences between the original ms. and the publication of 1979, see the contribution 
by Peter Daniels to this volume.
. Discovery and restatement
Noam was steeped in Hebrew language studies in his family, and he may have done 
some linguistic fieldwork with Hebrew-speaking informants in Philadelphia, but the 
‘discovery’ phase of linguistic analysis of Hebrew had already been done in Zellig’s 
publications when he undertook the restatement in (Chomsky 1951) . On that bor-
rowed basis, this is the only work approaching a comprehensive grammar that he has 
ever done. All his subsequent work has been a succession of restatements of fragments 
of the grammar of English. This is deemed sufficient because his primary aim is a 
metagrammar of all languages (‘Universal Grammar’), and he proposes that the gram-
mar of any one language cannot be written properly until that is achieved.
Did Zellig write about discovery procedures? Based on extensive fieldwork expe-
rience, both his own and that of others, eliciting information from informants about 
unknown languages, Zellig did not seek and did not expect to find any discovery pro-
cedures to simplify and short-cut the work of linguistic analysis.
These procedures are not a plan for obtaining data or for field work. [… They] 
also do not constitute a necessary laboratory schedule in the sense that each 
procedure should be completed before the next is entered upon. In practice, 
linguists take unnumbered short cuts and intuitive or heuristic guesses, and keep 
many problems about a particular language before them at the same time.[…] 
The chief usefulness of the procedures… is therefore as a reminder in the course 
of the original research, and as a form for checking or presenting the results, 
where it may be desirable to make sure that all the information called for in these 
procedures has been validly obtained. (Harris 1951a: 1–2)
Nor did he develop formal language-like structures such as the ramifications of PSG 
that so engrossed Noam. His interest was in “differences in how the language data 
responded to identical methods of arrangement” (Harris 1951a: 3) and in how diverse 
methods disclose different properties of language. The structures disclosed by his 
methods could be formalized as language-like systems (types of formal grammars), 
but this work was largely left to others.40 Many years later, he noted this algorithmic 
. Principally Aravind Joshi and his students, who formalized string analysis as adjunc-
tion grammars and as the major component of tree-adjoining grammars. Naomi Sager and 
her colleagues developed the previously mentioned systems at NYU by extending the string 
parser developed at Penn. Stephen B. Johnson is working on the formalization of Operator 
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aspect of Noam’s work in his remark that “the tree representation could be considered 
a representation not so much of the sources of the sentence as of the ordered choices 
to be made in that system for producing the given sentence” (Harris 2002[1990]: 6). As 
we have seen, his effort from an early stage was to identify what is essential in language, 
avoiding artifacts due to any particular mode of analysis or presentation.
[T]he data, when arranged according to these procedures, will show different 
structures for different languages. Furthermore, various languages described 
in terms of these procedures can be the more readily compared for structural 
differences, since any differences between their descriptions will not be due to 
differences in method used by the linguists, but to differences in how the language 
data responded to identical methods of arrangement. […] The central position 
of descriptive linguistics in respect to the other linguistic disciplines and to the 
relationships between linguistics and other sciences, makes it important to have 
clear methods of work in this field, methods which will not impose a fixed system 
upon various languages.… (Harris 1951a: 3)
By the end of 1946 he had summarized this work, as far as it had then gone, in the hefty 
manuscript that was published five years later in 1951 as Methods in Structural Lin-
guistics.41 As we have seen, the recurrent theme of this book is that linguists of course 
Grammar, using the Lexicon Grammar framework of Maurice Gross for the system of reduc-
tions. (Due to an error by the publisher, his name as co-editor of Nevin & Johnson 2002 is 
given as Stephen M. Johnson because that is another author’s name previously entered in the 
publisher’s database.)
. There can be no doubt that it was revised in the interim. In an undated letter to Bernard 
Bloch (probably early August 1949), he wrote “this g–d d----d (for the hyphens, substitute od, 
and amne) methods in descriptive linguistics book was revised by me for the (n + 1)th time 
last spring. Several people who saw it said I ought to try a couple of commercial publishers 
before sending it to you (even though, as I explained to them, I had an informal understanding 
about it with you), in order to see if a wider audience (of non-linguists) could be reached.” The 
title in 1946 and as late as 1949 was Methods in Descriptive Linguistics. Zellig told me he was 
not certain who made the change, he or the publisher, and I have supposed that the publisher 
substituted a word with more marketing sizzle. However, Joos (1957: 96) says:
An older term for the new trend in linguistics was ‘structural’. It is not idle to consider 
how the term ‘descriptive’ now [1942] came to replace it, even if not all the reasons 
can be identified. The Sapir way of doing things could be called structural, but the 
term was more often used for the stimulating new ideas that were coming out of 
Europe, specifically from the Cercle Linguistique de Prague.
So, although it may have been a restoration of an older term, the publisher’s motivation 
may have been to align with the sales appeal of European linguistics. The notion that ‘neo-
Bloomfieldians’ rejected European ideas seems ill supported.
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have freedom to work in diverse ways (Zellig was after all an anarchist), employing 
all kinds of heuristics and hunches as they wrestle their data into a form that makes 
useful sense, but as scientists aware of their all too human proclivity to perceive what 
they expect to perceive, and as linguists aware of the all too human suggestibility of 
informants, especially in politically and economically subordinated cultures, it was 
incumbent upon them to verify that their conclusions continue to bear a valid rela-
tionship to their data. It was Noam, and not Zellig, who by his own account was avid 
for discovery procedures.42
7. Fundamental data
Judgments of meaning are among the heuristics that linguists use (Harris 1951a: 
365n6). Indeed, Zellig plainly indicates that among all the possible distributional regu-
larities that may be found, just those are sought which establish “elements which will 
correlate with meanings” (Harris 1951a: 188). A late statement is found in Zellig’s last 
book, A theory of language and information, in Section 2.4, entitled “Can meaning be 
utilized?”: “All this is not to deny the usefulness of considering meaning in formal 
investigation...” etc. (Harris 1991: 42). Not only is it incorrect, therefore, to say that he 
avoided meaning, as is commonly alleged; we must rather acknowledge that identify-
ing the fundamental data of linguistics depends upon “the meaning-like distinction 
2. This is not to say that Noam was interested in discovering data about languages. I see no 
evidence of that. Rather, he seems to have had the conviction that Zellig’s “presentation of the 
methods … of research in descriptive, or, more exactly, structural, linguistics... in procedural 
form and order” (Harris 1951a: 1) should be, despite disclaimers on the page just cited and 
elsewhere, algorithmic procedures corresponding to the process by which children learn lan-
guage. Noam’s lifelong penchant for abstract analysis in preference to breadth of data, increas-
ingly prominent in his later career, seems to have been the dominant factor in this early work 
“devoted to the problem of revising and extending procedures of analysis so as to overcome 
difficulties that arose when they were strictly applied” (Chomsky 1975: 30). The procedure de-
scribed in (Harris 1955, 1967) for identifying morpheme boundaries (or rather, the boundaries 
of morpheme alternants, or allomorphs) is the closest thing to a discovery algorithm in his 
publications; it depends upon a prior representation of the contrasts (standard orthography 
suffices for an approximation) and requires subsequent morphophonemic and morphemic 
analysis to establish the morphemes of a language. Note that (Harris 1955: n1) acknowledges 
Noam’s input. The Turing-machine-like system for sentence recognition (Harris 1966) was 
presented as a demonstration of distributional principles, not as a discovery procedure. “The 
detailed problem here is … the word-representation methods which made it possible to apply 
so simple a device. Indeed … it can be studied as a notation for the modalities of requirement 
and permission [which a given word has to all environing words].”
2 Bruce Nevin
between utterances which are not repetitions of each other” (1951a: 363).43 We will 
return to the nature and role of meanings again farther on.
This brings us to a subtle point, central to Zellig’s work, namely that the funda-
mental data of linguistics are not phonetic records or notations, but rather speaker 
judgments of what is different and what is a repetition. Phenomena cannot be repeated 
exactly; categorical perceptions of those phenomena can. In consequence, these most 
basic linguistic elements, the phonemic contrasts, are not segments or features of 
sound as discriminated by phoneticians, they are perceptual distinctions made by 
native speakers, which we keep track of by associating them with such phonetic seg-
ments or features.44 Sounds are associated with the contrasts by the very process of 
the substitution tests that identify them, a process which requires segmenting utter-
ances such that one segment can be substituted for another.45 But the contrasts are 
primary, and can be represented by segmenting the speech stream in alternative ways. 
This crucial point is stated in numerous places, for example in the extended statement 
at (1951a: 16–21), and in the following:46
Since the representation of an utterance or its parts is based on a comparison of 
utterances, it is really a representation of distinctions. It is this representation of 
differences which gives us discrete combinatorial elements (each representing a 
minimal difference). (1951a: 367)
Yet, despite the frequent reiteration with different words in a variety of contexts, so far 
as I know, none of his contemporaries recognized this.47 Bernard Bloch, for example, 
3. Likewise in many other places, e.g. (Harris 1942), where is cited also Bloomfield (1933: 161) 
to the same effect. See also (Hiż 1979: 344), quoted farther on below.
. This is consistent with the development of logic and mathematics from the making of a 
distinction in a space, see Spencer-Brown (1969).
. Ideally, but not necessarily, the pair test. The segments need not all be made by ‘vertical’ 
cuts of the phonetic record; the substitution of ‘horizontal’ features or simultaneous compo-
nents is also possible.
. See also (Harris 1941b), especially the third paragraph, beginning “It is in the second 
step, selection of the contrast-criterion....”
7. See e.g. Joos (1957: 108) “[Hockett’s] segmentation into ‘sounds’ is not so much logi-
cally justified as taken for granted. Today it is even considered possible to defend the thesis 
that such segmentation can’t be done strictly until after phonemic segmentation has been 
somehow (say distributionally) established.” Had he “today” (1956 or so) understood the pair 
test and its consequences as to the ontology of phonological contrast, he would have under-
stood that an initial segmentation is inseparable from, and in a sense is effected by, the deter-
mination of contrasts. In particular, he could not have employed that last phrase, “somehow 
(say distributionally) established,” for the non-substitutability of contrasting segments in the 
pair test (or more generally in substitution tests) is precisely a distributional establishment of 
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assumed that phonemic distinctions can only be derived from distributional analysis of 
phonetic data (Bloch 1948).48 Certainly it is no part of phonology today, and, although 
in several places Noam recognizes the utility of the pair test (e.g. 1975: 93, 147) for deter-
mining the phonemes without appeal to meanings, there is absolutely no  evidence that 
he understood the consequences for the ontological status of phonemic distinctions 
and of linguistic elements established on that basis. Everything in his phonological 
work is grounded in a universal alphabet of descriptors or features, each of which is 
defined by some phonetic characteristic.49
Those descriptors are considered to be universal phonological elements. The 
effort to achieve universality for them has turned out to be difficult through many 
successive revisions, and remains inconclusive. The features are considered to be pho-
nological rather than merely phonetic because they cohere in a system; that is, their 
interrelations constitute an a priori abstract system which is taken to be more impor-
tant phonologically than the equally or even more systematic considerations of their 
distribution in utterances.
them. See also the comments earlier on confirmation bias. Harris’s writing is always careful 
and exceptionally clear, and (unless the matter itself is exceptionally complex) difficulties are 
usually where what he says is contrary to the reader’s expectation. As Jane Robinson once 
observed (pc): “If I have an idea what he’s talking about, I can understand him. As someone 
said of Quine, once you’ve understood what he means, you realize he couldn’t have said it any 
other way. Harris is that way for me. It’s just that what he’s trying to say is difficult.”
8. The critique of Bloch and others and the rejection of distributional methods in 
(Chomsky 1964) appears to be intended to apply, incorrectly, to Harris (1951); see Nevin 
1993a, 1999 for discussion. Some readers have been confused by e.g. “This procedure takes 
the segmental elements of Chapter 5 … and groups them into phonemes on the basis of 
complementary distribution” (Harris 1951: 59). What is overlooked, leading to this misunder-
standing, is that “the segmental elements of Chapter 5” are not ‘phones’, that is, elements of 
a phonetic transcription; rather, they already constitute a preliminary phonemic representa-
tion, since they indicate speakers’ phonemic distinctions, albeit inefficiently, and it is those 
 inefficiencies or redundancies that distributional analysis removes.
9. Some work on a hierarchy of features that enter progressively, as it were, into the pho-
nemic contrasts of a language (e.g. Dresher 2003) amounts to a statement of affordances for 
contrast (if I may borrow Gibson’s (1977, 1979) terminology without importing with it his 
conclusions about the environmental causation of behavior). This principle is most clearly 
seen where in certain articulatory regions differences of articulation have little acoustic effect, 
and in adjacent regions slight differences of articulation result in a change in categorial per-
ception. An example is the so-called quantal vowels (Stevens 1972). It remains that the con-
trasts of a language cannot be predicted from phonetic data, and the crucial factor is still 
human perception. See also Kirchner (1995).
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8. The attack on distributional analysis
At the end of Chapter X of (Chomsky 1956a), we read the following approbation of 
distributionalism:
Within the general limits of formal distributional analysis, there are many 
avenues of investigation beyond those that have been followed here, notably, the 
whole study of the statistical structure of language. ... In short, there seems to be 
considerable unexplored territory within the boundaries of formal distributional 
analysis, and the possibilities and potentialities of such analysis show no sign of 
having been exhausted. It is surely premature to insist that the basis of linguistic 
theory be extended to include obscure and intuition-bound concepts, on the 
grounds that the clear notions of formal analysis are too weak and restricted to 
lead to interesting and illuminating results. (Chomsky 1956a: X751–752)
This Chapter X became50 the Summary Chapter 1 of (Chomsky 1975), but when we 
consult the latter, such language has entirely disappeared. What happened?
In his plenary presentation at the 1962 Ninth International Congress of Linguists, 
as later expanded to (Chomsky 1964), several aspects of the divergence that we are 
discussing are in sharp relief. A full analysis of this tour de force of reframing51 would 
require treatment of at least equal length, but a few exemplary extracts will help illus-
trate the extent and nature of the divergence in views at this stage, beginning here 
with the question of phonetics and phonological contrast. Most of what Noam says 
. “In the spring of 1956, I began to revise the manuscript for publication. In the original, 
the tenth and final chapter was a summary. In the version that I was preparing for publication, 
I placed the summary chapter first, otherwise leaving the chapter order unaltered. During that 
year I did manage to rewrite the new summary chapter (Chapter I) and the first five chapters 
of the original (Chapters II–VI). The manuscript as published here consists of a preface written 
in 1956 and the chapters (here numbered I–VI) of this edited version.” (Chomsky 1975: 3) 
However, Chomsky (1956a) shows the summary chapter (from which I have quoted here) in its 
original position at the end as Chapter X. Ryckman (1986) has shown that extensive revisions 
in addition to the rewriting in 1956 intervened before publication of (Chomsky 1975).
. I use the term ‘reframing’ in the sense of Lakoff (1987, 2002). (It is likely that he adopted 
the term from Bandler 1982. See the Wikipedia article on reframing for an account of the 
origination and earlier usage of the term.) Reframing shifts the terms of debate in presupposi-
tional ways. In this instance, the diversity of descriptive linguistics was reframed as a unified, 
hegemonic ‘taxonomic linguistics’ straw man. This collapsing of diversity into a convenient 
form for argument is admitted e.g. at (Chomsky 1964:75): “Though modern phonologists have 
not achieved anything like unanimity, a body of doctrine has emerged to all or part of which 
a great many linguists would subscribe” etc. Developments in phonology that are too diverse 
to be made to fit are dismissed as inexplicit and vague (ibid. fn. 13), as measured against a 
standard of suitability for formalization in an algorithm.
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is perfectly compatible with Zellig’s views. He has told me (letter of September 18, 
1995) that this apparent compatibility is only because Zellig is ‘vague’, but it is more 
accurate to say that Zellig did not demand that only one of several alternative formu-
lations must be true. For Zellig, these are not rules in an algorithm, they are tools of 
analysis. It is true, as Noam says, that he held that these tools are useful for different 
purposes, yielding results which in the very nature of science are provisional. But 
more than that, each type of analysis (constituency, expansions, string analysis, trans-
formations, least differences, discourse analysis, sublanguage analysis, etc.) reveals a 
different aspect of “what gives” in language. Where Noam looks for rules, Zellig offers 
methods. For example
It should be clear that while the method of 7.3 [grouping segments having 
complementary distribution] is essential to what are called phonemes, 
the criteria of 7.4 [phonetic and environmental symmetry] are not essen-
tial ‘rules’ for phonemicization, nor do they determine what a phoneme is. 
(Harris 1951a: 72n28, italics added)
Zellig developed diverse methods of analysis, and showed how each method discloses 
some of the properties of language well, and others not so well. His approach was to 
honor the method, apply it with neutral care, and see what emerges.
Zellig Harris’s work in linguistics placed great emphasis on methods of analysis. 
His theoretical results were the product of prodigious amounts of work on the 
data of language, in which the economy of description was a major criterion. He 
kept the introduction of constructs to the minimum necessary to bring together 
the elements of description into a system. His own role, he said, was simply to 
be the agent in bringing data in relation to data.... [I]t was not false modesty 
that made Harris downplay his particular role in bringing about results, so much 
as a fundamental belief in the objectivity of the methods employed. Language 
could only be described in terms of the placings of words next to words. There 
was nothing else, no external metalanguage. The question was how these placings 
worked themselves into a vehicle for carrying the ‘semantic burden’ of language.... 
His commitment to methods was such that it would be fair to say that the methods 
were the leader and he the follower. His genius was to see at various crucial points 
where the methods were leading and to do the analytic work that was necessary 
to bring them to a new result. (Sager & Ngô 2002: 79)
Noam understands matters in terms of argument, of which there must be a winner. 
These are for him not tools of analysis, but theories of grammar which are either cor-
rect or incorrect. For example, central to the project of Generative Phonology, as we 
have seen, is the stipulation that the phonological features constitute a system which 
is independent of any particular language in which those features might be employed to 
make the contrasts between different utterances. Noam (1964: 77) sets this against the 
position that “languages could differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable 
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ways” (attributed to Boas by Joos 1957: 96).52 In his (1941b) review of Trubetzkoy, 
Zellig does not reject what Noam (op. cit.) calls ‘systematic phonetics’ (also ‘structural 
phonetics’); although he says “it is pointless to mix phonetic and distributional con-
trasts” [sic], and he asserts that the former are secondary to the latter:
[I]n order to study the relations between phonemic contrasts one must first have 
selected what kind of contrast to investigate. Those which Trubetzkoy studies are 
the phonetic contrasts. He does not say that he is intentionally selecting these 
rather than any other. He merely uses them as though they were the natural and 
necessary ones to consider. […] But there are other criteria in terms of which one 
may study the contrasts.... Chief among these is the positional distribution.... 
Trubetzkoy was quite aware of this....he discusses the importance of considering 
[this]... and... modifies the patterning of the phonetic contrasts by some results 
from distributional contrasts. However, it is pointless to mix phonetic and 
distributional contrasts… [and phonetic parallels among the phonemic contrasts] 
must be independently proved. (Harris 1941b.348, italics added)
This passage invites the quoting of sound bites (or ‘text bites’) out of context. Compare 
the more careful formulation of his (1951a) in which speaker perceptions of contrast 
are the primary data which are distributionally associated with discrete features of pho-
netic data by substitution tests, and then these associations are wrestled by various cri-
teria into one of the several possible more efficient and useful representations “that are 
called phonemes”.53 The difficulty is that he is using the term ‘contrast’  ambivalently 
2. Noam quotes only this phrase, and attributes it solely to Joos, who in fact attributed it 
to Boas and the tradition following him: “Trubetzkoy phonology tried to explain everything 
from articulatory acoustics and a minimum set of phonological laws taken as essentially valid 
for all languages alike, flatly contradicting the American (Boas) tradition that languages could 
differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways, and offering too much of a 
phonological explanation where a sober taxonomy would serve as well. Children want expla-
nations, and there is a child in each of us; descriptivism makes a virtue of not pampering 
that child.” One cannot but wonder if Noam took this last as being aimed at himself, and 
rankled at it. But see also Thomas (2002) on the now institutionalized misinterpretation of 
this quotation from Joos.
3. “At a time when phonemic operations were less frequently and less explicitly carried 
out, there was discussion as to what had to be done in order to arrive at ‘the phonemes’ and 
how one could discover ‘the phonemes’ of a language. Today we can say that any grouping of 
complementary segments may be called phonemic. [Bear in mind that the ‘segments’ here are 
not ‘phones’, having been established in substitution tests that identified the phonemic con-
trasts. — BN] As phonemic problems in various languages came to be worked out, and pos-
sibilities of alternative analysis were revealed, it became clear that the ultimate elements of the 
phonology of a language, upon which all linguists analyzing that language could be  expected 
to agree, were the distinct (contrasting) segments (positional variants, or allophones) rather 
than the phonemes. The phonemes resulted from a classification of complementary seg-
mental elements, and this could be carried out in various ways. For a particular language, one 
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in this passage. The phrase which I have italicized above, “other criteria in terms of 
which one may study the contrasts,” distinguishes the “contrasts” from two kinds of 
criteria for studying them, (a) “other [i.e. distributional] criteria” on the one hand and 
(b) the previously discussed phonetic criteria that produce what he equivocally called 
Trubetzkoy’s “phonetic contrasts,” on the other.
The thrust of this part of the review is that “phonemes are in the first instance 
determined on the basis of distribution” and phonetic criteria are secondary. This is 
because the substitution tests (idealized as the pair test) establish the “first instance” by 
identifying which parts of the speech stream may be substituted for each other without 
contrast, and which may not, and it is the substitution within an environment which 
makes the very establishing of them distributional in character.
Noam (1964:77) continues quoting Joos (1957: 228) as saying
that “distinctive features are established ad hoc for each language or even dialect”, 
and that “no universal theory of segments can be called upon to settle the moot 
points” (228). Similarly, Hjelmslev appears to deny the relevance of phonetic 
substance to phonological representation.
What Joos is discussing here, with reference to Hockett (1947), is the variety of pho-
netically defined distinctive feature systems that had emerged within ‘taxonomic lin-
guistics’. Consequently, it is neither a “rejection of the level of structural phonetics” 
qua level nor of “the relevance of phonetic substance,” as Noam says. Rather, it is a 
rejection of applying any a priori solution universally. It is unclear whether or not Joos 
understood Zellig’s reason for such rejection. This reason, as we have seen, was that 
the terms of contrast must be determined for each language on the basis of distribution 
(substitution tests identifying speaker perceptions of contrast and thereby associat-
ing phonetic features with them), and that phonetic criteria are therefore necessarily 
secondary.
The difficulty is that the universality of any system of distinctive features had 
(and has) yet to be demonstrated, and to presume it in advance, begging the question, 
would actually hinder that demonstration. As an illustration, at a certain stage in the 
long and complicated (and still unfinished) history of this universal alphabet, so-called 
‘pharyngeal’ or ‘faucal’ sounds in languages like Arabic and Achumawi have been rep-
resented by a retracted tongue root (RTR) feature. The actual articulatory gesture is 
phonemic arrangement may be more convenient, in terms of particular criteria, than other 
 arrangements. The linguistic requisite is not that a particular arrangement be presented, but 
that the criteria which determine the arrangement be explicit.” (Harris 1951: 72n28) The fact 
that the allophones are contrasting affirms that the contrasts are yet more basic, although of 
course they (the contrasts) are established simultaneously with the allophones by the same 
substitution tests.
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epiglottideal (Laufer & Condax, 1979), with secondary effects on the tongue, pharynx, 
and larynx. In Achumawi, certain phenomena are simpler to describe if the epiglot-
tideal aspirate (like that of Arabic) is treated in parallel with the glottalized consonants 
of the language, to which no one would apply this RTR feature. Yet convenience for the 
‘universal’ feature hierarchy dictated the existence of RTR and that it should be used to 
distinguish this aspirate from the ordinary one, complicating the description of those 
laryngeal phenomena (Nevin 1998).
Noam continues (1964: 77):
Nevertheless, it seems to me correct to regard modern taxonomic phonemics, 
of all varieties, as resting squarely on assumptions concerning a universal 
phonetic theory of the sort described above. Analysis of actual practice shows 
no exceptions to the reliance on phonetic universals. No procedure has been 
offered to show why, for example, initial [ph] should be identified with final [p] 
rather than final [t] in English, that does not rely essentially on the assumption 
that the familiar phonetic properties … are the “natural” ones. Harris might be 
interpreted as suggesting that a non-phonetic principle can replace reliance an 
[sic] absolute phonetic properties when he concludes (1951a, 66) that “simplicity 
of statement, as well as phonetic similarity, decide in favor of the p–ph grouping”; 
but this implication, if intended, is surely false. The correct analysis is simpler 
only if we utilize the familiar phonetic properties for phonetic specification. With 
freedom of choice of features, any arbitrary grouping may be made simpler.
There are several equivocations here. First, what is at stake is not a universal theory 
of phonetic description, but a universal theory of phonetically defined phonological 
features — in other words, of all possible phonetic descriptors, just that subset which is 
presumed to account for all contrasts in all languages, in such a way as to support the 
most perspicuous account of alternations in all languages.
Now, place what Zellig said about “simplicity of statement” in context:
It is also convenient to have the relation among segment definitions within one 
phoneme identical with the relation in other phonemes. This requires that the 
segments be grouped into phonemes in such a way that several phonemes have 
correspondingly differing allophones … in corresponding environments.[...] We 
could have grouped [p] and [th] together, since they are complementary. But the 
above criterion directs us (barring other relevant relations) to group [p] with 
[ph].... For if we do so, we can say that the /#__V/ member of all these phonemes 
is virtually identical with the /s___/ member except that [h] is added; such a 
simple general statement would not have been possible if we had grouped the 
segments differently. (Harris 1951a, 66)
It is in a footnote that Zellig says we could in principle violate this, combining e.g. [p] 
with [th], etc., but that doing so would complicate the description. The definition of 
phonemes would have to say that in addition to adding [h] the point of articulation 
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changes. This would also complicate any statement (rule) applying to phonemes defined 
in this way. Therefore, “simplicity of statement, as well as phonetic similarity, decide in 
favor of the [p] – [ph] grouping.”
What Zellig says here cannot coherently be construed as “replacing” a reliance on 
phonetic features, since the statements or rules in question cannot be compared as to 
their simplicity except by reference to phonetic features that [p], [ph], [th], etc. do or 
do not have in common. This is of course what Noam paraphrases in the quoted pas-
sage at (1964: 77), but it is so obvious that we have to wonder why he bothered to flog 
the point.
In the larger context of the section quoted above, what Zellig is saying is that at 
this (hypothetical!) early point in phonemic analysis many items in the preliminary 
segmentation are in complementary distribution, so complementarity is not always a 
sufficient criterion for associating two segments with the same speaker-identified con-
trast. By a second criterion, we may group segments so that “several phonemes have 
correspondingly differing allophones” — in other words, so that phonological rules 
can refer to such phonemes together as a set, or alternatively can refer to the features 
that they have in common. This is what he calls “simplicity of statement.” It is difficult 
to imagine what Noam could fault about making a phonological rule more general.
To suggest that the criterion of “simplicity of statement” somehow replaces “reli-
ance on absolute phonetic properties” is so curiously obtuse that we must wonder at its 
possible motivation. In this context, consider how peculiar it is for Noam to wonder 
what Zellig meant here. After all, he could just ask him, if he had not already done so 
in the preceding 15 years or so of their association. The explanation evidently is that it 
was rhetorically useful for his argument.
What Noam is gearing up for here is a rejection of distribution as a criterion. 
This is necessary in order to supplant the distributional identification of contrasts (by 
substitution tests) with a universal alphabet of phonetically defined terms of contrast. 
He does not come right out and assert his own exclusive reliance on phonetic descrip-
tors which are claimed to be ‘absolute’ universal phonological features. Perhaps the 
reason he does not say this is because it is convenient for his argument at this point to 
assert as a straw man that Zellig, by using other criteria in addition to shared phonetic 
properties, is doing the converse of what Noam is in fact doing — that is, rejecting 
the criterion of shared phonetic properties — a classic innoculation move in polemic 
argument. This need not have been nefarious abuse of rhetorical prowess. It has been 
suggested (e.g. R. Harris 1998) that it is difficult for Noam to perceive what someone 
is saying in any terms other than his own. This is of course a cognitive trap to which 
we are all subject, but is perhaps exacerbated by the characteristic cognitive style that 
I have attributed to him.
The Noam of (1951a, 1955a) was entirely in accord with Zellig on this point, 
placing “simplicity of statement” first in rank among criteria for choosing the ‘correct’ 
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description (1951a: 49–50); he of (1964) rejects it, giving paramount importance 
instead to an a priori system of phonetic descriptors (their systematicity apparently 
that which makes them ‘phonological’), with a parallel shift respecting syntax. This 
shift, and the ratcheting up of polemical rhetoric, coincides with the emergence of 
‘universal grammar’ in Noam’s doctrine.
9. Sounds and contrasts
Noam has acknowledged (letter of 9/18/1995 to the author) that his (1964) critique 
of linearity, invariance, biuniqueness, and local determinacy does not apply to Zellig’s 
work. In this, he may have backed off from the claim (Chomsky 1964: 98) that “The 
only general condition that they [Zellig’s procedures] must meet is the biuniqueness 
condition, which is not justified on any external count, but simply is taken as defining 
the subject.”54 But here again they are not referring to the same thing. Noam is talk-
ing about the correspondence of ‘taxonomic phonemes’ to the ‘phones’ of a phonetic 
transcription. Zellig is talking about the correspondence between two phonemic rep-
resentations of the contrasts attested by speaker judgments: a preliminary and rela-
tively disorganized representation achieved by associating phonetic descriptors with 
the contrasts, and a more efficient representation achieved by distributional analysis 
yielding “the scientific arrangement” (Harris 1941b: 345) of those phonetic data. Both 
“arrangements of data” depend upon the segmentation of the utterance by those acts 
of substitution that identified the contrasts (that is, the speaker judgments of what is 
repetition and what is not) and which thereby associated phonetic data with them. The 
distributional analysis does not create or discover the phonemic contrasts; it merely 
maps a complex and redundant representation of the contrasts to “what are called pho-
nemes,” a clearer and more useful association of phonetic data to the contrasts.
Zellig usually referred to this mapping as a ‘one-one correspondence,’ but intro-
duced the term ‘bi-unique relation’ in his 1944 paper on phonemic long components:
. Zellig admits a one-many correspondence as follows: “In general, the representation is 
in one-one correspondence with each occurrence of the represented speech. In the case of 
intermittently present distinctions, however, it is in one-one correspondence only with a set 
of repetitions of the represented speeches” (Harris 1951: 364n5). The “external [ac]count” jus-
tifying this correspondence depends upon the purpose to which the representation is put. 
Typically it is important to have a well-defined mapping from speech to representation so that 
the recording of speech for the sake of further analysis is straightforward; and since utterances 
predicted by the analysis must be tested with native speakers, it is obviously important to be 
able to reconstruct from the representation something that they recognize as utterances in 
their language.
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Finally, if we are ready to admit partial overlapping among phonemes, we 
may agree to have different components in different environments represent 
the same phonetic value. So long as we do not have a component in one 
environment represent two phonetic values which are not freely interchangeable, 
or two components or component-combinations in the same environment 
represent the same phonetic value, we are preserving the bi-unique one- 
to-one correspondence of phonemic writing. (The term bi-unique implies that 
the one-to-one correspondence is valid whether we start from the sounds or from 
the symbols: for each sound one symbol, for each symbol one sound.) (1944a. 
187–188, footnote suppressed)
This sounds like a correspondence of phones with phonemes. However, not any ‘sound’ 
will do, but only those that are associated with the contrasts by virtue of the segmenta-
tion established in substitution tests with informants to determine speaker judgments as 
to “phonemic distinctions, these being the ultimate and necessarily discrete primitives 
of the language structure. Phonemes were defined as a convenient arrangement of how 
these phonemic distinctions appeared in utterances” (Harris 2002.2, italics added).
Those speaker judgments necessarily pertain to the given language, and are 
not themselves universal. There may indeed be some set of universal ‘affordances’ 
(Gibson 1977) that people preferentially, perhaps even necessarily, use to make the 
contrasts of their respective languages. There is evidence of this in so-called quantal 
vowels and in phonological universals. From Zellig’s point of view, that is an interest-
ing and valuable result, but it cannot be presumed in advance. In any case, speaker 
judgments are the primary data.
Zellig concurs in the value of simultaneous features (e.g. 1951a: 64–65) as a rep-
resentation of contrasts that may in some respects be more convenient than phone-
mic segments or phonemic long components, or combinations of these. Noam argues 
that phonological features are the only legitimate representation — when alternatives 
are offered, there can only be one winner. The argument has two aspects, firstly their 
convenience for stating phonological rules, and secondly their purported universality. 
Claims of their universality rest overtly on arguments for innateness. In this, Noam’s 
earlier wish for an algorithmic solution to the problem of language description has 
been reframed as a biological solution to the problem of child language.
The case for exclusive use of features is the core argument against ‘taxonomic 
phonemics’ in (Chomsky 1964). Split and merger processes in the historical develop-
ment of languages can produce an ‘asymmetry’ such as that reported for Russian in 
(Halle 1959), where voicing is contrastive for stops but not for the affricates /c, č/ and 
fricative /x/, yet in all cases voicing is assimilated from a following obstruent. In a 
‘taxonomic’ segmental representation, this must be described in the same way for all 
cases, but with two kinds of rules, morphophonemic rules for stops and allophonic 
rules for the affricates and fricative. “Simplicity of statement” requires a single rule 
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stated in terms of features. Zellig of course had advocated “simplicity of statement” 
long before, but had greater variety of means to that end at his disposal. Noam does not 
consider alternative formulations that are possible using phonemic long components 
instead of universal features.55
. The relative nature of elements
As we have seen, the substitution tests which establish native speaker judgments of 
contrast are inherently distributional in character, and establish phonemes relative 
to one another. This is why “phonemes are in the first instance determined on the 
basis of distribution” (Harris 1941b: 348). Given the relative nature of the contrasts, 
all the phonemic, morphophonemic, morphemic, constructional, and other elements 
are necessarily also relative in nature. For most practical purposes, these elements are 
treated as though they are records of things which happen to be different, but in fact 
each element is no more than a marker of differences.
Since each element is identified relatively to the other elements at its level, and 
in terms of particular elements at a lower level, our elements are merely symbols 
of particular conjunctions of relations: particular privileges of occurrence and 
particular relations to all other elements. It is therefore possible to consider the 
symbols as representing not the particular observable elements which occupy 
an environment but rather the environment itself, and its relation to other 
environments occupied by the element which occupies it. We may therefore 
speak of inter-environment relations, or of occupyings of positions, as being our 
fundamental elements. (Harris 1951a: 370–371)
Thus, when Zellig says things like the following, it is not ‘hocus-pocus’ or ‘game play-
ing’, he is talking about something that is essential in the nature of language:
...morphemes may be regarded either as expressions of the limitations of 
distribution of phonemes, or (what ultimately amounts to the same thing) as 
elements selected in such a way that when utterances are described in terms of 
them, many utterances are seen to have similar structures. (1951a: 367)56
. In 1964, Zellig had not concerned himself with phonology for probably 20 years. Any 
representation of the contrasts, even conventional English orthography, is adequate for his 
 investigations into the informational properties of language. Phonology is encapsulated relative 
to syntax and semantics in Generativist writings as well, for the same reasons.
. The locution “as expressions of the limitations of distribution of phonemes” in this 
passage shows that Zellig was aware of the next-successor stochastic determination of mor-
pheme boundaries in the 1940s, long before writing (Harris 1955, 1967). This is of course 
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Thus, while intuitions of the meanings of morphemes (or lexical items) are sugges-
tive, regularity and generality of structure in the description as a whole are criterial 
for determining by which distributional regularities to define the elements (phonemes, 
morphemes, etc.). Noam, however, sees here only a vague statement by a man who “did 
not believe there was any truth to the matter to be discovered” (letter to the author, 
9/8/1995). It is not that Zellig did not believe that there was any truth to the matter to be 
discovered, but rather he did not believe that any of the diverse possible representations 
should be taken to be that which they represent. We have already noted that the find-
ings of science may legitimately make no claims (or covert presuppositions) of absolute 
truth. See for example Hawking, who affirms (1988: 9) that a scientific theory “exists 
only in our minds and does not have any other reality (whatever that might mean).”
Zellig’s recognition of the relative character of all linguistic elements, and his facil-
ity in shifting perspective between an element and its environment, conferred great 
freedom on his investigations of language data and his formulation of methods and, 
later, of theory. For Noam, the purpose of analyzing language data is to specify univer-
sal elements and metagrammatical principles when then can be known in advance of 
analyzing language data.
. The role of meaning
In the 1975 Preface of LSLT,57 Noam clearly declared the autonomy of syntax from 
semantics:
Syntax is the study of linguistic form. Its … primary concern is to determine the 
grammatical sentences of any given language and to bring to light their underlying 
formal structure. […] Semantics, on the other hand, is […] the study of how this 
instrument, whose formal structure and potentialities of expression are the subject 
of syntactic investigation, is actually put to use in a speech community. […] We 
related to information theory and to linguistic information, that aspect of meaning which is 
specific to language. Note also that the decade or so of incubation between the writing of this 
brief allusion in the 1940s and the publication of a scientific report in 1955 is typical of his 
way of working.
7. Although there is no Preface to the 1956 revision of the June 1955 ms. as posted at 
http://alpha-leonis.lids.mit.edu/chomsky/, and this passage does not appear as such in that 
ms., we do read on page 2 that “no reliance is placed on the meaning of linguistic expres-
sion in this study, in part, because it is felt that the theory of meaning fails to meet certain 
minimum requirements of objectivity and operational verifiability, but more importantly, 
because  semantic notions, if taken seriously, appear to be quite irrelevant to the problems 
being investigated here.”
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shall study [syntax] as an independent aspect of linguistic theory. […][S]emantic 
notions … appear to assist in no way in the solution of the problems that we 
will be investigating. We will see, however, that syntactic study has considerable 
import for semantics. This is not surprising. Any reasonable study of the way 
language is actually put to work will have to be based on a clear understanding 
of the nature of the syntactic devices which are available for the organization and 
expression of content. (Chomsky 1975: 57)
Although the conflation of semantics and pragmatics that is evident here has been 
somewhat clarified since this was written, Noam’s view of semantics as the interpreta-
tion of the productions of syntax has persisted in generativist proposals of semantic 
features, a semantic component parallel to a phonological component, and so forth.
We may contrast
...the attitude of Harris toward semantics. In his work, he uses semantics both 
explicitly and in a syntactic guise. Contrary to general belief, in his early work 
(1950), Harris does not eliminate explicit semantics. Rather, semantics is reduced 
to a single, simple, and testable question: Are two utterances repetitions of each 
other, or do they contrast? Book and hook contrast and this is a fundamental 
semantic datum. From it, by formal manipulations, the linguist reconstructs two 
different phones [sic] /b/ and /h/. To contrast means to not be a repetition: to say 
or to mean something else. This rudimentary, explicit semantic element was never 
eliminated from Harris’s work and — I may add — is assumed in all linguistic 
efforts, even if that fact is not always recognized. It is present in phonetics, in 
syntax, in discourse analysis, in field methods, and in comparative studies. In 
addition, Harris uses semantics implicitly. The entire effect of Harris’s syntax … 
is oriented toward rendering semantic differences by syntactic means. His syntax 
is always semantically motivated, in spite of the changes in form through the 
years. It is not that the result of the syntax — the derived sentences — will later 
receive semantic interpretation, but that each syntactic step reflects or records 
a semantic property, a paraphrase being a particular case of such a property. 
(Hiż 1979: 344)
Here, semantics (meaning, information) is not a projective interpretation of syn-
tax (form), but rather form and information are two views of the same thing, and 
Zellig’s work was to make the correspondence of these two faces of the coin explicit 
and  obvious by distinguishing the information- content aspect of language from the 
 presentational aspects.58
8. The separation of content from its presentation has become familiar to a new generation 
of computer scientists with the development of (crudely) semantic markup ‘languages’ for 
texts, especially SGML and XML.
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Although the identification of phonological elements is semantic (as well as dis-
tributional) in nature, it is semantic to only a ‘rudimentary’ extent. They, or rather the 
contrasts that they represent, do not themselves correlate with meanings:
If in all the occurrences of a word the phonemes were replaced by others, we 
would simply have a variant form of the same word. But if we replaced some 
or all of the occurrences of a word by a word which had different selection, i.e. 
whose normal occurrences were different, we would have a different meaning. 
(Harris 1991: 322)
Zellig’s recognition that “inter-environment relations, or ... occupyings of positions, 
[are the] fundamental elements” (Harris 1951a: 371, quoted above) has ramifications 
for semantics. If we accept the customary assumption that the meaning of a word 
determines in what environments it may occur (the word owl is only used in combina-
tion with those words with which it ‘makes sense’), then we must accept the converse: 
that the distribution of an element is a formal specification of its meaning, or rather, of 
that part of its meaning with which we are most concerned in linguistics.
As Leonard Bloomfield pointed out, it frequently happens that when we do not 
rest with the explanation that something is due to meaning, we discover that it 
has a formal regularity or ‘explanation’. It may still be ‘due to meaning’ in one 
sense, but it accords with a distributional regularity. (Harris 1954: 157)
  If one wishes to speak of language as existing in some sense on two 
planes — of form and meaning — we can at least say that the structures of the 
two are not identical, though they will be found similar in various respects. 
(Harris 1954: 152)
  Language is clearly and above all a bearer of meaning. Not, however, of all 
meaning. […] Meaning itself is a concept of no clear definition, and the parts of 
it that can be expressed in language are not an otherwise characterized subset 
of meaning. Indeed, since language-borne meaning cannot be organized or 
structured except in respect to words and sentences of language …, we cannot 
correlate the structure and meanings of language with any independently known 
catalogue or structure of meaning. (Harris 1991: 321)
In Zellig’s original form of discourse analysis there is a transform of the sentences of 
a discourse that regularizes its structure so that all repeated phrases and their ‘local 
synonyms’ can be placed in the same column of a table. Each row is a successive period 
of the discourse, each cell is a lexical item in the specialized lexicon of that discourse, 
and the column heads are the classifier vocabulary of that semantic domain. Zellig 
extended this in two ways. First, all discourses of a constrained subject-matter domain 
have discourse structures in common, exemplifying the sublanguage of that domain. 
They employ the same sublanguage lexicon and the same classifier vocabulary in a 
common specialized sublanguage grammar. This is especially clear in a technical 
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domain, such as the sublanguage of a science (Harris et al. 1989). Secondly, in the lan-
guage as a whole there is a subset of sentences in which the correspondence of distri-
bution with meaning is much more direct and transparent. This subset constitutes an 
informationally complete sublanguage with no ambiguity and no paraphrase (Harris 
1969). The sentences of the language in which the correlation of form with meaning is 
less clear are paraphrases of sentences in this subset.
The correlation between distribution and meaning is sharpened progressively in 
Zellig’s work, until with operator grammar we are concerned with the fuzzy acceptabil-
ity gradation of operator-argument dependencies which, for a sublanguage, approach 
or reach a completely binary selection, where a given dependency is either fully accept-
able or is rejected as nonsense (or non-science), and such fuzziness of selection as 
remains is a marker of controversy or change in the field (Harris et al. 1989).59 From 
this work results a theory of linguistic information (Harris 1991).
This is a theory of the information that is ‘in’ language by virtue of its structure. 
Language users associate additional meanings with this information. “Correlations 
between the occurrence of linguistic forms and the occurrence of situations (features 
of situations) suffice to identify meanings; the term ‘to signify’ can be defined as the 
name of this relation.” (Harris 1940: 228 [704 of reprint]).
2. The language, the whole language, and nothing but the language
To give more palpable substance to our understanding of how the work of Noam and 
Zellig has diverged, consider Noam’s requirement (echoing Carnap) that a grammar 
is required to account for “all and only the sentences of the language.” This is an ide-
alization that omits many pertinent aspects of language structure, including on the 
one hand the sentence fragments that pepper ordinary discourse, and on the other 
hand most60 restrictions that cross sentence bounds. For of course “Language does 
not occur in stray words or sentences but in connected discourse — from a one word 
utterance to a ten-volume work, from a monolog to a Union Square argument” (Harris 
1952: 3). Even the conjunction of two sentences imposes word-sharing requirements. 
Consider this simple conjoining of sentences taken from two different books:
9. In some degree corroborating the so-called Whorf-Sapir hypothesis.
. The treatment of pronouns and other referentials in a sentence grammar fudges this 
without addressing the larger questions of inter-sentential regularities.
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* Let us make the assumption that a string X of I which is n phonemes in length 
is carried by ΦPm into a string Y which is n phones in length and other views of 
Heidelberg can be seen in emblems, here reproduced for the first time.61
There is nothing wrong with this example from the point of view of a sentence-grammar 
of ‘the language,’ because such grammars cannot discriminate different domains of 
discourse. By that I do not refer to matters of presentation such as dialect, register, and 
style, but rather to subject-matter domain or (equivalently) the sublanguage of such a 
domain. The regularities that are found, and the elements and operations upon them 
adduced in a grammar, depend upon the domain or sublanguage being considered as 
well as the scope under consideration.
For instance the sentence The antibody titer rose on the fourth day (as may occur 
in a text of cellular immunology) can be represented in various ways by different 
sentence grammars: as having the phrase structure
(S (NP the antibody titer) (VP (V rose) (PP (P on) (NP the fourth day))))
or a partially-ordered word dependence structure [as in Operator Grammar 






As occurring in a text in a sublanguage of cellular immunology, the sentence 
might be reconstructed, showing its similarities with other sublanguage sentences, 
as: On the fourth day following the reinjection of viral antigen into the footpad of 
rabbits of the same strain, the titer of antibody rose in the lymph follicles, which 
can be represented as an instance of the word class sequence GJB : AVT, with : = 
on the fourth day following; G = viral antigen; J = (re)injection; B = rabbits of the 
same strain; A = antibody; V = titer present in; T = the lymph follicles. (Ryckman 
1986:246n)
This last representation is underwritten by the analysis and grammar of an immunol-
ogy sublanguage as detailed in Harris et al. 1989. Each of these three representations 
. The first sentence is from (Chomsky 1975: 160), and the second is from (Yates 1972: 59), 
Ryckman (1986: 247) offers this illustration:
*Manifestation is a relation of a whole and its parts and it was all characteristically 
Teutonic, and, critically examined, not very tactful; but tact was never Wagner’s strong 
suit when trying to convince the world that its only hope of salvation lay in hitching itself 
to the German chariot.
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of sentence structure enables one to reconstruct the well-formedness of the example 
sentence in accord with the sentence-defining elements and operations of a certain 
type of grammar. The elements and operations specified in each such grammar cap-
ture regularities shared by sentences that occur normally together in a discourse (or 
set of discourses in a sublanguage domain). But the project of “generating all and only 
the sentences of the language” entails an idealization that can capture only sufficient 
structure to assure that the sentence is sayable, regardless of whether it expresses any 
coherent meaning or has any likelihood of ever being actually said. This has artifi-
cially limited the notion of ‘grammaticality’ so that it contrasts with acceptability or 
meaningfulness.62 However, language users recognize structure (or “have intuitions of 
grammaticality”) much more extensively in respect to sentences as they occur together 
in a discourse.
Consider the utterance It doesn’t me either (spoken in my hearing recently by my 
brother). Immediately prior context was a series of sentences of this sort: He might 
have wanted to X. Or it might have been because of Y. I had to remember four or five 
sentences prior, where his wife said It doesn’t make sense to me. It is only in that distant 
context that the words make sense to are redundant so that zero allomorphs of them 
can occur in It doesn’t me either. A classical Generativist gapping operation on a PSG-
based tree structure is quite useless here.
Example sentences isolated in the metalinguistic context of grammatical dis-
cussion are not an idealization so much as a willful ignorance, which can warrant 
only very limited conclusions about the nature of language, and which gives rise to 
pseudoproblems.
2. Whereas for Zellig these attributes concur (grammaticality, acceptability, meaningful-
ness), Noam relegates acceptability to ‘performance’ in his revisionist Introduction to LSLT 
(Chomsky 1975: 7). He claims that Section 100.2 is an instance of making this distinction, 
although that section merely identifies a phenomenon that he does not know how to explain 
(and which not all informants recognize as an actual phenomenon, eerily suggestive of 
the disputes about Generative Semantics). In Section 11.1 (Chomsky 1975: 81–82) he rejects 
“informant response tests to determine the degree of acceptability or evocability of sequences” 
in favor of “a revealing general theory of which all [grammars thus approved] are exemplifica-
tions.” He may be obliquely rejecting the criterion for transformation that Zellig discussed in 
1955 or earlier but only later in (Harris 1965) advanced as a replacement for ungraded selec-
tion-preservation (the foremost criterion in Harris 1957). However in correspondence with 
the author he has disclaimed any familiarity with Zellig’s writings since about 1955  (although 
clearly from the comment (Chomsky 1975: 38 and fn. 70) he had read (Harris 1965)). The 
‘general theory’ or metagrammar that he posits as a desideratum in the above quotation is 
what he elsewhere reframes as a biologically innate Universal Grammar.
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3. Pseudoproblems
As an example of such pseudoproblems, consider the notion that language users have 
an intuition of ambiguity, e.g. that a sentence such as flying planes can be dangerous is 
ambiguous. When such a sentence is no longer artificially isolated there is of course 
no ambiguity. Such context is called ‘disambiguating’, but it is rather the case that the 
isolation of sentences by linguists is ‘ambiguating’, and what are called intuitions of 
ambiguity are no more than the ability to imagine more than one context in which the 
isolated sentence might naturally occur. Noam has rejected this view, however:
Apparently many linguists hold that if a context can be constructed in which an 
interpretation can be imposed on an utterance, then it follows that this utterance 
is not to be distinguished, for the purposes of study of grammar, from perfectly 
normal sentences […], though the distinction can clearly be both stated and 
motivated on syntactic grounds. [...] This decision seems to me no more defensible 
than a decision to restrict the study of language structure to phonetic patterning. 
(Chomsky 1964: 7n2)
There is a distinction, surely, but the proposal that it is a matter of grammaticality is 
coherent only given a prior commitment to restricting ‘grammar’ to a grammar of iso-
lated sentences (with anaphora and other cross-reference a marginal problem).
A more extended class of pseudoproblems are the so-called island phenomena. 
These are problematic for grammatical operations on abstract phrase-markers derived 
from phrase-structure grammar. When Haj Ross was visiting Joshi’s class at Penn in 
1969, and spoke, as one might expect, about island phenomena,63 I told him that they 
are not an issue in string adjunction grammars (Harris 1962a, Joshi et al. 1968, 1972a, 
1972b). He asked, with evident concern, “Is that true, Aravind?” and Joshi replied “Yes, 
but they [adjunction grammars] have their problems, too,” whereupon he relaxed and 
the discussion moved on. What Joshi meant was that rewrite rules and adjunction rules 
are complementary: rewrite rules handle exocentric constructions well but not endo-
centric constructions, and the converse is true for adjunction rules, for which the small 
set of center strings and adjunct strings is simply specified in a list.64 At the time, Joshi 
3. The subject of his 1967 dissertation (Ross 1967).
. “[E]ach style [of formal grammar] … is well suited for characterizing certain aspects 
of natural language structure and is awkward for characterizing certain other aspects. The 
awkwardness can be due to either an inherent difficulty in characterizing a certain aspect 
(e.g., the characterization of the notion of the ‘head’ of a constituent in a PSG) or actually a 
counter-intuitive characterization (e.g., this often happens in a PSG, especially in the context 
of transformational grammars, because a PSG allows an ‘uncontrolled’ introduction of new 
‘non-terminals’). … The main purpose is to set up a class of grammars which has no more 
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and his students were working on grammars combining the two types of rules so as 
to exploit this complementarity.65 This led to tree-adjoining grammars (TAGs, see e.g. 
Joshi 1985), in which the (exocentric) center strings and adjunct strings are generated 
by very simple rewrite rules rather than being listed, and adjunction rules then han-
dle the much more complex endocentric structures of language.66 There is a natural 
transition from an adjunction grammar to a transformational grammar, by deriving 
adjunct strings from sentences.67 In an Operator Grammar (Harris 1982, 1991), island 
phenomena fall out naturally from the linearization and reduction constraints, calling 
for no particular special attention (Nevin 1989). The exocentric properties of language 
arise from the dependency of operators on their arguments which must have previously 
entered into the construction of a sentence; the endocentric properties arise from the 
(‘extended morphophonemic’) reductions of the overt forms of the resulting strings.
To substantiate in more detail the assertion that island phenomena are pseudo-
problems arising from use of phrase structure rules in the base would take us far too 
far afield in this context.68 It is well supported by the relevant literature. Two points are 
especially germane to our present narrative.
Firstly, adjunction grammars form a hierarchy distinct from the Chomsky hier-
archy (more correctly, the Chomsky-Schützenberger hierarchy) of formal grammars, 
intersecting it in interesting ways. This is not widely understood. The Chomsky hier-
archy is often thought of, at least by computer scientists of my acquaintance,69 as 
power than necessary and which also can characterize different aspects of natural language 
structure in a natural way.” (Joshi et al. 1968). Compare also Zellig’s discussion of the relation 
of the Morpheme to Utterance grammar of string expansions to string analysis and to trans-
formations in (Harris 2002: 3–4), quoted later in the present paper, and in the first section of 
(Harris 1965).
. This may be why he was so close-mouthed.
. Zellig had developed string analysis (published after some delay as Harris 1962a) as an 
alternative to constituent structure, providing the basis for the 1959 computational analysis 
system at Penn (Joshi 1959, 2002).
7. This was noted at the very beginning, in the 1930s and 1940s (Harris 2002: 3–4). 
Naomi Sager and her group exploited this relationship in implementing the very successful 
Linguistic String Processor (LSP) and the Medical Language Processor (MLP) at NYU. The 
MLP system uses XML (mentioned earlier) in the data-organization part of its implementa-
tion (Sager & Ngô 2002). Most of the work is in refining the subclasses of the lexicon. The 
same may be said for the development of a sublanguage grammar and lexicon. This work is 
conveniently summarized in (Sager 1984; Sager & Ngô 2002). Successful computer implemen-
tation is a demonstration that speaks far more strongly than argument.
8. For a detailed study from this point of view see (Nevin 1989).
9. Or in their case even a restricted subset of grammars in that hierarchy. See (Manaster-
Ramer & Kac 1990: 328–329): “[T]he term phrase structure grammar is often — in theoretical 
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 comprehending or outlining the full range of formal grammars, although it concerns 
only rewrite grammars of the sort invented (as noted earlier) by Emil Post.70 Yet PSG 
trees of abstract pre-terminal symbols have become in effect indicators of paradigm 
membership for writings on syntax.
Secondly, a principal reason that adjunction grammars, tree-adjoining gram-
mars, and Operator Grammar are more suited to natural language than PSG-based 
formalisms is that semantic relations hold between adjacent morphemes and words.71 
In adjunction grammars, the initial strings are simple enough to meet the contiguity 
requirement, and when adjunct strings that are inserted, creating discontiguities in the 
previously present host string, they are inserted next to their head word.72 There is no 
problem of constraints at a distance.
computer science always [...] — used to denote type-0 (unrestricted) grammars, which gen-
erate all the recursively enumerable languages, a proper superset of the context-sensitive lan-
guages. [etc.]”
7. The essential differences between language and language-like formal systems such as 
computer ‘languages’ should be borne in mind. Language subsists essentially in spoken form 
of which any graphic form is a representation for convenience. A formal language such as that 
generated by phrase-structure rules subsists essentially in graphic form, of which any spoken 
form is a representation for convenience. In his Mathematical Structures of Language, Zellig 
notes “certain apparently universal and essential properties of language, which are observable 
without any mathematical analysis, and which are such as to make possible a mathematical 
treatment” (1968: 6). These are that language elements are discrete, socially preset in speaker 
and hearer, and arbitrary, that combinations of these elements are linear and denumerable, 
that not all combinations constitute a discourse, that operations are contiguous, that the meta-
language is in the language, and that language changes. “Each of these properties has metathe-
oretical consequences for linguistics.” In a formal language, the elements are discrete, preset 
by explicit definition, contingent on the terms and conventions of definition, operations need 
not be contiguous, the metalanguage is in natural language, and the language does not change 
(changed terms, definitions, etc. produce a different language).
7. Word-order phenomena are also defined locally. This is important computationally. See 
Joshi & Rambow (2003).
72. Insertion of adjuncts accounts for almost all discontiguities. The adjunct that ends up 
most distant from the head is inserted first, and becomes separated from it by subsequent 
adjunctions. In string grammar, the head of an adjunct string may possibly be separated from 
the insertion point at the head word by other words in the adjunction string itself, but an 
alternate word order is available that permits contiguity. This is exploited by the extension to 
transformational grammar (and to operator grammar), in which e.g. an adjunction string in 
which a word is fronted may be a reduction from a sentence in which that word is fronted. The 
procedure of string analysis is to ask repeatedly what is a least part that can be excised from 
a sentence without destroying sentencehood. The result is to identify each least increment of 
information to the sentence.
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This is easier to see in Operator Grammar, where the source of all adjuncts is the 
reduction of an interrupting parenthetical sentence. For example:
 a. ? books — books (same as prior) I like especially well — are in this box.
 b.  books which I like especially well are in this box.
This example demonstrates that the required metalanguage assertions that two words 
have the same reference are available in the language itself. (The metalanguage is a 
sublanguage in the language.) Co-reference is a condition for the reduction to wh– 
pronoun. In the example, co-reference of the two occurrences of the word books is 
expressed here by the phrase same as prior.73 If it were expressed by an index (e.g. 
booksi — booksi I like especially well — are in this box), that index marker is no more 
than a graphical representation of that metalanguage assertion in words. This is explic-
itly seen when the use of such index tags is explained or defined, as it must be.74
However, the indexed terms must be contiguous in order for this notational con-
vention of subscript indices to be interconvertible with metalanguage assertions that 
are intrinsically available within language.75
Indices were invented precisely to address arbitrary points in a string, and points 
that are separated by arbitrarily long intervening strings cannot be addressed by stating 
a simple relationship in language (e.g. prior). Non-language indices are an unavoidable 
consequence of the use of rewrite rules in the base, because unbounded extraneous 
material may intervene between coreferential terms. But in Operator Grammar, as in 
adjunction grammar and tree-adjoining grammar, co-referential terms are contiguous 
at the time that the reduction takes place, becoming separated from each other only 
73. For a more careful formulation, see Harris (1968, 1982, 1991). It might be objected that 
same as prior is itself an adjunct phrase requiring a sentential source and reduction under 
metalinguistic sameness. Note that lexical items in a sublanguage lexicon often are lexically 
complex when considered in a broad-coverage grammar or in the grammar of another sub-
language. For example, has high fever might be a single lexical item in the Symptom class in a 
medical sublanguage. Other examples were seen in the quotation above from Ryckman (1986), 
e.g. rabbits of the same strain as a single lexical item in in the B lexical category of the immu-
nology sublanguage.
7. And for comprehension such definitions in words must be in the hearer’s context (tacit 
or overt) when reading examples that employ such index tags.
7. For some types of reductions, ‘nearby’ suffices. See (Harris 1982; Nevin 1984) for details. 
All anaphoric and epiphoric reference is handled by the same sort of zeroable metalinguistic 
sameness statement. So-called crossing coreference, as in The man who shows he deserves it 
will get the prize he desires, is not problematic for the reductions in Operator Grammar, since 
they are not defined in terms of constituent structure.
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by the subsequent entry of additional sentences which may be reduced to adjuncts.76 
The same problem arises for semantic relations between words (selection restrictions), 
mandating in addition to indices an extra superstructure of semantic features or the like.
This illustrates a contrast between the two approaches to linguistics. Noam’s con-
strual of a particular ‘tool of analysis’ (immediate constituent analysis) as a theory of 
grammar (phrase-structure grammar enriched by transformation rules) and his com-
mitment to it as the ‘correct’ theory until disproven and replaced by another, con-
strains what he takes to be worthy of consideration, and focuses attention on anecdotal 
examples set up as proof or disproof of one detail of theory or another. (Even after the 
radical reformulations in Government and Binding Theory and in Minimalism, the 
machinery of abstract phrase-markers has been retained.) The examples and counter-
examples of one stage are only of historical interest at a later stage (rule ordering and 
island phenomena, for instance, are passé, no longer hot topics). Zellig used diverse 
‘tools of analysis’ to disclose different properties of language (constituency is good at 
endocentric constructions, string analysis at exocentric constructions, etc.). “It is not 
that grammar is one or another of these analyses, but that sentences exhibit simultane-
ously all of these properties” (Harris 1965: 365). Properties of language, once identi-
fied, are not subsequently set aside or replaced, though they may be subject to further 
analysis (as in the factorization of transformations in Harris 1964, 1969). This freed 
him to develop broad-coverage grammars and enabled him to defer commitment to 
a theory of language and information until the relevant properties of language had 
become clear.
. Grammatical machinery is expressed in a metalanguage
Zellig realized that77
There is no way to define or describe the language and its occurrences except in 
such statements said in that same language or in another natural language. Even 
if the grammar of a language is stated largely in symbols, those symbols will have 
to be defined ultimately in a natural language (1991: 274).
This means that any apparatus of grammar is only an abbreviation (or representation 
by symbols) of that which can also be expressed by metalanguage assertions conjoined 
7. Note that Noam concurs in the obvious fact that the language in which grammars are 
formulated is a metalanguage of the language which they describe (Chomsky 1975: 116).
77. I recommend to your attention the more careful yet concise account of the thinking that 
led to recognizing the role and status of the metalanguage as a sublanguage, given at (Harris 
2004[1990]: 7–9).
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to sentences, but which are not usually uttered in overt phonemic form because they 
are common knowledge. Examples of zero allomorphs like the zero form of the plural 
morpheme in sheep are of course well accepted. The zeroing of redundant or low-
information morphemes in e.g. so-called gapping (John plays piano and Mary violin) 
is an obvious and uncontroversial reduction in Operator Grammar. The zeroing of 
common-knowledge conjuncts, such as the dictionary sentence in It’s raining [and an 
umbrella is for protection from rain or sun] so I’ll take an umbrella is a straightforward 
extension. It enables a simple statement of the word-sharing requirement for conjoined 
sentences illustrated above with a conjunction of sentences taken from two different 
books. Similar to this, then, is the zeroing of metalanguage assertions that constitute 
the machinery of grammar, e.g. for co-reference. (Noam’s solution to this dilemma has 
been to assert that the machinery of grammar must be innate by “What else could it 
be?” arguments, as noted earlier.)
This also means that linguistics cannot rely upon any prior metatheory of 
language.
In the absence of an external metalanguage, the entities of each language can 
be identified only if the sounds, markers, or words of which they are composed 
do not occur randomly in utterances of the language. That is, the entities can 
be recognized only if not all combinations occur, or are equally probable. This 
condition is indeed satisfied by languages. A necessary step, then, toward 
understanding language structure is to distinguish the combinations of elements 
that occur in the utterances of a language from those that do not: that is, to 
characterize their departures from randomness. (Harris 1988: 3)
In addition, it imposes a requirement on the results of linguistic analysis:
This task entails an important demand: it calls for a least description, that is, for 
a characterization of the actually occurring combinations by means of the fewest 
and simplest entities and the fewest and simplest rules and conditions of their 
combination, and with no (or least) repetition. The reason for this demand is 
that every entity and rule, and every complexity and restriction of domains of a 
rule, states a departure from randomness in the language being described. Since 
what we have to describe is the restriction on combinations in the language, 
the description should not add restrictions of its own. If two descriptions, one 
more efficient than the other, characterize the same data, then the less efficient 
description must have overstated the actual restrictions in the language — by 
overstating and then withdrawing part, or by repeating a restriction, or whatever. 
(Harris 1988: 3–4)
  [T]here is also a responsibility to formulate a theory based on self-organizing 
capacities: one that will present language as a system that can arise in a state in 
which language does not exist. This is so because of the unique status of language 
as a system which contains its own metalanguage. Any description we make of a 
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language can only be stated in a language, if even only in order to state that some 
items of the description are properties of some other items (i.e. how to read the table). 
We cannot describe a language without knowing how our description can in turn be 
described. And the only way to avoid an infinite regress is to know a self-organizing 
description, which necessarily holds also for the language we are describing even if 
we do not use this fact in our description. (Harris 2002[1990]: 10)
There are two important contrasts here with Noam’s work. First, Noam has asserted 
from an early stage that linguistics cannot proceed unless informed by a prior metathe-
ory of language.
It is elementary that theoretical investigation and collection of data are independent 
activities. One cannot describe a linguistic system in any meaningful way without 
some conception of what is the nature of such a system, and what are the properties 
and purposes of a grammatical description. (Chomsky 1956a: 2–3)
Where Zellig stipulates only the restrictions on method (distributionalism) and on for-
mulation (least grammar) due to absence of an external metalanguage, Noam rejects 
distributionalism and asserts a need to know “what is the nature of … a [linguistic] 
system, and … the properties and purposes of a grammatical description” of such a 
system. He simply asserts, without argument, that no alternative is possible.
For this reason, it is important to develop a precisely formulated and conceptually 
complete construction of linguistic theory, based on the clearest possible 
elementary notions, even when the more elaborate constructions based upon 
these notions cannot, because of insufficient evidence, be empirically supported. 
The establishment of such a theory may be an essential step towards obtaining 
this evidence. (ibid.)
Here, in the 1956 draft of LSLT, this amounts to a leap of faith. Formulating one’s 
conclusions in advance may be an essential step towards obtaining evidence for those 
conclusions — or maybe not. Subsequently, as we know, that faith was placed in the 
innate biological endowment of humans. That is the second point of contrast, his attri-
bution of metalanguage functions to a biologically innate Language Organ or (more 
recently) Language Function.78 In the event, what was ambitiously presented in 1956 as 
a sequence (first theory, then evidence) was later reverted to a bootstrapping operation 
78. We would be remiss not to recognize the reduction of the Language Function in its 
narrow sense (exclusive to human language) to just the property of recursion, and the 
ensuing disputation. See Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch (2002); Pinker & Jackendoff (2005); Fitch, 
Hauser & Chomsky (2005); Jackendoff & Pinker (2005). Zellig’s discussion of the nature and 
probable evolutionary origin of language (Chapter 4 of Harris 1988 and Chapter 12 of Harris 
1991, esp. pp. 365–373) is much more simple and straightforward, as a natural consequence of 
accounting for information-bearing constraints in language rather than accounting for formal 
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in which theory guides investigation of examples and counterexamples which moti-
vate revisions of theory, and so on, with no end in sight.
These matters constitute some of the substance of the divergence of views that we 
are considering, and they figure importantly in various miscommunications and mis-
construals over the years, but lest we stray too far from our present theme, discussion 
elsewhere must suffice (Harris 1991, 2002[1990]; Nevin 1993b, 2002).
Noam has said (p.c.) that this talk of the metalanguage is not anything that he 
remembers hearing from Zellig. The importance and function of the intrinsic metalan-
guage is implicit in Zellig’s writings of the 1940s and 1950s, being the essential motivation 
of distributionalism and what is commonly taken as “avoidance of meaning,” although it 
may not have been clearly communicated until after Noam had (by his account) ceased 
to pay attention to what Zellig was saying and (by any account) was firmly established in 
his views on innateness. The crux of the matter for the present discussion is that Zellig 
recognized (and demonstrated) that the metagrammatical resources that are available 
within language itself suffice, and necessarily so; whereas Noam assumes that the requi-
site metagrammatical resources are necessarily external to and prior to language, given 
in the biological endowment of humans. Zellig’s assumption freed him to employ diverse 
methods of analysis to disclose the properties of language, and at the end of his career 
he organized these properties into a theory of language and information (Harris 1988, 
1991). Noam’s assumption constrains him to treat each method as a theory of language, 
and to determine, by deploying examples as disproof, which one is correct.
. Generalization is not the same as abstraction
As we have seen, Zellig’s concept of transformation came directly from linear algebra. 
The discussion in (Harris 2002.3–4) is instructive:
The relevance of the hierarchy of word expansions [Harris 1946] … was not simply 
in providing a direct procedure that yielded the structure of a sentence in terms 
of its words, but in opening a general method for the decomposition of sentences 
into elementary sentences, and thus for a transformational decomposition system. 
This unexpected result comes about because, first, the small sentence which is at 
the base of the expansions is recognizable as the grammatical core sentence of 
the given sentence, and, second, each expansion around a particular word can 
be seen to be a reduction or deformation of a component sentence within the 
given one. The status of expansions as component sentences was visible from the 
beginning: when the expansion method was presented at the Linguistic Institute, 
a question was raised as to how the method would distinguish the two meanings 
properties of language-like mathematical systems that are proposed to be (or describe) the 
means by which language users produce and understand language.
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of She made him N in She made him a good husband because she made him a good 
wife; the answer was in showing that two different expansions obtained from two 
different component sentences yielded here the same word sequence (sec. 7.9 in 
[Harris 1946]). The expansion analysis was formulated later as a decomposition 
of the given sentence into word strings[...]79
  While the machinery for transformations was provided by the “Morpheme 
to Utterance” equivalences, the motivation for developing transformations as 
a separate grammatical system was furthered by the paraphrastic variation in 
sentences that was found in discourses. In 1946, with the completion of Methods in 
structural linguistics, the structure of a sentence as restrictions on the combination 
of its component parts seemed to have gone as far as it could, with the sentence 
boundaries within an utterance being the bounds of almost all restrictions on word 
combination. I then tried to see if one could find restrictions of some different 
kind which would operate between the sentences of an utterance, constraining 
something in one sentence on the basis of something in another. It was found that 
while the grammatical structure of any one sentence in a discourse was in general 
independent of its neighbors, the word choices were not. [This is related to the 
word-sharing requirement noted earlier. — BN]
  In a discourse, the component sentences revealed by the Morpheme to Utterance 
expansions were often the same sentence appearing in different paraphrastic forms 
in neighboring sentences. The use of reductions and deformations of sentences 
79. That is, string analysis is a later formulation of the expansion analysis. This refutes the 
common mistake of judging the expansion grammar of (Harris 1946) to be a notational 
variant of phrase structure grammar. Just prior to the above quotation he writes:
[N]º a priori justifiable general method was found to reach the structure of a 
sentence (or an utterance) by a hierarchy of constituent word sequences, or other 
parital structures of words. The problem was finally resolved by a single general 
procedure of building, around certain words of a given sentence, graded expansions 
in such a way that the sentence was shown to be an expansion of a particular word 
sequence in it, this word sequence being itself a sentence. (Harris 2002: 3)
Where (Harris 1965: 363) contrasts string analysis with constituent analysis, he is not talking 
about the expansion grammar of 1946, but rather the immediate constituent analysis of 
Bloomfield. This distinction should be obvious upon reading even the first paragraphs of 
(Harris 1946). Constituent analysis depends upon native speaker judgments of where to 
bisect sentences and the resulting parts of sentences, on the assumption that such bisection is 
fundamental to human psychology. The expansion analysis, instead, depends upon judgments 
of the substitutability of strings of morphemes (with single morphemes being the limiting 
case). String analysis, conversely, depends upon judgments of successive least portions of a 
sentence that may be excised without destroying sentencehood. X-bar notation, head-driven 
PSG, and other innovations aim to capture the endocentric capacities of the expansion 
grammar. So-called bare phrase structure (BPS) proposed in Noam’s Minimalist Program 
appears to be a more direct attempt to capture Zellig’s original insight, to the extent that the 
notion of ‘projection’ corresponds to expansion from word-class to construction-class.
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both to produce expansions and also to produce separate paraphrastic forms of 
a sentence motivated the formulation of a whole transformational system, and 
[Harris 1952] was presented to the Linguistic Society of America in 1950.80... 
The transformational system...was presented to the Linguistic Institute at Indiana 
University in 1951–1952. The formal presentation, with detailed structural-linguistic 
evidence that the expansions were indeed transformed sentences, was given at the 
[LSA] meeting in 1955 ([Harris 1957]). (Harris 2002: 3–4, footnote added)
Taking the notion ‘transformation rule’ from Carnap, Noam thought of transforma-
tions as an algorithmic rule of a new type acting on the productions of the phrase-
structure rules. In this we see a critical parting of ways in their treatment of language 
and their understanding of linguistics, and (quite apart from questions of tempera-
ment) the basis of many mischaracterizations of Zellig’s work.
Noam’s development of transformations as operations on abstract tree structures 
derived from PSG has led to an ever more abstract metatheory of grammar. Zellig’s 
work demonstrates that such abstract treatment is not required, and that properties 
of this grammatical machinery actually obscure the essential properties of language. 
Zellig recognized this:
There is an advance in generality as one proceeds through the successive stages of 
analysis above [from structural linguistics through transformational linguistics 
to operator grammar]. This does not mean increasingly abstract constructs; 
generality is not the same thing as abstraction. Rather, it means that the relation 
of a sentence to its parts is stated, for all sentences, in terms of fewer classes of 
parts and necessarily at the same time fewer ways (‘rules’) of combining the parts, 
i.e. fewer constraints on free combinability (roughly, on randomness). But at all 
stages the analysis of a sentence is in terms of its relation to its parts — words 
and word sequences — without intervening constructs. Because of this fact, and 
because the parts which are determined are such that their meanings are preserved 
under the sentence-making operations, the meaning of a sentence as a particular 
combination of particular words is obtained directly as that combination of the 
meanings of those words. (Harris 1981: v–vi)
The abstractness of Generative Grammar seems to arise primarily from the abstract-
ness of phrase structure trees. For Noam, language is at root a logico-mathematical 
system, and transformations are rules that operate on tree structures generated by 
phrase- structure rules.81 In recent years, the rules have been factored into interactive 
8. And prior to that “was given at an anthropological congress held in 1949.” (Hymes & 
Fought 1975: 153).
8. I take the substantive differences to be in Zellig’s and Noam’s respective treatments of syntax 
and semantics. Setting aside for the present the claims of Generative Phonology, discussed earlier, 
we can see that they both start with the discrete elements of language, whether identified by 
language users (and by descriptive linguistics) in the speech stream or directly observable in 
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modules with cumulative effect, but they still operate on abstract structures of preter-
minal symbols.82 In addition, abstract treatment has been useful to Noam for control-
ling the terms for argument and debate, a labyrinthine playing field with which he alone 
is most familiar, all the more so to the extent that others have not been so free as he to 
redefine the field from time to time (as exemplified by R. Harris 1993).
For Zellig, transformations are algebraic mappings from subset to subset of 
the set of sentences. For convenience, each subset is represented by an n-tuple of 
morpheme classes and constants83 (called a sentence form), but the relationship is 
between the actual correspondant sentence pairs that are the subset members. This 
illustrates what he means by generalization as distinct from abstraction. The set of 
transformations themselves turned out to be factorable into elementary sentence-
 differences (Harris 1964, 1969). These in turn were restated as the effect or incre-
ment of an operator word entering on the words in its argument, with reductions 
(‘extended morphophonemics’) being carried out at the time that word entry creates 
the requisite string conditions84 (Operator Grammar, Harris 1982). Each tool of anal-
ysis that he developed and used along the way (word expansions, string structure, 
transformational structure, etc.) revealed or favored some of the properties of language 
and disfavored others.
It is not that grammar is one or another of these analyses, but that sentences 
exhibit simultaneously all of these properties. […] Each of these properties can 
be used as the basis for a description of the whole language because the effects 
of the other properties can be brought in as restrictions on the chosen property. 
(Harris 1965: 364)
writing, and with the basics of morpheme classes and subclasses. Except for intonation, issues of 
phonology are encapsulated, that is to say, they do not enter into examples used in discussions of 
syntax and semantics, which even in an ‘exotic’ language are presented with nothing more phono-
logically sophisticated than a practical orthography.
82. Morphemes were initially understood to enter these structures by a subsequent step 
of lexical insertion at each terminal symbol. Subsequently, Noam introduced the Projection 
Principle to alleviate some of the problems that were encountered. Since these problems do 
not arise in Zellig’s Operator Grammar or in sublanguage grammars, the Projection Principle 
is evidently an artifact of notation.
83. A single morpheme may function as a constant in a sentence form, as e.g. the -ing of the 
gerund.
8. The string conditions for reduction are created by the product of an operator word 
 entering on the product of some prior operator(s) and the reductions previously carried out 
on them, or on primitive arguments (mostly concrete nouns). The linearization of operator 
and arguments is also determined at the time of operator entry into the construction of a 
sentence. See Harris (1982, 1991) for details.
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In a footnote, he added: “The pitting of one linguistic tool against another has in it 
something of the absolutist postwar temper of social institutions, but is not required 
by the character and range of these tools of analysis.”85
With Operator Grammar all the identified properties of language could be 
accounted for in a reasonable and comprehensive way, and in a way that supports a 
theory of linguistic information. The role of redundancy in this theory (and, crucially, 
in the linguistic analysis that led to it) is clearly related to mathematical information 
theory, but whereas information theory concerns only quantity of information in a 
channel, the theory of linguistic information concerns information content.
The problem here was not to find a broad mathematical system in which the 
structure of language could be included, but to find what relations, or rather 
relations among relations, were necessary and sufficient for language structure. 
Then anything which is an interpretation of the model can do the work of natural 
language. Modifications of the abstract system are then considered, which serve 
as models for language-like and information-bearing systems. (Harris 1968: v)
I commented to Zellig once that descriptions by Generativist linguists seemed unnec-
essarily complex. He only said “They do seem to be over-structured,” with a slight 
smile. Phrase-structure trees introduce layers of abstraction that are neither needed 
8. In correspondence with the author (18 December 1999) Noam took this personally, as 
follows: “[H]e had no comment, no suggestions, and as far as I am aware no familiarity with or 
interest in anything that I did in generative grammar, from my undergraduate thesis through 
later years. The only comment I recall in print is a remark about how it reflected the Cold War 
atmosphere.” Noam has frequently disclaimed Zellig’s involvement or interest in his work, e.g. 
Barsky (1997: 53). However, he reported a very different memory in his 1975 Introduction to 
LSLT: “While working on LSLT I discussed all aspects of this material frequently and in great 
detail with Zellig Harris, whose influence is obvious throughout” (Chomsky 1975:4). Zellig’s 
student and friend Bill Evan has told me that on a visit to the Harrises at Princeton, where 
they lived during the time Zellig’s wife, the physicist Bruria Kaufmann, was assistant to Ein-
stein, he found Zellig and Noam “going at it hammer and tongs” with the manuscript of LSLT 
(Chomsky 1955) spread out on the kitchen table. The only explanation I have for this self-
contradictory denial of Harris’s help and influence is that he was never able to convince him. 
If Zellig said “That’s not what I’m doing, but you are welcome to try” (words very similar to 
what he did in fact say to me on one occasion), that wouldn’t be enough. Noam would feel that 
if Zellig only just really understood, he would necessarily agree. So he would keep arguing. 
But for Zellig such argument was beside the point. If Noam had a different way of working, 
fine. Zellig wanted to see what would result from doing the work. As he wrote to Goetze, in 
the letter quoted earlier, “I [do] not consider it ‘unpleasant’ but am glad of the controversy. No 
person, certainly not I, can be sure of his judgments as ‘always right’; the best way to get closer 
to the ‘truth’ — after I have figured out whatever I could — is to get the divergent opinions 
which arise from a different scientific analysis. The only fun in science is finding out what was 
actually there.”
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nor desirable. Aravind Joshi has called this the pseudo-hierarchy of preterminal sym-
bols. “Zellig Harris pursued the strategy of eschewing as much hierarchical structure 
as possible in describing sentence structure” (Joshi 2002: 121). In operator grammar, 
the hierarchy is of operators entering on their arguments; in tree-adjoining grammars 
(TAGs), Joshi has used rewrite rules because they are widely understood, but has also 
shown that dependency rules may be used for this limited hierarchy. The bulk of syn-
tax is linear adjunction of words and strings of words (including morphophonemic 
reductions of words), requiring no hierarchy or nested bracketing.
In the comparison of theories, there is a diagnostic that to my knowledge has not 
been applied. If phenomena are reported as puzzles or issues by practitioners of one 
paradigm, but for another they are not problematic, or do not even merit status as phe-
nomena, that disparity strongly suggests that what is involved is an artifact of method, 
of notation, or of proposed theory or metatheory. When we consider that issues with 
island phenomena, the Projection Principle, the Trace Erasure Principle, and so much 
else simply do not arise with Operator Grammar (nor with some other types of gram-
mar, such as Stratificational Grammar), it is difficult to avoid the supposition that the 
Generative enterprise has been notationally entrapped.
. Psychological realities
In Noam’s writings of the 1950s, there is no suggestion of psychological or biological 
considerations, either as an interpretation of an assumed metagrammar called UG, or 
as its hypothetical origin.86 Only later is there any claim that ‘linguistic competence’ 
(particularly of children as language learners) derives from a biologically innate ‘lan-
guage organ’.87 In (Chomsky 1951: 4), as we saw near the beginning of this paper,
8. Revisions in (Chomsky 1975), and statements in the Introduction to that work, might 
suggest the contrary, but in e.g. (Chomsky & Ronat 1977: 123, Chomsky & Ronat 1979: 113) 
Noam affirms that “The psychological point of view did not begin to appear until the end of 
the fifties”. Just before this (Chomsky & Ronat 1979: 111), Ronat asks “When did you think 
for the first time of proposing an explanatory theory in linguistics?”. In English, Noam replies 
“That was what interested me about linguistics in the first place”. In the earlier French publi-
cation, his reply is given as “En fait, c’est une préoccupation qui est apparue très tôt, dès mon 
travail sur la morpho-phonologie de l’hebreu moderne.”
87. In passing, we should note that Bloomfield’s ‘failure’ to propose an innate language organ 
was not because he was a behaviorist, but because that was (and is) an undisprovable explana-
tory principle, and in any case is not required for linguistics — as Zellig has decisively dem-
onstrated. All that was disproved in Hauser et al. 2001 was the purported language specificity 
and human specificity of the cognitive capacities involved with language use (with recursion 
still hanging on by its fingernails). So innateness lives on, as explanatory principles must until 
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[T]he statement of the grammar, the presentation of the results of the completed 
distributional analysis, must meet … criteria which involve, essentially, 
considerations of elegance and considerations of adequacy as determined by the 
particular purposes of the grammar.
Around 1960, instead of the “purposes of the grammar” it is the speaker’s linguistic 
competence that determines the relevant “considerations of adequacy”. This psycho-
logicization of generative grammar transpired after the commencement of Noam’s 
association with a cohort of young psychologists in Cambridge who were forging the 
new field of cognitive psychology in rebellion against the behaviorists. We may pre-
sume that in their company he became familiar with one of their touchstones, Lashley’s 
(1951) critique of behaviorism.88 Seuren (2009) suggests that the section of Lashley’s 
paper that discusses language provides a kind of skeleton for much of the argument 
in Noam’s own now famous (1959) review of Skinner (1957), which indeed cites and 
quotes that paper.
A proper discussion of psychology and linguistics must be reserved for another 
place, but two aspects require brief notice here. Firstly, I must acknowledge that Noam’s 
algorithmic bent has a natural home in psychology. Whatever the structure and prop-
erties of language may be, humans are somehow able to use language so as to achieve 
ends which require the mutual understanding and cooperation of others. A genera-
tive model of that accomplishment should be able produce utterances as an individual 
human does, and to demonstrate understanding by acting appropriately upon hearing 
what one has said. Results so far have been limited — for example, question-answering 
systems correlate utterances in a highly restricted domain with database queries, so 
that it is a relational database system rather than linguistics that is doing the work.89 
The reason for this is the same as the reason that robot systems are operational only in 
artificially constrained environments or when augmented with human direction. That 
reason is that the environment is unpredictably variable. Algorithms that can replicate 
observed behavior in unconstrained environments involve continuous  negative feed-
back control of perceptual inputs in accord with internally maintained reference  values 
alternatives are recognized — ”the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis with an ugly fact”. It is un-
likely that Zellig’s demonstration that we have no need of that hypothesis will affect matters. 
Null is hard to recognize as an alternative or as a fact.
88. Based on his presentation at the Hixon Symposium in 1948, see (Gardner 1985: 10–14).
89. In an analogous way, the metagrammatical systems that Noam has developed correlate 
sentences with ‘semantic representations’ of one kind or another in which meanings are sup-
posed to be formally indicated. As discussed earlier, Zellig has shown that the information 
carried by language is immanent in language itself.
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for those perceptions.90 The explanation of this is beyond the scope of this paper; the 
interested reader is directed to Powers (1973, 1998, 2008); Marken (1992, 2002); Cziko 
(1995, 2000); and Runkel (1990, 2003).
Secondly, we must touch on Noam’s convictions about innate ideas. Lin (1999) 
provides a useful survey of the issues. Innateness is a stool with three legs: (1) infants’ 
limited cognitive abilities, (2) paucity of data, and (3) complexity of language. Ideas 
about infant cognition which were available to Noam in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
have long been superseded by research showing the remarkable learning capacities of 
infants, and statistical learning theory has vitiated Noam’s early claims that empirical 
learning from experience is not possible (see e.g. Gleitman 2002; Aslin & Newport 
2009; Gebhart, Newport & Aslin 2009; Reeder, Newport & Aslin, in press). One of the 
founders of Cognitive Psychology, Jerome Bruner, demonstrated (as others have elab-
orated since) the supportive social scaffolding within which children learn language 
(Bruner 1985), challenging the paucity of data thesis.91 And Zellig has shown that the 
structure of language is actually remarkably simple.92
9. In engineering control theory, these ‘setpoints’ are set by an agent or operator external 
to the ‘plant’. In hierarchical perceptual control theory, or HPCT, they are set by the outputs 
of control loops at a higher level of the perceptual hierarchy. Error in control of biologically 
innate ‘intrinsic values’ necessary for survival triggers reorganization within the hierarchy, so 
infinite regress in a finite perceptual hierarchy is not an issue. By changing synaptic connec-
tions, reorganization can change any phase of the control loop, including the reference signal 
input. Error in control of other variables can also trigger reorganization. It is this that behav-
iorism studied as a theory of learning. Obviously, at any given time many perceptions are not 
controlled, and just as one may be aware of any given perception or not, so also may control 
of a perception be conscious or unconscious.
9. Bruner also opposed himself to Noam’s philosophical Realism, holding that, rather 
than discovering the organization of phenomena, science invents the “scientific arrange-
ment” of them (Bruner et al. 1962: 7), reminding us of that same locution in Zellig’s review of 
 Trubetzkoy (Harris 1941b).
92. “[T]he very simplicity of this system, which surprisingly enough seems to suffice for lan-
guage, makes it clear that no matter how interdependent language and thought may be, they 
cannot be identical. It is not reasonable to believe that thought has the structural simplicity 
and the recursive enumerability which we see in language. So that language structure appears 
rather as a particular system, satisfying the conditions of Chapter 2 and perhaps also bound 
by a history, which may evolve not only in time but also by specialization in science languages, 
and which is undoubtedly necessary for any thoughts other than simple or impressionistic 
ones, but which may in part be a rather rigid channel for thought.” (Harris 1968: 216) The 
reference to Chapter 2 is to the enumeration of essential properties of language summarized 
earlier in this paper, properties that make language amenable to mathematical treatment.
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Just in order to see what there is in language, and whether it is unique, we can even 
in principle count the demands (the departures from randomness) in language. 
We can count the demands that suffice to enable a person to speak a given 
language. […] Nobody will do this counting, but we can see that there is nothing 
magical about how much, and what, is needed in order to speak. Finally, and this 
is perhaps more important, we can see roughly what kind of mental capacity is 
involved in knowing each contribution to the structure — in knowing phonemic 
distinctions; in knowing the phonemic composition of words; in knowing the 
requirement status of words, i.e., their dependence on the occurrence of other 
words; in knowing the (mostly pairwise) likelihoods of operator-argument 
choice and the rough meanings attached to each word; and finally, in knowing the 
reductions in phonemic shape of given words in operator-argument situations. 
The kind of knowing that is needed here is not as unique as language seems to be, 
and not as ungraspable in amount. (Harris 1988: 111–113)
Given the observation that language contains its own metalanguage, Zellig specified 
methods which themselves require no additional metalinguistic or metagrammatical 
assumptions, and followed where those methods led, disclosing essential properties 
of language, which he then formulated as a theory. Noam begins with the contrary 
assumption that research is impossible without a prior theory of language, and that 
this prior theory is justified by complex metalinguistic and metagrammatical resources 
provided by a biologically innate Universal Grammar existing prior to and external to 
any particular language. His arguments then are of the “What else could it be?” sort, 
in which you argue against not-X in order to prove X. But because science does not 
prove anything, tertium non datur (the law of the excluded middle) is not an appropri-
ate argument form for science. Universals of language, for example, can exist without 
being genetically inherited, as for example quantal vowels and the universal preference 
for certain means of making contrasts have an acoustical basis. Zellig has shown how 
other universal properties of language have an informational basis, such that without 
them utterances could not embody and ‘convey’ the information that they do. To show 
this, he has not had need of Noam’s hypothesis of an innate Universal Grammar.
7. Revolutionaries
We come now to the role of academic politics and the question of what can possibly 
be meant by ‘revolution’ as applied to Noam’s career. Noam’s portrayal of himself as 
isolated and disregarded in the 1950s because no one was interested in what he was 
doing, and that the old guard of ‘taxonomic linguistics’ opposed the rise of Generative 
Grammar, has been thoroughly debunked by (Murray 1994, Chapter 9). After signing 
off on his dissertation, Nelson Goodman and Zellig helped Noam to get a Research 
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Fellowship at Harvard, which he held from 1951 through 1955.93 In 1956, Noam was 
one of the speakers at the Symposium on Information Theory held at M.I.T. (Chomsky 
1956b), an occasion which the participants mark as the birth of Cognitive Psycholo-
gy.94 In 1959, when Archibald Hill invited Noam to speak at a conference in Texas, he 
delivered an early version of the caustic attack on ‘taxonomic linguistics’ which was 
renewed at the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, held near M.I.T. in Cam-
bridge in 1962. I have been told that Zellig had been invited as a plenary speaker, but 
was unable to attend, and promoted the acceptance of Noam to speak in his stead. One 
of the organizers was Noam’s colleague and, as it were, co-conspirator, Morris Halle 
(a friendship dating from 1951 — Chomsky 1975: 30). The plenary session at which 
Noam spoke was devoted to “The logical basis of linguistic theory,” practically identi-
cal to the title of LSLT (Chomsky 1955a, 1956a, 1975).
[O]rganizational leadership [of Generative Linguistics was provided] by Halle, who 
helped Chomsky obtain a position at M.I.T., instituted first a degree program and 
then a department which he headed..., connected Chomsky with the publisher 
Mouton (and with its raison d’être, Roman Jakobson), and was involved in getting 
Chomsky into the spotlight in the 1962 international congress. (Murray 1994: 243)
He alone of all presenters at the International Congress was given opportunity and a 
free hand to revise and expand his remarks for the proceedings. His presentation in 
this plenary session was the attack on ‘taxonomic linguistics’ which was later expanded 
in CILT (Chomsky 1964 and its successive revisions), as discussed earlier.
It has been amply documented (e.g. Murray 1994 and elsewhere) that the rise and 
rapid expansion of Generative Linguistics in the 1960s was made possible by a sharp 
increase in the availability of government funding, analogous to but much greater than 
that during World War II.
It is tempting to speculate on the speed with which transformational [generative] 
grammar would have won general acceptance had Chomsky’s and Halle’s students 
had to contend with today’s [late 1970s] more austere conditions, in which not 
just military, but ALL sources of funding have been sharply curtailed, and the 
number of new positions has been declining yearly (Newmeyer 1980: 52n8; other 
references at Murray loc. cit.).
93. Noam was also invited to Columbia for the 1957–58 year, with expectations of a perma-
nent position (Murray 1994: 246). It seems likely that Zellig’s connections in New York and at 
Columbia were instrumental in this. Zellig’s friend Seymour Melman was on the faculty from 
1949 until his retirement in 2003, and he himself repaired to Columbia when he left Penn.
9. See (Gardner 1985: 28–29).
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This was “striking...support for adherents of a supposedly persecuted perspective 
engaged in making a ‘scientific revolution’ ”(Murray 1994: 242). In the extraordinarily 
polemical climate of the 1960s, prevalent in society at large as well as being cultivated 
in linguistics, there was talk of overthrowing the ‘hegemony of taxonomic linguistics’. 
There were claims, baseless in fact, of being misunderstood and rejected by that sup-
posed hegemony.95 A course about structural linguistics at M.I.T. was called ‘The Bad 
Guys’.96 In the event, the outcome manifestly was a hegemony of Generative Linguis-
tics, and to suppose that this was not also the aim requires extraordinary credulity.
Chomsky was able to define linguistics as whatever he and his associates did. 
Success in this ‘definition of the situation’ was facilitated by the tenuousness of 
institutionalized linguistics and the paucity of neo-Bloomfieldians relative to the 
hordes of students. While there was a faculty-based core with claims to forming 
an elite specialty, it was the exponential increase in the number of linguists and 
M.I.T.’s military funding that diluted the strength of opposition by those trained 
earlier. (Murray 1994: 244)
The rhetoric of revolution does not fit the facts in crucial ways. Noam’s work and that 
of his followers was
...published, sought out and taken seriously by major neo-Bloomfieldians. The 
most central of them actively fostered Chomsky’s and Lees’s careers. In terms 
of aggression, the Chomskians struck first. Their revolutionary rhetoric was not 
a reaction to the incomprehension of the ‘establishment,’ nor a defense against 
neophobia or persecution by angry elders. (Murray 1994: 244)
On the other hand, the rhetoric of revolution was extremely effective marketing.97
9. “The active contributors to linguistics in the period were themselves far from agreement 
on these points, and there is some reason to think that the program was being superseded, or 
at least significantly extended, by the beginning of the 1950s….” (Hymes & Fought 1975: 122) 
“It would be quite mistaken to regard the period as a fortress of fixed opinions. … What would 
have been insisted upon was the necessity of the kind of work — development of explicit, 
abstract, wholly general models of the nature of linguistic structure.” (ibid: 126).
9. In correspondence with me, Noam has rejected any responsibility to counter misrepre-
sentations that his students or followers have made of Zellig or his work. To some extent, and 
perhaps a great extent, he may be genuinely innocent of their excesses, in the sense that he 
has been swept along by social phenomena that he neither created nor really guided, but was 
able to ride willy-nilly. But neither has he done anything to discourage or correct those who 
look to him for an insider’s knowledge in these matters, and in that, certainly, my notions of 
responsibility differ from his.
97. It may be relevant that advertising and marketing texts were (perhaps pointedly) 
among those subjected to discourse analysis in seminars and discussions in which Noam was 
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Revolutionary rhetoric seems to appeal to the enthusiasms of a new generation 
(with no stake in the old perspective and little knowledge of it) for meaningful 
and original work. (Murray 1994: 245)
As Generative Linguistics achieved the perception in other fields and in the public as 
‘mainstream linguistics’, the new departments that were being formed fell in line, eager 
to share in the funding, and pushed by administrators anxious to maintain the reputa-
tions of their institutions in the eyes of parents, students, and alumni. Though peer 
review was freely available — and extraordinarily forbearing, given the ill-founded 
viciousness of many attacks — Generativists sidestepped regular publication channels 
in favor of circulating mimeographed papers. New journals were founded — Founda-
tions of Language (1965), Papers in Linguistics (1969), and especially Linguistic Inquiry 
(1970) at M.I.T. — whose closed editorial policies were in sharp contrast to the open-
ness of the ‘establishment’ journals Language and IJAL.98 Subsequently, despite the 
drying up of government largesse, and the consequent contraction or demise of many 
of the new Departments of Linguistics, these generativist benchmarks of establishment 
have all survived, except for one (Papers in Linguistics). While the status of Generative 
Linguistics as a scientific revolution is uncertain, there can be no doubt of its success 
as a revolution in academic politics.
Noam and his students had an open invitation to come down to Penn for collabo-
ration. In the late 1980s, speaking with me of our student days twenty years earlier, Ellen 
Prince told me that the emissaries that were sent from M.I.T. were commissioned essen-
tially to spy and take ideas back. “And Harris and Hiż invited them!” she exclaimed. 
“They were such suckers!” Recently, I connected this remark with certain sociological 
observations recounted on Ira Glass’s radio program, “This American Life”, about the 
Israeli concept of being a freier.99 Among many striking examples illustrating freierism, 
there is an interview with Tom Segev, an Israeli journalist and historian, who says:
You constantly hear it, constantly: don’t be a freier. That is the worst thing for an 
Israeli to be, a freier, in his own eyes, and also in the eyes of other Israelis. So 
never ever be too generous, be always on guard. Somebody is out there to take 
what is due to you.
  I think it would be impossible to understand Israelis without understanding 
the whole notion of freierism. It is at the heart of Israeli culture, affecting how 
involved, as for example the “Millions Can’t be Wrong!” text analyzed in Section 2.2 of Harris 
(1952).
98. The sole exception in North America was Word under the editorship of Martinet.
99. The program “Episode 222: Suckers” may be heard at http://www.thislife.org/Radio_
Episode.aspx?episode=222. There is more discussion at http://www.balashon.com/2007/10/
freier.html and http://www.wzo.org.il/en/resources/view.asp?id=2226 and elsewhere.
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people work, how they shop, how they vote, how they think about themselves and 
the people around them.
  From an Israeli point of view, Jews were suckers for 2000 years in exile, 
constantly being tricked and persecuted. The whole idea of Israel is to create a 
place where Jews were in control, where Jews would never again be freiers. And 
even though Israel is now a powerful state, the fear of being taken advantage of 
hasn’t gone away.
Part of the ‘revolutionary’ conflict here may be that low-synergy100 characteristics such 
as freierism became more prevalent during and after WWII, resulting in a generational 
difference in which Zellig and other elders of the field, as noted above, had the more 
forbearing nature of Sapir and Bloomfield, and Noam’s already contentious tempera-
ment, joined with that of his new colleagues and students, was encouraged and ampli-
fied in an environment of “post-War absolutism” (Harris 1965: fn5).101 But while this 
sort of Zeitgeist effect may be part of the picture, it is no explanation. There were many 
students; there was only one Noam Chomsky.
For present purposes, however, these developments, by the same token, extend 
beyond the scope of this paper; for by the time the rising flood-tide of funding, the 
accretion of politically adept colleagues, and the peculiar institutional circumstances 
at M.I.T. came together in a kind of perfect storm, differences in temperament and 
predisposition had already set Noam on an increasingly divergent course from the 
family friend to whom his father had turned for help so many years before.
. Borrowing the term from Ruth Benedict, as presented in Maslow & Honigmann 1970. 
Coming from her experience of culture contact with Native Americans and in the Pacific 
before and during the war, she sought means for determining which of two juxtaposed culture 
traits or complexes is to be preferred. Simplistically put, that culture is best which is best for 
those enacting it, a subtle and sophisticated relative of utilitarianism. In a culture or trait that 
is low in synergy, such as frierism, there is a strong conflict between selfishness and altruism, 
while in systems that are very high in synergy, one cannot benefit others without benefit to 
oneself, and the converse, so that the vocabulary and concepts for selfishness and altruism 
may not even exist in the language of such a people. Kindred ideas are often expressed in 
terms of zero-sum games, etc.
. It may be objected that Zellig lived in Israel a lot of the time, but he lived on one of the 
dwindling number of left-idealistic kibbutzim. This is not to say that he was naively insulated 
from these corrosive developments. The comment in Harris (1965 fn. 5) indicates his aware-
ness of this social change, and as well his detachment from it.
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Chomsky 1951a and Chomsky 1951b
Peter T. Daniels
The December 1951 version of Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew that has 
been available to scholars since its publication in 1979 is very different from the 
original M.A. thesis accepted six months earlier. To assess the importance of this 
work to the history of linguistics, a number of factors must be studied: Chomsky’s 
background in Semitic philology and linguistics; the other influences to which he 
was exposed to date; the degree to which those influences were assimilated and/
or transcended; the archival nature of the materials concerned and those that 
followed; and the nature and causes of the differences between the versions.
“The earliest generative grammar in the contemporary sense was a (partial) grammar 
of Hebrew (Chomsky, 1951).” So wrote Noam Chomsky (1989, 87) in the memorial 
volume for the Israeli Arabist Haim Blanc. But neither the author nor the volume edi-
tors explain why the preeminent theoretical syntactician had been invited to contrib-
ute to a volume otherwise comprising Semitic, Arabistic, and Indo-European studies, 
nor why a mention of Chomsky’s M.A. thesis was singularly appropriate. In two series 
of generously extended e-mail conversations, in August–September and December–
January 2007–8, Noam Chomsky answered this question and many others concerning 
the two very different extant versions of that thesis.1
The version of the thesis that has been known to the linguistics community since 
its publication in 1979 clearly states on its title page that it is the “December, 1951 
Revision of / Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew” (Chomsky 1951b, [v]; hereafter 
MMHb).2 Anyone familiar with the thesis as deposited in the University of Pennsylvania 
1. Versions of this chapter were presented at the annual meetings of the American Oriental 
Society in Seattle in March 2006, and of the North American Association for the History of the 
Language Sciences in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of America 
in Chicago in January 2008. I am grateful for encouragement and assistance and for substantive 
comments to Woodford A. Beach, John Goldsmith, Robert D. Hoberman, John Huehnergard, 
Joshua T. Katz, Konrad Koerner, Peter Machinist, W. Keith Percival, and John U. Wolff.
2. The most cursory glance at the contents of this book shows that it is not a photographic 
reproduction of a work of 1951; it has obviously been retyped on an IBM Selectric, a form
1 Peter T. Daniels
Libraries can see that it was a very thorough revision indeed; the revision is the only 
version Chomsky himself would consult.3 But very few people were familiar with the 
thesis before its 1979 publication.4 In 1971 or so, this author, while an undergraduate 
linguistics major at Cornell University with an incipient interest in Semitic linguis-
tics, noted that Chomsky’s M.A. thesis was one of the earliest publications concern-
ing Israeli (or Modern) Hebrew, and requested it from Inter-Library Loan. Chomsky 
was well known to linguists but not yet a world-wide celebrity, and the slim volume 
arrived in due course. (It is now a valuable document sequestered among the Special 
Collections.) It proved not to be the ribbon copy5 of the work, but a bound “blue 
ditto.”6  Cornell’s graduate library had a primitive coin-operated photocopier, which 
unlike later models was not blind to the color blue. It used a heavy coated paper and 
a  possibly ammonia-based (like a blueprint machine) chemical process that yielded 
copies that (protected from light) have survived for nearly forty years (whereas ditto 
copies can fade after some number of years even when not exposed to light).
of typewriter that was introduced in 1961. Chomsky did not remember any retyping and 
is certain that no changes were made during the process; John Goldsmith recalled that the 
retyping was done by a fellow M.I.T. graduate student, David Duncan. Mr. Duncan, now an 
 attorney practicing in Boston, did not respond to an e-mail requesting reminiscences.
3. When I first contacted Chomsky about this project, requesting permission to quote from 
MMHa, he answered, “You can if you like, but I don't see the point.  The late (I think  December) 
1951 version is vastly improved” (8/26/07). Later on, I noted, “But looking at antecedents is 
what historians (including of linguistics) do,” to which he acceded, “Point taken. … As far as I 
can recall, no historian of linguistics has ever contacted me about this or about most relevant 
topics” (12/30/07).
4. Koerner and Tajima’s (1986) entries for this work are inexplicably erroneous. That for the 
published version (“1979b”) fails to note that it comprises the December revision of the June 
original and lists as a commentary on it a work written three years earlier (Chayen 1977); 
that for “1951” claims that it occupies 46, rather than 71, typed pages, and fails to note that 
the thesis was accepted in June. It also asserts incorrectly that the thesis was “included as an 
appendix” to chapter VII of Chomsky 1975 (hereafter LSLT). Rather, a note of the intention to 
include it appears in both the typescript and the printed version. See below for further incon-
cinnities in Koerner’s accounts of LSLT.
5. That is, the original typed copy, as opposed to carbon copies made during the same typing 
operation. (Notes on pre-photocopier methods of reproduction are necessary for readers who 
may never have seen carbon paper, ditto copies, or mimeographs.)
6. The work had been typed on “ditto masters,” a reproduction method that pressure-transfers 
blue dye to a paper backing, from which a limited number of copies are run off by moist-
ening the copy paper with an alcohol so that some of the dye is transferred. This process is not
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The title of the library copy is the same as that in the published version, omitting the 
first line and the indication “June” in the last line: “Morphophonemics of Modern 
Hebrew / Avram Noam Chomsky / ‘A Thesis / In Linguistics / Presented to the Fac-
ulty of the / Graduate School of the University of / Pennsylvania in partial fulfillment 
of / the requirements for the degree of / Master of Arts’ / 1951” (Chomsky 1951a, 
[i]; hereafter MMHa). After the unnumbered title page, the work occupies 71 leaves, 
clearly typed by the author as no hired typist could have reliably dealt with the dia-
critics and the innovative notational devices, and as the occasional typographical 
error is corrected in the page (most obviously, the term “morphophonemics” is sev-
eral times typed as “morphonemics,” with “pho” inserted above the line likely with 
a different typewriter).
Only four references to this thesis before the 1979 publication have been traced: 
Gutman 1970, Levi 1972, Kilbury 1976 (103–7), and Chayen 1977. Daniel Gutman’s 
Texas dissertation is a generative phonology of (Masoretic) Biblical Hebrew in the 
Sound Pattern of English (Chomsky & Halle 1968, hereafter SPE) mold. He inspected 
Chomsky’s thesis but “It consists of a very early generative grammar with a theoreti-
cally important discussion of ordered rules. However, it was written some fifteen years 
prior to the development of generative phonology as we now know it; the theory of a 
lexical component and especially of distinctive features was yet to be elaborated,” so 
Gutman is only “indebted to it in a very general way” (Gutman 1970, 3).7 Chayen’s 
squib takes the rather surprising opposite view, that nearly all of generative phonology 
is foreshadowed. Levi’s M.A. thesis is a generative phonology of a subpart of Hebrew 
verbal morphology (see n. 44 below).
Kilbury’s Development of Morphophonemic Theory is a revision of his 1974 Ph.D. 
dissertation at Cornell. In those days, undergraduate and graduate linguistics majors 
took the same classes (only the coursework requirements were different), so Kilbury 
and I had many classes together and were well acquainted; neither of us specifically 
recalls the circumstances, but it is extremely likely that Kilbury took advantage of my 
borrowing of the book to make his own copy. He recalled that his was the same sort of 
odd-smelling coated paper copy, which he discarded when his interests changed (pers. 
to be confused with a “mimeograph,” where pressure as from typing removes a waxy substance 
from the master, leaving a stencil via which black ink is transferred from source to paper, 
and which with care can be used for a large number of copies. Chomsky registers MMHb 
(“Cambridge, Mass.”) as “mimeographed” in the reference list of Chomsky 1967; it is not 
evident that any copies exist outside private hands (cf. n. 8). A prepublication version of LSLT 
is registered as “mimeographed” in Chomsky 1964b, 975.
. Gutman’s dissertation committee comprised Aaron Bar Adon, Chair; Emmon Bach; 
 Archibald A. Hill; and Edgar Polomé.
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comm.).8 Kilbury is impressed by Chomsky’s reliance on Rudolf Carnap and on his 
teacher Nelson Goodman and notices that where Bloomfield (1939) employs sufficient 
conditions for rule ordering, Chomsky introduces necessary conditions as well. Both 
these topics recur below.
1. Background: Semitics
Noam Chomsky had the sort of Hebrew education that could be expected for a pre-war 
Jewish-American boy whose father happened to be a renowned scholar of Medieval 
Hebrew.9 He learned the language in Hebrew school, read it with his father on Friday 
nights, assisted with the proofreading of his father’s magnum opus (W. Chomsky 
1952),10 attended youth groups, and from the age of 14 went to the Hebrew-speaking 
Camp Massad in the Poconos (a resort area in northeast Pennsylvania), as camper, 
junior counselor, and counselor. It was there that he met his lifelong friend Haim Blanc 
(1926–1984), two and a half years his senior — “even as a teenager he was plainly some-
one remarkable, a heroic romantic figure who seemed to have come from a novel” (NC, 
8/26/07) — who was blinded and crippled in Israel’s War of  Independence a few weeks 
8. W. Keith Percival informs me that microfilm copies of the thesis are deposited in several 
American libraries. WorldCat (accessed via Google Books 2/17/09) lists four with a microfilm 
and six with a paper copy. Cornell University’s microfilm was made — coincidentally? — 
in 1971. The University of Kansas’s and Louisiana State University’s microfilms were made 
in 1968; paper copies are found at Harvard University, the University of Nebraska, and the 
University of California (Los Angeles and Santa Barbara). Those seven copies are assuredly 
of the June 1951 original, because each numbers 71 leaves. The electronic catalog records at 
Ohio State University (paper) and Southern Illinois University (Carbondale) (microfilm) are 
insufficiently detailed to determine the version. WorldCat also returns a copy at the Sonoma 
County (California) Library, which is a false positive.
9. William Chomsky (1896–1977), professor and faculty president of Gratz College, near 
Philadelphia. His 1926 Ph.D. dissertation at Dropsie College was a study of the 12th/13th-
century Hebrew grammarian David K. imh. i.
1. This is not an edition of nor a commentary on the Mikhlol of David K. imh. i. Rather, it 
is a translation of a rearrangement of the entire contents of the work into the order of a 
19th-century reference grammar of Hebrew, such as that by Gesenius (Kautzsch 1910), pro-
vided with extensive notes detailing the treatment of each topic by the other medieval Hebrew 
grammarians. The first 120 pages, representing the dissertation, covering the phonology, pro-
nouns, and strong verbs, were published in 1933. The entire work was published in 1952; those 
first 120 pages were reproduced photographically, as evidenced by obvious typographic errors 
repeated on pp. 36 and 40, and by the presence of five pages of addenda to those chapters 
(373–77). It was thus the chapters on weak verbs, nouns, particles, and syntax that Noam 
Chomsky proofread.
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after arriving in Palestine early in 1948 but nonetheless carried out intensive fieldwork 
on Palestinian and Iraqi Arabic dialects over many years. That Chomsky could forge 
such a friendship when the gulf between 14 and 16/17 is usually unbridgeable speaks 
to his precocity (cf. n. 12); as does his admission to the University of Pennsylvania at 
16 (for the 1945/46 school year).
Already fluent in Hebrew, both Classical and Modern,11 Chomsky, imbued with a 
vision of fostering a “socialist binationalist” Jewish-Arab state in Palestine, registered 
for Arabic; his classmates were missionaries-in-training from the Summer Institute of 
Linguistics (now SIL), students of Kenneth Pike’s sent to learn Zellig Harris’s methods, 
who seemed to him considerably older.12 Most were daunted to find themselves facing 
Giorgio Levi della Vida (1886–1967), “one of eleven professors in Italy who refused to 
take the fascist oath and therefore lost their posts” (Gordon 1986, 58), the preeminent 
Arabist of the first half of the twentieth century, who came to Penn in 1940. He entered 
the classroom armed with “Thatcher’s Arabic Grammar, a pretty thick volume[, and] 
a slim volume. … We would spend three weeks on Thatcher’s grammar, and after we 
knew the language, we’d turn to the slim volume — of pre-Islamic poetry.13 There was a 
kind of shudder in the class, but he said something like ‘Don’t worry, it has explanatory 
notes in Latin’ ” (NC, 8/26/07).
Some time later, Chomsky asked Levi della Vida for a class in Colloquial Arabic; 
he agreed to authorize it so long as he had nothing to do with organizing or teaching 
it, and with an informant at Penn who belonged to King Farouk of Egypt’s royal guard, 
a small group had some success with the language, with Chomsky able to read news-
paper Arabic (a skill not long maintained). Levi della Vida returned to Italy after the 
1947/48 year, and his place was taken by the preeminent Arabist of the second half of 
the twentieth century, Franz Rosenthal (1914–2003). With Rosenthal Chomsky stud-
ied the Arab grammarian Sībawayh.14 With the eminent Assyriologist E.A. Speiser 
(1902–1965) he studied Comparative Semitic, which was offered in his sophomore 
and junior years (Gordon 1986, 61–62).
11. Chomsky published one article in Hebrew, in 1957 (Koerner & Tajima 1986, 6) — in the 
Festschrift for his father.
12. “They looked about 50 years old to me (I guess they were in their 20s)” (NC, 8/26/07). 
“I could never talk to them. Partly a substantial age difference (which matters at age 16–17)” 
(NC, 12/30/07).
13. Presumably the 4th edition (Thatcher 1942), nearly 500 pages including chrestomathy 
and glossary, and Nöldeke 1890.
14. A sense of Western historians’ of linguistics unfamiliarity with Arab grammarians gener-
ally in that era can be gathered from the opening pages of Semaan 1968 (1–5).
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In Philadelphia’s small, close-knit Jewish community, the Chomsky and Harris 
families were acquainted, to the extent at least of an occasional Passover seder at the 
Harrises’ home. Zellig S. Harris (1909–1992), who was to become Chomsky’s mentor, 
had made his name in Semitic linguistics, with some of the first American Descriptivist 
grammars of ancient languages (Harris 1936, 1941) and an apparently unprecedented 
historical Descriptivist study that formulates changes (in phonology and morphology) 
as chronologically ordered rules (Harris 1939). The two books, at least, remain clas-
sics in their field;15 Hebrew had been a home language for Harris16 (his family immi-
grated to Philadelphia from Ukraine when he was four); he taught Modern Hebrew 
from 1940/41 (and subsequently Moroccan Arabic [cf. Harris 1942b], Hausa, and 
 Swahili as wartime measures; Gordon 1986, 58, 60); and Hebrew and Arabic data figure 
prominently in Harris’s best-known work (1951, 246–49, 285–89, 314–24, 352–60), yet 
 Harris’s biographers (e.g., Nevin 1992, Watt 1995) typically ignore this primary aspect 
of his work, the first fifteen years of his career, entirely. Harris founded the Linguistics 
Department of the University of Pennsylvania in 1947, one of many that claim to be 
the first such university department (Moses 2008).17 Chomsky properly met Harris at a 
socialist meeting, probably in the Harris home, early in 1946: “At the time, I was think-
ing of dropping out of college, mostly very boring. He was really quite a charismatic 
 figure. I was very excited by what he had to say about these [linguistic] topics. He kind 
of took me under his wing, suggested readings, and also suggested that I sit in on some 
of his grad courses, which I found fascinating. Pretty soon he gave me the proofs of 
Methods to proof-read …. That was my introduction to linguistics” (NC, 3/8/09). Harris 
also encouraged Chomsky to study logic, philosophy, and the foundations of math-
ematics; and so he worked with Nelson Goodman (1906–1998) (Murray 1994, 227).
15. Though the latter must be used with caution in the earlier pages because Harris was 
misled by mistaken archeological dating of the recently discovered materials from Ugarit to 
1500 bce, or considerably earlier than the Amarna texts from ca. 1365, whereas they are now 
known to date from the period leading up to the destruction of the town about 1185 bce.
16. Gordon 1986: 58. Harris published one article in Hebrew, in the prestigious Israeli lin-
guistics journal Lĕšonénu in 1951 (Koerner 2004b, 247).
1. Harris’s first publication on general linguistics was his 1940 review article of the Indo-
Europeanist L.H. Gray’s Foundations of Language, the only one of the 37 articles in his selected 
writings to which he appended a note explaining its inclusion: “This material is reprinted here 
only because it contains an early expression of the modern linguistic viewpoint” (Harris 1970, 
695). It is virtually an encyclopedia entry on linguistics. Remarkably, it was the second of two 
reviews of that book appearing side by side in Language: the journal’s new editor, Bernard Bloch, 
may have been dissatisfied with the more conventional review by a Classicist, D.C. Swanson, and 
asked Harris to provide an up-to-date assessment.
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2.  Background: “Formal sciences”
“Formal sciences” is the label assigned, faute de mieux, by Marcus Tomalin (2006, 
2–3), to
various branches of pure mathematics and symbolic logic, but, in addition, 
… various kinds of applied mathematics and logic … a rather heterogeneous 
collection of related theories drawn mainly from mathematics and philosophy … 
the theories grouped together beneath this umbrella term all utilize some form of 
the axiomatic-deductive method. … In order for an axiomatic-deductive system 
to be constructed at all, it is necessary to be able to state initial assumptions, to 
identify primary elements of some kind, and to make valid deductive inferences 
from these assumptions and elements.
Tomalin stresses the importance of Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) to the work both of 
Nelson Goodman and Chomsky’s future teacher W.V.O. Quine (1908–2000).18 (It was 
Goodman, at Penn, who proposed Chomsky for the Harvard Society of Fellows in 
1950.) Carnap’s Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) makes an almost ritual appearance at 
the start of MMHa, in an introduction justifying the combination of logic and linguis-
tics in the investigation of a natural language. (As this introduction was removed from 
MMHb, it is reproduced below.) Chomsky did not read the Aufbau in German (an 
English translation was not published until 1967), but knew it from Goodman’s semi-
nars and from the manuscript of Goodman 1951. Chomsky’s introduction stresses the 
notion of “elegance,” derived from Goodman’s (1943) notion of “simplicity.”
The absence of acknowledgment to Harris in MMHa might seem odd. Chomsky 
has always insisted that his work there owed nothing to Harris’s methods (or, Methods). 
The work itself, though, owes its existence to Harris. He had suggested that Chomsky’s 
senior honors thesis in 1949 be a “structural restatement” of Modern Hebrew gram-
mar along the lines of those that Harris had published in the International Journal of 
American Linguistics a few years earlier (NC, 8/26/07).19 Chomsky tried working in 
accepted fashion with an Israeli informant but found both that he knew the  language 
18. Quine and Goodman became acquaintances, friends, and eventually collaborators during 
Quine’s 1935 Harvard seminars on Carnap’s Logical Structure of Language (1934, 1937) (Tomalin 
2006, 78). Chomsky’s first published article (1953) relies on Goodman and Quine 1947.
19. These reanalyses of the morphologies of Eskimo, Yawelmani, and Delaware (Harris 1970, 
217–50) appeared in IJAL in 1947. They developed from an intended review article on the 
celebrated 1946 Franz Boas memorial volume Linguistic Structures of Native America, edited 
by Harry Hoijer, containing sketches of thirteen languages (Mithun 1996, 49). Apparently 
Harris intended to deal with all the languages described in the volume. His contributions to 
American Indian (and African) linguistics, published between 1939 and 1948, are also gener-
ally neglected.
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about as well as the informant did, and that the traditional structural sketch did not 
interest him. His mathematical interests took him in a new direction.20 Harris’s struc-
tural sketch of Biblical Hebrew (1941) includes a series of 69 morphophoneme repre-
sentations and replacements presented in prose in a table (154–59), and other prose 
tables of morpheme order and coexistence (160–63); and his “Componential Analy-
sis of a Hebrew Paradigm” (1948) provides a model for dealing with morphological 
“components” recurring in a phrase, such as “feminine” and “plural,” parallel with the 
phonological “long components” he had dealt with earlier (1944). Chomsky’s dia-
grams of the Elementary Sentence and perhaps of Necessary Order (pp. 192 and 204 
below) are very like those in Harris 1951, 153, 353. Goldsmith (2008) notes that it was 
Harris (1951, 79–89) who validated the indication of morpheme boundaries — under 
the name “juncture” — in phonological descriptions. Chomsky’s footnote **, occurring 
in the context
The fundamental linguistic fact is the sentence.**
**Actually, the fundamental linguistic fact, i.e., the unit presented in experience, 
is the discourse. A complete grammar in the sense of this paper would begin with 
a structural analysis of discourses, analyzing these into sentences. (MMHa, 9; 
omitted from MMHb)
surely relates to the “seminars” on his latest work that Harris held for selected 
participants.21
Vexed is the question of “influence” on MMH. For years, Koerner (2002 ≈ 2003;22 
2004a ≈ 2001) has been insisting (initially) that Chomsky must have read and assimilated 
2. Chomsky is not certain that the undergraduate paper no longer exists. It may be on file 
at Penn, or he may have it in a carton somewhere (NC, 12/29/07).
21. “Harris, at least in the years I knew him well — ’47 to mid-50s — had a kind of triple 
life. One life had nothing to do with Penn at all. It was socio-political …. The other two lives 
were at Penn. One was a normal academic life. Teaching a few classes, seeing students now 
and then. A second was with a small group of students who were working very closely with 
him. I was one of those from 1947. We didn’t meet on campus. Sometimes we had ‘seminars’ 
at the Horn & Hardart [restaurant, not Automat] across the street …, more often [at Harris’s 
home] in Princeton or New York …. During the days I was there, these small seminars were 
not on linguistics. The general assumption was that the field was basically over, after Methods 
was available (from 1947). They were on extending the methods of structural analysis to dis-
course. Some sense of the contents can be found in Harris’s papers on discourse analysis in 
Language in the early 1950s” (NC, 9/7/07), i.e., Harris 1970, 313–72 = Language 28 (1952): 
1–30, 474–94. Note that Chomsky in this quotation explicitly excludes the study of discourse 
from linguistics.
22. Neither of these versions mentions the other, so we cannot know which is considered 
definitive.
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Bloomfield’s “Menomini Morphophonemics” (1939)23 or (more recently) that he must 
have known about it through others’ discussions and publications; Bloomfield’s arti-
cle, at variance with all his previous and future work,24 observes that a parallel exists 
between historical and morphophonemic description. Chomsky continues to deny 
this source, and unless we are to believe that Chomsky is simply lying about his student 
years, we must carefully examine Koerner’s claims. He notes that in the late 1940s there 
were only four American journals publishing linguistics: Language, IJAL, Word, and 
Studies in Linguistics (he overlooks the Journal of the American Oriental Society and all 
“area studies” journals) and very few books, and that a linguist could and should be 
familiar with all the literature in the field. One wonders, though, whether an under-
graduate, even then, was expected to go directly to the journals.25 Koerner (2004a, 89) 
observes that Bloomfield 1939 is cited several times in Harris 1942a; what he fails to 
note is that the article is mined for data only, and nothing is said about Bloomfield’s 
method; nothing would direct a student interested in such theoretical questions to 
seek it out (whether in a series volume26 or in an offprint sent to Harris by the author). 
Likewise Koerner (2004a, 90) identifies three mentions of the article in Harris 1951 
(231, 237, 336) but does not note that the first two are, again, simply as a source of data 
and the third disposes of (one of Bloomfield’s cases of) rule ordering by reanalyzing it 
in terms of morphophonemes. Thus this cannot be taken as pointing to a source for 
Chomsky’s notion of rule ordering.
Koerner’s (2004a, 71) other piece of contemporary evidence involves some five 
degrees of separation. (1) Chomsky mentions Bloomfield 1939 side by side with 
Jakobson 1948 in LSLT (78 n. 2). (2) Harris 1951 does not mention Jakobson 1948, 
23. Pierre Encrevé saw a preliminary version of this chapter and asked that an oversimplifi-
cation of Encrevé 1997, 2000 be acknowledged as the source of Koerner’s interpretation (pers. 
comm., 3/9/09).
24. And with Harris’s; the burden of Harris 1940 is that historical information is utterly 
inadmissible in the analysis of a language.
25. (Note Chomsky’s 1988 assertion, quoted by Koerner [2004a, 71 n. 7], that “no one ever 
read a word of Jakobson’s” in his day.) Things were not all that different 22 years later, when 
I too became a linguistics major in my sophomore year at 17. We had the great advantage, 
however, of Joos 1957, in which American Descriptivist orthodoxy was canonized. It is note-
worthy that only two of the 43 items included are reprinted from Word. The next significant 
American journal, Linguistic Inquiry, did not begin until 1971.
26. Harris’s note “Since many linguistic workers in America may want to have some idea of 
Trubetzkoy’s method” (1970, 708), in his 1941 Language review of Trubetzkoy’s Grundzüge, 
the previous volume of the Prague series in which Bloomfield 1939 was published, suggests 
that that series was not widely held in American libraries.
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but does mention earlier work by Jakobson (on zero markers, not on ordered rules). 
(3) Jakobson provided “important criticisms” of Harris 1951 before January 1947. 
(4) Harris “may well have seen” (when?) Jakobson 1948 in manuscript.27 (5) Chomsky 
assisted with the manuscript of Harris 1951 before January 1947. I fail to see how any 
of these observations connects Chomsky with Bloomfield 1939 at any point before the 
1975 publication.
Koerner legitimately states that Chomsky was familiar with Bloomfield 1939 by 
1962, as it is discussed in his plenary address (Chomsky 1964b) to the Ninth Interna-
tional Congress of Linguists, jointly hosted in Cambridge by Harvard and M.I.T. in 
August 1962.28 It may indeed have “sounded as if he had been well aware of Bloom-
field’s Menomini paper for quite some time” (71), but I cannot fathom how this sen-
tence can continue “at any rate much earlier than 1954” (ibid.). If, however, we consult 
the typescript that underlies LSLT, we find that this date is very unlikely to be earlier 
than January 1956. Koerner and Tajima (1986, 3), apparently based on LSLT (2–4) 
rather than on examination of the available materials,29 identify four stages in the 
2. Koerner cannot both insist (passim) on dating Harris 1951 to 1947, and claim that Harris 
1948 was “previously published” (2004a, 91).
28. Murray (1994, 240) appears to accept Koerner’s, as it were, “vast left-wing conspiracy” 
view of how Chomsky secured the prestigious post of plenary speaker at that Congress. 
Chomsky’s explanation is much simpler: “[The organizers, Roman Jakobson and Morris 
Halle,] wanted, naturally, to have an American for one of the keynote addresses, and invited 
Harris, who accepted. At the last minute, he withdrew, for unknown reasons. They were stuck, 
and asked me to fill in for him. I was quite reluctant … But I agreed to give a talk, though I 
didn't stay for the conference” (NC, 12/30/07). Chomsky’s address was in fact on the morning 
of the last day of the Congress (Lunt 1964: xxi).
29. Koerner (2004a, 70) creates the impression (with the claim that all references to 
Hjelmslev in version 2 were expunged from the published version) that at least version 2 was 
studied. However, tracing the missing reference to Koerner 1995, 99, we read: “We can find 
… Chomsky referring to Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena on various occasions in his 1955 LSLT. 
… I am referring to Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures as an early published instance where an 
explicit reference to the Prolegomena is made.” There is in fact no reference to Hjelmslev on 
any footnote page of LSLTpdf. Syntactic Structures is not extracted from LSLT; it originated 
as notes for an undergraduate linguistics course at M.I.T., for budding engineers and math-
ematicians who had to be disabused of notions that “elementary Markov sources, information 
theory, Shannon’s statistical order of approximation, Quine’s version of radical behaviorism, 
etc.” would provide “the answer” to problems of language; “the early material in SS, devoted 
to refutation of these notions, doesn’t appear in LSLT at all, bccause it was mostly intended as 
a kind of Wittgensteinian therapy” (NC, 12/30/07). Interestingly, the substance of Chomsky’s 
review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1959) was part of the same course materials (ibid.) — 
though obviously in a different year.
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development of that work; the 1975 publication reflects version 3. What appears to be 
the 918-page version 2 has been freely available for several years (Chomsky 1955–56, 
hereafter LSLTpdf).30 Thanks to the author index by Jan van Voorst appended to the 
1985 Chicago reprint, we can isolate the two mentions of Bloomfield 1939 in the work. 
In the first (78 n. 2), it is linked with Jakobson 1948 “as examples of this general form,” 
where “this” appears to me to be ambiguous between the “grammar” considered in the 
text, or “a different form” mentioned in the footnote and referenced to Harris (1951, 
372–73 § 20.3). In the second (115 n. 5), it is linked with MMH as two examples among 
many of languages where “morphophonemes have wide distribution and are complexly 
interconnected[;] such analysis can lead to very great economy.” LSLTpdf, i.e., version 
2, is a messy (though never illegible) manuscript, with many supplementary pages, 
much crossing-out, and many handwritten insertions. The vast majority of these inser-
tions are in print-style handwriting and probably date to a single sustained period of 
revision. The first mention of Bloomfield 1939, however, is inserted before the typed 
Jakobson 1948 reference (LSLTpdf, 65 = ms.p. Ifn1), in cursive handwriting suggesting 
that it was hastily added subsequent to the main editing of version 2 in January 1956.31 
The second mention does not appear in LSLTpdf at all; the first half of the published 
n. 5 is in the text at 98 = ms.p. III-76, with footnote 3 (at 132 = ms.p. IIIfn1) a cross 
reference to the intended insertion of MMHb as an appendix to Chapter V.32 (Interest-
ingly, Chomsky also intended to insert a corresponding syntax of Modern Hebrew as 
an appendix to Chapter VII; LSLTpdf, 465 = ms.p. VII-352.) The second reference to 
Bloomfield 1939 could thus have been added at any point from version 3 later in 1956 
until publication in 1975. Chomsky recalls that Morris Halle and their student Thomas 
Bever discovered Bloomfield 1939 about 1960 (NC, 3/7/09).
We have already seen that two of MMHa’s earliest commentators recognized that 
the work brought something entirely new to the study of morphophonemics: “a theo-
retically important discussion of ordered rules” (Gutman 1970, 3); and
3. As announced in LINGUIST List 18.1223 (4/23/07) by Prof. Robert Berwick, the work is 
available at http://alpha-leonis.lids.mit.edu/chomsky/.
31. The manuscript version of the passage and footnote is clearer than the published 
version: the Menomini and Hebrew treatments exemplify the style of analysis described in 
the main text.
32. Koerner and Tajima (1986, 3) claim that MMH “was included as an appendix to chapter 
VII” [copying Chomsky’s mistake from LSLT (4)] of (some ms. version of) LSLT, but this 
seems most unlikely, as the note in LSLT (169) in lieu of the appendix to chapter VI is identical 
to the note in LSLTpdf, 243 = ms.p. V-189, but for the insertion of a sentence and a half. I have 
wondered whether it was nothing but the typographic complexity of MMHb that kept it from 
being included in the publication of LSLT, but Chomsky did not answer that question.
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Whereas earlier descriptions in terms of ordered morphophonemic rules, 
e.g., Bloomfield 1939, had been content merely to specify sufficient conditions 
of ordering (i.e., by arranging n rules in a linear order from 1 to n)5 [5 Cf. 
Chomsky 1964[a]: 70.], Chomsky’s thesis attempts to specify necessary ordering 
and regards the set of morphophonemic rules as being only partially ordered. 
(Kilbury 1976, 106)
What, then, need Chomsky have taken specifically from Bloomfield 1939?
Another article has recently been put forward by John Goldsmith (2008) as a 
potential precursor of generative phonology: Wells 1949. Goldsmith convincingly 
shows that a number of characteristics of what was to become generative phonology 
appear — not foreshadowed, but explicitly — in this article.33 Not, perhaps, acciden-
tally, neither Bloomfield 1939 nor Wells 1949 appears in Joos 1957; though Swadesh 
and Voegelin 1939 does: Joos’s afterword to this article (Joos 1957, 92) together with 
 Goldsmith’s extended quotation from Joos 1964 suggest why. Goldsmith sees Bloom-
field and Swadesh & Voegelin as the heart of Wells’s presentation. Chomsky’s assess-
ment is very different from Goldsmith’s (and, presumably, Joos’s):
It is pure description of surface forms and their arrangements, which is why the 
solutions he discusses are so intricate and complex, and miss the underlying 
principles and generalizations that emerge in generative morphophonemics 
…. It is a very careful discussion, Wells-style, of the familiar options in use in 
descriptive morphology …. He cites Bloomfield’s Menomini but dismisses it. 
Rather, he cites Bloomfield’s thesis in Language that descriptive order is “a fiction” 
— in Well[s]’s paraphrase, “fictive and metaphorical,” therefore “avoidable,” and 
he proceeds to discuss how to avoid it. He says that the standard use of such 
devices is an illegitimate borrowing from historical linguistics, and has a mocking 
and dismissive reference to the “theory” proposed by Swadesh and Voegelin that 
doesn’t recognize that all of this is fiction.34 (NC, 1/23/08)
Content




4. General Statement-criteria, and Necessary Order 47
33. In asserting (n. 4) that this article contains the first expression of the notions “focus” and 
“environment,” Goldsmith overlooks Wells’s own reference (n. 7) to Wells 1947, § 11.
34. Chomsky’s alacrity is extraordinary. I asked about Wells 1949 just past midnight on 
Tuesday, 1/22/08; he replied that he did not recall it, and at 1:25 pm the next day he had gone 
to the library and assessed the article. Note that the elaborate rewriting of MMHa into MMHb 
took considerably less than six months. 
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As nothing corresponding to the Introduction appears in MMHb, so that the con-
nection with Carnap and the motivations for the approach are lost, it is reproduced 
here in full (with the author’s permission, 8/26/07).35
1.0. This study has its roots in two fields, symbolic logic* and descriptive 
linguistics. But the work which constitutes the body of this paper is not an 
example of what is customarily done in logical construction, nor, for that matter, 
is it a typical representative of work in descriptive linguistics. In that case, its 
status remains undetermined. This introductory statement will attempt to explain 
the status of the present study in Modern Hebrew grammar, exhibiting:
 1. The connection of logic and linguistics
 2. The connection (or relevance) of this paper to logic
 3. ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” linguistics.
 Sections 1.2. and 1.3., at the cost of some repetition, are self-contained units.
1.1. Logic and linguistics meet at several points. Perhaps the clearest way to 
perceive that connection relevant here is to consider the applications of logic to 
the construction of systems. Thus Carnap in the Aufbau,† for example, begins with 
a primitive  relation between slices of experience and attempts to construct, by a 
series of definitions, the concepts of quality class, quality, sensation, etc., i.e., he tries 
to construct concepts for the most general description of experience. Similarly, it 
can be shown that the theoretical part of descriptive linguistics, beginning with 
three 2-place predicates of individuals, and restricting its individuals to a tiny 
domain of experience (i.e., speech [p. 2] sounds‡) can construct concepts such as 
‘phoneme’, ‘morpheme’, etc., which are available for a general description of that 
part of experience called linguistic phenomena.
35. In the transcription of MMHa and MMHb, underlining in the typescript is replaced by 
italics; superscripting and subscripting are as typed, despite some possible inconsistencies; 
Chomsky’s handwritten ligatures of NP and VP are set thus; and supralinear typed insertions 
(notably in the word “morphophonemics”) are enclosed in ‹ ›. A very few obvious typing 
errors are corrected silently. Chomsky’s footnotes are marked *, †, ‡, § (rather than the typed 
*, **, etc.). Page breaks in the typescript are indicated. Numbered footnotes are mine.
* More specifically, the constructional part of philosophy which uses logic as its essential tool.
† Carnap, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin, 1928.
‡ Or, perhaps, segments of magnetic tape on which speech is recorded.
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1.2. Suppose that a system such as that of the Aufbau is successfully established, 
and it is now desired to focus the powerful concepts developed on a small part of 
experience, e.g., on the experience of A in time range T. Suppose that it is desired 
to describe this part of the totality of experience, giving certain information about 
it, for instance, of what qualities, sensations, etc., is it an instance.§ There would 
be two ways, essentially, of proceeding. One could list the occurring individuals 
and progressively develop the concepts of the system, restricting each predicate 
to the individuals (or sets, sums, etc., of individuals) for which it holds, thus 
proceeding in what will be called a synthetic process, i.e., in the direction of greater 
generality. Or, one could invert the whole process, list first the most general 
elements applying to the part of experience under consideration, analyze these 
into their actually occurring constituents (from among the totality of constituents 
permitted by the system), further analyze these, etc., until finally the whole 
experience would be specified in terms of the individuals of the system. This will 
be called an analytic process. Which method will be [p. 3] selected depends on 
considerations of elegance and relative adequacy for the particular purposes of 
the description.
Analogously, the theoretical linguistic system constructed is available for 
descriptions of small parts of the realm of experience constituted by the totality 
of its individuals. In one of the most interesting cases, the part to be described 
is an individual language. As above, the system can be applied in two ways. 
One can begin with the elementary phonetic units, construct the phonemes, 
morphemes, syntactic classes, etc., proceeding synthetically. Or one can state 
the most general unit (i.e., the sentence) in terms of its constituents (e.g., the 
particular phrases of the language), further analyze these into their constituents, 
etc., until finally every possible sentence is represented in terms of phonetic units, 
thus proceeding analytically. Again, this choice will depend on considerations of 
elegance and adequacy.
This paper will be an attempt to carry out an analytic statement of Modern 
Hebrew grammar. Thus, beginning with the sentence as the fundamental unit, 
the grammatical statements will progressively transform it into its more and 
more simple constituents, until all sentences of Modern Hebrew, an actual spoken 
language, are represented in terms of phonetic units. Of course, to actually describe 
such a complex part of experience as a spoken language is an enormously involved 
procedure, and  certain parts of the total description, which will be specified, are 
only given in outline, or merely mentioned. But all of the essentials have, I think, 
been included, and a complete description of [p. 4] Modern Hebrew, from this 
point on, would be largely a matter of additional detail.
§ It is here assumed that we actually know the basic facts but wish to state them. The actual 
process of discovery of the facts and of recording them would be comprehended by some 
science, not by philosophy, and would correspond to what will be called, in 1.3., step 1 in the 
process of descriptive analysis.
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1.3. The process of descriptive analysis of a language can be divided into two 
parts. The first step consists of the discovery of the basic substitutable elements, 
and the determination of the relevant sequences, classes, sequences and classes of 
classes, etc., of these elements. The second step is the construction of a descriptive 
statement based on the results of this process of discovery. It should be noted, 
of course, that the second step is also a creative, information-yielding process. 
The activities which constitute the first step are governed by certain criteria, and 
the elements obtained at each level must meet certain requirements. The various 
formulations of these criteria and requirements constitute the subject matter of 
researches in the methodology of distributional analysis. But the statement of the 
grammar, the presentation of the results of the completed distributional analysis, 
must meet wholly different criteria which involve, essentially, considerations 
of elegance and considerations of adequacy as determined by the particular 
purposes of the grammar. The present paper will confine itself to step two in the 
description of Modern Hebrew.
The task of rigourously defining the criteria which should govern grammatical 
statements is beyond the scope of this paper, although certain formulations will be 
given and the question will be discussed in section 4. But it must be stressed here 
that the considerations of elegance cannot [p. 5] be regarded as trivial or merely 
‘esthetic’. It has been pointed out with reference to constructional philosophical 
systems*, and it is no less true for descriptive grammatical systems, that the 
demand for elegance (or economy) is essentially equivalent to the demand that 
there be a system at all. The amount of material under consideration by the linguist 
is finite, and it could be completely described in many ways, e.g., by listing every 
linguistic expression which can occur in terms of the various units appearing at 
various levels of analysis. Thus the morphophonemic statement of the present 
paper could be replaced by a complete set of paradigms for all morphemes; the 
syntactic statement, by a listing of all sentences, etc.
The argument against these and similar constructions is that (i) they are 
inefficient and (ii) do not exhibit relations and interconnections among linguistic 
expressions. (i) is simply a rephrasing, with a different emphasis, of the criterion of 
elegance. (ii) is equivalent to a demand for generality and for the constructability 
of elements from a set of more fundamental elements (e.g., of syntactic 
constructions from morphemes, morphemes from phonemes, etc.). But these 
considerations are immediately reducible to criteria of elegance, since generality 
is increased by reducing the number (and complexity, if it is to be real generality) 
of statements, while keeping the subject matter constant, and constructability is 
increased by reducing the [p. 6] number of basic elements (e.g., by a phonemic 
* N. Goodman, “Simplicity of Ideas,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, Dec. 1943, p. 107. “The 
motives for seeking economy in the basis of a system are much the same as the motives for 
constructing the system itself.”
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statement) and by specifying with greatest generality the construction of other 
elements (e.g., morphemes, sentences, etc.) from these.
The purpose of the grammar outlined in this paper is to specify, in terms 
of phonemes (ultimately, in terms of phonetic units), all the sentences of 
Modern Hebrew. The grammar is composed of syntax, morpho‹pho›nemics, and 
phonemics.† The introductory syntactic statement breaks down the sentence 
into its parts. The morphophonemic statement specifies these parts in terms of 
phonemes. The phonological statement effects the transfer from symbolism to 
observable fact. Thus the grammar is a set of analytical statements each of which 
analyzes more closely the units presented to it by the preceding statement. Running 
through the list of statements in one way (i.e., with one set of choices) gives one 
sentence. Running through them in all possible ways gives all possible sentences.
The customary structure of a grammar is phonology, morphology, and 
syntax, in that order. A departure from custom should be justified. I think that 
there is methodological, and perhaps even psychological justification for the 
inversion of order carried out here.
Fundamentally, one may ask what the grammar structured in the customary 
pattern does. What it does is to tell you how to write, in the most general possible 
form, any actually occurring sound sequence. At every stage in the construction 
[p. 7] of this most general symbol sequence, information is imparted about 
the given sound sequence (e.g., of what phonemes, morphemes, etc., is it an 
instance) and about the interconnections and relations among units constructed 
at the intermediate stages. But the purpose of the present grammar, as presented 
previously, is different. It is to completely characterize and specify the totality 
of linguistic expressions of the language in terms of elementary units. To do 
this clearly requires an inversion of the customary pattern. The intermediate 
information is imparted with no loss. The question here is not which is the 
‘correct’ purpose (although I think that the relevance of the position taken here 
can be defended), but simply, given the purpose, which is the better method of 
achieving it.
Another possible methodological consideration is as follows. One of the parts 
of any grammar will have to be a series of statements describing the phonemic 
form of morpho‹pho›nemes. These are fundamentally analytic (in the sense 
that they break down more general units into less general ones) statements, as 
opposed to the essentially synthetic statements which characterize the grammar 
of customary structure. When the morpho‹pho›nemic statement constitutes a 
large part of the grammar (as is the case of Hebrew), there is a certain gain in 
unity if the analytical morphophonemic statement is put into an analytic frame. 
† The phonological statements are not actually given. Their place is, however, indicated.
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To put the matter differently, the ‘synthetic grammar’ will not lead directly even 
to its own goal, the symbolic generalization of a given sound sequence. For to 
[p. 8] do this directly would require a series of synthetic statements each of which 
recasts and combines the elements transferred to it by the preceding statement 
into more general units of which they are instances. But the morphophonemic 
statement would have to proceed in the other direction, analyzing the more 
general elements, morphophonemes, into their particular phonemic form.
The psychological consideration I advance hesitantly. In an ‘analytic grammar’ 
(as will be presented here), every time a unit is introduced it is immediately and 
automatically (i.e., by the very way it is introduced) placed in the broad context 
of which it is a part and in which it functions, and the way it functions in relation 
to the units around it is immediately and automatically determined. Thus one 
cannot really understand what a noun phrase is except in the contextual frame 
provided by other phrases, or until it is presented against the background of the 
sentence of which it is a part. But this is what has been called an analytic process. 
This consideration seems to have some relevance, at least on the higher levels of 
analysis, but, generally speaking, I do not know how much (if any) weight is to 
be attributed to it.
Initially, brief characterizations of the remaining chapters will suffice; their content 
will be exemplified below when MMHa and MMHb are compared.
The Syntax chapter (9–18) includes 23 of what would come to be called “rewrite 
rules” (excerpted in II below), with definitions of symbols interspersed, as well as two 
sample analyses (III below). Harris’s term “transformation” makes an appearance. M, 
U, and O denote the precursors of N, V, and P — nouns, verbs, and prepositions. What 
seems to be a major innovation is the use of abstract markers in place of at least some 
phonological content.
The heart of the thesis is “Morphophonemics” (19–46). This includes 42 “state-
ments” of the most disparate form (excerpted in V below); for years, generative pho-
nology would consist of devising restrictions on the forms of statements — restrictions 
that would rule out the vast majority of these 42 rules. But they are preceded by a long 
discussion of notational conventions (called “terminology”), and by a list of ten sub-
sets of consonantal roots — which, however, are not characterized, but only exempli-
fied. There are no fewer than five groups of Middle-Yod roots, with no indication of 
which ones go in which class (see n. 44 on p. 194).36
36. In traditional Hebrew grammar, all verbs and most nouns are said to be formed from a 
triconsonantal root. One class of verbs that exhibit only two consonants in their surface form 
can be analyzed as having a semivowel, w or y (known by the letter-names Waw and Yod), as 
the second root consonant. “Double-Ayin” refers to another exceptional class.
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The fourth chapter, “General Statement-criteria, and Necessary Order” (47–64), 
presents a chart of the “necessary order” of application of the 42 “statements” 
(VI below). Chomsky observes that “this can be done completely by justifying the 
construction of each segment of a vertical line in the chart” (49). There are 51 such 
justifications (excerpted in VII below). Justifications are presented in the format
m < n  J →n    J́  →m     J́ ´ →    *J́ ´́ [J´́´́ ]
The meaning of such an expression is as follows: statement m precedes statement 
n because, were their order to be reversed, the element J (where J, J´, … are any 
sequences of elements which appear at any point in the process of application of 
the statements of the grammar) would become (by m) J́´, which would finally 
become (upon application of the remaining statements) J́´́, which is an incorrect 
form. The correct final form is J́ ´́´. Sometimes a clear counter-instance can not 
be constructed. In this case, the reason for the ordering will be stated to the right 
of the double vertical line. As has been brought out previously, considerations of 
elegance are a sufficient justification for a given ordering.*
The general considerations which have been regarded as relevant criteria are 
as follows:
1. Simplicity of statement
2.  Maximization of the number of derivations in which a statement will occur 
relevantly.
3. Minimization of irrelevant applications.
4.  Maximization of similarity among statements, and amalgamation of 
statements involving the same elements. (49–50)
Finally, 24 sample verb derivations and 23 sample noun derivations are given; they are 
not unhelpful in divining the purpose of each of the 42 “statements” (I below). The 
Appendix lists what has been omitted from the grammar: loanwords, primary nouns, 
suppletions, numerals, adjectival -ay or -a’i, Double-Ayin verbs, directional -a, adverbs, 
pronominal verbal suffixes, and the infinitive construct and inflected infinitive.37
* Actually, if these considerations are dropped, almost any order can be shown to function 
successfully, simply by enumerating in each statement the cases which lead to an incorrect 
result, and adjoining to each statement a correction for each such instance. This is possible as 
long as the material is finite.
3. Some of these are phenomena of Biblical Hebrew with little or no occurrence in Modern 
Hebrew.
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3. Reception
Chomsky has always insisted that MMHa fell on mostly deaf ears at the University of 
Pennsylvania; that only the Indo-Europeanist Henry Hoenigswald (1915–2003) read 
it and made comments (some of Hoenigswald’s own work is highly formalized, and 
he was also steeped in Pān
˙
ini; Chomsky missed the chance to work with Hoenigswald 
and master the third in the triumvirate of ancient grammarians, alongside Sībawayh 
and K. imh. i).38 He believed that Harris paid the work no attention; that Harris believed 
38. These two distant antecedents may have been quite important, if only subconsciously, in 
Chomsky’s formation. Bohas, Guillaume, and Kouloughli (1990: 38) observe regarding Sībawayh:
Typologically, grammatical and linguistic systems can be divided into two rough 
classes: on the one hand, those which analyse utterances in terms of formal 
relationships between their components; on the other hand, those which analyse them 
in terms of operations performed by the speaker in order to achieve a specific effect 
on the allocutee. Our claim is that Sībawayhi’s approach basically belongs to the 
latter category …. Sībawayhi’s system of analysis crucially presupposes that any 
utterance is the final result of a sequence of operations performed by the speaker, 
each one of these operations being simultaneously formal and semantic.
We do not know which portions of Sībawayh’s work were studied (Bohas et al. exemplify their 
point with a discussion of the early § 30), but this system may well have made a profound 
impression on Chomsky’s voraciously integrative mind. Whichever passages a student reads, 
the structure of the work is clear:
After a few pages of high-level theoretical preliminaries, the work examines first 
the syntax of Arabic, then the morphology and finally its phonology. This sequence 
is seldom followed in Western descriptive grammars (and has even been implicitly 
criticized), though it does represent the natural order in which the data would 
present itself to the observer, who would have to start with the whole utterances 
before breaking them down into their morphological and phonological components. 
(Carter 2004: 38)
Carter’s conclusion, “There is no need to look in Sībawayhi for the antecedents of any of the 
innovations of modern Western linguistics: no historical connection exists” (p. 145), may have 
been premature (cf. p. 184 above).
 From his father’s work on K. imh. i (cf. n. 10), Chomsky may have absorbed — along with the 
traditional analysis of Hebrew grammar — the notion that classic works are not necessarily 
sacrosanct: that total rethinking of inherited wisdom is not beyond the pale.
 If Chomsky had had the privilege of studying Pān
˙
ini at that time, a quite different realiza-
tion of “elegance” might have ensued. The relating of Pān
˙
ini to generative linguistics fell, many 
years later, to Paul Kiparsky (e.g. 1994 with references).
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nothing more was to be said in linguistics about phonology, that the future lay in dis-
course studies (cf. n. 21).39 For the same reason, Chomsky may have been reluctant to 
show his work to Harris; given how quickly Chomsky works (cf. n. 34), he may have 
been unwilling to pause for cycles of drafts and comments.
There are, however, two concrete pieces of evidence that Chomsky was not so 
unappreciated as he has always believed. First, on February 7, 1991, Charles F. Hockett 
(1916–2000) wrote to John Goldsmith as follows:
Quite apart from publications, a number of us (Bloch, Trager, Harris, Voegelin, 
Smith, Joos) were in active correspondence in the late 1940s and early 1950s. I have 
(or did have; some of them are lost) letters from Zellig Harris that mention a young 
student named Chomsky. One of them speaks enthusiastically of Chomsky’s work 
on Hebrew morphophonemics, saying that Chomsky had found a way to put the 
ordering of morphophonemic rules on a logical basis.40 (Goldsmith 2008, 48–49)
Harris was thus bragging about his student, aware of his innovation, and appreciative of it.
Second, Chomsky was asked by Harry Hoijer to review for IJAL two major books 
on phonology, Hockett’s Manual (Chomsky 1957a) and Jakobson and Halle’s Funda-
mentals (Chomsky 1957b). Chomsky had not yet published anything on phonology; 
for some time he had been concentrating on syntax. That means that the significance, 
if not the details, of MMH was already widely recognized by 1955.
In the summer of 1951, Chomsky moved to Cambridge to take up his five-year 
appointment to the Harvard Society of Fellows. There he encountered Yehoshua 
 Bar-Hillel (1915–1975), whom he credits as the only person who seriously read and 
understood MMHa. It was Bar-Hillel who 
suggested to me that I … postulate something very much like the reconstructed 
historical forms on the abstract morphophonemic level. It was with this in mind 
that I carried out the revision to the final 1951 version. I was struck by the fact 
that it led to considerable improvement. (LSLT, 29)
As he put it more recently,
Bar-Hillel’s suggestion was that I should pursue more rigorously the general 
simplicity formalism, and that if I did, I might find that the loose analogy between 
39. Chomsky may be right about Harris’s lack of interest in his innovations; as late as his 
1951 Language review of Sapir’s Selected Writings, he still proffered a morpheme distribution 
model in preference to Sapir’s (historico-)processual model (Harris 1970, 714).
4. Hockett’s family and colleagues believe that Hockett’s papers are archived at Rice Uni-
versity, Houston, Texas, with which he was affiliated toward the end of his life. However, 
an  archivist/special collections librarian at Rice, Philip Montgomery, reports that Hockett’s 
papers are not there (pers. comm., 2/21/08). Thus it seem impossible to determine just what 
Harris was saying to his colleagues, and when.
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historical linguistics, with its explanations in terms of sequentially ordered 
processes, and generative grammar, with its ordered rules, held much more 
closely than in my 1949 undergraduate honors thesis and the revision in my 1951 
MA thesis. That turned out to be correct, a matter of more general importance. 
Incidentally, when Morris Halle and I worked on what ultimately became Sound 
Pattern of English we were guided by similar ideas. (NC, 12/29/07)
Still more recently, he acknowledges the importance of his early exposure to his father’s 
work:
I’m pretty sure that ideas [like the analysis of begadkefat letters, see p. 209 below] 
have roots either in K. imh. i or in my father’s papers on history of Hebrew in the 
1930s, I presume related to his work on K. imh. i.41 I was reading these by the time 
I was a young teenager, maybe published, maybe in drafts. They don’t appear in 
the first version of MMH, but do in the second version, after Bar-Hillel’s crucial 
suggestion, which led me to think back to what I remembered about history of 
Hebrew. (NC, 3/8/09)
It turns out that Chomsky had already published a note on this event several years earlier 
than LSLT, in 1969 — a “political” article of the sort that many linguists set aside as not 
relevant to Chomsky’s linguistic work — discovered by Murray (1994, 228): “Accord-
ing to Chomsky, progress in linguistics depended on someone coming along who was 
familiar both with the mathematical work on recursive systems and with the tradition 
of historical linguistics.” Murray “thought that Chomsky saw himself as this fortuitous 
combination.” Chomsky denied this vehemently in letters to Murray, but evidently did 
not direct him to Bar-Hillel42 (who is absent from Murray’s chapter on Chomsky).
It is difficult to recognize any connections between the underlying forms and the 
operations performed on them with historical forms in MMHa, while they are clearer 
in MMHb.
4.  Revision
As mentioned, there are 47 sample derivations (24 verbs and 23 nouns) in MMHa; there 
are only 22 (14 verbs and 8 nouns) in MMHb. Fourteen of the derivations are of the same 
words (8 verbs and 6 nouns) in the two versions. We choose one verb derivation and one 
41. W. Chomsky’s discussion of begadkefat — including a mention of sequential rule ordering — 
is found in 1952 (i.e. 1933, cf. n. 10 above): 40 n. 38.
42. Is it significant that Chomsky’s extended contribution to the Bar-Hillel memorial volume 
(1976) contains no mention of MMHb like that which was to appear, almost gratuitously, 
much later in the Blanc volume, nor any reference to Bar-Hillel’s work?
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noun derivation to illustrate the differing approaches (on facing pages). Following the 
sample derivations are given all the syntactic (II below) and morphophonemic (IV–V 
below) statements that figure in the two derivations, and the tables of necessary order 
(VI below), together with the justifications involving any of the pairs that happen to be 
included in this list (VII below).
Beyond the two sample syntactic derivations (17–18), none of the examples in MMH 
(and there are dozens interspersed within the presentation of the morphophonemic 
statements) are glossed. These two are, respectively, ‘they (f.) were hungry’ and ‘her 
books’. In the strings of morphemes at the beginning of each derivation, r‘B and sPr 
represent the theoretical triconsonantal roots; ..a..á.. and ..é..e.. are the basic vowel 
patterns of these two items; La and Lb stand for the personal pronominal suffixes and 
the personal pronouns respectively; P and F denote plural and feminine respectively; 
S is the construct state (“smixut”), used for a noun appearing before a noun or pro-
nominal suffix. The absence of m- or Ft from the verb definition shows that it is not a 
present or future form respectively; therefore it is a past tense. In MMHa, “ ‘+’ indicates 
concatenation between positions, ‘•’ indicates concatenation within a position” (14), 
where “position” refers to the columns in the table that constitutes syntactic definitions 
13–15 (reproduced below). In MMHb this distinction is no longer used, and it was not 
considered necessary to define the concatenator “+”. [Discussion resumed on p. 208.]
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43. At some point in the derivation, the  underlining (italics) should have been removed 
from hen, probably at this point.
I. Sample derivations  Sample derivations
A9.r‘B•..a..á..+Lb3•P•F A7.La3+Lp+PF#r‘B+a—á+La3+PF
  1. ra‘áB+Lb3•P•F (2)   1. La3LpPF#ra‘áB+La3PF [MR3]
  2. Lp•La3•P•F#ra‘áB+La3•P•F (3i)   2. La3ePF#ra‘áB+La3PF [MR7]
  3. La3•P•F# ra‘áB+La3•P•F (3iii)   3. hePF#ra‘áB+PF [MR10]
  4. h•P•F# ra‘áB+P•F (7)   4. hemF#ra‘áB+uF [MR12́ ]
  5. h•em•F# ra‘áB+u•F (12)   5. hen#ra‘áBuF [MR13]
  6. h•en# ra‘áB+u (17i, v)   6. hen#ra‘BuF [MR28]
  7. hen# ra‘Bú (20ix, 1i)   7. hen#ra‘aBuF [MR30]
  8. hen#43 rā‘āBú (34viii)   8. hen#ra‘aBu [MR33]
  9. hen# rā’āBú (37)   9. hen#ra‘avu [MR34]
10. hen# rā’āvú (39) 10. hen#ra’avu [MR42]
11. hén# ra’avú (40v, vii) 11. hén#ra’avú [MR45]
B18.sPr•..é..e..+P+S•La3•F B7.sPr+í—+P+S+La3+F
  1. séPer+P+S•La3•F (2)   1. síPr+P+S+La3+F [MR3]
  2. séPer+P+S•h•F (7)   2. síPr+P+S+h+F [MR10]
  3. séPar+im•A+S•h•F (12)   3. síPar+P+S+h+F [MR12]
  4. sPar+im•A+S•h•F (14i)   4. síPar+im+A+S+h+F [MR12´]
  5. sPar+im•A+S•h•a (17iv)   5. síPar+im+A+S+ha [MR13.8]
  6. sPar+ím+S•h•a (25)   6. síPar+eY2+S+ha [MR20]
  7. sPār+ím+S•h•a (26i)   7. síPar+eA+S+ha [MR22]
  8. sPār+éY2+h•a (26vii)   8. sPar+eA+S+ha [MR23]
  9. sPār+é+h•a (33iv)   9. sPareAha [MR31]
10. sfāréha (39) 10. sfareAha [MR34]
11. sfaréha (40v) 11. sfaréha [MR35]
            (MMHa, 61, 68)         (MMHb, 60–61, 65)
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Any element enclosed in a minimal polygon is called a phrase.
13.
 
M = # (M0) R•VlPn (•M1(•LC)) (LC) (S(•Lak(•LC))) # 
position 0 pos. 1 pos. 2 pos. 3
U = # (U0) R•VlPv (U2) LN(•LC)+(M3) #
O = # Pr (M3) #
M0 = { m1-, m2-, T, h1} [noun prexes] 
17. LC = {P, F} [Def. 4, plural, feminine]
18. U0 = {h1, h2, N} [verb prefixes,(passive, causitive, reflexive, etc.)]
19. U2 = {Ft, m-} [respectively, future and present tense]
20. Ln = {Lak, Lbk, Lc}  [1 ≤ k ≤ 3] [La and Lb, personal pronouns; Lc, 
infinitive]
21. M1 = {on, an, i, eY2} [noun suffixes]
22. Pr = {b, l, ’al, miN, …} [a set of morphemes (prepositions) …]
23. Nn     = {M0–2, U0–3 [where U2 = m-, Ln = La]}
24. V2     = {U0–3 [where U0 ≠ h2, U2 = Ft, U3 = Lc]}
25. V1     = {Va, Vb}
  where Va = U0–2
   Vb = U0–3, and La3 occurs in pos. 3










Lb — , i.e., in ES when 
 ES = NP VP and NP = La or Lb
28.  A word is a sequence of morphemes enclosed by # (i.e., in environment: 
# — #). Phrases and constructions (except for the long components) which are 
themselves  morphemes (e.g., Lb3, Z) are words. ha- U and ha- M are words. 
ES must be represented completely in terms of words, i.e., no morpheme can 
occur which is not a word or part of a word.


























S4. VPLCi → V1+LCi〈V2〉〈V2〉…〈V2〉NP
LCj [j = 1,…,4]



































where (i) [j,n=1,…,4], [k=1,2,3] 
(ii) q → i 


or j in env. LCj…__
—
   ‘…’ does not extend outside of the NP
 (iii)   δ → ha (or  in env. __N1)†
    and all δ’s change simultaneously and identically since  
δ represents a long component.
 (iv)   haLak → Lak
 (v)   N1={N1a, N1b}









P‚ in env. a:Y2__
F or PF in env. u:__‚ and
u: → u:y in env. __  PF
 and if one LCi → α, then all instances of LCi in the sentence → α.‡

















zot in env. __ F
eyle in env. __ FP  and F‚ PP → 
ze
S15. M0={, m1-, m2, T-}
 U0={, h-, N-, h-N-}
 U2={, Ft, m-}
 (MMHb, 13–14, 16–17)
* Those morpheme designations which will appear in the morphology, and which are not 
given in morphophonemic spelling, will be underlined [italicized] to distinguish them clearly 
from sequences of morphophonemes.
† Common ‘compound nouns’ of the form N1LCSN1LC are often treated as a single N1, 
and the ha is prefixed to the first N1 rather than the second, giving forms like “habetséfer”, 
“haxadar’óxel” instead of “bet haséfer” (‘school’), “xadár ha’óxel” (‘dining room’).
‡ I.e., if there is an LCi in env.   
a:Y2
u
__, then i →  32 or 4   throughout. Thus all segments of any 
one long component become the same morpheme.
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III.  Illustration of the use of this syntactic system to analyze sentences into morphemes:
A. 1. Let sentence Σ = ES [1]
 2. ES = NP1
a VPa + LC [3]
 3. LC = F [4]
  ∴ES = NP1
a VPa + F = NPF VPF
 4. NP1 = Nc ;  ∴ NP1
F = Nc + F [7]
 5. VP = V1V2 ;  ∴ VP
F = V1
F V2 [6]
 6. Nc = La2 [9]
  ∴Σ = La2+F V1
F V2
 7. V2 = #h1 + R•VlPv + Ft + Lc# [24, 14, 18]
 8. V1
F = VaF = #R•VlPv + F# [25, 14,]
 9.  But, by 28 and comments following 22, since La2+F is not a word, it must 
fall in U3 of V1.
 ∴Σ = # R•VlPv + La2•F# #h1+R•VlPv + Ft + Lc#
An example of A might be ‘racít lhitraxéc’ (‘you (F) wanted to get washed’).
(MMHa, 17)
It is now necessary to specify R and VlP in terms of morphemes. It is convenient 
to consider the morphophonemic statement as being initiated at this point, although 
there is no systematic break.
IV.  3. Morphophonemics
The roots (R) and the vowel patterns (VlP) are discontinuous morphemes. We will 
first define R as a set of sequences of morpho‹pho›nemes, each sequence having three 
members.
Let ‘C’ (with or without subscripts) be a variable ranging over elements of the fol-
lowing two sets:
 i. M, f, y, x
 ii. ’, ‘, X, B, P, K, Y, N, g, d, h, v, z, t, l, m, n, s, c, k, r, š
R  = {CCC}, where ‘C’ ranges over elements of (ii).
Ra = {CYC}44 = {tYš, XYl, …} [See statement 9, below]
Rb = {CYC} = {šYr, sYm, …} [ ” 19 ]
Rc = {CYC} = {kYm, šYB, …} [ ” ” ]









, rY‘-, …} [see p.    ]
Rd´ ⊂ Rd. Rb, Rc, Rd are disjoint, and their union is {CYC}.
¯ is a morphophoneme characteristic of some roots (those of Rd', where it occurs 
with the third consonant) and of some vowel patterns (see below).
44. Levi (1972, 5–6 with nn. 3–4) identifies Ra as a noun pattern, Rb as verbs of the sam/
yasim pattern, Rc as kam/yakum, and Rd as ba/yavo. Rd' appears to be a group of anomalous 
verbs and does not reappear in the rules. (Perhaps this accounts for the missing cross refer-
ence at Rd'–ptd.) [I found Levi’s work in my papers after completion of this article.]
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Illustration of the representation of a sentence in terms of morphemes 
by development of the syntactic statements:
A.  1. Sentence
  2. Elementary Sentence  [S1]
  3. NPLC2+VPLC2  [S3]
  4. NPLC2+V1+LC2+V2  [S4]
  5. La2+LC2+V1+LC2+V2  [S6]
  6. V1+La2+LC2+V2  [S7]
  7. #V1+La2+LC2##V2#  [S9]
  8. #U0+R+VlP2+U1+La2+LC2##U0+R+VlP2+Ft+Lc# [S10]
  9. #U0+R+VlP2+U1+La2+F##U0+R+VlP2+Ft+Lc# [S13]
 10. #R+VlP2+U1+La2+F##h-+R+VlP2+Ft+Lc [S15]
 An example, filling in actual roots and vowel patterns, might be “racít lhitraxéc” 
(‘you(F) wanted to get washed’).
 (MMHb, 18)
 Leading up to the analysis of roots and vowel patterns, we list several classes 
of morphophonemes, which will also be referred to later on.
S18. Let G = {’, ‘, X, h}
  L = {’, t, n, y}*
  G+ = G∪{r}
 L+  = L∪{l}*
 CR = G+∪L+∪{B, P, K, d, k, g, v, s, z, š, c, m, N, Y1, Y2, Y3}
 C = CR∪{M, b, p, f, x, :}




0:}, where V0={i, e, a, o, u}




3(:, sometimes, if C2=Y2)
 Ra = {šYr, šYm, …}, all of form CYC [see MR1]
 Rb = {kYm, šYB, …}, ”  ”     ”        ” [see MR1]
 Rc = {zYt, lYl, …},       ”  ”     ”        ” [see MR12]
 Rd = {šmr, KtB, ’sP, …} If C1 = Y1, R∈Rd [see MR2]
* Designated ‘L’ because these are the forms taken by Lak in certain positions. Lc → l (see MR4).
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 Re = {yšn, yr’, ml’, KBd, …} [statement 20ii, 32vi]
 Rf = {šmr, gmr, KtB, ’sP, …} [    ”  20x, 34vi]
 Re ∩ Rf = Λ, i.e., Re ⊂ Rg (Re is a subset of Rg)
 Rg = R–Rf [statement 30i, 32xi, 36iii]
  Practically all members of R with second or third C = ’, ‘, X are members 
of Rg.
 Rh = {sPr, dgl, krB, …} [statement 28i]
 Ri = R–Rh [  ” 28iia]
 Rj = {mšl, Xkr, rkz, lcr, …} [    ” 32iii]
The vowel patterns are single- or bi-vocalic discontinuous sequences made up of 
elements of the following set:
 (i) i, e, a, o, u
‘V’ is a variable ranging over these five elements.
In addition, each vowel pattern contains once the element ´ (accent).
 (MMHa, 18–20)
V. Grammatical statements:
2. C1C2C3 • ..V1..V2.. → C1V1C2V2C3
3.
 






in env.: U, — P
F
(ii) Lbk → Lp Lak
 [1 ≤ k ≤ 3]
(iii) Lp →
(a.)  La3 P
(b.) #[La3 F] i# La3 F
(c.) #[La3] u#
in env.: — 
in env.: — 
in env.: — La3
(d.) ’ in env.: — La2






























 7. (i) La1 → i




n in env.: — P
’ in env.: — R
ti in env.: U, R—
(ii) La2 → ta









and t → 









P , and K(→) eK in env.: 
Y3+S•— a (and elsewhere, rarely)
eK in env.: S — 
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Re = R – Rd; i.e., all members of R except those in Rd [see MR24]
 If C1 = y, then R∈Re
 If C2 = G, then R∈Re (except, sometimes, when C2 = X, e.g., mXk, dXP)
 If C3 = G, then R∈Re (unless C1=Y1)
Re´ = (yšn, yr’, ml’, KBd, …) [see MR1]
 Re´ is a subset of Re†
Re´́  = {’mr, ’Bd, ’Kl, ’BY3, ’PY3}, all of the form ’CC. [see MR27]
 Re´́  is a subset of Re
Rf = {KnP, ’nP, XBr, …} [see MR26]
Rg = {mšl, Xkr, rkz, lcr, …}, mostly with C1 = l, r, X. [see MR24]
   Vowel patterns are single or bi-vocalic discontinuous sequences of elements in 


































































































n in env. __...P













(2) La2 → ta, and 
a →  in env. __μ
t → (e)x in env. S __(a) (sometimes, but not in env. P..__)








y in env. __...C1
























o in env. S+__#
† It is apparently disappearing as a separate subset, partly through analogy (yašán, yošén—see 
MR1), partly through disuse in the distinctive forms (as verbs).








(iii) La3 → h





























β  and ĕ2 → a in env.: CV́C—C 




































(i) [em → en] in env.: em•—
(ii) [y → t]  ”    ”   : y..+/— 



















* ehu may be eyhu in some dialects.


































where CaCbCc ∈ Re 










a  in env.: Km—
(vi) a2 → i ” ” : h1+..—













(a.) V2 →        ”   ”   : U‚ —
(b.) é2 Q        ”   ”   : M‚ CC—
C3+(S•) Wj
where Wj ≠ ĕ of ĕt





























































































and Y2 → y, sometimes 
and aY3C3 → C3a:Y3, sometimes



















































































































+im+(A) → o: 
a









__A(#‚ and t → ) 
except in env. S…__ 



































(and i → ‚ and sometimes)
(+u → #na)§









(9)  in env. S…__ 
‡ Also in env. uC3__ in the case of the quadriliteral ’šmr, giving “’ašmurá” alongside of “’ašmóret”.
§ The parenthesized transformation, when applied, leads to the rare and apparently disap-
pearing second and third person feminine plural “tiCCóCna”, etc., in Verb Future. In addition, 





giving such forms as “tikatávna”, “teládna”, “hodá’na”, by MR30.5.




25. ...Vk...•A → ...V́k...
26.
 
 (iii) V̆k →  in env.: —..S
      unlessVk is ĕ of ĕm or is final V of word
 (iv) Cká → Ckát in env.: —S
      where k = 3 or Ck is C of M1
 


















h t in env.: —+C1aC
−, and Q (see below), and n → h in env.: #l#—
and td →  d–† 





































hu  in env.: —CC, and Q 


















































where Wk = V or K 
#


















































































ót  — Km








+im+ S → éy in env.: —# 
† May be td, dd, or may vary. The facts are not clear.
‡  ey may be e in some dialects.































































































































































































































 (x) S → 
30. Intrusion of i
 (i)  L´ Y—1 C(V)C, where Y1CC ∈ Rg
 (ii)   #C—CkC, where Ck ≠ Y2
 (iii)  C—e CC
32. Intrusion of ē sometimes e in (i)
  











, where N ≠ C1 












(only sometimes in env.: —C− 2)
 (v)  Ĺ—i Y1C( o—)C
 (vii)   ē,ē
      —́Cet#
 
























 C2, except in env.: Ni‘…Y3..




































(b.)     a = 2
(c.)     a = b
sometimes
















Wj , where Wj ≠ a, ó [of ót]
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MR30. Intrusion of a
 
MR31. S(A) →  (in env. __#)
MR33. 




































































X(_)C2…‚ where … does not contain C3
(but does not hold sometimes in env. __...S)
(3) #G__C 
(4) l+—C2e


























…__Ck,* where … contains no W‚
Vj = i‚ e2









* Only sometimes in env. X__. This is a complex and perhaps fluctuating situation which 
requires further investigation for a complete specification, although it could be given more 
explicitly than this.Apparently never in M except in env. __C3#.
† [text reference missing] Except when R=r’Y3, which occurs in this form as “her’á”, etc.
‡ Exceptions to (6) are “bóhen”, “’óhel”, “léxem”, “réxem”, and forms from the root hyY3 (e.g., 
“yihyé”). “mixyá”, “yixyé”, etc., can be derived from the root xyY3 (x∉G).
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33. (i) In U, —Y2 (→) [V1 → 
=oC3]
 (ii) —Y2  → y
 (iii) éY2ĕCk → áyĭCk




40. (i) V → φ in env.: —CV…V́, unless this would form #CCC..
 (ii) V̋ → V́ 
 (iii) V́ → V̆ in env.: —…V́
            
 (v) W— → W
 (vi) Vj →  in env.: Cn—Vk,
  where n ≠ 2 if j ≠ k
 (vii) If there is no V́, then the V nearest the end of the word becomes V́.
 (MMHa, 27//45)



























































































































































 in env. __...A
V‚ where … contains no V
MR42. ‘ → ’
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VII. Necessary order arguments (for those rule pairs included above)
1, 2 < all statements 1 and 2 have the form of preliminary rules. Actually, 
they do not take effect until later, and they could be 
inserted later, but this would in some cases violate 
criterion 4,45 and would in general, without any com-
pensating advantage, confuse the systematic picture.
13 < 14i šóraš + ím•A →14j  šraš + ím•A → *šraším [šoraším]  
córaK + im•A+S →14j  craK + im•A+S →     *cirxéy [corxéy]
20 < 22 h2 + šit-éP →22   šit-éP → *šitéf [šutáf]  
t + h1 + Pasák →22   t + Pasák →20   t + Psák →     *tifsák [tafsík]
20 < 26 m+šamár+ím+S  →26    m+šmáréy →20  m+šmréy → *mišmréy [šomréy]
25 < 26 Yéld + a•A+S•Ka →26ii  Yéld + A+S•Ka → *yaldxá [yaldatxá].  
Also, A would have to be introduced into parts of 26, e.g., i,ii.
32 < 33 Otherwise 32i, ii would have to be complexly rephrased, since  
Y2 →
33    .
38 < 39 liiKtóB →39   liixtóv →38   *xtóv [któv]
37 < 40 Otherwise, 40iv must list ‘‘’ as well as ‘’’, violating criterion 1.
39 < 40 kiB–él →40   kiBél →39   *kivél [kibél]
 (MMHa, 51–57)
45. The criteria are quoted on p. 186 above.
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Necessary order arguments (for those rule pairs included above)
MR7 < MR10, otherwise
 La2Lp →
10   tLp → *”át” [“atá”].
MR12 < MR12´, otherwise
 im + A/P in MR12.
MR12´ < MR13,  otherwise the conditions for P → imA would have to be 
added to MR13(4), and “P →  in env. —o:t” would have to 
be added to MR12´.
MR13 < MR20,  otherwise the environment for → eY2 would be very compli-
cated to state, in MR20. And
  Y1álad + imAF + So →
20   Y1álad + imAF + Na:Y2 + So → 
*“yladótav” [“yaldotáv”].
MR22 < MR23, otherwise
 maKY2ó:naA →
23   maKY2ó:naA → *“maxoná” [“mxoná”].
MR28 < MR30, otherwise
 Ka’áBu →30   Ka’áBu *“ka’vú” [“ka’avú”].
MR30 < MR31, otherwise
  miXno:tASA →31   miXno:tA → *always “maxanót”  
[“maxanót” or “maxnót”].
MR30 < MR42, otherwise
 zró‘ →42   zró’ → *“zró’ ” [“zróa’ ”].
MR35 < MR45, otherwise
 sfareAxa →45   sfareAxá → *“sfarexá” [“sfaréxa”].
MR33 < MR34, otherwise
 lIiKtóB →34   lIiktóv → *“xtóv” [“któv”].
(MMHb, 53–58)
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Discussion
The most obvious difference between the two versions of verb derivation (I above) is 
that the personal pronoun accompanying the verb is taken to be obligatory in MMHa, 
and therefore derived in the second step (“Lp” is a placeholder for the independent 
personal pronoun that operates within transformation 3); in MMHb it is taken to be 
optional and must therefore be generated by the input to the morpheme string. The 
greatest difference in the noun versions (I above) is that in MMHa the initial vowel pat-
tern morpheme takes the shape corresponding to the unmarked singular séfer ‘book’, 
while in MMHb it corresponds to *sifr, the reconstructed Proto-Semitic ancestral form 
of this noun.46 This is a clear example of Chomsky’s adoption of Bar-Hillel’s suggestion 
to let the historical forms serve as the input to the morphophonemic component.
The first step in each derivation is the intercalation of the root and the vowel pat-
tern. The morph(ophon)emes are then rewritten as phonemes, one at a time. Capital 
B, K, P represent the three stops that in Modern Hebrew spirantize postvocalically 
(in Biblical Hebrew, all six stops b g d k p t did so); it is not clear why the archiphone-
mic notation with capital letters is used for P: p has no non-alternating counterpart 
corresponding to *q, *w (which Chomsky renders as k, v in the list of root consonants 
at IV above). Macrons in the MMHa derivations are purely diacritic — they do not 
relate to vowel length; acutes in both versions relate, in a sometimes roundabout way, 
to stress accent.
We consider the MMHa version of hén ra’avú. Statement (2) begins every deriva-
tion, intercalating root and pattern. (3i) puts a copy of the pronominal material at the 
beginning of the word; herein could be seen the germ of “affix-hopping” (“Auxiliary 
Transformation” in Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957c, 113). (3iii) takes away the 
Lp that serves a purpose in other forms. (7iii) introduces the pronominal base h twice, 
but the second line of the second part of (7iii) deletes the post-radical occurrence 
in a verb. (12) puts phonological meat onto the morphological bone “Plural,” twice; 
again, the intermediate form em in invoked rather than simply saying P → u after n 
or final radical. (17) does the same for “Feminine.” (20) appears to jumble together 
morphological and phonological changes, but all of them serve to insert the correct 
vowel pattern allomorph into the stems and persons. (34) represents a statement-form 
that did not survive into subsequent phonology — “Intrusion of ā” means ‘write an ā 
46. The class of nouns of the form CVCC is known in Hebrew grammar as segolates, because 
in the fully vocalized Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible, they appear as CVCeC, where e is 
notated with the vowel symbol called segol. Segolates are not treated in Harris 1941 because 
the resolution of the final cluster is understood to have been introduced along with the vowel 
markings by the Masoretes in the later first millennium ce, and not to have been part of the 
language of ca. 600 bce described by Harris.
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where indicated’ — and appears to undo (20), and also introduces the purely diacritic 
macron. (37) changes ‘ayin to ’aleph (‘ayin appears to be needed because of (32x) and 
(34i and viii), the only places where ’aleph does not occur alongside ‘ayin). (39) is the 
aforementioned BeGaDKeFaT rule — interestingly, the stop is taken as conditioned 
and the fricative as the “elsewhere” outcome, contrary to the traditional teaching that 
the stop is fricativized after a vowel (Kautzsch 1910: 34 § 6n; Malone 1993: 64; cf. n. 
41 above). (40) is a catchall cleanup statement that removes stray diacritics and also 
ensures that every word with no stress marking ends up with final stress.
Turning to the noun sfaréha, we have already seen the first three steps, but here 
the diacritic A is introduced by (12); it is not clear that it does anything but add stress 
to whatever precedes. (14) does for nouns what (20) does for verbs; a different part of 
(17) appears; (25) changes the A to stress; (26) makes the construct forms; (33) refines 
the construct marker; and (39) and (40) reappear.
How do the MMHb derivations differ from the original? Superficially most obvi-
ous is that the rules have been largely recast. Both derivations have the same number 
of steps, though as we have seen the input is different. If Bar-Hillel’s suggestion to 
use historical forms were his only contribution, it would have marked the foundation 
of the SPE approach to generative phonology. (In the reduced number of derivations 
in MMHb, it is not shown how to get from *sipr to séfer.) The forms of rules are as 
bizarre-looking as in the earlier version; but among the justifications of the neces-
sary ordering of the rules can be seen foreshadowings of future arguments concerning 
vacuous rule application (cf. Chomsky 1967)47 and “feeding” and “bleeding” order; 
compare the statements referring to MR22 and MR28 in VII above. MR13 does not 
look “elegant” in terms of later generative phonology (cf. n. 38 above, end), but the 
inclusion of every possible allomorph of F in a single rule constitutes a different sort 
of elegance. Especially in the footnotes, there can be seen a concern for variation in 
the spoken language: in MMHa it is limited to several mentions of the fact that e and 
ey can alternate, but in MMHb both grammatical change (cf. n. † on p. 193 above, n.† 
on p. 197 above, and n. § on p. 199 above) and synchronic variation (cf. the necessary 
order statement for MR30 < MR31 on p. 207 above) are recognized. Had the work 
been known earlier, variation studies might have gotten an earlier start.
Turning to other differences between MMHa and MMHb, lost with the omission of 
the introduction is the notion that “the syntactic statement [could be replaced] by a list-
ing of all sentences” (quoted on p. 183 above), which could reflect Leonard Bloomfield’s 
4. Chomsky published only two articles in Language; this, his only appearance after the 
review of Verbal Behavior, is in the Bernard Bloch Memorial Number. Bloch was a close 
friend, and though he disagreed with what Chomsky was doing, he encouraged his students 
to study it (NC, 12/30/07), in contrast to other prominent members of the Linguistic Society 
of America. Chomsky is a Life Member of the LSA.
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“The totality of utterances that can be made in a speech-community is the language of 
that speech-community” (1926). Instead, MMHb has
The linguistic analysis of a language L [is] the process of determining the set of 
‘grammatical’ or ‘significant’ sentences of L …, or, in other words, it is the process 
of converting an open set of sentences — the linguist’s incomplete and in general 
expandable corpus — into a closed* set — the set of grammatical sentences — 
and of characterizing this latter set in some interesting way. (1)
Compare this from Syntactic Structures: “A language [is] a set of sentences” (Chomsky 
1957c, 13), but also
The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language L is to separate the 
grammatical sequences which are the sentences of L from the ungrammatical 
sequences which are not sentences of L and to study the structure of the 
grammatical sequences. (ibid.)
The notion of “grammaticality” does not appear in MMHa, but it does in MMHb. 
“Transformation” appears in MMHa, but in MMHb it is promoted to the introduction 
to the new section Notation (6), albeit in a different sense:48 “The grammar, then, 
will be a set of transformation statements each of which transforms a given repre-
sentation of a sentence into a more specific one.” And “generate”? “It is assumed that 
the sole purpose of the grammar is to generate a closed body of sentences, these 
having already been determined” (3). “A complete grammar … [is] a single set of 
‘transformational statements’ generating, from the most general representation of 
any sentence … the specific representations, i.e., all grammatical phone sequences” 
(MMHb, 67f. n. 6).
The volume editor set the question, “Are there ‘revolutions’ in linguistic theory? (in the 
Kuhnian sense) and how does Chomsky’s career support whichever conclusion one 
might reach to that question? (One could also use this consideration to reject Kuhn’s 
theory of scientific revolutions, if one wished.)” I certainly will not take it upon myself 
to address such a question of the philosophy of science. In the early works considered 
here, what is clear is that Chomsky believed he was doing something that had not 
been done before; that he was blazing a new trail branching off from that which had 
* Though not necessarily finite. Thus the resulting grammar will in general contain a recursive 
specification of a denumerable set of sentences.
48. “The term ‘transformation’ is used basically in the sense of ‘rewriting rule,’ which is dif-
ferent from transformations in Harris’s sense (a description of cooccurrence relations) or 
mine (as a generative syntactic operation)” (NC 3/7/09).
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been paved by his mentor. He did not expect anyone would follow him through the 
rough new terrain; but his track did join two established thoroughfares, the way of lin-
guistics and the way of “formal sciences.” The former contributed the subject matter; 
the latter, notions of ordered rules and recursion, both already present in his earliest 
known work but not explicitly derived from any earlier linguistic source that he knew 
or recognized. These earliest formalisms are a far cry in complexity from the easily 
comprehended versions in his earliest publications (1953, 1957), and maybe they had 
to be worked through the extremely baroque versions in the thickets of LSLTpdf and 
LSLT in order to emerge in the sunshine on the other side. But somewhere along the 
way, the subject matter was diverted from phonology to syntax. A formal approach 
to phonology (not treated by Tomalin 2006) was attempted in the 1950s and 1960s 
but dead-ended before the publication of SPE (Daniels in preparation). I would thus 
agree with Murray (1994, 238–39) that if there was a “Chomskyan revolution,” it was 
in phonology, not in syntax: but even so, a scholar whom Chomsky and Murray (1994, 
238) identify as a principal obstacle in the old guard, Archibald A. Hill, served on the 
committee for one of the first non-M.I.T. dissertations in generative phonology, Daniel 
Gutman’s.
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Grammar and language in Syntactic Structures
Transformational progress and structuralist ‘reflux’
Pierre Swiggers
(University of Leuven [K.U.L.])
In his review of Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957), R.B. Lees praised 
the work as a pioneering effort in constructing a truly scientific theory of 
language. Very soon, Chomsky’s 1957 book was regarded as inaugurating 
the ‘generative revolution’ in linguistics. The present study focuses on the use 
made by Chomsky, in his 1957 book, of key concepts such as ‘structure’, ‘level’, 
‘grammar’ and ‘language’, while relating his argumentation to theory formation 
in linguistics in the 1950s. It is shown that, from the point of view of theory 
construction, Syntactic Structures has an ambivalent status: the work goes beyond 
distributionalism in showing the acceptability of level mixing, and in extending 
syntactic analysis to the relationships between utterances, but at the time of 
addressing the issue as to what it is to ‘understand’ a sentence, the work relapses 
into American structuralist orthodoxy. Also, in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky 
reverts to the Bloomfieldian skeptical attitude concerning the use of meaning 
in linguistic description, and no reference is to be found here to the speaker’s 
‘competence’. As a result, the book appears to be rooted in the structuralist 
tradition, reflecting the structuralist concern with rigorous methodology; its 
distinctive quality was to deal with linguistic methodology as constituting the 
core of a general theory of grammar.
“Whether the change that actually took place — the advent of and eager 
reception of the approach called transformation theory — should be described 
as internal or external, as a revision and rehabilitation of Descriptive 
Linguistics, or as a displacement of it, is no simple one, for which reason I save 
it for another day”
 (Wells 1963: 48).
0. Introduction
In 1957 Noam Chomsky’s (b. 1928) Syntactic Structures came out. In his lengthy review 
of the book, which appeared in the same year, Robert Lees (1922–1996) praised the 
work as
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...one of the first serious attempts on the part of a linguist to construct within the 
tradition of scientific theory-construction a comprehensive theory of language 
which may be understood in the same sense that a chemical, biological theory is 
ordinarily understood by experts in those fields. (Lees 1957: 377)1.
Within the historiographical literature, the rise of transformational grammar has been 
described and appreciated in divergent ways,2 partly in line with divergent predispo-
sitions of the respective historiographers, and partly in accordance with the specific 
focus — on sociological aspects, on rhetorical strategies,3 on methodological prin-
ciples, or on general theoretical statements4 — of these studies.
The aim of this paper is not to make judgments on the historiographical treatment 
of the early phase of transformational grammar,5 nor to evaluate the claims made, 
at one time or another, regarding the (possible) superiority of the transformational 
model with respect to other models. The scope of the present contribution, offered as a 
homage to Konrad Koerner, is much more limited and modest: I am mainly interested 
in a number of key concepts as these appear, in a more or less explicit formulation, 
in Chomsky’s 1957 book.6 This examination will involve an analysis of (only part of) 
.  Lees (1957: 377–8) adds: ‘It is not a mere reorganization of the data into a new kind of 
library catalog, nor another speculative philosophy about the nature of Man and Language, 
but rather a rigorous explication of our intuitions about our language in terms of an overt 
axiom system, the theorems derivable from it, explicit results which may be compared with 
new data and other intuitions, all based plainly on an overt theory of the internal structure of 
languages; and it may well provide an opportunity for the application of explicit measures of 
simplicity to decide preference of one form over another form of grammar.’
.  See, e.g., Hymes/Fought (1975), Maher (1980), Newmeyer (1980, second ed. 1986), 
Murray (1984, Chapter 9), Koerner (1989), Harris (1993), Matthews (1993).
3.  See Harris (1989).
4.  Chomsky’s theoretical work has attracted the attention of philosophers; for selections of 
essays, see, e.g., Harman (ed. 1974) and Kasher (ed. 1991).
5.  See esp. Murray (1981 [and cf. Historiographia Linguistica 9.185–7 (1982)]), Newmeyer 
(1986), and the retrospective assessment in Koerner (1989).
.  Two major works by Chomsky which precede his Syntactic Structures will not be dealt 
with here: (1) his Ph.D. dissertation (Chomsky 1955a), which I have not been able to see in its 
original form (the text was incorporated, in a revised form, into Chomsky 1975); (2) the type-
script The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (Chomsky 1955b), of which a book version 
was prepared by Chomsky in the 1970s (published as Chomsky 1975). [On the revisions of the 
1975 published version, see Boal (1984), a manuscript which I have not seen, but which is referred 
to by Koerner 1989 and Harris 1993.] – For fuller bibliographical details on Chomsky’s writings, 
see Koerner/Tajima (1986).
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Chomsky’s argumentation, and will relate it to theory-formation and work in linguis-
tics in the 1950s.
. ‘Structure’: A significant singular ?
Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures deals with the description of structure at the level of 
syntax. Throughout the book, Chomsky favors the singular form structure, as can be 
gathered from the following selection of passages:
This study deals with syntactic structure both in the broad sense (as opposed to 
semantics) and the narrow sense (as opposed to phonemics and morphology). 
(Chomsky 1957: 5);
  The ultimate outcome of these investigations should be a theory of linguistic 
structure in which the descriptive devices utilized in particular grammars are 
presented and studied abstractly, with no specific reference to particular languages. 
(Chomsky 1957: 11);
  I think that we are forced to conclude that grammar is autonomous and 
independent of meaning, and that probabilistic models give no particular insight 
into some of the basic problems of syntactic structure. (Chomsky 1957: 17);
  This is the basic requirement that any conception of linguistic structure (i.e., 
any model for the form of grammars) must meet. (Chomsky 1957: 68).
Two points deserve our attention at this stage: (1) on the one hand, Chomsky does not 
comment on a possible distinction between structure and structures;7 (2) on the other 
hand, he does not offer, at least not straightforwardly, a definition of ‘structure’. Both 
points are related, in my view: (i) Chomsky’s interest is in formulating the descriptive 
devices for presenting a grammar — or, crucially, the descriptive devices by which 
extant/possible grammars can be comparatively evaluated —: such an aim is central to 
a theory of linguistic structure, with ‘structure’ as a global cover-term (for both ‘struc-
turing’ and ‘structuration’); (ii) in his 1957 book Chomsky explores the possibility of 
construing a formalized theory for the structural description of natural languages; as a 
consequence the emphasis is not on the notion of ‘structure’ itself (which hence can be 
left undefined), but on the construction of a formal representation for sentences.
The issue of the singular structure vs. the plural structures is not, in my view, a 
futile question. First, there is the fact that the singular structure occurs in labelling 
terms such as phrase structure or transformational structure, where the term stands for 
. To account for the title Syntactic Structures in terms of the co-presence of phrase struc-
ture and transformational structure would be missing the important fact that these are seg-
ments of the grammar as a whole.
 Pierre Swiggers
‘structural model’ (or ‘model structure’). Second, the use of the singular structure is 
completely in line with the methodologically grounded use of the term by Zellig  Harris 
(1909–1992) in expressions such as ‘distributional structure’ or ‘linguistic structure’ 
(see, e.g., Harris 1954, 1957).8 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the use of the 
term structure as referring to a model (and theory) of description raises the fundamen-
tal problem of the correspondence between the structure set up by the linguist and the 
structure used by the speaker. In Syntactic Structures Chomsky does not speak about 
interiorized knowledge of linguistic structure, but he establishes a link between the 
grammar and the speaker’s behavior. After having rejected the conception of grammar 
as (the description of) the structure of the corpus of utterances handled by the linguist, 
he defines grammar as a non-finite projective description: ‘Any grammar of a language 
will project the finite and somewhat accidental corpus of observed utterances to a set 
(presumably infinite) of grammatical utterances’ (Chomsky 1957: 15), and he adds:
In this respect, a grammar mirrors the behavior of the speaker who, on the basis 
of a finite and accidental experience with language, can produce or understand 
an indefinite number of new sentences. Indeed, any explication of the notion 
“grammatical in L” (i.e., any characterization of “grammatical in L” in terms of 
“observed utterance of L”) can be thought of as offering an explanation for this 
fundamental aspect of linguistic behavior. (Chomsky 1957: 15).
Such a statement can be or should be read as rejecting the distinction drawn between 
an ‘instrumentalist’ and a ‘realist’ (or: ‘subjective’ vs. ‘objective’) conception of linguis-
tic structure; the formal description of grammar is said to determine structure in such 
a way that it corresponds to the use the speaker makes of the structure. Whereas in 
Syntactic Structures Chomsky is quite allusive on this matter, in a 1977 interview he 
recalled the crucial issue at stake then:
In American linguistics — in fact, also in European structuralism of the thirties, 
forties, and early fifties — there was very intensive work, as you know, in developing 
procedures that in principle, one hoped could be applied in a mechanical way to a 
corpus of data so as to produce, finally, a grammar of that corpus. Well, a crucial 
question arises at that point; it’s essentially the question of realism, you might 
say. That is the question, What is the nature of these procedures? Are they simply 
a device for bringing organization to chaos? And, is it the case that one set of 
. It should be noted that in his 1954 paper Harris proposed a working definition of ‘struc-
ture’: ‘For the purposes of the present discussion, the term structure will be used in the fol-
lowing non-rigorous sense: A set of phonemes or a set of data is structured in respect to 
some feature, to the extent that we can form in terms of that feature some organized system 
of statements which describes the members of the set and their interrelations (at least up 
to some limit of complexity). In this sense, language can be structured in respect to various 
 independent features’ (Harris 1954: 146).
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procedures is as good as any other set? Or, is there a kind of truth claim involved 
in those procedures? Well, if there is a truth claim, then that means that the system 
that arises by applying the procedures is claimed to be represented in the mind 
in some fashion. That is, one claims, at least, that the procedures correspond in 
some fashion to what the child is doing when he acquires language, and that 
the result of applying the procedures corresponds in some fashion to the mental 
representation of the language in his brain. And in fact that conclusion had been 
drawn. For example, it had been drawn by Charles Hockett in a very perceptive, 
brief paper that appeared in the late 1940s, where he took a very strong realist 
position and said, in effect, that the grammar that the linguist constructs is a 
representation of synaptic connections in the brain and that the procedures of 
analysis correspond to what the child is doing when he works with the data and 
develops that grammar. (Saporta/Chomsky 1978: 303–4).
It may be worthwhile to dig further into this. Hockett’s short paper, published in 1948, 
was in fact a squib that followed hot on the tracks of a review published by Preston 
(1948). Taking issue with the mentalist assumptions of the author (viz. C. de Goeje) 
whose book he was reviewing, Preston had affirmed that ‘Structure is a series of state-
ments. The structure of a given language or language corpus does not exist until it is 
stated’ (Preston 1948: 131). Hockett’s reaction was not meant to question the nature 
of linguistic description, but to show the pitfalls of assuming a gap between some 
‘objective’ structure of the linguistic facts and the (subjective) structure the linguist 
constructs out of these. In his reaction Charles F. Hockett (1916–2000) noted two 
important points: (i) the fact that the linguist’s description is never fully reducible to 
the materials of his corpus; (ii) the fact that the difference between the linguist’s analy-
sis and the speaker’s behavior (Hockett refers to the child or language learner) is one of 
(degree of) explicitness, not of nature.
The analysis of the linguistic scientist is to be of such a nature that the linguist can 
account also for utterances which are not in his corpus at a given time. That is, as 
a result of his examination he must be able to predict what other utterances the 
speakers of the language might produce, and, ideally, the circumstances under 
which those other utterances might be produced. […] The essential difference 
between the process in the child and the procedure of the linguist is this: the 
linguist has to make his analysis overtly, in communicable form, in the shape 
of a set of statements which can be understood by any properly trained person, 
who in turn can predict utterances not yet observed with the same degree of 
accuracy as can the original analyst. The child’s ‘analysis’ consists, on the other 
hand, of a mass of varying synaptic potentials in his central nervous system. The 
child in times comes to behave the language; the linguist must come to state it. 
(Hockett 1948: 270–1).
Although Chomsky in his Syntactic Structures eludes issues concerning the ‘nature’ of 
linguistic structure, and discards the Markov-type view of the speaker as a machine 
for producing, in different stages, sentences of a language, it is clear that at the time 
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he conceived of linguistic theory as a description of the speaker’s linguistic intuitions. 
This can be gathered from both Lees’s review of Syntactic Structures,9 and from Chom-
sky’s statements at the 1958 Third Texas Conference on Problems of Linguistic Analysis 
in English.10
. ‘Levels’
At one point, though, in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky does use the plural structures. 
The passage in which the plural form occurs is about the tripartite arrangement of 
grammars, as combining a phrase structure, a transformational structure, and a set 
of morphophonemic rules (which serve to convert the string of words yielded by 
transformations into a string of phonemes).11 Chomsky then points out that, whereas 
. ‘The term ‘intuition’ may also be used in a different sense in connection with linguistic 
theories. The empirical data which a linguistic theory must explain consists not only of noises 
which talking people produce, but also of various kinds of judgments they can make and feel-
ings they may have about linguistic data. For example, a speaker knows which sounds or words 
rhyme, and he can say when a sentence is grammatically permitted or excluded, whether or 
not he has ever before heard the particular rhyme or sentence in question. These judgments 
are sometimes referred to as linguistic intuitions. They are part of the linguistic data to be 
 accounted for’ (Lees 1957: 376) [with correction of Lees’s spelling ‘rime’ to ‘rhyme’].
0. See the summarizing account in Matthews (1993: 201): ‘Toward the end, Chomsky says 
that he ‘dislike[s] reliance on intuition as much as anyone, but if we are in such a bad state 
that it is only intuition that we are using, then’, he feels, ‘we should admit it’. We must, however, 
‘try to refine it by testing’. If we can then ‘get to a point where we have refined our basis by 
theoretical investigations and operational tests’, he will be ‘very happy to stop saying that we 
start with the intuition of the native speaker’ (Hill, ed. 1962[1958]: 177f.). An example of such 
refinement would perhaps be the procedures which are envisaged a little later to ‘elicit differen-
tial responses’ bearing on grammaticalness (181). But for the moment reliance on the speakers’ 
intuitions cannot be avoided. ‘Intuition’, Chomsky said, ‘is just what I think I am describing.’ ‘The 
empirical data that I want to explain’, he goes on, ‘are the native speaker’s intuitions’ (158). If that 
is not accepted as ‘the purpose of linguistic study’, he is ‘lost’ (168). These remarks are almost all 
from interchanges with Hill, who drew him out repeatedly on this point. In another passage, Hill 
remarks that ‘if I took some of your statements literally, I would say that you are not studying 
language at all, but some form of psychology, the intuitions of native speakers’. ‘That’, Chomsky 
replied, ‘is studying language’ (167)’ (Matthews summarizes here Chomsky 1962 [conference 
paper of 1958] and portions of the relevant discussions at the 1958 Texas Conference).
. I will not enter into a discussion of the adequacy of ordering the set of morphophonemic 
rules after the transformational structure; as well known, some transformations should be 
directly linked with morphophonemic shapes (e.g., introduction of question particles in the 
interrogative transformation; a different type of stems used in passive transformations, etc.).
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phrase structure cannot be broken down into sublevels (at the level of phrase structure 
there is no ordering into a higher and a lower level), on the transformational level a 
distinction has to be made between kernel sentences and derivations:
On the transformational level, an utterance is represented even more abstractly 
in terms of a sequence of transformations by which it is derived, ultimately 
from kernel sentences (more correctly, from the strings which underlie12 kernel 
sentences). There is a very natural general definition of “linguistic level” that 
includes all of these cases, and as we shall see later, there is good reason to consider 
each of these structures to be a linguistic level. (Chomsky 1957: 47; italics mine).
Since ‘structure’ is equated here with ‘level’, it might have been more accurate to speak 
of ‘representations’. As a matter of fact, we are dealing here with the actualized repre-
sentations, obtained through the application of descriptive devices. In his 1957 book, 
Chomsky defines a ‘linguistic level’ as a set of descriptive devices, or as a method of 
representing utterances (Chomsky 1957: 109). The notion of ‘linguistic level’ was a 
central one within Bloomfieldian linguistics, as it was coupled with the applicational 
scope of techniques such as segmentation, contrasting, substitution, etc. As a general 
rule, Bloomfieldians stuck to the principle that distinct levels should not be mixed: the 
reason for this was the assumption that a grammar was the realization of a (linear) dis-
covery procedure, yielding definitive solutions at every distinct level, with the higher 
levels being seen as built up of the lower level forms.13 However, as shown by a num-
ber of linguists working in the structuralist tradition,14 phonemic analysis is at times 
crucially dependent on morphological information. In order to avoid the danger of 
circularity, it is important to co-define pairs of phoneme sets and morpheme sets, and 
a procedure of adjustment. Interdependence of levels, though, still remained a matter 
.  The first edition of Syntactic Structures has the erroneous spelling underly here; in later 
printings the error is corrected.
3.  For a clear statement on the ‘ascending’ order of levels (following directly after a passage 
rejecting the use of ‘meaning’), see Trager/Smith (1951: 81): ‘The procedure followed in this 
Outline has endeavored to use the meaning of recurring partials only as a short cut to the 
establishing of contrasting structural features, […] and to go forward on the assumption that 
microlinguistic analysis can and must deal with statements about the distributions of the ele-
ments rigidly observed on ascending levels of complexity of organization. The realization of 
the extreme importance of levels in the observation and classification of events in the whole 
field of human behavior has been and will doubtless continue to be one of the most important 
criteria for scientific work in the social sciences. […] It is probably true that in linguistics, 
because of the extremely formal and handleable nature of the data, the greatest progress in 
organization on the proper levels has been made’.
4.  Especially with respect to the ‘feedback’-relation between phonemic and morphemic 
analysis, see Harris (1951), Hockett (1947, 1955), and Pike (1947, 1952).
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of ad hoc intervention. Chomsky’s strategy in Syntactic Structures consists in making 
interdependence of levels part of the formal system of grammar (now including also 
syntax), governed by the principle of simplicity: ‘simplicity is a systematic measure; the 
only ultimate criterion in evaluation is the simplicity of the whole system’ (Chom-
sky 1957: 55–6). The issue then is no longer one of discovering the ‘correct’ phone-
mic or morphemic output, but that of developing an evaluation measure for strings 
representing linguistic structure. Interdependence of levels therefore is no longer an 
objectionable step in establishing structure, but becomes an expedient quality of the 
metalinguistic15 aims of a linguistic theory.
Given such a theory, we can attempt to construct grammars for actual languages, 
and we can determine whether or not the simplest grammars that we can find (i.e., 
the grammars that the general theory compels us to choose) meet the external 
conditions of adequacy. We shall continue to revise our notions of simplicity 
and our characterization of the form of grammars until the grammars selected 
by the theory do meet the external conditions. Notice that this theory may not 
tell us, in any practical way, how to actually go about constructing the grammar 
of a given language from a corpus. But it must tell us how to evaluate such a 
grammar: it must then enable us to choose between two proposed grammars. 
(Chomsky 1957: 54).
3. ‘Grammar’ and ‘language’
What then is a grammar for Chomsky in Syntactic Structures? The general answer to 
this question is that grammar is a formal description. More specifically, a grammar 
of a language is a generating device, or a set of devices. The notion of ‘generate’ in 
Syntactic Structures has a definite extensionalist ring: the grammar of language L gen-
erates the grammatical sequences in L, separated from the ungrammatical sequences. 
And a language is defined, by stipulation, as a set of sentences: ‘From now on I will 
consider a language to be a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length 
and constructed out of a finite set of elements’ (Chomsky 1957: 13). This definition is 
stipulative in three respects: (i) a language is reduced to a set of strings (viz. sentences); 
(ii) the component members are assigned a finite length; (iii) these finite length members 
are made up of elements from a finite set.
5. Or, more precisely, of the ‘metametalinguistic’ aims, since, as Chomsky rightly points out 
(1957: 54 fn. 3), linguistic theory is formulated in a ‘metametalanguage’ to any language for 
which a grammar is constructed.
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Stipulative definitions share with postulates the characteristic of containing the 
T-theoretical required conditions. The disadvantage they generally have is that they 
are (very) restrictive. In the present case, it is interesting to briefly confront the above 
definition of ‘language’ with definitions found in major textbooks of linguistics that 
appeared before Syntactic Structures;16 in the textbooks, reference is made to (a) the 
symbolic nature of language; (b) the social dimension of language; (c) the conven-
tional character of linguistic forms.
The general advantage of a stipulative definition is that it is highly controllable 
(also for the reader). The definition of ‘language’ in Syntactic Structures, apart from 
being controllable, has the advantage of being ‘open’: it allows one to subsume under 
the concept of ‘language’ every set of sentences that can be formulated in terms of a 
construction relation holding between elements and strings, and — with respect to the 
set of sentences constituting the language in question — it imposes only a very gen-
eral, internal condition, viz. of grammaticalness. There is, in addition, an important 
operational aspect involved: the definition of language in these terms entails its being 
defined by its ‘alphabet’ (the set of constitutive symbols) and by the constructed (gram-
matical) sentences. This constitutes the basis for evaluating the adequacy of descriptive 
grammar formats. Chomsky first examines the adequacy of two (types of) models:17 
the finite state Markov process model (based on a communication theory model)18 
and the phrase structure grammar model (which applies the analysis into immediate 
constituents). The finite state model falls short (a) of accounting for all the grammati-
cal English sentences, and (b) of generating only sentences, to the exclusion of non-
sentences. The empirical proof of this inadequacy is given by the fact that a finite state 
grammar cannot define the extension, scope and insertion of recursive devices; the 
basic reason for its failure lies in the nature of human languages, which are ‘non-finite 
state’. The second type, phrase structure grammar, is superior to it in that it can account 
for complex strings such as
 i. ab, aabb, aaabbb (n occurrences of a followed by n occurrences of b)
ii. aa, bb, abba, baab (any string of symbols followed by its mirror image).
.  See, e.g., Sapir (1921: 8): ‘Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of 
communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of voluntarily produced symbols’; 
Bloch/Trager (1942: 5): ‘A language is a system of arbitrary vocal symbols by means of which 
a social group co-operates’. Compare Hall (1964: 158): ‘Language is an institution whereby 
humans communicate and interact with each other by means of habitually used vocal-auditory 
arbitrary symbols’.
.  See also Chomsky (1956).
.  More specifically the model put forward by Shannon/Weaver (1949: 15–17).
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Chomsky (1957: 35–43) then shows the phrase structure to be inadequate in order to 
deal with three types of processes:
formation of sentences by conjunction (in fact: conjunction with partial blend-1. 
ing): e.g., the scene of the movie was in Chicago + the scene of the play was in 
 Chicago → the scene of the movie and the play was in Chicago;19
the appearance of discontinuous elements with auxiliary verbs (e.g., 2. have –V(past 
participle); to be –V(ing);
the active-passive relation.3. 
While it can be argued that a phrase structure grammar extended with a structural 
description of the internal build-up of syntagms and with a device for handling non-
linear constituency, can be made to cope with the processes listed in (1) and (2), the 
active-passive relation cannot be dealt with in a pure phrase structure grammar, since 
it exceeds the limits of a specifically attested phrasal string ( = token string) or its type-
representation. In order to be able to deal with the active-passive relation, the phrase 
structure model should be supplemented with (a) a categorical description of predi-
cates, and (b) a rather complex ‘rephrasing component’, accounting for linearization 
and for morphosyntactic adjustments in the ‘target string’. Chomsky, however, does not 
go into an examination of how a phrase structure model could possibly be extended 
and enriched;20 he considers that attempts to remedy its deficiencies will ‘lead to the 
development of ad hoc and fruitless elaborations’ (Chomsky 1957: 41 fn. 6), and asserts 
that an adequate account of linguistic structure cannot do without a transformational 
component, i.e., a component that contains rules operating on a given string with a 
given constituency and converting this into a new string with a new constituent structure.21 
At least three formative types of strings can be distinguished:
.  Chomsky does not enter into a discussion of what he considers to be a ‘constituent’ in 
these sentences (‘of the movie’ and ‘of the play’ are said to be ‘actually constituents’ of these 
sentences), nor does he consider problematic cases (the conjunction/blending process does 
not give the same result in the case of: the father of the bride was from Chicago + the father of 
the groom was from Chicago).
0.  For the issue of discontinuities in a phrase structure model, see Chomsky (1953); on its 
handling in morphological description, see Harris (1945).
.  As noted by Harris (1962: 19), transformational analysis is, in comparison with imme-
diate constituent analysis and string analysis, the ‘most refined’; but Harris observes that the 
three are ‘relevant, for language has the properties of all three’. Contrary to Chomsky, Harris 
offers a more oecumenical view of extant syntactic models: ‘For each of these types of analysis 
can describe all the sentences of a language (though at very different cost in complexity of the 
description). This is so because the complex detail of each language and, not to put too fine a 
point on it, the irregularities and the not-fully-carried-out analogies, force each type of anal-
ysis to provide in its statements for cases of special subsets of word-categories or  structures; 
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a. the strings underlying kernel sentences; these strings are terminal strings of a 
phrase structure grammar;
b. the kernel sentences, obtained by applying obligatory transformations to the 
strings in (a)
c. the optionally transformed sentences, obtained by applying optional transforma-
tions on (a)-type or (b)-type strings.
From this it follows that there is an evaluation measure22 for grammars of natural lan-
guages: as the latter are non-finite state and since they display relationships between 
sentences that can be captured under the term ‘transformation’, a model incorporat-
ing the level of transformational structure will provide a simpler23 account. Simplic-
ity, as seen above, is not a matter of concision or elegance: it is a matter of (higher) 
systematicity,24 across (classes of) descriptive statements.25
4. Grammar and meaning: The structuralist ‘reflux’
Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures combines the legacy of constituent analysis26 and 
of Item-and-Arrangement modelling,27 with ideas stemming from attempts at 
and statements of this form can be used to describe any special cases that diverge from the 
main rules and elements, or even any entirely different classes of sentences. The difference 
is rather in how the three analyses interrelate the sentences and sentence-segments of the 
language: For each characterization of a sentence relates that sentence to its decomposition 
products and also to other sentences having a similar decomposition’ (Harris 1962: 18–19).
.  This is the weakest requirement that can be placed on the relationship between a theory 
of linguistic structure and a grammar/set of grammars. Chomsky is aware of the fact that the 
majority of the extant linguistic models try to define a stronger type of (deciding) relationship 
between theory and descriptive outcome. In subsequent work Chomsky (see, e.g., 1964, 1965) 
was to introduce a theory of adequacy criteria for judging grammars.
3.  At one point, ‘simple’ is equated with ‘natural’ (Chomsky 1957: 68); this seems to me 
slightly inaccurate, since the simplicity condition is not one of naturalness, but one of (theory-
internal) systematicity.
4.  Recall that it is within the overall view of the systematicity of the grammar form that 
Chomsky finds a straightforward justification for mixing levels: if interdependence of levels leads 
to simpler statements in the form of the grammar, and when the interdependence is consistently 
handled in the grammar, this will be to the benefit of the description of linguistic structure.
5.  I.e., statements applying to kernel sentences and to non-kernel sentences.
.  As expounded in Wells (1947), to whom Chomsky (1957: 28, 52) refers; the classic text-
book exposition is that in Gleason (1955, Chapter 10).
.  The concept of ‘Item-and-Arrangement’ is accurately defined in Hockett (1954).
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 axiomatizing syntax28 and from discussions of general methodology. The book went 
beyond distributionalism in showing the acceptability of level mixing, and in extend-
ing syntactic analysis to the relationships between utterances; it also pointed out the 
weaknesses of constituent analysis in its treatment of subconstituency relations. But at 
the moment of addressing the moot question of what it is to ‘understand’ a sentence, 
the work shows a curious relapse into an orthodox brand of American structural-
ism. The central question raised in Chapter 9 ‘Syntax and Semantics’ is ‘How are the 
syntactic devices available in a given language put to work in the actual use of this 
language?’ (Chomsky 1957: 93). The question is not answered in a theoretical way; 
Chomsky seems to assume that it was (sufficiently) answered by offering a fragment 
of a transformational grammar of English in a preceding chapter (Chapter 7: ‘Some 
Transformations in English’), to judge from the following passage:
The grammar of a given language must show how these abstract structures are 
actually realized in the case of the language in question, while linguistic theory 
must seek to clarify these foundations for grammar and the methods for evaluating 
and choosing between proposed grammars. […] The requirement that this theory 
shall be a completely formal discipline is perfectly compatible with the desire to 
formulate it in such a way as to have suggestive and significant interconnections 
with a parallel semantic theory. What we have pointed out in §8 is that this formal 
study of the structure of language as an instrument may be expected to provide 
insight into the actual use of language, i.e., into the process of understanding 
sentences. (Chomsky 1957: 102–3).
Understanding sentences involves the understanding of their representation at each 
level; and while Chomsky admits that at least components of sentences have mean-
ing — he remains unclear as to how to describe the (possible) meaning of a ‘transfor-
mation’ —, one would have expected a statement on the representation of semantic 
contents. But at this point, Chomsky reverts to the skeptical position held by Leonard 
Bloomfield (1887–1949):29
.  Here one should mention Harwood’s (1955) attempt to axiomatize a fragment of 
 Immediate Constituent analysis.
.  As a direct consequence of his neo-positivist view of science (cf. Hiż/Swiggers 1990), 
Bloomfield was skeptical concerning the possibility of using, from an operational point of 
view, meaning in linguistic description; the two basic reasons for his skeptical attitude were: 
(a) on the one hand, the fact that the meaning (of the vast majority) of linguistic forms is not 
fully describable (or statable); (b) on the other hand, the fact that the meaning of a linguistic 
form is not identically distributed over the totality of the speakers of a language L. In Chapter 9 of 
his Language, Bloomfield makes explicit how far, and for what purpose, meaning can be incor-
porated in a theory of language; his skeptical attitude is concisely expressed in the following 
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I am not acquainted with any detailed attempt to develop the theory of 
grammatical structure in partially semantic terms or any specific and rigorous 
proposal for the use of semantic information in constructing or evaluating 
grammars. It is undeniable that “intuition about linguistic form” is very useful 
to the investigator of linguistic form (i.e., grammar). It is also quite clear that the 
major goal of grammatical theory is to replace this obscure reliance on intuition 
by some rigorous and objective approach. There is, however, little evidence that 
“intuition about meaning” is at all useful in the actual investigation of linguistic 
form. I believe that the inadequacy of suggestions about the use of meaning in 
grammatical analysis fails to be apparent only because of their vagueness and 
because of an unfortunate tendency to confuse “intuition about linguistic form” 
with “intuition about meaning”. (Chomsky 1957: 93–4).
Chomsky then adduces arguments in order to support his defeatist attitude, but 
the problem30 with his arguments is that he (a) either combats semantically based 
statements that have no direct consequence for syntactic analysis (e.g., the idea that 
passage (from another chapter in Language): ‘Actually, however, our knowledge of the world in 
which we live is so imperfect that we can rarely make accurate statements about the meaning 
of a speech-form. The situations (A) which lead to an utterance (B), and the hearer’s responses 
(C), include many things that have not been mastered by science. Even if we knew much more 
than we do about the external world, we should still have to reckon with the predispositions of 
the speaker and the hearer. […] It is true that we are concerned not so much with each indi-
vidual as with the whole community. We do not inquire into the minute nervous processes of a 
person who utters, say, the word apple, but content ourselves rather with determining that, by 
and large, for all the members of the community, the word apple means a certain kind of fruit. 
However, as soon as we try to deal accurately with this matter, we find that the agreement of 
the community is far from perfect, and that every person uses speech-forms in a unique way’ 
(Bloomfield 1933: 74–5). – For a study of the attitude taken towards meaning in Bloomfieldian 
linguistics, see Koerner (1970).
30.  I refrain from a detailed discussion of Chomsky’s arguments, which would lead us 
too far. I will limit myself to a brief comment concerning Chomsky’s attack on the asser-
tion [117(i) in Chomsky (1957: 94)] that ‘two utterances are phonemically distinct if and 
only if they differ in meaning.’ Chomsky’s criticism has a number of defects: (i) it misses the 
point that the assertion is intended to be operational in the direction form to meaning, not 
in the opposite way (hence, synonyms cannot be used as a counterexample to the assertion; 
incidentally, in taking ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ as synonyms, Chomsky neglects their 
distributional non-equivalence: bachelor’s degree; *unmarried man’s degree); (ii) it passes over 
the system-internal validity of a phonemic description (cf. Chomsky’s remarks accompanying 
some of his counterexamples: ‘may coexist even within one style of speech’, ‘in many dialects’); 
(iii) homonymous forms (‘homonymity’) do not invalidate ‘difference in meaning’ as a crite-
rion for phonemic distinctness: on the one hand, phonemic non-distinctness does not imply 
morphemic/morphosemantic identity, and, on the other hand, it should be remembered that 
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grammatical sentences are those that have semantic significance, or the assertion that 
morphemes are the smallest elements that have meaning), or (b) takes issue over the 
use of meaning criteria, but without considering the correspondences that indeed hold 
between the forms to which the criterion is applied. This is the case, e.g., of his criti-
cism of the assertion that between an active and its corresponding passive sentence 
there holds a relation of synonymy.31 Chomsky observes that
we can describe circumstances in which a ‘quantificational’ sentence such as 
“everyone in the room knows at least two languages” may be true, while the 
corresponding passive “at least two languages are known by everyone in the room” 
is false, under the normal interpretation of these sentences — e.g., if one person in 
the room knows only French and German, and another only Spanish and Italian. 
This indicates that not even the weakest semantic relation (factual equivalence) 
holds in general between active and passive. (Chomsky 1957: 100–101).
But his counterexample needs some qualification (‘under the normal interpretation’) 
and only shows that in some cases the active sentence and its straightforward passive 
transform (may) differ in truth value; however, from this counterexample one cannot 
conclude that (a) there is not ‘even the weakest semantic relation’32 involved here, nor 
(b) that there is no semantic relation holding in general between active and passive.
Curiously, Chomsky then relativizes his downgrading of the appeal to semantics,33 
but subsequently resumes an ‘operational’ stand, stressing that at the present stage, 
semantic clues are too vague, and therefore of little or no use in stating the formal 
linguistic structure. The study of (significant ?) ‘correspondences’ between formal and 
semantic ‘features’ (Chomsky 1957: 102)34 is put into perspective for a ‘general theory 
‘differing in meaning’ was used as a (first) criterial test with simple morphemes, given that 
larger contexts serve to distinguish relations such as polysemy and homonymy.
3.  In Syntactic Structures Chomsky uses the term synonymity (and also the term hom-
onymity).
3.  ‘Factual equivalence’ is not, in my view, the weakest semantic relation.
33.  ‘These counterexamples should not, however, blind us to the fact that there are striking 
correspondences between the structures and elements that are discovered in formal, gram-
matical analysis and specific semantic functions’ (Chomsky 1957: 101).
34.  Chomsky uses the term ‘features’, but it remains unclear how, in his view, such features are 
arrived at. At the end of Chapter 9 of Syntactic Structures, Chomsky refers to ‘presumed’ fea-
tures of meaning, and suggests a distribution-based study of (significant) differences between 
forms: ‘In general, when we distribute a sequence of morphemes in a sequence of blanks we 
limit the choice of elements that can be placed in the unfilled positions to form a grammatical 
sentence. Whatever differences there are among morphemes with respect to this property are 
apparently better explained in terms of such grammatical notions as productivity, freedom of 
combination, and size of substitution class than in terms of any presumed feature of meaning’ 
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of language that will include a theory of linguistic form and a theory of the use of lan-
guage as subparts’ (Chomsky 1957: 102).
5. Epilogue: A new ‘flux’
Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures was a work rooted in the American structuralist tra-
dition (cf. Hymes/Fought 1975: 1044–53, 1067–76, 1080–7); it was inspired by the 
structuralist concern with rigorous methodology, by the emphasis laid on the formal-
ization of descriptive representations, and by the distrust of ‘intuition’; the method-
ological problems tackled by Chomsky were those addressed already by linguists such 
as  Harris, Hockett, and Pike, and even the concept ‘transformation’ had its origin in 
their writings. Chomsky departed from his structuralist predecessors in paying little 
attention to the problem of linguistic levels and of the descriptive techniques (and 
notations) associated with distinct levels. As a matter of fact, Syntactic Structures — 
with its focus on a single level of description within distributionalist taxonomy — 
propounded interdependence of levels as an overall evaluation measure. In Chomsky’s 
view linguistic levels are a derivative notion with respect to structural descriptions; he 
also made it clear that field techniques for data collection and data analysis should be 
sharply distinguished from constraints and principles to be observed in grammar con-
struction. This view — made explicit by Chomsky in the early 1960s, and vehemently 
criticized by structural linguists advocating a rigid distinction between the phonemic, 
morphophonemic and morphemic levels — is closely tied up with Chomsky’s strategy 
in carrying the methodological discussion to another stage: from the outset, he pres-
ents his book as a contribution to a (formalized) general theory. The general theory is 
one about the formal definition of grammar, i.e., about the specification of the form of 
grammar. For Chomsky, the aim of linguistic theory is to establish a formal concept of 
grammar as a device that enumerates the sentences of a language in such a way that for 
each sentence of the language one can associate with it its (correct) structural descrip-
tion (cf. Chomsky 1962).The discussion thus became a ‘foundational’ one, concern-
ing the form of grammar and concerning the comparative evaluation of grammatical 
formats. But then again, the structuralist ‘reflux’ is undeniable: the properly linguis-
tic argumentation in Syntactic Structures is based on distributional grounds and on 
statable, i.e., formalizable relationships. And, as noted above, semantics is eschewed. 
Also, no reference can be found to the speaker’s ‘competence’ or ‘interiorized knowl-
edge’, the key notion in what Chomsky later called the ‘cognitive revolution’ brought 
(Chomsky 1957: 105). Explanation of formal distribution is presented here as a substitute for 
‘talk about meaning’.
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about by generative grammar.35 But at the time Syntactic Structures rolled off the press, 
 Chomsky was already moving ahead.
Let us take a look at a passage in Lees’s review:
Perhaps the most baffling and certainly in the long run by far the most interesting 
implications of Chomsky’s theories will be found in their cohesions with the 
field of human psychology. Being totally incompetent in this area, I shall allude 
to only one possible consideration, but one which I find extremely intriguing. 
If this theory of grammar which we have been discussing can be validated 
without fundamental changes, then the mechanism which we must attribute to 
human beings to account for their speech behavior has all the characteristics of 
a sophisticated scientific theory. We cannot look into a human speaker’s head to 
see just what kind of device he uses there with which to generate the sentences 
of his language, and so, in the manner of any physical scientist confronted with 
observations on the world, we can only construct a model which has all the 
desired properties, that is, which also generates those sentences in the same 
way as the human speaker. If the model has been rendered maximally general, 
it should predict correctly the human speaker’s future linguistic behavior. We 
may then attribute the structure of this model to the device in the human 
35.  See Chomsky (1992: 9–11): ‘The rise of generative grammar in the 1950s, a major factor 
in the cognitive revolution, also resurrected traditional ideas. The Cartesians, in particular, had 
applied their ideas on the nature of the mind to the study of language, which was commonly 
viewed as a kind of “mirror of mind”, reflecting the essential properties of mind. […] The 
cognitive revolution of the 1950s, then, should be understood, I believe, as having recovered 
independently the insights of earlier years, abandoning the barren dogmas that had impeded 
understanding of these questions for a very long period; and then applying these classical 
ideas, now reconstructed in a new framework, in new ways, and developing them along lines 
that would not have been possible in an earlier period, thanks to new understanding in the 
sciences, technology and mathematics that had developed during this century. From the point 
of view adopted in this so-called “cognitive revolution”, the central problems of the study of 
language are essentially the following four:
 The first question, a preliminary to any further inquiry, is this: What is the system of knowledge 
incorporated in the mind/brain of a person who speaks and understands a particular language? 
[…] A theory concerned with this topic for a particular language is called “a grammar of that 
language”, or in technical terms, “a generative grammar of the language” […]
 How is this knowledge of language used in thought or expression of thought, in understanding, 
in organizing behavior, or in such special uses of language as communication, and so on? […]
Assuming some kind of answer to the first and central problem of characterizing the knowledge 
attained, we can turn to a third problem: to find the physical mechanisms that exhibit the prop-
erties that we discover in the abstract investigation of language and its use, that is, the physical 
mechanisms of the brain that are involved in the representation of knowledge, and the physical 
mechanisms of the different systems of the brain that access and process this knowledge. […]
 The fourth problem is to explain how the knowledge of language and ability to use it are 
acquired’.
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head, and say that we understand human speech behavior better than before. 
(Lees 1957: 406).
And so it happened … In the first issue of volume 35 of Language, a year and a half 
after the publication of Lees’s review, Chomsky published his review of Skinner’s Verbal 
Behavior,36 in which he assumes a very different tone37 from the one he had used in his 
Syntactic Structures. The review introduced the notion of ‘innate grammatical schema-
tism’, and speaks of the ‘remarkable ability’ to understand new sentences, to note certain 
ambiguities, to distinguish sentences from non-sentences, and of the grammar that each 
individual has ‘somehow and in some form internalized’ (Chomsky 1959: 56). We touch 
here upon new perspectives — integrating linguistics, psychology, and  epistemology —, 
upon new issues for wide-ranging controversies — with behaviorists and empiricists —, 
upon new intellectual challenges: in short, a new phase in the search for a theory of lin-
guistic structure.38 But that part of its history has to be saved for another day.
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Noam Chomsky is closely associated with the eponymous Chomskyan Revolution, 
a dramatic shift of allegiances, interests, and methodologies in linguistics over the 
decade or so following his 1957 Syntactic Structures. But these events did not occur 
in isolation. The developments in linguistics, and Chomsky’s currents of influence 
more generally, were shaped by movements in other fields, chiefly mathematics, 
philosophy, and psychology; in turn, Chomsky’s picture of linguistics, and his 
associated arguments, shaped developments in those fields as they participated in 
another revolution, an umbrella revolution, the Cognitive Revolution.
  The Cognitive Revolution, also dating to the 1950s but still today,  
grew largely out of artificial intelligence and psychology, dilating to include 
disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, the neurosciences, literary criticism, 
and even several distinctly non-Chomskyan frameworks within linguistics. All 
histories of this revolution name Chomsky prominently among the founding 
figures, on the basis of the shared features between his approach to linguistics 
and the model of mind that anchored the revolution, and on the basis of his 
systematic dismissal of the psychological framework that cognitive  
revolutionaries forcefully rejected, behaviorism. This chapter charts the 
interpenetration of Chomskyan linguistics, Cognitive Psychology, and Artificial 
Intelligence, as the Cognitive Revolution took form. It pays particular attention 
to Chomsky’s collaborations with George Miller, another universally identified 
founding figure of the Cognitive Revolution, whose work profoundly  
and directly shaped Cognitive Psycholinguistics; and to the consonance 
Chomsky’s model had with the algorithmic, information-processing, 
computational picture of mental life that was among the first principles of the 
Cognitive Revolution.
1. Chomsky’s other revolution
The rise of ‘cognitive science’ as an umbrella category covering much 
work in linguistics as well as in psychology, philosophy, computer 
science and artificial intelligence, has taken place for the most part 
under a Chomskyan mantle.
 — John E. Joseph (2002: 69)
 R. Allen Harris
There was an upheaval of decisive proportions in linguistics in the late nineteen-fifties 
whose consequences are still widely in evidence, an upheaval propelled in very large 
measure by the claims, instruments, and arguments of Noam Chomsky (b. 1928). The 
upheaval is controversial. In particular, the term revolution was contested from the 
outset, and it remains at the centre of debates over the outcome of that shift (see, for 
instance, Searle 2002; Bromberger & Searle 2002; Chomsky & Searle 2002). This situ-
ation on its own is probably enough to invalidate Kuhn’s (1962) model for that shift, 
in which a revolution, after a period of contention, settles into paradigmatic normal 
science. Indeed, Percival (1976) pointed out that paradigm did not apply to Chomsky’s 
program in the mid seventies, since that program was not “a conceptual framework 
shared by all the members of the profession” (289), an observation that is even more 
apposite to the field of linguistics fifty years after the upheaval; thirty after Percival’s 
observation.
But there is another Kuhnian train of events in which Chomsky played a legendary 
role, one for which the word revolutionary is widely used, with little or no controversy: 
the rise of cognitive science. Richardson (1998) describes this train as “the spectacu-
lar developments in psychology, linguistics, philosophy of mind, and neuroscience ... 
[which] form the central story of Anglo-American intellectual life from the 1950s to 
the present” (1998: 39). Virtually all historians of the cognitive revolution, amateur 
and professional, foreground Chomsky. Cognitive Scientist Paul Thagard (2005), for 
instance, reels off the familiar role call thusly:
There is no canonical list of the “founders” of cognitive science, but such a list 
could not omit the following figures who were active in the mid-1950s eruption 
of ideas that provided the intellectual origins of the field: Noam Chomsky, George 
Miller, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, and Herbert Simon. (2005: 320).
And Margaret Boden’s (2006) massive, two-volume study, Mind as Machine: A History 
of Cognitive Science, features Chomsky very prominently. “The cognitive revolution,” 
she says, “starts with psychology” (282) — in particular, with “the psychological work 
inspired by Noam Chomsky” (283). In fleshing that claim out, her section, “Pointers 
to the Promised Land,” unfolds a chronicle entitled “Chomsky Comes on the Scene” 
(296–298).
“More than any other figure,” David Golumbia argues, “Noam Chomsky defined 
the intellectual climate in the English-speaking world in the second half of the 
 twentieth century. ... [N]ot only did Chomsky redefine the entire academic discipline 
of linguistics, but his work has been something close to definitive in psychology, phi-
losophy, cognitive science, and even computer science.” (Golumbia 2009: 31). More 
than any other figure, arguably, is hyperbolic, though Golumbia’s case is very persua-
sive. But the general scope and the multidisciplinary range Golumbia gives to Chomsky’s 
 influence is not.
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While Chomsky’s influence has not been uniform, stable, or cumulative in any of 
the fields Golumbia itemizes, and while it has seen a notable decline in recent decades, 
it has unquestionably been massive with respect to their collective transformation of 
the intellectual landscape over the second half of the twentieth century. In this essay, I 
examine the intersection of Chomsky’s activities with the development of two of these 
fields: the shift towards cognitivism in psychology; and the growth of artificial intel-
ligence, the cognitive wing of computer science,. I am interested, specifically, in how 
a research program founded on two books with negligible overt attention to mental 
activity or knowledge representation — The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory and 
Syntactic Structures — backstopped the cognitive revolution.
. Cognitive psychology
[B]y the end of the 1950’s the distant mutterings of a scientific 
revolution were in the air, impelled by Chomsky’s generative and 
transformational grammar.
 — Charles Osgood (1975: 19)
Psychology and language have long commingled, but their relationship had gone 
largely underground in the first half of the twentieth century. This relationship resur-
faced at a workshop of psychologists and linguists at Cornell University in 1951, which 
led to the formation of an interdisciplinary Committee on Linguistics and Psychology 
the following year, a Summer Institute seminar a year later, and a nine-author mono-
graph the year after that, Psycholinguistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems 
(Carroll et al. 1954).1 This new hybrid subdiscipline, psycholinguistics, was emerging 
just as Chomsky was going through graduate school.
One of the psychologists on the 1952 Committee was George A. [Armitage] 
Miller (b. 1920), soon to become Chomsky’s strongest advocate in psychology, and the 
1. See Weiss (1925) for a very brief and very behaviorist account of the intersection of psy-
chology and linguistics at the quarter century. Roger Brown (1970: vii) gives the 1951 Cornell 
workshop as the official birth site of psycholinguistics. The word itself, psycholinguistic, dates to 
considerably earlier — A.F. Chamberlain used it in 1894 (Chamberlain 1894: 454) — though it 
does not seem to have had much currency, and certainly no disciplinarity, until the mid 1950s. 
Carroll et al. (1954) is almost universally cited not by its authors, as I have cited it here, but 
by its editors, Charles Osgood and Thomas Sebeok. No doubt their editorial work was heroic, 
given the number and variety of the monograph’s authors, and the remarkably brief comple-
tion time, but such a citation misrepresents both the structure of the book, which, until I actu-
ally consulted it, I long believed to be an edited collection, and the remarkable cohesiveness 
of the principals in this story.
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most important force in psycholinguistics as it mutated rapidly in cognitive directions 
over the latter part of the 1950s, into the 1960s. His talk on Chomsky, transforma-
tional grammar, and psychology “became famous on the university lecture circuit” 
(Crowther-Heyck 1999: 53). Miller is especially interesting, too, as a representative 
case study in the swift disciplinary shift of the umbrella field — from psychology as 
“the science of behavior,” in the conventional definition with which he opens his 1951 
textbook, Language and Communication (Miller 1951: 1), to psychology as “the sci-
ence of mental life,” in the more controversial terms he used for the subtitle of his 1962 
textbook, Psychology (Miller & Buckhout 1962b).
When he met Chomsky, Miller was an established psychologist, actively forging 
links between linguistics and psychology by way of information theory, cybernetics, 
and symbolic logic. A survey article he wrote in 1954, for instance, introducing work 
in “Communication” relevant to psychology, included Jakobson, Fant, and Halle’s Pre-
liminaries to Speech Analysis (Jakobson, Fant, & Halle 1952) and Zellig Harris’s Meth-
ods in Structural Linguistics (Harris 1951[1947]), alongside work by Claude Shannon 
(Shannon 1951), Rudolph Carnap and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (Carnap & Bar-Hillel 1952), 
and Benoit Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot 1953). He could not, in short, have been better 
prepared for the work of Chomsky, whom he met in September of the year he pub-
lished that survey. In Bernard J. Baars’s phrasing, Chomsky sounds like an ingénue at 
a Hollywood soda counter: “George A. Miller discovered Chomsky, and became his 
advocate among psychologists” (1986: 193). The meeting occurred at a symposium 
on information theory in Cambridge. Chomsky was at Harvard, a Junior Fellow in 
the Society of Fellows; Miller was at M.I.T., in its Research Laboratory of Electron-
ics (RLE). Within two years, they had switched institutions — Chomsky now in the 
RLE, working on Victor Yngve’s machine translation project, Miller in the psychology 
department at Harvard, where he would soon found the Center for Cognitive Studies 
with Jerome Seymour Bruner (b. 1915) — but they remained in close contact.
The 1954 information-theory symposium was hosted by the RLE, and another fol-
lowed in 1956, at which they both gave major papers. Miller’s paper was a version of his 
classic 7 ± 2, magical-number paper (Miller 1956), Chomsky’s, his hugely influential 
“Three Models for the Description of Language” (Chomsky 1956b). The symposium was 
wide-ranging — information theory was growing faddishly in the mid-fifties and many 
disciplines were represented — but the dominant theme was a view of the brain as an 
information processor, with a strong subtheme that a certain information-processing 
machine, the computer, could converge with the brain in important and revealing ways.
The symposium was a confluence of transformational generative grammar, 
information-processing psychology, and artificial intelligence, the gathering of ideas 
that are widely understood to have ignited the cognitive revolution. Miller dates the 
“moment of conception” for cognitive science to the second day of the symposium — 
when it became clear that a concept of mind was necessary for solving the important 
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problems of psychology, and that the tools for solving those problems were meshing 
before his eyes. “I went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction,” Miller 
later remembered,
...more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical 
linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces 
of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and 
coordination of their shared concerns. (Miller 1979: 9)
Miller and Chomsky collaborated extensively over the next several years. They spent 
the summer of 1957 together at Stanford, both families living together in a fraternity 
house. On paper, Chomsky was Miller’s teaching assistant for a seminar on mathe-
matical psychology, but it was Chomsky’s work they taught. “We worked together that 
summer and tried to teach Chomsky’s semantics and Chomskyan syntax to students, 
who were all professors themselves,” Miller later recalled. “That was an interesting sum-
mer” (Hébert 2006). They were soon publishing together (Chomsky & Miller 1958; 
Chomsky & Miller 1963; Chomsky & Miller 1957; Miller & Chomsky 1963). More 
significantly, Miller developed an empirical research program based on the Syntactic 
Structures grammar which is widely regarded as having triggered the explosion of cog-
nitivist psycholinguistic research and the accompanying disciplinary growth. Miller 
was a maturing giant in psychology — “if there were a retrospective Nobel Prize in 
Psychology for the mid-1950s,” Bruner has written, “George Miller would win it hands 
down ... on the basis of [his 7 ± 2 paper alone] (though he had lots of other arrows in 
his quivers)” (Bruner 1983: 97) — and his endorsement of Chomsky’s linguistics was 
effectively a Cognitive Seal of Approval.
These developments were multiplex, for Miller and for cognitivists generally, 
but, in line with Kuhn’s observations, they reflect two central motives: the drive away 
from a science of behavior and the drive toward a science of mental life. Chomsky 
was deeply implicated in both. The repulsion from behaviorism that characterized the 
early growth of cognitive science is summed up almost entirely in Chomsky’s lionized 
review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959; Skinner 1957). The propul-
sion toward mental representations and processes was powerfully aided by Chomsky’s 
linguistic arguments, chiefly represented by the book that came out the same year as 
Skinner’s, Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957).
. Out with the science of behavior
The contemporary linguistic assault on associationist learning theory 
began with Noam Chomsky’s gloves-off critical review of Skinner’s 
Verbal Behavior.
 — Jerome Bruner (2004: 19)
 R. Allen Harris
Chomsky’s legendary assault on B.F. [Bhurrus Frederic] Skinner (1904 – 1990) circu-
lated for some time before it was published in 1959 as the featured piece in the premier 
linguistics journal, Language. It is a long, meticulous, devastating review, meant less to 
evaluate a particular book than to eradicate the line of thought it represented. Perhaps 
because Chomsky was largely unknown in psychology at the time, Skinner thought 
that Miller had masterminded it (Crowther-Heyck 1999: 53, 63n109), but it is vintage 
Chomsky, with the characteristic ad hominem disdain that attends most of his polem-
ics. Miller had certainly seen it before publication, as had many scholars in the emerg-
ing cognitivist circle centered in Cambridge, and he was highly receptive. Miller had 
little trouble shedding the behaviorism he initially identified with. Looking back now, 
he sees his early behaviorist moves as a type of fakery:
In 1951, I apparently still hoped to gain scientific respectability by swearing 
allegiance to behaviorism. Five years later, inspired by such colleagues as Noam 
Chomsky and Jerry Bruner, I had stopped pretending to be a behaviorist. 
(Miller 2003: 141)
Miller, it is clear, was never a pure behaviorist, but it is doubtful if anyone was a pure 
behaviorist in the 1950s. Mid-century psychologists, despite largely sharing one ideo-
logical banner, evinced that ideology in a variety of forms(see Kantor 1971; Staddon 
1993, and Zuriff 1985 for various taxonomies). Most psychologists methodologically 
allied to operant conditioning were self-consciously neobehaviorist by that point, 
attempting to assimilate developments in other fields and other areas of psychology 
with the Watson-Skinner tradition of learning theory. Miller regarded his 1951 text-
book, Language and Communication as “behavioristic” at the time, for instance (Miller 
1951: 73), but once Verbal Behavior came out, and he saw what a truly behaviorist 
account of language and communication would look like, he came to regard it  retro-
spectively as “eclectic, not behavioristic” (Miller 2003: 141). His work in the late forties 
and early fifties was characterized by a restless search for more revealing methods to 
investigate psychology generally and psychology of language specifically, and his book 
shows the results of that search.
Most of the emerging cognitivists were equally suspicious of behaviorist theories 
of human learning, regarding them as antithetical to the information-processing view 
of the brain. George Mandler (b. 1924), a Harvard psychologist at the time, remembers 
Cambridge as a “nest of antibehaviorist developments” in the early fifties (Mandler 
2002: 343). He thinks it was “likely that Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s Verbal Behav-
ior put him [that is, Skinner] beyond the pale of the burgeoning cognitive commu-
nity” (Mandler 2002: 341), but for this community Skinner was very close to the pale 
already. His work with rats and pigeons did not, to anyone’s satisfaction in that group, 
extend itself well to specifically human abilities, abilities without even the sliver of a 
presence in pigeons and rats — such as, quintessentially, language. Chomsky’s review 
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was playing to the gallery. “I thought it was damning,” Miller has said of the review; 
adding, however, “I made [Chomsky] take out some of the worst slurs before it was 
published.” (Hébert 2006). Even with the toning down Miller accomplished, the veil 
over Chomsky’s insults was diaphanously thin indeed: superficial alone is used four 
times, pointless five, empty six, vague seven; we also get confused, absurd, futile, grossly 
in error; a theory that “operates at a level so gross and crude that no answers are sug-
gested to the most elementary questions” (Chomsky 1959: 54). 
Its fame is well earned. The review is not just ruthlessly acerbic. It is ruthlessly effi-
cient (Hébert 2006), exposing how “the insights that have been achieved in the labora-
tories of the reinforcement theorist, though quite genuine, can be applied to complex 
human behavior only in the most gross and superficial way” (Chomsky 1959: 28). But 
it is a mistake to regard this review as meeting, by any clear standards of argument, the 
mandate it is almost universally held to have satisfied by most cognitivists (and which 
Chomsky later encouraged — Chomsky 1967: 146): the intellectual obliteration of 
behaviorism.2 It is unquestionably and convincingly hard on core aspects of Skinner’s 
program. But Skinner was not representative. He was a “respected but atypical behav-
iorist” (Baars 1986: 142), one for whom, while he did not explicitly endorse the label 
himself until later (Skinner 1974: 16ff), the phrase Radical Behaviorist was tailor-made. 
In particular, Skinner’s claims about the extrapolation of experimentally manipulated 
animal behavior to the understanding of human capacities were not widely endorsed 
by other psychologists.3 Further, “Skinner is much more tentative and cognizant of the 
incompleteness of his ideas in [Verbal Behavior] than one would surmise from Chom-
sky’s review” (Agassi 1997: 147n4). Still, the gallery, as galleries will, egged on by the 
scornful tone, read the review not as a careful dismantling of one theorist’s research 
program, but as the public execution and ignominious burial of an entire psychologi-
cal tradition, with salt sown over the grave. And the gallery grew.
. See MacCorquodale (1969) for a late but very thorough answer to Chomsky’s review, 
Andresen (1991) for an overview of the reception and an outline of the intellectual response 
to Chomsky’s review, and Virués-Ortega (2006) for another overview, with observations from 
Chomsky. Skinner himself seems never to have commented on the review in print.
. In fact, this is more than apparent in Chomsky’s review, which notes on the first page that 
“Skinner’s confidence in recent achievements in the study of animal behavior and their appli-
cability to complex human behavior does not appear to be widely shared. In many recent pub-
lications of confirmed behaviorists there is a prevailing note of skepticism with regard to the 
scope of these achievements,” and documents this skepticism well (Chomsky 1959: 26n1). One 
might also note the pair of mainstream psychology reviews, predating Chomsky’s, that were 
markedly critical of Verbal Behavior (Morris 1958; Osgood 1958), or Tikhomirov’s review in 
Word (Tikhomirov 1959).
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Chomsky’s review also highlighted, as the strongest counter-evidence to Skinner’s 
animal-extrapolation program, the
...fact that all normal children acquire essentially comparable grammars of 
great complexity with remarkable rapidity[,] suggest[ing] that human beings 
are somehow specially designed to do this, with data-handling or ‘hypothesis-
formulating’ ability of unknown character and complexity. (Chomsky 1959: 58)
And, while he was clear that “[a]t the moment, the question [about the ultimate char-
acter of this ability] cannot be seriously posed” (1959: 59), he offered the hope that “the 
study of linguistic structure may ultimately lead to some significant insights into this 
matter” (Chomsky 1959: 58–59).
. In with the science of mental life
[T]he behaviorist theory was fundamentally dead, and ... the problem 
was [now] to reconstruct a kind of mentalism that would work, at least 
in some areas of psychology and presumably in linguistics, since that 
seemed to be where the action was.
 — Jerry Fodor (in Baars 1986: 356)
The game plan for a study of linguistic structure which would prototype the science 
of mental life was laid out in Syntactic Structures, and in the massive Logical Structure 
of Linguistic Theory, a purple-ink hectographed version of which was in circulation 
among the vanguard.4 The importance of Logical Structure to the growth and impact 
of Chomskyan research in its first decade would be difficult to over-estimate. As dense 
as the book is, as restricted as its availability was, and as partially read as it was, even 
by those few who had access to copies, the very existence of the manuscript stood 
as guarantor to any gaps of coverage or generality of explication that might be per-
ceived in Syntactic Structures.5 Its sheer mass, level of detail, style of exposition, even 
. There is no definitive count, so far as I know, of the number of copies in circulation; the 
usual quantity cited is “a couple of dozen” (Sheehy 2004: 67); the first-run of a hectograph could 
produce between 20 and 80 copies. Hectography was a laborious and messy process, mostly 
used (from the late nineteenth to the the mid twentieth century) for school bulletins, church 
newsletters and the like. It must have been a monumental chore to run off copies of a 919 page 
document. For a description of hectography, see Hanley, easily retrievable via Google Books 
(http://books.google.ca/books).
5. Chomsky regularly cited Logical Structure in this regard, particularly in his overviews of 
transformational generative grammar. Syntactic Structures has a dozen citations alone.
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its  relative impenetrability for most linguists, assured the community that Transforma-
tional Generative Grammar was a complete and resilient theoretical edifice. The highly 
influential review of Syntactic Structures by Robert Lees (1922–1996), for instance, is 
(much like Chomsky’s review of Skinner, in reverse) not about the book under review 
so much as it is about the emerging paradigm it represents, and for which Logical 
Structure stands bond:
The reviewer was privileged to read a first version of the larger work — The logical 
structure of linguistic theory, pp. 752 + li (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) — and now finds 
it difficult to refrain from referring to topics and results which appear there but not 
in the book under review. This discussion may therefore serve in part as a preview 
of the author’s detailed statement of his theory of language. (Lees 1957a: 375n1)
Prominent in Lees’ review was the assurance that “in the long run by far the most inter-
esting implications of Chomsky’s theories will be found in their cohesions with the field 
of human psychology” (Lees 1957a: 406), and within the decade Chomsky was defining 
linguistics as a “branch of cognitive psychology” (Chomsky 2006[1968]: 1).
There are, however, no mentions of cognition, psychology, or mental life anywhere 
in Syntactic Structures; ditto with Logical Structure. That is not to say these themes 
weren’t in Chomsky’s mind at the time — who can say? — only that the cohesions with 
psychology that Lees advertises, and that came to be one of the most powerful selling 
points of transformational grammar, are more a product of creative hermeneutics than 
of careful composition. In fact, there is only one word with a prominent psychological 
lineage that has any substantial presence in both books, and that word is behavior. But 
it was clearly behavior with a twist.
Behavior in Chomsky’s early work had two distinct senses, neither of which linked 
to its familiar operational meaning in the psychology of the time. In one sense, usu-
ally hitched to linguistic, it meant the way people understood their language — for 
instance, the awareness that actives and passives are related structures or recogniz-
ing that “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” is ‘grammatical,’ while “Furiously sleep 
ideas green colorless” is not. For instance, in Logical Structure, Chomsky argues that 
“a systematic approach which defines grammatical sentences in terms of the rules ... 
would represent a fundamental contribution to our understanding of linguistic behav-
ior” (Chomsky 1956a: IV-121). That is, rules help explain how speakers understand 
syntactic relatedness and grammaticality. Or, in Syntactic Structures, he says that “cer-
tain linguistic behavior that seems unmotivated and inexplicable in terms of phrase 
structure appears simple and systematic when we adopt the transformational point of 
view” (Chomsky 1957: 75). This use of behavior is effectively indistinguishable from 
knowledge, and represents the highest cognitive quotient in his work of the period. He 
frequently connects it with the only mentalist term that permeates Syntactic Structures 
and Logical Structure: intuition — as in, most clearly, when he says that if one could 
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build a rule set that “corresponds to the ‘intuitive sense of grammaticalness’ of the 
native speaker,” one would “have succeeded in giving a rational account of this behav-
ior, i.e., a theory of the speaker’s linguistic intuition.” Building a grammar, in short, 
is modeling what speakers know about their language. “This,” he adds, “is the goal of 
linguistic theory.” (Chomsky 1956a: I-40).
The other sense of behavior is quite different, however. It does not reference speaker 
knowledge. It directly references the properties of abstract linguistic elements. Thus, 
when he says “[w]e shall see that their behavior is very regular and simply describ-
able,” he is talking about auxiliary verbs. (Chomsky 1957: 38). When he says “we can 
investigate the place of its major constituent break by considering its behavior under 
certain transformations,” he is talking about the verb-preposition construction (as in 
“thought of ” or “laughed at;” Chomsky 1956a: IX-702). It is this second usage, and, 
in general, Chomsky’s relentless talk of grammars and words and rules in dynamic, 
process-oriented, even anthropomorphic terms that triggered the bulk of psycholin-
guistic research in the late-fifties turn toward “mental life.”
This mental-operation usage of behavior, very possibly entangled with the cogni-
tive usage, led to an understanding of transformational grammar’s links to psychology 
which (1) eventually led to a break between them, but, in the short term, (2) led to a 
surge of cognitivist psycholinguistic research. Crucially, under this construal, transfor-
mations were seen to correspond with mental events in a quite direct way. John Bissell 
Carroll (1916–2003), surveying the recent psycholinguistic surge in 1964, reported that 
“[t]housands of contributions to linguistics and the psychology of language” were pub-
lished in the first few years of the 1960s, and attributed “this intense activity” to “working 
out, testing, elaborating, and refining the theories and new ideas of the previous decade” 
(Carroll 1964: 119). While that decade included the work he had helped initiate with the 
Committee on Linguistics and Psychology and its associated monograph (Carroll et al. 
1954), work involving communication theory and the testing of Whorfian notions, it was 
clear that the bit was firmly in the transformationalist’s mouth. After a very brief overview, 
Carroll begins explicating “Chomsky’s (1957) sketch of a new linguistic theory” (Carroll 
1964: 119). Summing up the work of the leading figure — in both that surge and in its 
transformational character — George Miller, Carroll found support for the conclusion
...that the ‘transformations’ underlying variations in linguistic structure correspond 
to ‘mental operations’ that have to be carried out in a certain order and in a definite 
amount of time in order to achieve certain results (Carroll 1964: 122).
This conclusion was precisely what Miller was arguing that the research showed, and 
what Chomsky appeared to be arguing as well with his dynamic metaphors of gram-
mar. The earliest attempt to investigate the psychological reality of transformations 
began with what was later dubbed the ‘correspondence hypothesis,’ a conjecture that 
the more transformations differentiated two sentences, the longer it would take for peo-
ple to relate them (see Miller & Buckhout 1962b: 757ff; Miller & McKean 1964: 298f, 
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reporting on work with Dan Slobin). In another overview of psycholinguistics the same 
year as  Carroll’s, A. Richard Diebold was even more effusive about the positive results 
pouring in. “It is especially exciting,” he crowed, “that the work of Miller and others 
is beginning to offer corroboratory support for the ‘psychological reality’ of many of 
the abstract characterizations of the user’s linguistic competence which are contained 
in a formalized generative grammar” (A. Richard Diebold 1964: 227). The transfor-
mational research in psycholinguistics snowballed into the 1970s. Samuel Fillenbaum’s 
1971 survey in the Annual Review of Psychology runs to over fifty pages, for instance, 
with constant mentions of Chomsky, transformations, competence, performance, deep 
structure, surface structure and other contributions from his expanding and shifting 
lexicon, and the title of one textbook in the early 70s made Chomsky’s work definitional 
of the subfield: Psycholinguistics: Chomsky and Psychology (Greene 1972).
5. Artificial Intelligence
I must admit to taking a copy of Noam Chomsky’s Syntactic  
Structures along with me on my honeymoon in 1961.
 — Don Knuth (2003)
The second day of the 1956 Information Theory Colloquium made such an epoch-
shifting impression on Miller because of two papers in particular (and perhaps also, 
though he doesn’t mention it, because he gave a variant of his own groundbreaking 
7 ± 2 paper that day). One, of course, was Chomsky’s “Three Models.” The other was 
by Allen Newell (1927 – 1992) and Herbert A. [Alexander] Simon (1916 – 2001). The 
abstract for their revolutionary paper, “The Logic Theory Machine — A Complex 
Information Processing System,” reads, in part:
In this paper we describe a complex information processing system ... capable of 
discovering proofs for theorems in symbolic logic. This system, in contrast to the 
systematic algorithms that are ordinarily employed in computation, relies heavily on 
heuristic methods similar to those that have been observed in human problem solving 
activity. The specification is written in a formal language, of the nature of a pseudo-
code, that is suitable for coding for digital computers. (Newell & Simon 1956: 61)
Newell and Simon were talking about abilities characteristic of intelligence, and they were 
talking about them as emanating from a machine. They were soon putting it this way:
There are now in the world machines that can think, that can learn and 
that can create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase 
rapidly until — in a visible future — the range of problems they can handle 
will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. 
(Simon & Newell 1958: 8)
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Newell and Simon had made their way to Cambridge that fall from the Dartmouth 
Summer Research Conference on Artificial Intelligence. The term conference is some-
what misleading. The event was a one-month, small-group, think-tank — including 
John McCarthy (b. 1927), Marvin Minsky (b. 1927), Nathaniel Rochester (1919 – 2001), 
and Claude Shannon (1916 – 2001) — at which the field of artificial intelligence was 
born (the phrasing having been coined in the 1955 proposal for that conference, by 
McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, and Shannon). Bringing the product of that research 
into contact with psychology and linguistics at the symposium was a major impetus to 
the cognitive revolution.
Whatever Chomsky thought at the time of Newell and Simon’s attempt to model 
human reasoning by mechanical means (later, he expressed only contempt — e.g., 
(Chomsky 2006[1968]: 85), Newell and Simon were clearly impressed with  Chomsky’s 
formal arguments about language, seeing them as closely aligned with their own 
research. Simon, for instance, characterizes the two papers, and the research programs 
they represent, as sharing a deep intellectual bond:
Historically the modern theory of transformational linguistics and the 
information-processing theory of cognition were born in the same matrix — the 
matrix of ideas produced by the development of the modern digital computer, 
and in the realization that, though the computer was embodied in hardware, its 
soul was a program. One of the initial professional papers on transformational 
linguistics and one of the initial professional papers on information-processing 
psychology were presented, the one after the other, at a meeting at M.I.T., in 
September 1956 [citing them]. Thus the two bodies of theory have had cordial 
relations from an early date, and quite rightly, for they rest conceptually on the 
same view of the human mind. (Simon 1996[1969]: 75)6
Chomsky’s relation to artificial intelligence is somewhat cloudier than that with 
psychology. To begin with, there was a tradition of intermittent contact between 
linguists and psychologists, which had started to increase markedly just before 
Chomsky came on the scene. No such tradition existed in the beginnings of artifi-
cial intelligence — the Dartmouth gathering was dominated by mathematicians and 
engineers7 — until the Cambridge Information Theory Colloquium. But it is easy 
. Newell and Simon (Newell and Simon 1972: 4) date the cognitive revolution not quite 
to the symposium, as Miller does, but to the same year, because 1956 saw the publication of 
these two papers, along with Miller’s 7 ± 2 results, and Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin’s Study 
of Thinking (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1986[1956]).
. Simon was an economist, Newell a mathematician who wrote his doctorate under Simon; 
McCarthy, Minsky and Shannon were all mathematicians, Shannon having a degree in electrical 
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to see why Chomsky’s paper made such an impression on the AI community. There 
was an extremely important point of contact. All of the AI pioneers were versed in 
the narrow artificial languages of symbolic logic and computer programming; and 
Chomsky was well versed in logic and mathematics. That is, the AI folk were used to 
thinking in the language of mathematics; Chomsky in the mathematics of language. 
As Miller recalls, “Other linguists had said language has all the formal precisions of 
mathematics, but Chomsky was the first linguist to make good on the claim. I think 
that was what excited all of us” (1979: 8).8 If any contemporary work in linguistics 
promised to expand the range of computers until it became coextensive with range 
of the human mind — making language tractable to practical, applied, programming 
tasks — it was Chomsky’s mathematically amenable models. The first area in which 
this range looked to be expanding was machine translation.
. Machine Translation
Another important gap that also has significant practical implications 
lies in the area of simulation of natural language processes. Here, 
interest in language translation and in the improvement of computer 
programming languages has already led to exciting progress — as 
illustrated, for example, by the work of Chomsky and Yngve.
 — Herbert A. Simon (1961: 117)
Chomsky’s relation with machine translation is complicated and uncertain. Two 
things, however, are clear. First, Chomsky now disavows any interest in, involvement 
with, or sympathy for, the enterprise of computer translation. Officially, his first aca-
demic post was as a researcher on Victor Yngve’s Machine Translation project, in the 
engineering as well; Rochester was an electrical engineer. Rounding out the group were Oliver 
Selfridge (1926 – 2008) and Trenchard More, mathematicians, Arthur Samuel (1901 – 1990), 
an electrical engineer, and Ray Solomonoff (b. 1926), a physicist best known for his work in 
mathematics.
. Miller was a psychologist by training (with lower degrees in English and Speech), but he 
studied mathematics at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study in 1950, had a strong interest 
in computation, and had ties to members of the AI community. For instance, he obtained the 
funding for Minsky and Dean Edmond project to build an array of ‘artificial neurons’ (vacuum 
tubes), in an early connectionist experiment, which learned a path through a maze (Cordeschi 
2007: 279n4).
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RLE, at M.I.T., but he reports taking the job under protest and then not contributing 
to the project at all:
While he was being interviewed by laboratory director Jerome Wiesner for the 
position, Chomsky stated that the project had “no intellectual interest and was also 
pointless’ ... He actually ‘never touched the translation project’ (Barsky 1997: 86)
Second, however, he was perceived overwhelmingly by the AI community to be 
a Machine Translation researcher, which, in that predominantly applied-computing 
milieu, added considerable attraction to his work, and that view of Chomsky’s early 
career remains common in AI circles. Coulter, for instance, says that “Chomsky was 
originally preoccupied by the technical problems posed by the project of achieving 
high-quality machine translation between natural languages” (Coulter 2003: 439–440). 
And the importance of Machine Translation research, which begat computational lin-
guistics, for the development of Artificial Intelligence in the United States is difficult 
to overestimate. Winfred Lehmann went so far as to say that “[t]hrough work towards 
MT, scores of students with positions throughout the country have been trained at the 
Linguistics Research Center alone. The field of Artificial Intelligence would probably 
not have developed without such support.” (Lehmann 1980: 188).9
Chomsky’s role in the RLE project is difficult to reconstruct, but he does not seem 
to have been very active in any obvious, hands-on way. He regularly produced ver-
sions of his work for the RLE Quarterly Report in the mid-fifties, and wrote at least 
one analysis explicitly for the Machine Translation project, with Fred Lukoff (Chomsky 
& Lukoff 1955; see Lees 1957b: 6n2), and did some minor chores, such as translat-
ing an abstract from Hebrew to English for Machine Translation, an M.I.T. newsletter 
(Bar-Hillel 1956). But the archives of Machine Translation include no mention of direct 
activity. The closest they come is a brief remark by Yngve that reads like a justification 
of Chomsky’s presence in the lab. Commenting on the failure to obtain “an adequate 
description” of German for the recognition routines they are developing, he says that 
“perhaps linguists have not known how to make such a grammar, or how to tell a good 
grammar from a bad one,” and adds that “[i]t is these problems that have been occupy-
ing N. Chomsky. He has been working on a theory of grammar that gives many new 
and powerful insights into the structure of language” (1956: 45). This is cheek-by-jowl 
with notes on Applegate, Lees, and Matthews directly building such a description of 
German. On the other hand, those same archives brim with references to Chomsky’s 
. George Miller has a presence in this work as well (see Miller & Beebe 1956, which men-
tions, without citation, Chomsky on grammaticality). The same issue of Mechanical Transla-
tion that includes Miller and Beebe (1956) has a very early (pre-publication?), brief, favorable 
notice of Syntactic Structures, focusing on the Chomsky Hierarchy argument for transforma-
tions (Ulvestad 1956).
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models and citations of his work. It would be easy to get the impression from reading 
Machine Translation in the late fifties and early sixties that the RLE project was essen-
tially Chomsky’s  augmented no doubt by the knowledge that many of its personnel 
(Lees, Morris Halle, G.H. Matthews) were strongly allied to his approach. The AI com-
munity certainly regarded the primary force of Chomsky’s contribution to be in the area 
of Machine Translation, as witnessed by Simon’s session-opening address at the 1961 
IRE session on Modeling Human Mental Processes (Simon 1961: 117).10 Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel, Chomsky’s close friend and the first leader of the RLE Machine Translation project, 
argued strongly for a transformational approach to translation and computational linguis-
tics  (Bar-Hillel 1966: 4–7). In a survey of “Syntactic Analysis of English by Computer” for 
the 1963 Joint AFIPS Computer Conference, 11 Daniel Bobrow includes more mentions 
of Chomsky than all other linguists combined, including people like Harris and Yngve, 
who were heavily and directly involved in computational projects (Bobrow 1963).
In the linguistics community, also, the impression was fostered that Chomsky’s 
research implicated computers and electronic translation work. In part, there was the 
lineage. Zellig Sabbatai Harris (1909–1992) was not only his thesis and dissertation 
supervisor, he was also the intellectual source of transformational grammar. He was 
additionally well-known for his interest in computers; his approach to transformations 
encompassed practical problems of interest to the AI community, including informa-
tion retrieval (Harris 1952), as well as machine translation (Harris 1954); and he was 
explicit about the computational amenability of transformational grammar. “[S]ince 
transformational methods are entirely formal,” he wrote, “the obtaining of the normal 
form can be done mechanically. In fact, it can be done in principle by a computer, and 
in principle for all sentences of the language” (Harris 1964: 421).
Lees’ promotional review of Syntactic Structures, too, highlights “the field of 
machine translation” as an area “in which Chomsky’s conception of grammar may 
prove to be of the utmost importance” (Lees 1957b: 406). Lees was speaking from 
experience. He used Chomsky’s arguments and instruments regularly, as did all of 
1. The session, incidentally, included a dialogue project involving Carol Chomsky. Tracing her 
computational work in the period would make for a fascinating project. She had a position on the 
Machine Translation project earlier than Noam, from 1951 to 1953, under Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, 
followed by a position on Harris’s Transformations and Discourse Analysis Project (TDAP) at the 
University of Pennsylvania, 1955 to 1959, after which she moved back to M.I.T., working in the 
Lincoln Laboratory, 1959 to 1962 (Hutchins 2000: 78). Aravind K. Joshi and Phil Hopely report 
that the project outlined in the 1961 Mental Processes session, a question-and-answer application 
about baseball (Bert F. Green et al. 1961), developed out of program that Carol Chomsky took 
with her when she moved from the TDAP back to M.I.T. (Joshi & Hopely 1996: 294).
11. That is, the American Federation of Information Processing Societies, which combined 
both the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Computer Society and the Association 
for Computing Machinery.
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the RLE Machine Translation group, in the research that came out of that project 
(see Lees 1957b; Yngve 1957; Yngve 1960). Again, however, the perception of Chomsky’s 
sponsorship relied more on hermeneutics than on argumentation when it comes to 
Chomsky’s work itself. Certainly there is no overt concern with translation issues in 
Syntactic Structures, nor in Logical Structure, and no such concern manifests in his 
subsequent work.
. A device of some sort
Syntactic investigation of a given language has as its goal the 
construction of a grammar that can be viewed as a device of some sort 
for producing the sentences of the language under analysis.
 — Noam Chomsky (1957: 11)
“[A] grammar,” Lees said, explicating the Syntactic Structures model (Lees 1957a: 384), 
“may be described as though it were a kind of machine,” and while telephone switchboards 
had been used extensively in information theory analogies, and all sorts of other devices 
were theoretically possible, it was clear to everyone what sort of machine a Chomskyan 
grammar resembled, almost to the point of identity. And, just in case it wasn’t clear, Lees 
went on. “[T]he derivations” of such a grammar, under the right conditions, he added, 
“may be mechanized inside an actual physical machine, such as an electronic computer” 
(Lees 1957a: 385). Lees was here continuing Chomsky’s policy of fostering a strong sense 
of affinity between his formal approach and the computational approach to language.
Chomsky was, in the early years, thoroughly enmeshed in the computational 
community. He attended and gave talks at information theory conferences, which 
were heavily populated by computer science people. He attended and gave talks at 
more specifically computational venues, such as, with Miller, a Symposium on Pattern 
Recognition (Chomsky & Miller 1957), an International Symposium on Automata 
Theory (see Koerner & Tajima 1986: 20), and a summer school in programming at the 
University of Michigan in 1958, where he gave a lecture entitled “Linguistics, Logic, 
Psychology, and Computers.” He published in the journals that were defining com-
puter science, such as Information and Control, the Journal of Symbolic Logic, and IRE 
Transactions. He placed chapters in books like Computer Programming and Formal 
Systems (Chomsky & Schutzenberger 1963) and Computer Programming and Artificial 
Intelligence: An Intensive Course for Practicing Scientists and Engineers (see Chomsky 
1958). He published on topics, like push-down storage, which were of interest almost 
exclusively to computer scientists (Chomsky 1962).
What he said in many of these publications had a pessimistic cast about the 
 immediate prospects of computationally implementing a natural-language grammar. 
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His most widely cited and influential finding — announced in “Three Models,” the 
paper that helped launch the cognitive revolution, and repeated in Syntactic Struc-
tures — was in fact a negative ‘proof ’ about the descriptive incapacity of finite state 
grammars (Markov processes) to handle the full richness of natural languages. Prior 
to “Three Models,” developing out of work by Claude Shannon (1948) and endorsed by 
Charles Hockett (1955), there was a vigorous research program attempting to analyze 
natural languages (for applications such as Machine Translation) in terms of finite 
state grammars. And, much as Chomsky’s assault on Skinner helped to clear the decks 
for psychologists’ embrace of generative grammar and its associated hypotheses, his 
systematic discounting of finite state grammars helped clear the deck for computer 
scientists’ embrace of transformational grammar. Those arguments also substantially 
reduced, by association, the cachet of information theory. To replace those research 
programs, Chomsky offered a new picture of language, and a new methodology to 
research it:
[W]e picture a language as having a small, possibly finite kernel of basic sentences 
with phrase structure in the sense of §3, along with a set of transformations which 
can be applied to kernel sentences or to earlier transforms to produce new and 
more complicated sentences from elementary components. We have seen certain 
indications that this approach may enable us to reduce the immense complexity 
of actual language to manageable proportions and; in addition, that it may 
provide considerable insight into the actual use and understanding of language. 
(Chomsky 1956b: 124)
“Certain indications” is not, on the face of it, incendiary talk, but there is a notewor-
thy similarity here between Chomsky’s phrasing and Watson and Crick’s phrasing, in 
their revolutionary DNA paper. “It has not escaped our notice,” they remark, “that the 
specific pairing we have postulated [i.e., the double helix structure of DNA] imme-
diately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material” (1953: 737). 
Chomsky does not reach quite the level of smug faux-humility that Watson and Crick 
achieve in this most famous of litotes in the history of science.12 His paper is nowhere 
near as earth shattering as theirs, his understatement not so elaborate. But his tone, 
1. Compare Watson, on the initial idea:
My pulse began to race. If this was D.N.A., I should create a bombshell by announcing 
its discovery. The existence of two intertwined chains with identical base sequences 
could not be a chance matter. Instead it would strongly suggest that one chain in 
each molecule had at some earlier stage served as the template for the synthesis of 
the other chain. (Watson 1968: 118).
And here is Crick: “The structure of D.N.A. ... immediately gave the game away, suggesting 
only too vividly how nucleic acid could be replicated exactly. (Crick 1988: 60).
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like theirs, is of conspicuously muted triumph: the “certain indications” are for reduc-
ing “immense complexity” into “manageable proportions;” thereby yielding “consider-
able insight” into a notoriously difficult problem, “the actual use and understanding 
of language.”
It is not understatement, however, that made this paper famous in artificial intelli-
gence. It is the establishment of the “Chomsky Hierarchy,” and its implications for com-
putational modeling of language. Chomsky argues that finite state grammars are not 
sufficient to bring immense complexity into manageable proportions. Nor are phrase 
structure grammars. One must go up the hierarchy of descriptive power yet further, to 
transformational grammars. And it is only on that level of the hierarchy, the transfor-
mational level, where one might be able to gain considerable insight into the use and 
understanding of language. Ostensibly here, in the “Three Models” paper, Chomsky is 
talking about the activity of a linguist, studying the cognitive resources of speakers and 
hearers. But in this context — read at the Information Theory symposium, published 
in the transactions of the Institute of Radio Engineers — the management and use and 
understanding of language have, in a phrase used in other contexts by Chomsky, a “sys-
tematic ambiguity.” They can certainly apply to the linguist and to cognitive resources. 
But there are two more construals as well, both of which were mutually reinforcing in 
the developing cognitive science community. Actual use, in particular, very naturally 
suggests verbal behavior; that is, dynamic performance. And actual ... understanding 
equally suggests cognitive processing. More crucially, in the context of computer sci-
ence and the nascent artificial intelligence movement, manageable proportions meant 
(or at least evoked) computationally tractable proportions, while use and understand-
ing implied computational use and computational understanding.
Chomsky’s discussion of systematic ambiguity in Aspects presents the term, and 
the concept, grammar, in two distinct but parallel frames, referring, “first, to the native 
speaker’s internally represented ‘theory of language,’ and, second, to the linguist’s 
account of this” (Chomsky 1965: 25). But there is a third way that grammar could 
be, and rampantly was, taken by the cognitive community — as a program imple-
mented on a computer to generate, understand, translate, and otherwise deploy natu-
ral languages. This usage falls directly into line with grammar as “a kind of machine” 
in Lees’ terms, and as “a device,” in Chomsky’s regular phrasing (e.g., Chomsky 1956a: 
X-728; 1956b: 114; 1957: 11). The Machine Translation people — including, notably, 
those working with Chomsky in the RLE — certainly used grammar with a systematic 
human/computer variation (e.g., Yngve, 1957; Yngve, 1960). And the more general 
AI community embraced that usage. Indeed, the Chomsky Hierarchy was widely per-
ceived in AI to concern the sorts of programs that might be written to simulate human 
performance, so that both “Three Models” and Syntactic Structures were widely read in 
the AI community as outlining the conditions computational grammars would have to 
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meet in order to approach human facility. This ambiguity was compounded further by 
the general vocabulary of process and performance in Chomsky’s arguments.
Systematic ambiguity, in fact, is one of the rhetorical ways in which multidisci-
plinary research develops. Leah Ceccarelli, in particular, has carefully documented the 
way key phrases can be taken differently by different disciplinary, or subdisciplinary, 
groups, leading to an umbrella unity that covers divergent research paths (Ceccarelli 
2001). Cognitive science is clearly such an umbrella, and the strains of research in 
psychology and artificial intelligence, while strongly overlapping, had somewhat dif-
ferent construals of Chomsky’s instruments and arguments (see Boden 2006: 297, on 
this). Moreover, those construals departed markedly from Chomsky’s intentions for 
linguistics, at least if we judge retrospectively, knowing the way his theories developed 
and the claims he later made.
But the single most representative term of the theory was so inherently dynamic 
that ambiguity must have seemed impossible. Transformation means alteration of 
state, change of form, movement between conditions, and so on, in every discipline 
that employs it (chemistry, biology, geology...). And Harris had self-consciously bor-
rowed it from mathematics (Harris 1964: 419), where it codes an operation — a mental 
operation, when performed by a mathematician, a mechanical operation when per-
formed by a computer. Further, it is (1) exactly the sort of operation that was expand-
ing to machines in the 1950s, and (2) exactly the sort of operation that sponsored 
the concomitant expansion of the word intelligence toward machinery. Moreover, it 
was Chomsky’s innovation to conceive the behavior of transformations in linguistics 
derivationally (Harris 1952: 6), so that they operated, one after the other in a sequence, 
very closely parallel to routines in lines of code; in fact, Harris saw this use of transfor-
mations, “in the theory of Noam Chomsky and in the applications by his students ... as 
instructions in the course of generating sentences” (Harris 1965: 370). The appeal for 
artificial intelligence researchers is not hard to fathom.
Don Knuth, the venerable, uniquely sobriquetted, Professor Emeritus of The Art 
of Computer Programming at Stanford, captures the eureka-spirit that Chomsky’s 
work triggered for many computer scientists in this period, hinging on the conflation 
of mechanical and mental grammatical instantiation:
I found the mathematical approach to grammar immediately appealing — so 
much so, in fact, that I must admit to taking a copy of Noam Chomsky’s Syntactic 
Structures along with me on my honeymoon in 1961. During odd moments, while 
crossing the Atlantic in an ocean liner and while camping in Europe, I read that 
book rather thoroughly and tried to answer some basic theoretical questions. Here 
was a marvelous thing: a mathematical theory of language in which I could use a 
computer programmer’s intuition! The mathematical, linguistic, and algorithmic 
parts of my life had previously been totally separate. (Knuth 2003: iii)
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. The mental as mechanical
New metaphors were coming into being in those mid-1950s and one of 
the most compelling was that of computing.
 — Jerome S. Bruner (1983: 274)
Nowhere did the computational modeling of mind and the mental model of compu-
tation come together more completely than in George Miller, Eugene Galanter, and 
Karl Pribram’s book, Plans and the Structure of Behavior — it fully epitomizes the 
themes and trends of the first wave of the cognitive revolution — and nowhere, outside 
of linguistics, is the influence of Chomsky more pervasive, Chomsky perceived as the 
architect of a plan-based, information-processing cognitive psychology. This extrapo-
lated Chomsky of Plans is not the one we can see from the vantage of his later career, 
nor from his later pronouncements about both psychology and artificial intelligence, 
but there is certainly precedent for it his work at the time. “The built-in structure of 
an information-processing (hypothesis-forming) system,” he said, counterposing his 
theory of mind to Skinner’s, “must ... enable it to arrive at the grammar of a language 
from the available data in the available time” (Chomsky 1959: 58), in phrasing that 
could have come directly from Newell and Simon’s work on the Logic Theory Machine, 
or on their later General Problem Solver.
Newell and Simon, whose paper shared the stage with Chomsky’s and with  Miller’s 
at the 1956 Cambridge colloquium, are the other presiding spirits of Plans and the 
Structure of Behavior, rounding out the computational cognitivism of the book. “The 
notion of a Plan that guides behavior,” Miller, Galanter, and Pribram note at the outset, 
is “quite similar to the notion of a program that guides an electronic computer” (Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram 1960: 2), and they directly invoke the artificial-intelligence research 
coming out of Simon and Newell’s lab at the RAND corporation.13  Language, however, 
is the quintessential behavioral structure in the book (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960: 
14n8), not logic, nor general problem solving. Indeed, language is  inextricably bound 
to human planning in all its aspects:
In man we have a unique capacity for creating and manipulating symbols, and 
when that versatility is used to assign names to TOTE [Test-Operate-Test-Exit] 
units, it becomes possible for him to use language in order to rearrange the 
symbols and to form new Plans. We have every reason to believe that man’s verbal 
abilities are very intimately related to his planning abilities. (Miller, Galanter, & 
Pribram 1960: 38)
1. For Research ANd Development, begun by the US Air Force in 1946 with Douglas 
 Aircraft, and becoming a separate non-profit company in 1948.
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The specific chapter on language, devoted entirely to explicating and endorsing the 
Syntactic Structures model, is called “Plans for Speaking.” It fully conceptualizes Chom-
sky’s grammar in the dynamic, mechanical frame that was so appealing to psycholo-
gists and AI scientists of the period, a grammar directly involved in the production 
and comprehension of speech. Here are Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, for instance, 
on issues of ambiguity (the resolution of which was an important selling point for 
transformational grammar):
The person must be aware of the underlying structure of the sentence in order to 
understand it or to know how to apply various transformations to it. “They are 
cooking apples” has one structure if it means “My friends are cooking apples,” but 
a different structure if it means “Those apples are good only for cooking, not for 
eating.” If the person has in mind the structure : (They) [(are cooking) (apples)], 
then he can apply a passive transformation to it and so obtain “Apples are being 
cooked by them.” But if the person has in mind the structure (They) [(are) (cooking 
apples)], then the passive transformation is not relevant. If the complete hierarchy, 
and not just the terminal string of words organized by the hierarchy, were not 
represented cognitively, we would not know which transformations could be 
applied to it, and we would not be able to recognize the intrinsic ambiguity of the 
utterance. (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram 1960: 153)
The chapter is a set piece, and the authors bring it round to something of a crescendo, 
which holds the preceding account of transformational grammar as an exemplum for 
understanding and replicating cognition as a whole. “[I]f the speculations of the present 
authors are correct,” they say, “nearly all of man’s behavior is similarly organized. We 
might speak metaphorically of a general grammar of behavior, meaning that the gram-
mar of a language was only one example of a general pattern of control that could be 
exemplified in many other realms of behavior” (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram 1960: 155).
This view of Chomsky as a computational cognitivist, and transformational grammar 
as the computational-cognitivist vanguard of the revolutionary movement in psychology 
and computer science, centred on the brain as an information process device, foundered 
within a decade, and does not fit the picture Chomsky, and his promotional historians, 
paint of his early scholarship. But the image was very representative of the period, dissi-
pating only through the sixties and into the early seventies. Miller was a close friend, col-
laborator, and enthusiastic supporter, who had not only shared the podium and the pen 
with him, but shared a house with him. Moreover, Chomsky had read the manuscript in 
advance, commenting on it (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram 1960: viii), and it is difficult to 
believe that he opposed Plans with any vehemence, if at all. He and Miller continued to 
collaborate, prominently including two articles in The Handbook of Mathematical Psy-
chology (Chomsky & Miller, 1963; Miller & Chomsky, 1963), alongside a chapter by 
Newell and Simon (Newell & Simon, 1963), in a book co-edited by one of Miller’s co-
authors on Plans and the  Structure of Behavior (Luce, Bush, & Galanter 1963).
5 R. Allen Harris
. Conclusion
Machine translation is a very low level engineering project, and 
artificial intelligence is largely fraud, dismissed by most serious 
scientists and lacking any results, as its leading exponents concede, after 
45 years of endless hype.
 —Noam Chomsky (quoted in Barsky, 1998)
The shift of attention, resources, and style in linguistics which Chomsky effected fits the 
bill for a Kuhnian scientific revolution except for the part where a new stable paradigm 
replaces the old, but that may have more to do with the sort of enterprise linguistics is 
(part natural science, part social science, part humanities) than with the motives, the 
mechanisms, or the scope of the shift. The same resemblances and differences from Kuhn’s 
template also attend the broader intellectual shift Chomsky is associated with (though it 
takes the label with far less controversy): the Cognitive Revolution. The differences, in this 
case, too, are probably because of the domain, but here the scale is altogether distinct from 
linguistics. Cognitivism is a very broad series of developments, touching in some way all 
of the fields in which humans study humans. That scope alone makes it closer kin to mod-
ernism or romanticism than to molecular biology or quantum physics. And Chomsky, as 
we have seen, is a major figure in the early years of its revolution, embraced at the time, 
and cited relentlessly in subsequent histories.
Cognitive science has disciplinary status, with degrees and specific faculty, at a 
goodly number of institutions, but its essence is multi- and inter-disciplinary. Even its 
specific disciplinary status, at those institutions where it has such, is mostly in associ-
ated with, or has hived off of, departments like psychology, computer science, or philos-
ophy, and often it has a high proportion of adjunct professors and cross-appointments. 
Paul Thagard puts it this way, “[c]ognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of mind, 
embracing psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, linguistics, and 
anthropology” (Thagard 2005: 317). There are major stories implicating aspects of cog-
nition to be told about Chomsky’s engagement with philosophy and neuroscience, lesser 
ones about anthropology, and others in literary studies, composition, communication 
studies, and evolutionary psychology — to say nothing of political science, media stud-
ies, and rhetoric, in his sideline career as public intellectual. His influence, as Golumbia 
reminds us, is enormous. But all of these other stories follow the first cognitive wave by 
a decade, or several, and gained their impetus from that surge.
The cognitive revolution, following Miller, got its first powerful multidisciplinary 
surge with the confluence of neo-behaviorist psychology, generative linguistics, and arti-
ficial intelligence, at the 1956 Cambridge Colloquium. Chomsky’s revolutionary role was 
key. But his subsequent role in psychology and artificial intelligence, and in linguistics, 
has not remained central. Chomsky himself is quite sanguine about the relation of his 
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work to cognitive science. Noting the decline of his influence in his home discipline, he 
has said that “if the kind of linguistics I am interested in survives in the United States, it 
may very likely be in [the network of connections loosely around the cognitive sciences], 
rather than in linguistics departments” (Chomsky 2004: 36). The indications that he is 
right, however, are not compelling. A brief look at psycholinguistics is instructive.
After early success, the correspondence hypothesis — that there is a direct, infor-
mation-processing impact of transformations in speech production and comprehen-
sion — failed to pan out. Even before any of the research was published, Chomsky was 
denouncing the correspondence hypothesis as an “utterly mistaken view” (Chomsky 
1961: 14), but he had a suggestion. In a highly influential paper with Miller, Chomsky 
endorsed a somewhat more subtle route, which still had inherently dynamic characteris-
tics, for investigating “[t]he psychological plausibility of a transformational model of the 
language user” (Miller & Chomsky 1963: 481). Among other things, that paper intro-
duced the competence/performance distinction, disengaging transformational gram-
mars from any direct claims about language use, and it distended the correspondence 
hypothesis into a suggestion that “performance on tasks requiring an appreciation of the 
structure of transformed sentences is some function of the nature, number and com-
plexity of the grammatical transformations involved” (Miller & Chomsky 1963: 481). 
“Some function of ...” was generally taken to mean something like “corresponds in an 
indirect and possibly measurable way to.” This suggestion — dubbed the Derivational 
Theory of Complexity — fueled the continued expansion of psycholinguistic research, 
under the near total hegemony of transformational grammar, into the early 1970s. But it 
foundered too (Watt 1970), and psycholinguistics separated almost completely from the 
Chomskyan approach. Chomsky’s reaction? Repudiation. “He’s since disavowed this 
whole thing,” Miller has lamented, “but at the time he thought it was an interesting thing 
to do. Later he said, ‘Nobody would do anything that stupid!’ ” (Baars 1986: 208). “By 
the middle 1970s ... psycholinguistics largely severed its ties with linguistics and became 
absorbed into mainstream cognitive psychology” (Tanenhaus 1988: 11)
Relations aren’t much better with the artificial intelligence community. Chomsky’s 
disdain for many, if not all, computational approaches to cognition has alienated such 
prominent figures as Roger Schank and Marvin Minsky. Schank says, simply, “Noam 
Chomsky represents everything that’s bad about academics” (Brockman 1996: 174), 
and Chomsky’s differences with Minsky are what apparently prevented M.I.T., despite 
housing two such giants, from assuming a major institutional role in cognitive science 
under the Sloan Foundation (“[I]t was all too apparent as Barbara Partee has put it, that 
M.I.T. was not the home for interdisciplinary cooperation that the Sloan Foundation 
was looking for” (Partee 2005).
The trajectory of Chomsky’s influence on the cognitive sciences, in fact, is per-
haps best described as attenuating oscillation: sometimes up, sometimes down, but 
overall steadily declining from the peak reached in the 1970s. His Syntactic Structures 
 R. Allen Harris
sketched an approach that was immensely attractive for an algorithmic, information-
processing model of mind. His review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior dismantled 
the psychological framework that cognitive revolutionaries overthrew. His collabo-
ration with George Miller, and good relations with figures like Newell and Simon, 
spread his fame far and wide, for defining linguistics, hitherto a field chiefly with a cul-
tural and anthropological cast, as “a branch of cognitive psychology.” But his work has 
receded in cognitive science to little more than historical interest. Even in linguistics, 
the approaches most in consonance with the methods and claims of cognitive science 
define themselves in opposition to the Chomskyan frameworks.
References
Agassi, Joseph. 1997. “The Novelty of Chomsky’s Theories”. The future of the cognitive revolu-
tion, ed. by David Martel Johnson & Christina E. Erneling. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Andresen, Julie T. 1990. “Skinner and Chomsky Thirty Years Later or: The return of the repressed”. 
The Behavior Analyst 14. 49–60.
Baars, Bernard J. 1986. The cognitive revolution in psychology. New York: Guilford Press.
Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1956. “Can Translation be Mechanized? [Abstract]”. Mechanical Transla-
tion 3. 67.
Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua & Aldo Ghizzetti. 1966. “Four Lectures on Algebraic Linguistics and 
Machine Translation”. Automatic Translation of Languages: Papers Presented at NATO Sum-
mer School Held in Venice, July 1962, 1–26. Oxford: Pergamon.
Barsky, Robert F. 1997. Noam Chomsky : a life of dissent. Toronto: ECW Press.
Bobrow, Daniel G. 1963. “Syntactic analysis of English by computer: a survey”. The Fall Joint 
AFIPS Computer Conference. Las Vegas: Association for Computing Machinery.
Boden, Margaret A. 2006. Mind as machine : a history of cognitive science. Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.
Brockman, John. 1996. The third culture : beyond the scientific revolution. London: Simon & 
Schuster.
Bromberger, Sylvain & John R. Searle. 2002. “Chomsky’s Revolution”. The New York Review of 
Books 49. 60–61.
Brown, Roger. 1970. Psycholinguistics. New York: Free Press.
Bruner, Jerome S. 1983. In search of mind : essays in autobiography. New York: Harper & Row.
Bruner, Jerome S. 2004. “A Short History of Psychological Theories of Learning”. Daedalus 133. 
13–20.
Bruner, Jerome S., Jacqueline J. Goodnow & George A. Austin. 1986[1956]. A study of thinking. 
Edison, NJ: Transaction.
Carnap, Rudolf & Y. Bar-Hillel. 1952. “An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information”. Techni-
cal Report, Research Laboratory of Electronics. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.
Carroll, John B. 1964. “Linguistics and the Psychology of Language”. Review of Educational 
Research 34. 119–126.
 Chomsky’s other Revolution 1
Carroll, John B., Susan M. Ervin, Joseph H. Greenberg, James J. Jenkins, Floyd G. Lounsbury, 
Leonard D. Newmark, Sol Saporta, Donald E. Walker & Kellogg Wilson. 1954. Psycholin-
guistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems. Baltimore: Waverly Press.
Ceccarelli, Leah. 2001. Shaping science with rhetoric : the cases of Dobzhansky, Schrödinger, and 
Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chamberlain, Alexander F. 1894. “Anthropological Psychology: Linguistics (and Related Sub-
jects)”. American Journal of Psychology 6. 453–456.
Chomsky, Noam. 1956a. Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory [Indicated to be a revision of 
Chomsky 1955a preserved on microfilm at the M.I.T. Humanities Library. PDF available 
for download at http://alpha-leonis.lids.mit.edu/chomsky/. Revised again & published as 
Chomsky 1975.].
Chomsky, Noam. 1956b. “Three Models for the Description of Language “. IRE(Institute of Radio 
Engineers) Transactions on Information Theory 2. 113–124.
Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton.
Chomsky, Noam. 1958. “Linguistics, Logic, Psychology, and Computers”. Computer program-
ming and artificial intelligence : an intensive course for practicing scientists and engineers ; 
lectures given at the University of Michigan, ed. by John W. Carr. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of 
Michigan College of Engineering.
Chomsky, Noam. 1959. “Review of Verbal Behaviour, by B.F. Skinner”. Language 35: 1. 26–59.
Chomsky, Noam. 1961. “On the notion of ‘rule of grammar”. Structure of language and its math-
ematical aspects: Proceedings of the twelfth Symposium in Applied Mathematics, held in New 
York City, April 14–15, 1960, ed. by Roman Jakobson. Providence, R.I.: American Math-
ematical Society.
Chomsky, Noam. 1962. “Context-Free Grammars and Pushdown Storage”. M.I.T. RLE Quarterly 
Progress Report 65. 187–194.
Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2004. The Generative Enterprise Revisited: Discussions with Riny Huybregts, 
Henk van Riemsdijk, Naoki Fukui, & Mihoko Zushi. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Chomsky, Noam. 2006. Language and mind. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Chomsky, Noam & Fred Lukoff. 1955. “Construction of the German Verb Phrase”. Mechani-
cal Translation Group Memorandum. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Research Laboratory of 
Electronics.
Chomsky, Noam & George A. Miller. 1957. “Pattern Conception”. Proceedings of the University of 
Michigan Symposium on Pattern Recognition. University of Michigan.
Chomsky, Noam & George A. Miller. 1958. “Finite state languages”. Information and Control  
1: 2. 91–112.
Chomsky, Noam & George A. Miller. 1963. “Introduction to the Formal Analysis of Natural 
Languages”. Handbook of mathematical psychology, ed. by R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush 
& Eugene Galanter. New York: Wiley.
Chomsky, Noam & Marcel-Paul Schützenberger. 1963. “The algebraic theory of context-free lan-
guages”. Computer Programming and Formal Systems, ed. by P. Braffort & David  Hirschberg, 
118–161. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Chomsky, Noam & John R. Searle. 2002. “Chomsky’s Revolution: An Exchange”. The New York 
Review of Books 49. 64–65.
Cordeschi, Roberto. 2007. “AI TURNS FIFTY: REVISITING ITS ORIGINS”. Applied Artificial 
Intelligence 21: 4–5. 259–279.
 R. Allen Harris
Coulter, Jeff. 2003. “Projection Errors and Cognitive Models”. Journal of the Learning Sciences 
12: 3. 437–443.
Crick, Francis. 1988. What mad pursuit : a personal view of scientific discovery. London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson.
Crowther-Heyck, Hunter. 1999. “George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of 
Mind”. History of Psychology 2. 37–64.
Diebold, A. Richard, Jr. 1964. “Review of Psycholinguistics: A Book of Readings, by Sol Saporta”. 
Language 40. 197–260.
Golumbia, David. 2009. The Cultural Logic of Computation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Green, Bert F., Jr., Alice K. Wolf, Carol Chomsky & Kenneth Laughery. 1961. “Baseball: an 
automatic question-answerer”. The Western Joint IRE-AIEE-ACM Computer Conference. 
Los Angeles, California: Association for Computing Machinery.
Greene, Judith. 1972. Psycholinguistics: Chomsky and Psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Hanley, Edmund C. 1939. “Double-surfaced Hectograph”. Popular Science 135: 5. 193.
Harris, Zellig S. 1964. “Transformations in Linguistic Structure”. Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge 108. 418–422.
Harris, Zellig S. 1965. “Transformational Theory”. Language: Journal of the Linguistic Society of 
America 41: 3. 363–401.
Harris, Zellig S. 1951. Methods in structural linguistics. Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press.
Harris, Zellig S. 1952. “Discourse Analysis”. Language: Journal of the Linguistic Society of Amer-
ica 28: 1. 1–30.
Harris, Zellig S. 1954. “Transfer Grammar”. International Journal of American Linguistics 20. 
259–270.
Hébert, Richard. 2006. “The Miller’s Tale: A Genealogy of the Father of the Cognitive Revolu-
tion”. Observer 19:June.
Hockett, Charles Francis. 1955. A manual of phonology. Baltimore: Waverly Press.
Hutchins, W. John. 2000. Early years in machine translation : memoirs and biographies of pio-
neers. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Jakobson, Roman, G.G.M. Fant & Morris Halle. 1952. “Preliminaries to Speech Analysis”. Tech-
nical Report of the Acoustics Laboratory. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.
Joseph, John Earl. 2002. From Whitney to Chomsky : essays in the history of American linguistics. 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
Joshi, Aravind K. & Phil Hopely. 1996. “A Parser from Antiquity”. Natural Language Engineering 
2. 291–294.
Kantor, J.R. 1971. “Behaviorism in the history of psychology”. The aim and progress of psychology 
and other sciences; a selection of papers, ed. by J.R. Kantor. Chicago: Principia Press.
Knuth, Donald Ervin. 2003. Selected papers on computer languages. Stanford, Calif.: CSLI Publi-
cations Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Koerner, E.F.K., Matsuji Tajima & Carlos Peregrín Otero. 1986. Noam Chomsky : a personal 
bibliography, 1951–1986. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Lees, Robert B. 1957. “Review: Syntactic Structures by Noam Chomsky”. Language 33. 375–408.
Lees, Robert B. 1957. “Structural Grammars”. Mechanical Translation 4: 1&2. 5–10.
Lehmann, Winfred P. 1980. “Linguistics at Wisconsin (1937–41) and at Texas (1949- ): A Retro-
spective View”. First person singular. Papers from the Conference on an Oral Archive for the 
 Chomsky’s other Revolution 
History of American Linguistics : (Charlotte, NC, 9 – 10 March 1979), ed. by Boyd H. Davis, 
XIII, 239 S. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Luce, R. Duncan, Robert R. Bush & Eugene Galanter. 1963. Handbook of mathematical psychol-
ogy. New York: Wiley.
MacCorquodale, K. 1969. “B.F. Skinner’s “Verbal Behavior”: A retrospective appreciation”. Jour-
nal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 12. 831–841.
Mandelbrot, Benoit. 1953. Contribution à la théorie mathématique des communications. Paris: 
Inst. de statistique de l’université de Paris.
Mandler, George. 2002. “Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution” [Fall 2002]. Journal of the History 
of the Behavioral Sciences 38: 4. 339–353.
Miller, George A. 1951. Language and communication. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Miller, George A. 1954. “Communication”. Annual Review of Psychology 5. 401–420.
Miller, George A. 1956. “Human Memory and the Storage of Information”. Institute of Radio 
Engineers [now, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers] Transactions on Informa-
tion Theory 2. 129–137.
Miller, George A. 1979. “A very personal history”. Occasional Paper. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. 
Center for Cognitive Science.
Miller, George A. 2003. “The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective”. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 7: 3. 141.
Miller, George A. & J.G. Beebe. 1956. “Some Psychological Methods for Evaluating the Quality 
of Translations”. Machine Translation 3. 73–80.
Miller, George A. & Robert Buckhout. 1962. Psychology: the Science of Mental Life. New York: 
Harper & Row.
Miller, George A. & Noam Chomsky. 1963. “Finitary models of language users”. Handbook 
of mathematical psychology, ed. by R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush & Eugene Galanter. 
New York: Wiley.
Miller, George A., Eugene Galanter & Karl H. Pribram. 1960. Plans and the structure of behavior. 
New York: Holt.
Miller, George A. & Kathryn Ojemann McKean. 1964. “A chronometric study of some relations 
between sentences”. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 16. 297–308.
Morris, C. 1958. “A review of B.F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior”. Contemporary Psychology 3. 
212–214.
Newell, Allen & Herbert A. Simon. 1956. “The Logic Theory Machine—A Complex Information 
Processing System”. Institute of Radio Engineers [now, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers] Transactions on Information Theory 2. 61–79.
Newell, Allen & Herbert A. Simon. 1963. “Computers in psychology”. Handbook of mathematical 
psychology, ed. by R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush & Eugene Galanter. New York: Wiley.
Newell, Allen & Herbert A. Simon. 1972. Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
Osgood, Charles E. 1958. “A Question of Sufficiency: A Review of B.F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior”. 
Contemporary Psychology 3. 209–212.
Osgood, Charles E. 1975. “A Dinosaur Caper: Psycholinguistics Past, Present, and Future”. 
Developmental Psycholinguistics and Communication Disorders 263. 16–26.
Partee, Barbara H. 2005. Reflections of a formal semanticist as of Feb 2005. Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts.
Percival, W. Keith. 1976. “The Applicability of Kuhn’s Paradigms to the History of Linguistics”. 
Language 52: 2. 285–294.
 R. Allen Harris
Richardson, Alan. 1998. “Brains, Minds, and Texts: A Review of Mark Turner’s The Literary 
Mind”. Review 20. 39–48.
Searle, John R. 2002. “End of the Revolution”. New York Review of Books 49: 3. 33–36.
Shannon, C.E. 1948. “A Mathematical Theory of Communication”. Bell System Technical Journal 
27. 379–423, 623–656.
Sheehy, Noel. 2004. Fifty key thinkers in psychology. London ; New York: Routledge.
Simon, Herbert A. 1961. “Modeling human mental processes”. The Western Joint IRE-AIEE-ACM 
Computer Conference. Los Angeles, California: Association for Computing Machinery.
Simon, Herbert A. 1996 [1969]. The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Simon, Herbert A. & Allen Newell. 1958. “Heuristic Problem Solving: The Next Advance in 
Operations Research”. Operations Research 6. 1–10.
Skinner, B.F. 1957. Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B.F. 1974. About behaviorism. New York: Knopf & Random House.
Staddon, J.E.R. 1993. Behaviorism : mind, mechanism and society. London: Duckworth.
Tanenhaus, M.K. 1988. “Psycholinguistics: An Overview”. Linguistics : the Cambridge survey, ed. 
by Frederick J. Newmeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thagard, Paul. 2005. “Being Interdisciplinary: Trading Zones in Cognitive Science”. Interdisci-
plinary collaboration : an emerging cognitive science, ed. by Sharon J. Derry, Morton Ann 
Gernsbacher & Christian D. Schunn. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Tikhomirov, O.K. 1959. “Review of Verbal Behavior”. Word 15. 362–367.
Ulvestad, B. 1956. “Noam Chomsky- Syntactic Structures”. Machine Translation 3. 89.
Virués-Ortega, J. 2006. “The case against B.F. Skinner 45 years later: An encounter with 
N. Chomsky”. The Behavior Analyst 29. 243–251.
Watson, James D. 1968. The double helix: a personal account of the discovery of the structure of 
DNA. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Watson, James D. & Francis Crick. 1953. “Molecular structure of nucleic acids: a structure for 
deoxyribose nucleic acid”. Nature 171. 737–738.
Watt, W.C. 1970. “On two hypotheses concerning psycholinguistics”. Cognition and the devel-
opment of language, ed. by John R. Hayes, Roger Brown & Carnegie-Mellon University. 
New York: Wiley.
Weiss, Albert P. 1925. “Linguistics and Psychology”. Language 1. 52–57.
Yngve, V.H. 1956. “Mechanical Translation Research at M.I.T.”. Mechanical Translation 3. 
44–45.
Yngve, V.H. 1957. “A Framework for Syntactic Translation”. Machine Translation 4. 59–65.
Yngve, V.H. 1960. “A Model and an Hypothesis for Language Structure”. Proceedings of the 
 American Philosophical Society.




Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
The revolutionary nature of Chomskyan linguistics must be considered within 
the framework of another ‘revolution’, in psychology, from behaviorism to 
cognitivism. George Miller dates this paradigm shift to a conference held at M.I.T. 
in 1956, in which Chomsky participated. This change of focus is, in turn, related 
to the development of the digital computer and the promise of understanding 
and modeling thought using the techniques of computer science. Chomsky 
evolves from behaviorism to mentalism between Syntactic Structures (1957) and 
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). This led psycholinguists to consider the 
relationship between deep structure and surface structure in processing. However 
the results were not very promising, and Chomsky himself seemed to abandon 
psychological reality as a relevant consideration in linguistic analysis. His focus 
on intuition favored rationalism over empiricism, and innate structures over 
acquired behavior. This biological turn — the search for the language ‘organ’, the 
‘language acquisition device’, etc. — became the new foundation for a science 
of linguistics. This, however, leads to problems with evolutionary biology, and 
Chomsky’s appeal to biology has explained little and created serious conundrums. 
The biological approach is linked to the claims of the ‘poverty of the stimulus’, 
i.e. the claim that children learn the structures of language with remarkably 
little input, and therefore must have innate structures that explain this human 
capability. This has been attacked from two fronts: first, suggestions that the 
stimulus is not as poor as claimed, and second, hypotheses that language learning 
does not require a richly structured and highly restricted learning mechanism. 
These approaches divorce cognitivism from Chomskyan linguistics, and pursue 
instead such language acquisition theories as statistical language learning, 
latent semantic analysis, and agent-based modeling. Chomsky’s resolute anti-
empiricism ends up isolating his linguistic theory from the forefront of current 
trends in biology and psychology.
*This paper is respectfully dedicated to Konrad Koerner, in appreciation of the rigor, 
high professional standards, and untiring labor he has consistently brought to the field of 
linguistic historiography.
 Malcolm D. Hyman
0. Introduction
There has been much argument about whether a “Chomskyan revolution” in linguistics 
took place; and among those who believe it did, about exactly when, and in what it 
consisted. This is not my present topic.1 For the moment, I shall simply echo Agassi 
(1997) in concluding that there are “reasons for doubting that Chomsky’s theory is 
either entirely new or entirely correct.” In this paper I wish to consider another revolu-
tion in which Chomsky is often implicated: the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s and 
1960s.2 This revolution, just as the linguistic one, has been hotly contested.3 I follow 
Greenwood (1999, 1) in concurring with Galison, who rejects as explanatorily useful 
“ ‘all-inclusive’ breaks” in the history of science, which entail “incommensurable […] 
paradigms that pass each other like ships in the night” (Galison 1997, 13).4 Instead of 
concentrating on rupture épistémologique (so Bachelard), I prefer to write of a “cognitive 
turn” — or, for reasons that will become clear, “cognitive turns” within psychology 
during this period.5
1. The “cognitive revolution”
According to the conventional story, behaviorism — which rejected explanations in terms 
of “mental” or “cognitive” states in favor of those directly linking an overt “stimulus” and 
“response” — dominated American theoretical psychology from John B. Watson’s 
“behaviorist manifesto” of 1913 until the eclipse of behaviorist ideas in the 1950s.6 
1. But I refer the reader to the critical review of Koerner (1983) and to Newmeyer’s (1986) 
response to Koerner and his other critics. Note that in his dialogue with Rieber, Chomsky 
repeatedly insists that he in no way views his work as revolutionary (Chomsky 1983, 60).
. Probably the best known account — readable, although not always reliable — is Gardner 
(1985).
3. Valuable literature includes Greenwood (1999), Reed (1997), Shanker (1997), and Leahey 
(1992).
4. For theoretical discussions concerning the applicability of the Kuhnian concepts of “revolution” 
and “paradigm” to linguistics, see: Percival (1976), Murray (1980), Koerner (2006, 2809–2810); 
in psychology, Weimer and Palermo (1973), Leahey (1992), Mandler (2007, 165). I believe that 
the concept of “incommensurability” in the history of science must be dealt with in another 
fashion; for some programmatic remarks in this regard, see Hyman (2007).
5. Compare the phrase “linguistic turn,” which originated with Gustav Bergmann (1953).
. See e.g. Leahey (1992, 313): “Belief in a cognitive revolution is an entrenched part of modern 
psychology’s form of life.” Yet the considerable variety of research published in American 
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In that decade a new “cognitive psychology” arose, and an interdisciplinary venture 
that came later to be called “cognitive science” had its “unofficial launching” (Gardner 
1985, 7). George Miller, a major participant in these changes, dates (in an admittedly 
personal and anecdotal account) the “cognitive revolution” to September 11, 1956, “the 
second day of a symposium organized by the ‘Special Interest Group in Information 
Theory’ at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (Miller 2003, 142), at which, 
inter alios, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon spoke on a “logic machine,” and Noam 
Chomsky presented transformational generative grammar. Seminal contributions to 
this “revolution” from its early days include Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) on 
cognitive strategies;7 Miller (1956) on the limitations memory imposes upon human 
information processing; Chomsky (1957) on natural-language syntax; Newell, Shaw, 
and Simon (1958) on problem solving;8 Brown (1958) on the relation between language 
and thought; and Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) on plans.
What unites the apparently diverse projects comprising the “cognitive revolution” 
is not immediately obvious. Leahey sees cognitivism as “a new form of behavioralism 
[sic; to be distinguished from classical “behaviorism”] based on a new technology, the 
computer” (1992, 316). Greenwood (1999) identifies a decisive shift from the “interven-
ing variables” (e.g. “pure stimulus act”) posited by the more liberal varieties of behavior-
ism (such as Hull’s) to the developed “hypothetical constructs” (such as “short-term 
memory”) posited by the cognitivists.9 Shanker sees not one revolution, but two: a genuine 
cognitive revolution that found its inspiration in the ideas of the Würzburg school, 
Gestalt psychology, Piaget, and Vygotsky; and an artificial intelligence revolution that, 
despite its embrace of such new concepts as automata and recursive-function theory, 
remained basically behavioristic and mechanistic (1997, 45).
Much, though not all, of the work heralded as “cognitive” is connected in some way 
to the digital computer — ranging from work that relies directly on computer modeling; 
to work employing formalisms and concepts drawn from areas of theoretical “computer 
journals during this period that did not follow behaviorist lines undermines the account of a 
behaviorist “hegemony” (Greenwood 1999, 18). Nor did behaviorism really constitute a unified 
paradigm: there were vast differences between Watson and Hull, or Skinner and Tolman!
. Greenwood (1999, 18) observes that theories such as those of Newell, Shaw, and Simon 
(1958) developed largely independently of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956).
8. These authors acknowledge their indebtedness to the Denkpsychologie of Otto Selz and 
his student Adriaan de Groot (Shanker 1997, 52 n. 1; Greenwood 1999, 17; Mandler 2007, 
111–114).
9. Cf. Chomsky (1957, 49): “Any scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations 
and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing 
general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs such as (in physics, for example) ‘mass’ and 
‘electron’ [emphasis mine].”
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science,” such as automata theory; to work that relies on an “information processing” para-
digm, which describes the encoding, rule-based processing, and storage of information 
mentally.10 Sometimes the digital computer has been taken as the central metaphor of 
cognitive psychology (e.g. Gigerenzer & Sturm 2007). But we must bear in mind that 
the computer was not just a tool ready to be taken over by psychologists; much of the 
pioneering work that led to advances in computer science was carried out by theorists 
(such as Alan Turing, John von Neumann, and Norbert Wiener) that were themselves 
interested in understanding and modeling the mechanisms of thought.
Perhaps the best candidate for characterizing the early cognitivist endeavors in 
contrast with earlier American work in the behaviorist and associationist traditions is 
a heightened “[c]onsideration of structure” (Mandler 2007, 174). A crucial cognitive 
structure picked up by cognitivists from earlier traditions is the schema.11 One ante-
cedent is the British psychologist Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett, who took the term from 
the British neurologist Henry Head (1920) and employed it for the unconscious mental 
structures he posited in his theory of memory (Bartlett 1932). Another is Jean Piaget, 
who used the term in a variety of applications: for sensorimotor schemata (such as the 
infant’s “schème de succion”; Piaget 1936; Maury 1997, 68–77), conceptual schemata, and 
operative schemata (Mandler 1983, 102–103).12 Karl Lashley had also used the term, 
in such expressions as “schemata of action” (1951, 122). In cognitive psychology, “A 
schema is considered to be a cognitive structure (i.e. an organized body of knowledge) 
that controls various kinds of perceiving, thinking, or acting” (Mandler 1983, 100). In 
the words of Kintsch (1998, 412), “A knowledge system […] must include schema-like 
structures with default-slots and procedural knowledge that links cognition and action 
[…].” Following Bartlett, schemata have played an especially important role in the 
theory of memory.13 Structures akin to the schema have also been proposed: these 
include most notably scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977) and frames (Barsalou 1992). 
The key point here is that the schema is a complex structure, capable of recursively 
embedding other schemata, and therefore fundamentally different from the S-R and 
associative chains posited by earlier theories.
But where does Chomsky stand in the cognitivist tradition? Greenwood (1999, 18) 
argues that “Computational theories of information processing [such as that of  Newell, 
10.  Yet “information” as a term is rarely defined; many authors “confess that they have no 
account of what ‘information’ is” (Reed 1997, 266). For a perspicuous study of the uses and 
abuses of the term “information” in the modern world see Nunberg (1996).
11.  See Neisser (1976, 286–292), Shanker (1997, 50–52), Mandler (2007, 172, 241).
1.  Piaget’s discussions of schemata are both quite complex and confusing, and the term 
changes significance considerably in the course of development of his œuvre.
13.  For a review, see Alba and Hasher (1983).
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Shaw, and Simon (1958)] […] seem to have developed largely independently of the 
work of Noam Chomsky (1957) and George Miller (1962) on psycholinguistics, which 
did so much to legitimize the ‘rule-following’ explanatory paradigm for the explana-
tion of linguistic processing and other symbolic processes that came to be exploited 
by computational theories of cognition.” Gardner (1985, 216) admits that “While 
his approach arose from many of the same roots as artificial intelligence, several of 
Chomsky’s main ideas are not readily implemented in computational formats. For 
example, there is no guarantee in principle that one can parse sentences using trans-
formational grammatical approaches.” If “Syntactic Structures was the snowball which 
began the avalanche of the modern ‘cognitive revolution,’ ” as Lightfoot (2002, v) has 
it, then we must be all the more amazed that there is so little psychological language or 
psychological subject matter therein.
. From “structures” to “aspects”
In 1957 Chomsky published Syntactic Structures [henceforth SS], which he drafted 
in 1956 on the basis of lecture notes for a course at M.I.T.; the book is essentially an 
outline of Chomsky’s manuscript The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory [hence-
forth LSLT] (Chomsky 1955–1956), which he began in 1953 — augmented with some 
material from Chomsky (1956) (Murray 1980, 77, 86 n. 22). In SS Chomsky rejects 
two grammatical models: one based on finite state Markov processes (cf. Chomsky 
1956, 114–116), and the other on phrase structure grammar (formally defined in 
Chomsky 1956, 117). He then elaborates a third model that combines a phrase struc-
ture component — immediate constituent analysis along the lines of e.g. Wells (1947) 
formalized via Post production (or “tag”) systems (Post 1943)14 — combined with a 
transformational component, inspired by the work of Chomsky’s teacher, Zellig Harris 
(1952; 1954; 1957). SS also contains a well-known methodological excursus, in which 
discovery procedures, decision procedures, and evaluation procedures for grammars 
are contrasted (Chomsky 1957, 49–60).
SS is largely concerned with formal and methodological aspects of linguistic 
theory. Chomsky’s interest in mathematical considerations is well in evidence into 
the early 1960s. Publications on formal language theory after SS include Chom-
sky (1958), Chomsky and Miller (1958), Chomsky (1959b; 1959c; 1962; 1963), Chom-
sky and Schützenberger (1963). At the time that Chomsky was working on formal 
 language theory and applications to natural languages, researchers in the emerging 
field of computer science were applying similar approaches to the analysis of artificial 
14.  See Greibach 1981a.
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 programming languages. Notably, Backus (1960) and Naur et al. (1960) defined a meta-
syntax for specifying the syntax of programming languages (originally ALGOL) that 
became known as Backus-Naur Form (BNF). Ginsburg and Rice (1962) demonstrated 
that ALGOL was equivalent to a context-free (or Type 2, in the typology of Chomsky 
1959b) language; thus BNF could express the grammar of all context-free languages 
and was equivalent to one form of Chomsky’s phrase structure rules. The polymath (and 
ardent anti-neo-Darwinist) Marcel-Paul Schützenberger, who started working on context-
free languages in the late 1950s (Lallement & Perrin 1997),15 discovered algebraic formula-
tions for these languages (Schützenberger 1961). A subsequent jointly-authored paper 
(Chomsky & Schützenberger 1963) contains an important theorem named for the 
authors. Kuroda (1964) succeeded in showing that each of the languages in the typol-
ogy of Chomsky 1959b (now known as the “Chomsky hierarchy”) corresponds to a 
specific kind of automaton. Chomsky’s papers of this period, as well as work inspired by 
him, form a core part of the theory of automata and languages in computer science as 
described in such authoritative surveys as Hopcroft, Motwani, and Ullman (2006).16
Although Chomsky in these years was evidently very concerned with mathemat-
ics, neither SS nor LSLT show evidence of the psychological and biological concerns 
that would occupy him later. In both works, Chomsky’s position is largely compatible 
with behaviorist orthodoxy. Thus he objects “that the theory of meaning fails to meet 
certain minimum requirements of objectivity and operational verifiability” (Chomsky 
1955–1956, 2). He suggests that mentalism can be ruled out “for what were essentially 
Bloomfield’s reasons, i.e. its obscurity and general uselessness in linguistic theory” 
(op. cit., 20) and asserts that the “introduction of dispositions (or mentalistic terms) is 
either irrelevant, or trivializes the theory” (op. cit., 21). He repeatedly expresses admira-
tion for “such operational devices as the pair test” (op. cit., 34).
Chomsky (1957, 13) equates grammaticalness with acceptability to a native speaker 
and assumes that such a speaker’s intuitions about sentences can constitute the basis 
for a scientific theory of language. Nevertheless, he adds, “We can take certain steps 
towards providing a behavioral criterion for grammaticalness […],” although he does 
not specify what these might be. Chomsky here seems somewhat uneasy at not 
being able to provide an objective, overt behavior as a basis for the theory. LSLT is 
more detailed, but seems to show a greater ambivalence about the relation between 
intuitive judgments and behavior. Chomsky writes that “we will regard a linguistic 
theory as successful if it manages to explicate and give formal justification and 
15.  We may observe that Schützenberger is already cited by Chomsky and Miller (1958).
1.  Greibach 1981b offers a detailed survey of formal language theory from 1936 through 
1964, with a limited discussion of developments through the late 1970s.
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support for our strong intuitions about linguistic form for many languages17 within the 
framework of an integrated, systematic, and internally motivated theory [emphasis 
mine]” (1955–1956, 55). He then adds, “But ‘intuition,’ of course, is an extremely weak 
support. The program of linguistic research would be a much clearer one if we could 
show experimentally that these intuitions have distinct behavioral correlates [emphasis 
mine]” (ibid.). Yet he cautions, “But we must be careful not to exaggerate the extent 
to which a behavioral reinterpretation of intuition about form will actually clarify the 
situation” (ibid.). Finally, “It appears then that in a certain sense the ultimate criterion 
remains the speaker’s intuition about linguistic form […], since only this can tell us 
which behavioral tests are to the point” (op. cit., 58). Moreover, we cannot take the 
procedure of relying on speakers’ intuitive judgments as beyond the neo-Bloomfieldian 
pale. Chomsky dutifully observes, “Hockett has pointed out [note omitted] that the 
sequences generated by the grammar as grammatical sentences must be acceptable, 
in some sense, to the native speaker […]” (op. cit., 55). In SS Chomsky refers to this 
criterion as the “external conditions of adequacy [emphasis original]” (1957, 49).
Chomsky does not dwell much on the speaker whose acceptability judgments pro-
vide the ultimate data for his theory. He does mention that the speaker “on the basis 
of a finite and accidental experience with language, can produce or understand an 
indefinite number of new sentences” (1957, 15; cf. op. cit., 75). There is here, of course, 
the germ of an idea that we will find fully grown in Chomsky’s later writings. Elsewhere 
Chomsky observes that if natural language could be captured by a finite state grammar, 
we could “view the speaker as being essentially a machine of the type considered [i.e. 
a finite state automaton]” (op. cit., 20). In one passage only does Chomsky consider 
learnability: “Similarly, he [i.e. the speaker of English] will be able to recall [the gram-
matical but nonsensical sentence] (1) much more easily than [the ungrammatical 
string] (2), to learn it much more quickly, etc.” (op. cit., 16). Note that measurement of 
the speed of recall and of learning are common behaviorist techniques.18
Thus in 1957 Chomsky seems a behaviorist, rather than a mentalist. A grammar 
is a scientific theory, rather than something instantiated in the mind of a speaker. 
Instead of Universal Grammar (UG), we have only “Language” with a capital “L” 
(1957, 14), together with some scattered remarks in LSLT.19 The “poverty of the 
1.  These words have been inserted by hand in the typescript.
18.  Indeed, the term “learning” itself was laden with behaviorist overtones; cf. Mandler 
(2007, 242–243). For the record, this sentence falsifies Lightfoot’s (2002, x) claim that in 1957 
“matters of learnability had not yet been raised explicitly” by Chomsky.
19.  E.g. “If we had such grammars for every language, we could attempt to abstract from 
them, and to construct a general theory of the elements of which languages are composed” 
(Chomsky 1955–1956, 7).
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stimulus” argument has not been made, although it is hinted at in the allusion to the 
speaker’s “finite and accidental experience with language.” Chomsky appears to be 
thinking much more along mathematical than psychological lines, and the only hint 
of an interest in the biology of language is given by the appearance of the name “Eric 
Lenneberg” (cf. Lenneberg 1967) in the acknowledgements of the preface (1957, 6).20 
But things are about to change.
Chomsky’s review of Skinner (1957) is conventionally taken as marking the 
final defeat of behaviorist orthodoxy and seems to some the pièce de résistance of his 
career.21 The review seems to show Chomsky’s ideas in transition. On the one hand, 
the term “mentalistic” in his text connotes (perhaps only for rhetorical effect? but there 
is no evidence that it is so) a lack of proper scientific rigor. Witness: “the talk of ‘stimu-
lus control’ simply disguises a complete retreat to mentalistic psychology” (Chomsky 
1959a, 32); “this terminological revision adds no objectivity to the familiar ‘mentalistic’ 
mode of description” (op. cit., 36). On the other hand, the modish term “information 
processing” is now in evidence; Chomsky refers to “the ways in which [the organ-
ism] processes input information [emphasis mine]” (op. cit., 27); “process information” 
occurs (in quotation marks) on p. 43; and the works of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 
(1956) and Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1958) are cited approvingly  (Chomsky 1959a, 
57 n. 48). Chomsky also describes as “an extremely interesting and insightful paper” 
Lashley’s contribution to the 1948 Hixon symposium (Lashley 1951). This paper 
(a cognitive turn in its own right), which discusses subtle phenomena of morphosyn-
tax in the general context of temporally- and spatially-sequenced behavior, is often 
considered to be quite ahead of its time, and it only began to attract significant atten-
tion in the 1960s.22
Most importantly, however, in his review of Skinner, Chomsky brings nativism 
into the scenario of child language acquisition:
0.  Unpublished work by Lenneberg (= Lenneberg 1960) is twice cited in Chomsky 
(1959a). Lenneberg (1967) contains an extensive appendix “The formal nature of language” 
(pp. 397–442) written by Chomsky.
1.  Still, in its aftermath, as Greenwood (1999, 2) reminds us, “behaviorists continued to main-
tain their in-house journals, their own APA division, and a sizable professional membership.” 
It is also worth pointing out that some scholars, including ones whom no one would accuse of 
sympathy for Skinner’s agenda, have expressed quite ambivalent reactions to the review: see e.g. 
Baker and Mos (1983, 403–404), Lieberman (1991, 138–140), Agassi (1997, 143).
.  For further discussion, see Mandler (2007, 190–194); also Gardner (1985, 192–193), Weimer 
and Palermo (1973, 232). N.B. also the reference to Lashley’s paper at Chomsky (1983, 42).
 Chomsky between revolutions 3
It is often argued that experience, rather than innate capacity to handle information 
in certain specific ways, must be the factor of overwhelming dominance in 
determining the specific character of language acquisition, since a child speaks the 
language of the group in which he lives. But this is a superficial argument. As long 
as we are speculating, we may consider the possibility that the brain has evolved 
to the point where, given an input of observed Chinese sentences, it produces (by 
an ‘induction’ of apparently fantastic complexity and suddenness) the ‘rules’ of 
Chinese grammar, and given an input of observed English sentences, it produces 
(by, perhaps, exactly the same process of induction) the rules of English grammar 
[…]. (Chomsky 1959a, 44)
In this striking passage, Chomsky implies (but merely implies, of course!) that some 
innate characteristic of the organism is a factor of greater importance than mere lin-
guistic data in the course of acquiring language.23 The passage just quoted shortly fol-
lows one in which Chomsky observes that the gaping response behaviors of a nestling 
thrush “are genetically determined and mature without learning” (op. cit., 43). We 
should not fail to notice that he will come later to characterize the human language 
faculty in precisely the same way.24 The final section of the review, to which greater 
attention has often been paid, does little more than recapitulate the points Chomsky 
has already suggested above: (1) all “normal” children in some sense acquire the 
grammar belonging to the language of the community in which they live; (2) such 
grammars constitute exceedingly complex generative devices; (3) they are acquired 
with astounding rapidity; and (4) no mechanism is known that can account for these 
facts (op. cit., 57–58).
Chomsky’s second monograph, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) evidences 
more changes still. First, we find at the outset a bevy of Enlightenment thinkers to 
whom obeisance is paid — César Chesneau, sieur Du Marsais; Denis Diderot; Friedrich 
Wilhelm Christian Karl Ferdinand Freiherr von Humboldt…. Such luminaries had been 
first trotted out by Chomsky for the European audience at the Nineteenth International 
Congress of Linguistics (1962) in Cambridge, Massachusetts (Koerner 1983, 156). From 
3.  The inverted commas around “induction” are perhaps noteworthy, since Chomsky will 
later argue the child exhibits grammatical regularities that could not possibly be induced from 
the limited data to which (s)he is exposed.
4.  Agassi (1997, 145) suggests that Chomsky’s nativism is inspired by the the theory of 
innate releasing mechanisms (such as imprinting) demonstrated by Heinroth and Lorenz. 
Such mechanisms are present at birth and need only slight experience to become functional. 
Just how much Chomsky owes to Lorenz is open to doubt, but the juxtaposition I have cited 
is hardly accidental. Note that Chomsky uses “released” in the technical sense of the biological 
theory on p. 43; see also the discussion of imprinting on p. 41.
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now on, we find them regularly appearing in Chomsky’s writings, with Descartes tak-
ing center stage when Chomsky “came out of the closet” as a Cartesian in Chomsky 
(1966) (Hintikka 1999, 133). Second, Chomsky is now willing to say that “linguistic 
theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying 
actual behavior” (Chomsky 1965, 4).25 Third, “Universal Grammar” (albeit dressed in 
lower-case letters) has appeared: “The grammar of a particular language, then, is to be 
supplemented by a universal grammar […]” (op. cit., 6). Fourth, generative grammar 
has become a theory of the linguistic competence of “an ideal speaker-listener, in a com-
pletely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly”;26 errors 
of performance are abstracted away (op. cit., 1965, 3). Fifth, grammar is no longer a 
scientific theory (as in SS), nor something that (with due hedging) “[the child] […] has 
in some sense constructed […] for himself ” (Chomsky 1959, 57); rather, “every speaker 
of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his 
knowledge of his language” (Chomsky 1965, 8). In sum: Chomsky’s thinking has in a 
decade evolved remarkably.
3. Chomsky among the cognitivists
George Miller (1962) was among the first to present the new Chomskyan picture of 
linguistics to the psychological community, in a presidential address delivered to the 
Eastern Psychological Association in Atlantic City, New Jersey. In addition to explaining 
some basic concepts of linguistics and recalling some (by then classic) experiments 
from the 1950s, Miller presented the results of experiments on arbitrary center-
embedding, as well as error rate and time performance analysis results for tasks involving 
sentences with transformations of various types (including kernel sentences, with no 
transformations). Research such as Mehler (1963) continued the analysis of the effects 
of number and type of transformations on recall. While a number of early studies 
suggested a correlation between the typology of sentences implied by generative trans-
formational grammar, Miller and McKean (1964) seemed to offer stronger evidence 
for the psychological reality of particular transformations themselves. The construct 
5.  In a long note, however, Chomsky insists that embracing the label of mentalism does not 
commit the linguist to Bloomfield’s (false) mentalism vs. mechanism dichotomy (Chomsky 
1965, 193–194 n. 1)
.  The necessity for imagining an ideal speech community of this sort will later be removed 
by Chomsky’s focus on “I-Language” (e.g. Chomsky 1997).
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validity of this experiment was subsequently questioned, and its results became suspect 
(Fodor, Bever, & Garrett, 1974, 231–234).27
One of the most important discussions of Chomsky’s theories and their psy-
chological applications is found in the influential text of Neisser (1967, 242–276). 
Neisser generally approves of the work of Miller (1962), Mehler (1963), Savin and 
Perchonock (1965), etc. A revealing feature of Neisser’s account, however, is his dis-
cussion of antecedents for Chomsky’s work; he draws frequent parallels between the 
work of Chomsky and that of the Gestalt psychologists (who are sometimes supposed 
to be an important influence on the early cognitivists). Thus: ambiguous sentences 
play an important role for Chomsky, just as ambiguous figures played for the Gestalt 
school (1967, 245); Chomsky and the Gestalt psychologists had common enemies in 
the behaviorists and associationists (op. cit., 246); the Gestalt psychologists, like Chom-
sky, were nativists, “believing that the perceptual processes were largely determined by 
necessary and innate principles rather than by learning” (ibid.); the idea that linguistic 
surface structures can be understood in terms of deep structures has an analog in the 
concept of “ideal figures” in Gestalt psychology (op. cit., 269).
With the publication of Chomsky (1965) aspects of the new “Standard Theory” were 
incorporated into experimental designs. Thus instead of investigating the relation between 
kernel sentences and sentences to which various transformations had applied, psycholin-
guists turned to the investigation of the interrelation of surface structure and deep struc-
ture in processing. Mehler and Carey (1967), for instance, sought to demonstrate that in 
processing sentences subjects had access to both surface and deep structure. In Russia, 
A.R. Luria noted Chomsky’s contributions (in particular the differentiation between sur-
face and deep structure in syntax) appreciatively and expressed optimism concerning 
the potential that generative transformational grammar offered to the psychological 
study of the production and understanding of language (Luria 1979, 156–161).
Much early psycholinguistic research along generativist lines focused on attempting 
to find a correlation between the complexity of a sentence (as somehow experimentally 
measured) and the derivational history of the sentence (as posited by the grammati-
cal theory). The hypothesis that the complexity of a sentence was correlated with the 
number of rules employed in its derivation came to be known as the Derivational 
Theory of Complexity (DTC). Experimental evidence against DTC accumulated in the 
latter part of the 1960s (Fodor, Bever, & Garrett 1974, 319–328). With evidence mount-
ing against DTC, it seemed that phenomena other than grammatical derivation were 
needed to explain sentence perception.
.  Cf. the remarks on the reinterpretation of the results of these early experiments in 
Akhutina (2002, 44).
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By the mid-1970s, debates about syntactic theory had become extremely heated.28 
Psychologists, who could scarcely afford to keep abreast of the latest theoretical quar-
rels, started to become disenchanted of generative grammar.29 Bever in 1975 described 
the situation poignantly:
It is no revelation to an audience of linguists that the field is in great disarray 
at the moment. There are as many revisions of transformational grammar as 
there are self-proclaimed theorists. Some researchers even question whether the 
domain of grammar is itself a discrete part of language structure. Arguments and 
theories slip past each other because of the lack of shared conceptual assumptions 
about what a grammar is for: we are paralyzed by the frenzied virtuosity of our 
scholastic momentum, which generates a counter-argument for every technical 
proposal. (Bever 1975, 63–64)
It may also have been somewhat disheartening for experimental psychologists to consider 
that Chomsky was not much interested in their confirming (or disconfirming) evidence. 
He insists that “linguistic evidence” is sufficient confirmation for a linguistic theory, 
without the need for corroborating “psychological evidence” (i.e. experimental evi-
dence) (Chomsky 1983). Thus, Chomsky laments, “A demonstration of psychological 
reality requires evidence about reaction time or something of that sort” (1983, 46); 
“even the weakest evidence concerning reaction time, etc., is held to bear on ‘psy-
chological reality’ ” (ibid.).30 Chomsky and Lasnik (1993, 509) have now denied that 
parsing must be an easy or rapid process,31 and even a staunch generativist such as 
Newmeyer concedes, “I do not know of any psycholinguists who would agree with 
Chomsky & Lasnik on this point” (Newmeyer 1998, 312).
Gardner (1985, 214) has observed that “the majority of workers [sic32] in psychology 
have remained skeptical about the overall relevance of his theory for their pursuits.” Yet, 
Gardner insists, “[t]here is one area of psychology where Chomsky’s ideas and example 
have had enormous influence: the psychology of language, or psycholinguistics” (ibid.). 
8.  See e.g. Huck and Goldsmith (1995).
9.  Thus Baker and Mos (1983, 405): “The loss of unanimity within linguistics appears, cur-
rently, to be causing psychologists to step back from contact with linguists since, obviously, 
they are not prepared to resolve the problem.”
30.  Occasionally Chomsky has noted psycholinguistic findings with approval, e.g.: “In fact, 
grammatical transformations characteristically reduce the amount of grammatical structure 
in phrase-markers in a well-defined way, and it may be that one consequence of this is to 
facilitate the problem of speech perception by a short-term memory of a rather limited sort” 
(Chomsky 1967, 435).
31.  The claim is repeated by Chomsky (1997, 121).
3.  Shades of Nietzsche’s philosophical laborers?
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A survey of contemporary research does not bear this claim out; or at least, we must 
admit that this “enormous influence” has waned. Such a major work as Levelt (1989) 
contains only a single reference to Chomsky. And a recent important contribution to 
developmental psycholinguistics, despite a chapter of nearly 100 pages on morphology 
and syntax, contains a mere two references to Chomsky’s work (and both critical!), 
specifically to Chomsky and Halle (1968) on generative phonology (Jaeger 2005). 
This (negative) evidence suggests the marginality, to say the least, of Chomsky to the 
contemporary enterprise of psycholinguistics.
Chomsky’s writings are well known and often read. His ideas about language 
are common knowledge. Why then the failure of psychologists to engage with him? 
Chomsky considers such cognitive capacities as social cognition, music appreciation, 
number sense, language, spatial cognition, and face recognition as essentially distinct 
in structure and independent of one another (1983, 33). He says, “I’d like to think of 
the system of cognitive structures as in effect a system of ‘mental organs,’ each of which 
is quite specific, highly articulated, developing in a particular manner that is intrinsically 
determined — if the biologists are right, genetically coded — with, of course, complex 
interactions that are also very largely predetermined” (op. cit., 35). Such a Balkanized 
view of cognition does not, of course, make a general psychology possible. But Chomsky 
is not interested in a general psychology; he is interested in “a reasonable version of a 
‘faculty psychology’ ” (op. cit., 36). Is it not fair to conclude that if this is a program for 
a revolution, it is a program for a medieval revolution?
Bloomfield, while adopting a nominally behaviorist position (this was a change 
of heart; he had once been committed to mentalism), essentially divorced linguistics 
from psychology (Bloomfield 1933; cf. Huck & Goldsmith 1995, 23–24). Chomsky in 
effect continued Bloomfield’s program of anti-psychologism by other means (Baker & 
Mos 1983). (And this claim perhaps lends an additional dimension to Koerner’s (1983, 
161) insistence on the essential continuity between Chomsky’s program and that of 
the  neo-Bloomfieldians.) Some of the most important psychologists of the twentieth-
 century believed that the study of general cognition and language could not be 
 divorced — Wundt, Piaget, Bühler, Vygotsky. And their practice reflected their belief. 
Bühler is particularly exemplary, as he both influenced, and was influenced by, the 
Prague Circle linguists: he is acknowledged in both Trubetzkoy (1939) and Jakobson 
(1941); and, alongside his not inconsiderable achievements in general and develop-
mental psychology, he made a significant contribution to the development of phono-
logical theory (Bühler 1931).33
33. Already in Die Krise der Psychologie (1927) Bühler drew attention to the importance for 
psychology of phonology and the abstraction it presupposes. On Bühler’s ideas concerning 
phonology, see Innis (1982, 11–18).
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It is now high time to reconsider the so-called “cognitive revolution.” Certainly 
alliances formed between individuals such as Chomsky and Miller. Yet psychologists 
by and large abandoned behaviorism for their own reasons and adopted new methods 
and perspectives in accord with their own interests. Some came later to recant “cog-
nitivism” — not to rejoin the behaviorist faithful — but to chart new courses.34 There 
was no single cognitive revolution, but rather a number of cognitive turns. Or to put 
it differently: not a revolution so much as a series of student uprisings. To believe that 
Chomsky (1959) quashed behaviorism is to believe myth and not history. One author 
has remarked, “It is striking that even close followers of Chomsky did not see the 
destructive genie they were bringing into their field under the rubric of ‘psychological 
explanation’ ” (Reed 1997, 263). Thus, in the same author’s analysis, Miller,  Galanter, 
and Pribram (1960), who styled themselves “subjective behaviorists,” replaced a behav-
iorist program concerned only with behavioral inputs and outputs with a “cognitive” 
program concerned only with behavioral inputs and outputs “as constrained by  specific 
rules” (Reed 1997, 264).
4. Introspection and intuition
In the psychology laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt, experimental subjects were trained 
to attend to their inner awareness of sensory stimuli; the chronoscope was then used as 
an instrument to measure the time the subjects took to come to this state of awareness. 
With introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) as a shared method, a debate arose between 
Wundt’s student Edward Bradford Titchener and the psychologists of the Würzburg 
school. The Würzburg school claimed the discovery of “imageless thought”— that is, 
thought unaccompanied by conscious representations (Mayer & Orth 1901). In their 
experimental protocols the Würzburgers noticed “a residue, an indefinable and unan-
alyzable something” (Evans 1975, 341) that they called Bewusstseinlagen (Mayer & 
Orth 1901, 6), or “dispositions of consciousness.”35 These Bewusstseinlagen, a kind of 
imageless thought, seemed to be borderline phenomena, somewhere between con-
sciousness and the unconscious. From this beginning the Würzburg school developed the 
 concept of Aufgaben ‘tasks’ — determining tendencies inaccessible to consciousness 
34.  As various papers in Johnson and Erneling (1997) show. With the passing of years authors 
have distanced themselves from their once revolutionary work. Consider, for instance, that 
Bruner (1997, 286) accepts this evaluation of his own early work: “concept attainment studies 
have steadily retreated from formalistic conclusions since the Bruner-Goodnow-Austin book 
(1956) of 40 years ago.”
35.  I borrow this translation from Mandler (2007, 78).
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(Mandler 2007, 93–97). Meanwhile, Titchener opposed any idea of “imageless 
thought”; he was a “sensationalist,” meaning that he believed thought must always be 
accompanied by sensation. On Titchener’s view, “the only scientific means of under-
standing mental structure was through introspection, practised under the most rigor-
ous experimental conditions” (Kroker 2003, 83), and the Würzburg psychologists had 
simply been too lax in their methods of introspection. For Titchener, the report of 
introspection must be a report of a conscious experience, and no concept of the uncon-
scious could have a proper place in a genuinely introspectionist psychology.
With the rise of behaviorism in America, psychologists came to reject introspection 
as a legitimate method of experimental inquiry. At the same time, the behaviorists had 
no interest in the unconscious phenomena the Würzburg school had discovered, since 
they avoided recourse to mentalistic explanation in general. Although the cognitive psy-
chology that grew up in the 1950s and 1960s had little interest in introspection either, the 
unconscious processes that had been posited by the Würzburgers were “rediscovered” 
at this time.36 Chomsky accepts introspection in a limited form but insists that “[a]ny 
interesting generative grammar will be dealing, for the most part, with mental processes 
that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness” (Chomsky 1965, 8).37 
Yet, as we have seen, Chomsky embraces speakers’ intuitions as the primary data of 
a linguistic theory, despite his caveat that a speaker’s “statements about his intuitive 
knowledge of the language are [not] necessarily accurate” (ibid.). It will be useful to refer 
to Chomsky’s position as “intuitionism.” I shall show in what follows that Chomsky came 
to intuitionism with a certain ambivalence, and that his intuitionism had far-reaching 
consequences both within and beyond linguistic theory.
The first statements in LSLT concerning intuition are quite negative: “Thus if one of 
the basic undefined terms of linguistic theory is ‘intuition’, and if we define phonemes in 
this theory as elements which our intuition perceives in a language, then the notion of 
phoneme is as clear and precise as is ‘intuition’ ” (Chomsky 1955–1956, 21). In short, 
the linguist “should try to avoid such notions as ‘intuition’ ” (op. cit., 22). These state-
ments are quite remarkable given the appeals to intuition that I have quoted earlier. 
In the absence of a reliable technique for constructing a phonemic system, Chomsky 
later argues, we have only our intuition that e.g. /p/ and /b/ are distinct in English; but 
3. On this “rediscovery of the unconscious” see Mandler (2007, 226–231); and on later 
 rediscoveries Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, and Tataryn and (1992). At least one direct link is that 
mentioned in note 9 above (Selz had studied with the Würzburg psychologists).
3. Chomsky insists that linguistics is sterile if it does not accept “introspective judgments 
of the informant (often, the linguist himself)” (1965, 194 n. 1). But it seems that this introspec-
tion is limited to mental contents and does not extend to mental processes. For a relevant 
point concerning introspection, see Neisser (1967, 249).
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“[f]ortunately, in the case of phonemic distinctness the pair test enables us to avoid 
this reliance on intuition” (op. cit., 36). Three pages later Chomsky comes to the ques-
tion of how we can determine that Colorless green ideas sleep furiously is a grammatical 
sentence, whereas Furiously sleep ideas green colorless is an ungrammatical string. “The 
only thing we can say directly is that the speaker has an ‘intuitive’ sense of grammatical-
ness” (op. cit., 39). Chomsky admits that there is a problem here, but he sees a way out:
Suppose that we can (i) construct an abstract38 linguistic theory in which 
grammaticalness is defined, (ii) apply this linguistic theory in a rigorous way 
to a finite sample of linguistic behavior thus generating a set of ‘grammatical’ 
sentences, [note omitted] and (iii) demonstrate that the set of grammatical 
sentences thus generated, in the case of language after language, corresponds to 
the ‘intuitive sense of grammaticalness’ of the native speaker. In this case, we will 
have succeeded in giving a rational and general39 account of this behavior, i.e. a 
theory of the speaker’s linguistic intuition. This is the goal of linguistic theory. 
(Chomsky 1955–1956, 39–40)
Chomsky admits intuitions concerning linguistic form, while denying intuitions concerning 
linguistic significance. Before a linguistic theory is constructed, the linguist must rely 
on speakers’ intuitions; whereas “[a]fter a linguistic theory has been constructed, the 
subject matter of linguistic description is determined by the theory itself. The success 
of the theory is determined in part by its efficacy in reconstructing intuition [emphasis 
mine]” (op. cit., 40).
The argument here is subtle. But Chomsky is motivated by a serious problem. On 
his view, analysis of a corpus of utterances is inadequate for theory building, because 
the corpus constitutes a finite sample of linguistic behavior.40 In principle an arbitrary 
number of grammars might be constructed that would generate only those sentences 
in the corpus. But any of these grammars might be vitiated by adding an additional 
sentence to the corpus. A corpus is finite, whereas a speaker’s linguistic capability 
includes the ability to produce, understand, and render grammaticality judgments on 
infinitely many sentences. As Chomsky has repeatedly stated over the years, the most 
basic fact about a language is that it involves a discrete infinity (Chomsky 1967, 434; 
Chomsky 1983, 38; Chomsky 2000, 19). A grammar is a model not of a finite portion 
of a speaker’s behavior, but of a speaker’s infinite language capacity. And so a linguistic 
theory cannot rely on behavioral observations, which are always finite. Like it or not, 
the linguist must deal with the speaker’s intuitions.
38.  Inserted by hand in the typescript.
39.  Inserted by hand in the typescript.
40.  There is the further problem that the corpus may (and, if sufficiently large, will almost 
certainly) contain performance errors.
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If a linguistic theory generates predictions that contradict a native speaker’s intuitions, 
then, Chomsky argues, something must be wrong with the theory. This statement is not 
limited to intuitions concerning grammaticality. If a linguistic theory asserted that John 
finished eating contained only a single word or identified -er in mother, father, brother, 
sister as a morpheme, that theory would be equally wrong (Chomsky 1955–1956, 55).41 
The linguist may rely on operational tests, but only insofar as they correspond to a 
native speaker’s intuitions; “we must be careful not to exaggerate the extent to which a 
behavioral reinterpretation of intuition about form will actually clarify the situation” 
(op. cit., 56).
We have not yet considered the case in which a speaker does not have a clear intuition con-
cerning the grammaticality of a particular string. Yet this is by no means an uncommon 
case, as the number of sentences with a prefixed question mark in publications on 
syntax demonstrates. Chomsky deals with this question at the beginning of SS. There 
his position is that the external conditions of adequacy for a grammar dictate that it (1) 
generate all the strings that a speaker intuitively judges as definite sentences and (2) does 
not generate any string that a speaker intuitively judges as a definite non-sentence. “In 
many intermediate cases,” Chomsky writes, “we shall be prepared to let the grammar 
itself decide, when the grammar is set up in the simplest way so that it includes the 
clear sentences and excludes the clear non-sentences” (Chomsky 1957, 14).
The consequences of Chomsky’s intuitionism within linguistics involved a movement 
away from empirically grounded methods. Linguists were free to hand-pick their 
examples, and virtually no work in syntactic theory attempted to discover whether 
a survey of more linguistic data might falsify the theory.42 Although León (2005) is 
undoubtedly correct in arguing that corpus linguists are engaging in myth-making 
when they claim that Chomsky prevented corpus-based research for twenty or thirty 
41.  But here we run into serious difficulties. Chinese speakers consider sentences as 
 sequences of zi4 (), monosyllabic morphemes (which correspond to characters in the writing 
system) (Read et al. 1986). Here zi4  constitutes what Chao (1968, 136) calls the “socio-
logical word.” But this unit is not at all coincident with the ci2 ( ), the linguistic terminus 
technicus for ‘word’. Moreover Chinese speakers who have not learned alphabetic writing are 
unable to segment utterances into individual speech sounds (phonemes), although they have 
no difficulty segmenting utterances into syllables (Read et al. 1986). (This result holds true 
for most illiterate speakers or speakers literate only in a non-alphabetic writing system.) It 
seems obvious to say that speakers unacquainted with the concept morpheme will be unable 
successfully to segment utterances into morphemes, even though such speakers are surely in 
the majority. It does not help to say that we must first acquaint the speakers with the relevant 
linguistic concepts, since we will then have taught them the (operationalized) concepts of a 
particular linguistic theory, which is what we were trying to establish in the first place.
4.  See Pullum and Scholz (2002) for the empirical falsification of a selection of concrete 
linguistic claims from the generativist literature.
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years, it is difficult not to believe that corpus linguistics43 and other empiricist endeavors 
within linguistics suffered a loss of prestige during the years in which generative 
grammar held its ascendancy.44 In these years, publications in linguistics proudly pro-
claimed their rationalist or even metaphysical orientation, as indicated by such titles as 
“The metaphysics of coarticulation” (Hammarberg 1976). Of course Chomsky never 
had the power to suppress all linguists who held competing views. Nevertheless, one 
sees, for a not inconsiderable time, the triumph of Chomsky’s rationalism over empiricist 
linguistics.
Hintikka (1999) argues that many philosophers (he emphasizes Saul Kripke in 
particular) embraced Chomsky’s intuitionism. For Hintikka, Chomsky, as a Cartesian 
(and hence committed to some version of innatism), is at least consistent in invoking 
intuitionism — as is any philosopher committed to “Platonic anamnesis, Aristotelian 
forms, Cartesian innate ideas, or Kantian transcendental deductions” (Hintikka 1999, 131). 
But few contemporary philosophers are committed to any of these; their reliance on 
intuition, Hintikka asserts (1999, 127), comes from their “attempt to get on the band-
wagon of transformational grammar.”
5. The appeal to biology
In 2000 Chomsky wrote: “The ‘biolinguistic’ approach is at the core of the modern 
study of language, at least as I understand it. The program was formulated with relative 
clarity about forty years ago” (Chomsky 2000, 24). Chomsky does not specify which 
or whose formulations he is thinking of, but I presume that he includes his own work. 
Forty years before Chomsky’s article, Eric Lenneberg had published an important 
paper “Language, evolution, and purposive behavior,” which reflected in part ideas 
that had emerged from his discussions with Chomsky and Miller (Lenneberg 1960). 
The paper was reprinted in the influential anthology of Katz and Fodor (1964) and is 
cited by Chomsky (1965). The phrase “about forty years ago” also can be construed 
43.  Fillmore’s (1991, 35) caricature of the armchair linguist from the perspective of the 
corpus linguist is too amusing not to quote here: “Armchair linguistics does not have a good 
name in some linguistics circles. A caricature of the armchair linguist is something like this. 
He sits in a deep soft comfortable armchair, with his eyes closed and his hands clasped behind 
his head. Once in a while, he opens his eyes, sits up abruptly shouting, “Wow, what a neat 
fact!”, grabs his pencil, and writes something down. Then he paces around for a few hours in 
the excitement of having come still closer to knowing what language is really like. (There isn’t 
anybody exactly like this, but there are some approximations.)”
44.  The rise of corpus linguistics in the 1990s had much to do with the availability of cheap 
computer processing time and computer storage.
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to include Chomsky’s own early publications. Although biological language has not 
always been noticed by readers of Chomsky’s early writings, it is not hard to find. Con-
sider the following examples:
“One would naturally expect that prediction of the behavior of a complex  –
organism (or machine) would require, in addition to information about exter-
nal stimulation, knowledge of the internal structure of the organism, the ways 
in which it processes input information and organizes its own behavior. These 
characteristics of the organism are in general a complicated product of inborn 
structure, the genetically determined course of maturation, and past experience.” 
(Chomsky 1959a, 27)
“Some recent studies have stressed the necessity for carefully analyzing the strategies  –
available to the organism, regarded as a complex ‘information-processing system’ 
[…]. These may be largely innate, or developed by early learning processes about 
which very little is yet known.” (Chomsky 1959a, 57 n. 48)
“The problem of mapping the intrinsic cognitive capacities of an organism and  –
identifying the systems of belief and the organization of behavior that it can readily 
attain should be central to experimental psychology. However, the field has not 
developed in this way.” (Chomsky 1965, 56–57)
“One would guess, rather, that it is the mentalistic studies that will ultimately be of  –
greatest value for the investigation of neurophysiological mechanisms, since they 
alone are concerned with determining abstractly the properties that such mechanisms 
must exhibit and the functions they must perform.” (Chomsky 1965, 193 n. 1)
The discussion of the organism in terms of innate and genetically determined factors 
suggests that Chomsky was likely interested in, and attracted by, the rapidly develop-
ing field of molecular genetics. After the two papers of Watson and Crick elucidat-
ing the double helix structure of DNA (1953a) and presenting its genetic implications 
(1953b), molecular biology began a period of rapid growth. By 1960 molecular genetics 
was a highly visible research area (Rheinberger, forthcoming). At the same time excit-
ing developments were occurring in brain science. Hubel and Wiesel (1959) identified 
receptors in the primary visual cortex of the cat and noted that certain receptors were 
specific to motion in a particular direction. Subsequent work by Hubel and Wiesel 
turned up even more specific types of receptors. These results promised exciting new 
possibilities for understanding brain processes, although they were quite controversial 
at the time and were received with some skepticism (Coren 2003, 98). Rapid progress 
in both molecular genetics and the understanding of brain function may have sug-
gested to Chomsky that biology was nearing the point where it could aid in the expla-
nation of mental functions and relate these to the genetic constitution of the organism. 
I suggest that at this time Chomsky decided biology could offer what psychology could 
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not, and he chose a “biolinguistic” approach. Having committed himself to the biological 
enterprise, Chomsky could appease critics who found his mentalism and intuitionism 
incompatible with a genuinely scientific approach to language.
Chomsky’s biolinguistic approach led him to the conception of “mental organs,” 
including a “language organ”:
So, using the term “organ” in a slightly extended sense to include something like, 
say, the circulatory system — not the usual sense — we might regard the body 
as a system of physical organs, each with its specific properties and peculiarities 
and with a mode of interaction, all genetically determined in basic outline, but 
modified in various ways in the course of growth. Now, I think that there is every 
reason to suppose that the same kind of “modular” approach is appropriate for the 
study of the mind — which I understand to be the study at an appropriate level of 
abstraction of properties of the brain — and in particular for the general system 
of cognitive structures, which does not exhaust the mind, but is the part we’re 
talking about. That is to say, I’d like to think of the system of cognitive structures 
as in effect a system of “mental organs,” each of which is quite specific, highly 
articulated, developing in a particular manner that is intrinsically determined — if 
the biologists are right, genetically coded — with, of course, complex interactions 
that are also very largely predetermined. (Chomsky 1983, 35)
In Chomsky’s view language is a neural representation of linguistic rules (Chomsky 
1983, 38). An I-language is a state of a person’s brain (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993, 508; 
Chomsky 1997, 119). Each person possesses a “language organ,” whose “initial state is 
an expression of the genes, comparable to the initial state of the human visual system, 
and appears to be a common human possession to close approximation” (Chomsky 
2000, 19). The initial state (S0) of the language organ is a language acquisition device 
(LAD). “The existence of such a LAD is sometimes regarded as controversial, but it is 
no more so than the (equivalent) assumption that there is a dedicated language module 
that accounts for the linguistic development of an infant as distinct from that of her pet 
kitten (or chimpanzee, or whatever), given essentially the same experience” (ibid.).
It is quite noteworthy that Chomsky apparently regards the existence of a dedi-
cated language module as uncontroversial. This assumption follows quite naturally 
from his idea that mind can be conceived as a set of distinct modules, which may 
equally be regarded as “organs.” A similar view is most famously articulated by Fodor 
(1983). Chomsky endorses a view of mental modularity that differs from Fodor’s, 
which he characterizes as input/output systems; by contrast, Chomsky conceives of 
modules as cognitive systems that “enter into perception and action” (Chomsky 2000, 20). 
A further variety of modularity, termed “representational modularity,” has been 
proposed by Jackendoff, who posits “integrative modules, which are responsible for 
integrating particular levels of representation, and interface modules, which are 
responsible for communication among representations” (Jackendoff 2000, 3). 
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 Jackendoff ’s account is intended to address concerns that if information is completely 
encapsulated within independent modules, no integration is possible (and thus it is 
difficult to understand how action, conscious awareness, etc. would ever be possible) 
(Jackendoff 2000, 19). Although Jackendoff ’s account is in certain ways compatible 
with the cognitive architectures proposed by psycholinguists such as Levelt (1989), 
Jackendoff seems quite at a loss when he has to develop the neurophysiological 
implications of his version of modularity:
My inclination is to think that all the levels of representation — the integrative 
processors — are innate, and that some of the interface processors are innate 
but others are not. […] At this point I don’t fully understand the logical and 
neurological issues involved in making a claim that an interface module is 
learnable, so I will have to leave it at that. (Jackendoff 2000, 22)
The idea of language as a “mental organ” has been explored at some length by  Anderson 
and Lightfoot (2000).45 The essence of this view is that:
Children acquire a productive system, a grammar, in accordance with the 
requirements of the genotype. If asked to say quite generally what is now known 
about the linguistic genotype, we would say that it yields finite grammars, because 
they are represented in the finite space of the brain, but that they range over an 
infinity of possible sentences. Finite grammars consist of a set of operations 
allowing for infinite variation in the expressions that are generated. The genotype 
is plastic, consistent with speaking Japanese or Quechua. It is modular and 
uniquely computational. (Anderson & Lightfoot 2000, 703)
On Lightfoot’s view the (generative/Chomskyan) linguist is really a kind of biologist: 
“Linguists seek to describe the mental systems that Japanese or Cornish people have, 
their language ‘organs.’ […] Linguists also specify the genetic information, common to 
the species, which permits the growth of mature language organs in Cornish, Japanese, 
Dutch, Kinande and Navaho children” (Lightfoot 2002, v).
The modularity of Chomsky and those who follow in his footsteps has met with 
frequent derision. “Modular theories owe much to phrenology,” Philip Lieberman 
(1991, 13) writes, scathingly. Similarly:
This essentially phrenological concept of psychological explanation is with us still, 
promoted by unabashed cognitivists (e.g. Fodor, 1983). For example, at present 
many researchers seem very excited about using modern imaging technology 
to ‘locate’ the neural substrate of thought, emotion, or whatever. The only sense 
in which such ‘discoveries’ are explanatory is in that they reveal a correlation 
45.  See also the more expansive and popular treatment: Anderson and Lightfoot (2002).
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between one kind of explicit behavior (whatever the patient thinks he or she is 
doing) and observable neural activity (Reed 1997, 272 n. 1).
Although organs such as the “language organ” are purportedly functional rather than 
physical organs (here the term “organ” has been pushed well beyond its accepted use 
in biology), proponents are eager to find physical correlates for behavioral phenom-
ena. Thus Anderson and Lightfoot (2000, 704) write, “These modules may or may not 
be separately represented in neural tissue. For example, Grodzinsky [2000] recently 
argued that movement relations — and not other aspects of syntactic form — are com-
puted by specific tissue within the classical Broca’s area. The claim of modularity does 
not in any sense rest on such physical separation, however.”
Thus claims of modularity are frequently translated into claims of brain local-
ization. These claims can be traced back to Paul Broca’s identification in 1861 of the 
posterior third of the inferior frontal gyrus (“Broca’s area”) with the control of speech. 
But claims of localization are quite problematic. “Indeed, the more we know about the 
brain the more we find that strict localization of language functions is not the case” 
(Tomasello 1995, 143). Virtually every student will have encountered in a textbook the 
claim that damage to Wernicke’s area causes a type of aphasia known as fluent aphasia 
or Wernicke’s aphasia. But in the late 1970s two physiologists found themselves having 
to ask “Wernicke’s region — where is it?” (Bogen & Bogen, 1976). These two authors 
note the vast disparity in the ways in which different authors depict Wernicke’s area 
and lament, with respect to a particular simplification, “There are a lot of molecular 
biologists and quantum physicists and mathematicians who are educated, sophisticated 
people, and who are now taking an interest in language; if you teach them this simple-
minded version, how will they feel several years from now when they realize they have 
been talked down to?” (Bogen & Bogen 1976, 841–842). A paper from early in this 
century decomposes Wernicke’s area into separate subsystems, implicated in functions 
ranging from sound perception, speech perception, speech production, verbal recall, 
mimicry, and the memorization of novel words (Wise et al. 2001). Functionally, things 
are not much clearer. As Tomasello notes, even Pinker has to admit: “But to be honest, 
no one knows what either Broca’s area or Wernicke’s area is for” (Pinker 1994, 311 qtd. 
by Tomasello 1995, 143).
The concept of a “language module” responsible for Universal Grammar (UG) 
has been widely criticized as biologically implausible.46 UG contains a set of fixed 
principles and some parameters that may be set upon exposure to linguistic data. In 
Chomsky’s terms, every human at birth has the same S0 of the language organ. From S0 
the development of the language organ is constrained by its own principles and by the 
4.  There is the further problem here of what is ascribed to UG. What does UG contain? 
Tomasello (2004) surveys quite a few proposals and finds no agreement whatsoever.
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linguistic data to which it is exposed. Chomsky provocatively asserts, “A rational Mar-
tian scientist, studying humans as we do other organisms, would conclude that there 
is really only one human language, with some marginal differences […]” (Chomsky 1997, 
121–122). But, as Lieberman points out, Chomsky’s hypothesis completely ignores 
a key fact of evolutionary biology: genetic variation. The genes that determine some 
aspect of the structure of a mammal exhibit about 10% variation (Lieberman 1991, 131). 
As Lieberman concludes, “A biologically plausible Universal Grammar cannot have 
rules and parameters that are so tightly interlocked that the absence of any single bit of 
putative innate knowledge makes it impossible for the child to acquire a particular lan-
guage” (1991, 132). (Or, we might say, if this hypothesis were correct, we would expect 
not infrequently to see otherwise normal children who were completely incapable of 
learning a language.)
In fact, Chomsky has asserted that UG is “counterfunctional.”47 For Chomsky, 
I-language is so autonomous that he imagines, “Some other organism might, in principle, 
have the same I-language as Peter, but embedded in a performance system that uses it 
for locomotion” (Chomsky 1997, 120). A reluctant critic writes, “One might think that 
Chomsky, as the leading exponent of the idea that we are endowed with an innate ‘lan-
guage organ’, would be at the forefront of the attempt to provide a reasonable account of 
its evolution in the species” (Newmeyer 1998, 305). But Chomsky feels no need to explain 
UG in terms of natural selection. Indeed, UG might simply be an emergent phenomenon 
of our large brains, or of some unknown attributes of neurons, or something else of this 
kind. Yet then we run into even greater problems. “[Chomsky] wants language, at one and 
the same time, to be an epiphenomenon and an ‘organ’, the latter by definition a product 
of a dedicated genetic blueprint. But it cannot be an ‘organ’, even in a metaphorical sense, 
if it is simply a consequence of a big brain” (Newmeyer 1998, 316).
Although Chomsky’s arguments have generally found an unfriendly audience 
among evolutionary biologists, at least one biologist is (up to a point) sympathetic. 
Stephen Jay Gould (1993, 321) writes, “I can’t prove that language was not the selected 
basis of increasing brain size, but the universals of language are so different from any-
thing else in nature, and so quirky in their structure, that origin as a side consequence 
of the brain’s enhanced capacity, rather than as simple advance in continuity from 
ancestral grunts and gestures seems indicated.”
Chomsky’s appeal to biology has explained little and created serious conundrums. 
Thus, “While Chomsky and many other linguists posit an organ responsible for lan-
guage competence, neuropsychologists are studying how this organ materializes in the 
cortex. The locus of the language organ, however, remains elusive. Even though it is 
relatively easy to delineate a network of neural areas actively involved when adults use 
4.  But cf. e.g. Chomsky (1967, 435) for some ways in which UG might be adaptive.
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language, it is still not known whether developing infants utilize similar structures 
when they use or acquire language” (Mehler, Christophe, & Ramus 2000, 68).
It is reasonable in conclusion to say that Chomsky’s appeal to biology has raised 
more questions than it has answered. Chomsky’s views concerning the nature of lan-
guage, however, are not his only contribution. He has worked to create an elegant and 
economical way of describing linguistic phenomena. Newmeyer concludes, “I hope 
to have demonstrated successfully that [Chomsky’s] published remarks on language 
evolution can and should be evaluated independently of his theory of language per se” 
(Newmeyer 1998, 318). Chomsky’s formalisms — from SS, to the Standard Theory, to 
GB, principles and parameters, and the minimalist program — have grown in elegance; 
and analyses within these frameworks are capable of shedding real light on linguistic 
data. Yet Chomsky’s appeal to biology has resulted in little more than confusion.
. Fate of “the poverty of the stimulus”
The “poverty of the stimulus,” an expression introduced by Chomsky (1980), occurs in 
much subsequent work in linguistics. The history of the concept is traced by Thomas 
(2002) (but see the criticisms of Scholz & Pullum (2002)). The term is used in diverse 
ways, as suggested by Pullum and Scholz’s (2002, 11) remark, “Such is the prestige of 
Chomsky’s pronouncements that this scare-quoted but undefined phrase was quickly 
picked up and repeated by others.” I shall take the “poverty of the stimulus” (POS) to 
refer to the proposition that the linguistic data to which a child is exposed is in itself 
insufficient for the child to acquire the grammar of the language (or in Chomsky’s 
terms, to acquire the I-language). Pullum and Scholz survey a range of arguments that 
have been advanced for POS and determine that they are all inadequate. Since POS 
is a key argument advanced for linguistic nativism (see e.g. Anderson & Lightfoot 
2000, 710–711) — and sometimes the only argument advanced! — it is crucial for the 
nativists’ claims. Sampson (2002) adds empirical data in support of the arguments of 
Pullum and Scholz (2002) and in general inveighs against linguistic nativism. Scholz 
and Pullum (2002) respond to their critics, and suggest that the term “poverty of the 
stimulus” is little more than a shibboleth: “ ‘Poverty of the stimulus’ does indeed have 
a sociological function: it is used by authors to identify themselves as being generative 
linguists who endorse some nativist line on acquisition” (Scholz & Pullum 2002, 194).
In this final section of the paper, I will not discuss particular arguments for or 
against POS. These may be found in the literature I have surveyed above. I see POS 
as a continuation of arguments that appear already in nuce in LSLT. Chomsky has, 
from the beginning, been concerned with the question: given the (apparently) impov-
erished linguistic data to which a child is exposed, how does the child rapidly and 
with (seemingly) little effort develop a rich and complex internal grammar? It is of 
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course controversial that the data are so impoverished. This is denied, for instance, by 
Sampson (2002). And authors such as Lieberman see no reason that general learning 
mechanisms cannot account for language acquisition: “we probably learn many, if not all, 
of the automatized motor control patterns and rules of syntax by means of general cogni-
tive mechanisms” (Lieberman 1991, 142). I shall not here take a position on whether 
the stimulus is in fact impoverished. What I wish to do, instead, is to consider the 
implications of POS. How, from the limited data to which a child is exposed might a 
complex grammar be acquired? Chomsky finds it necessary to postulate a language 
faculty with an S0 that “consists of a rich system of principles, with some parameters of 
variation. The fixed principles are highly restrictive” (Chomsky 1997, 121). But recent 
research in a variety of areas from developmental psycholinguists to computational 
modeling is yielding evidence suggesting that language learning might not require a 
richly structured and highly restricted learning mechanism. Humans may indeed have 
brain mechanisms specialized for language (cf. Lieberman 1991, 109), but these may 
be considerably less rich and restricted than Chomsky supposes. The principle of par-
simony dictates that we consider the simplest means by which a human might arrive at 
a full-fledged grammar. In pointing to some recent lines of research, I aim to show that 
Chomsky — and many other generative linguists — are increasingly divorced from 
contemporary developments in the “cognitive sciences.”
I shall briefly survey three areas of research, highlighting the potentials they offer in 
explaining language acquisition. These are: statistical language learning, latent semantic 
analysis, and agent-based modeling. I emphasize that none of these approaches has yet 
succeeded in providing a complete and convincing account of how humans learn lan-
guages. They have not even come close. We cannot expect that this goal will be reached 
quickly or easily. Nevertheless, these approaches demonstrate that complex linguis-
tic knowledge can be acquired without positing a highly-structured and highly-con-
strained autonomous language faculty of the Chomskyan sort. In conclusion, I shall 
mention one novel and surprising development that stems from the POS argument.
.1 Statistical language learning
Recently distributional and statistical approaches, which had largely fallen out of 
favor with the collapse of neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, have made a comeback in 
developmental psycholinguistics. Studies have demonstrated that infants possess a 
greater capacity for learning than was previously supposed and therefore suggest that 
innate capacities need not play so great a role. Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996) 
have shown that eight-month-old infants can use transitional probabilities to segment 
fluent speech into words. Mintz, Newport, and Bever (2002) have demonstrated that 
distributional information is sufficient for classifying many lexical items as nouns or 
verbs. These results do not imply that distributional information alone is sufficient for 
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grammatical category formation, nor do they imply that the child is a tabula rasa; in 
fact, it is necessary to presuppose certain “computational biases.” Nevertheless, they 
prove that distributional information is a much richer predictor of grammatical category 
than was traditionally assumed. Newport and Aslan (2004) have established that sta-
tistical learning is not limited to computations over adjacent items. Further, since there 
is a correlation between particular computational biases and language structures, the 
work “suggests that natural language structures may be formed, at least in part, by the 
constraints and selectivities of what human learners find easy to acquire” (Newport & Aslan 
2004, 159). The work of Thompson and Newport (2007) has extended the statistical 
learning approach to the acquisition of phrase structure, showing that transition prob-
abilities between words can be used to determine phrase boundaries. These studies 
provide strong support for the hypothesis that statistical and distributional informa-
tion plays an important role in language acquisition, and that a limited set of statistical 
“computations” is capable of accounting for the acquisition of linguistic structure in 
multiple domains.
. Latent semantic analysis
An average American child in late elementary school acquires 10–15 new words each 
day.48 This same child reads about 50 paragraphs of text each day. Studies of vocabulary 
learning show that when a child is exposed to 50 paragraphs of age-appropriate text, 
the child should acquire no more than 2.5 words (Landauer & Dumais 1997, 221–223). 
How to account for this discrepancy? This phenomenon of “excess learning” might 
prima facie indicate an impoverished stimulus. But in fact latent semantic analysis 
(LSA), a technique that computes a semantic space from word contiguity data, models 
human vocabulary acquisition in an impressive number of respects (Landauer 2007). 
LSA involves the computation of a vector space model from a large sample of  language, 
followed by a dimensionality reduction via singular value decomposition (Jackson 
2003, 189–196). This dimensionality reduction allows semantic similarity between 
lexical items to be induced reliably through inductive learning (Landauer & Dumais 
1997, 213). LSA accurately simulates human behavior in a variety of linguistic tasks; 
for example, it mimics human judgments of the similarity of word meanings (Landauer 
2007, 5). Although LSA is far from a complete theory of human language use — it in no 
way models language production, it is insensitive to syntax, and it lacks any propositional 
component —, it demonstrates that the acquisition of semantic relations from exposure 
to a finite amount of linguistic data can be accomplished through simple means, with 
48.  We can assume that virtually all these words will come from reading, because the active 
spoken vocabulary accounts for only a small percentage of recognition vocabulary. No more 
than 100 words a year are learned by direct instruction (Landauer & Dumais 1997, 222).
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no need for positing an innate mechanism incorporating arbitrary constraints. Current 
research is extending the model to incorporate syntactic aspects, such as word order 
(Dennis 2007).
.3 Agent-based modeling
Research with artificial agents (both robotic and simulated) has shown that interaction 
between uncoordinated agents equipped with mechanisms for perception and action 
whose behavior is minimally constrained can lead to regularities similar to those 
observed in human language (Steels 1998, 385). These regularities emerge through self-
organization and selective pressures. This type of modeling demonstrates mechanisms 
by which language might be acquired without positing specialized innate capabilities. 
Experiments have simulated the formation of a shared lexicon by agents engaged in 
adaptive games (Steels 1998, 391–393); the emergence of shared phonemic invento-
ries comparable to those of human languages, together with strong combinitoriality 
and phonotactics (Oudeyer 2006); and the emergence of morphosyntactic regularities 
in shared languages (Batali 1998). This work suggests that “grammatical regularities 
manifest in human language could emerge as a result of non-genetic cultural processes 
among a population of animals with the cognitive capacities required for communi-
cation, but who do not initially share a co-ordinated communication system” (Batali 
1998, 406). Instead of supposing that human brains adapted to language in the course 
of evolution, it may be the case that “the process itself by which languages are formed 
develops and selects just those which can be learnt. It is languages which adapt to a 
generic brain, and not the contrary” (Oudeyer 2006, 62).
The three research areas surveyed demonstrate that there is an abundance of 
strong, empirically grounded research in the cognitive sciences that points not just 
beyond POS arguments, but beyond the grounds that led Chomsky and his follow-
ers to these arguments in the first place. Meanwhile, though, Chomsky’s nativism has 
unexpectedly spread to new domains. Mikhail (2007) describes a research program 
entitled “universal moral grammar” (UMG) that is explicitly intended to parallel 
Chomsky’s program in linguistics.49 Thus UMG takes over the competence/perfor-
mance dichotomy, the distinction between descriptive and explanatory adequacy, 
Chomskyan modularity, and an “argument from the poverty of the moral stimulus.” 
This argument holds that examples of moral behavior are inadequate to acquire UMG, 
which is a “system [that] enables individuals to determine the deontic status of an 
infinite variety of acts and omissions” (Mikhail 2007, 144). It is hard to see UMG as 
anything other than natural law — dressed up in last season’s fashions.
49.  In fact, Mikhail thanks Chomsky for “helpful feedback” (2007, 151).
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. Conclusion
There were many cognitive turns in the latter part of the twentieth century, and history 
will no doubt judge many of them false ones. Chomsky’s position is enigmatic. He is 
at once at the center — inspiring George Miller, making seminal contributions to the 
nascent discipline of theoretical computer science, and creating vocabulary that is used 
today by many linguists who reject most of his foundational positions. Yet he is also at 
the periphery, at odds with such heroes of his contemporary revolutionaries as Piaget 
and Vygotsky, moving ever further from the modern psycholinguistics that he had 
once inspired, devising computational theories that resist computational implementa-
tion, and in the end holding firm to his Wundertheorie account50 of human language. 
In some sense, we may view Chomsky’s alignment with biology as prescient, given the 
increasing importance of neurolinguistics today. But Chomsky’s cavalier disregard 
for key principles of mainstream evolutionary theory, together with his resolute anti-
 empiricism create a chasm between Chomsky’s work and contemporary research in biol-
ogy that simply cannot be bridged. Likewise, his anti-empiricism separates him from 
contemporary psychology, which is a maturing empirical discipline. Chomsky’s ideas 
have certainly been influential — but more often than not as foils for those of others.
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What do we talk about, when we talk about 




This article sketches the history of ‘universal grammar’ as a term and as a concept, 
attending in particular to the range of expressions that have been used to label 
what human languages have in common. I focus on three contexts: medieval 
speculative grammar, which developed a concept of universal grammar without 
using that name; seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, the acknowledged 
heyday of western “craving for universals” (Robins 1990: 16), when terms 
and concepts for universal grammar proliferated; and Chomskyan generative 
grammar, which has adapted and reinvented universal grammar as a theoretical 
trademark. Chomsky asserts the continuity of seventeenth-century and generative 
universal grammar, while differentiating his use of the term from earlier usage 
and from contemporary Greenbergian terminology. I examine Chomsky’s shifting 
assignment of the expression ‘universal grammar’ to different lexical subclasses 
(modified count noun; mass noun; proper noun), as a tool for understanding the 
recent development of this notion in western language science.
1. Introduction
“Theories of universal grammar in the late 20th century” is the title of an essay Bernard 
Comrie contributed to volume 2 of History of the Language Sciences, co-edited by 
E.F.K. Koerner. Comrie’s essay begins with the claim that “The late 20th century is 
unusual in having two at times radically different approaches to the investigation 
of language universals” (2001: 1461). Those two approaches are that of Chomskyan 
generative grammar, and Greenbergian language typology.
Comrie’s statement is arresting, on at least two counts: first, because it implies 
that in the usual case only a single such approach prevails; and second, because the 
ease with which Comrie moves from the term ‘universal grammar’ (now principally 
associated with Chomsky) in his title to the term ‘language universals’ (associated with 
Greenberg) in his opening sentence curiously undermines his assertion of their radical dif-
ferences. It seems to me, rather, that there have existed for a long time a complex and 
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heterogeneous family of concepts with overlapping boundaries to which one could apply 
the cover term ‘universal grammar’ — concepts variously subsumed under that exact 
name, or varieties of it, or labeled otherwise but treated as if they pointed out (something 
like) the same referent. Even within Chomsky’s own use of the expression ‘universal 
grammar’ over the past 50 years, both evolution and discontinuity are apparent. More-
over, diverse scholars’ invocations of universal grammar (under that label, or others) 
have served diverse roles in language science.
My purpose in this essay is to explore what it is that we have talked about, when we 
have talked about universal grammar, and what words we have used to do the talking. 
While in no way presuming the vast erudition that informs the work of E.F.K. Koerner, 
I take inspiration from one trend in his writings, namely, his essays probing the his-
tory of key expressions in the language sciences, such as ‘synchronic’ (Koerner 1989), 
‘metalanguage’ (Koerner 1995), and “language as a système où tout se tient” (Koerner 
1999). Through these and other studies, Koerner has modeled how inquiry into the 
specific terms scholars have used in discussion of language can open understanding 
into the history of linguistics.
. Origin of ‘universal grammar’ in western language science
We will start with modern linguistics’ use of the term ‘universal grammar’, go quickly 
backward to locate a starting point, then work our way up to the present. Over the past 
50 years, universal grammar has been a cornerstone of Chomskyan generative linguistics. 
Some scholars, like Wasow (2001: 299), introduce that expression as if Chomsky had 
invented it. But Chomsky himself has always been at pains to indicate otherwise. The 
manner in which he typically links modern ‘universal grammar’ to earlier usage of the 
term is telling. (1) and (2) reproduce representative passages.
1. …[A] general theory of linguistic structure that aims to discover the framework 
of principles and elements common to attainable human languages [. . . ] is now 
often called ‘universal grammar’ (UG), adapting a traditional term to a new 
context of inquiry. (Chomsky 1986: 3)
2. Adapting traditional terms to a special usage, we call the theory of the state 
attained [in first language acquisition] its grammar, and the theory of the initial 
state Universal Grammar (UG). (Chomsky 1995b: 14)
Deferring the matter of the intriguing heterogeneity of Chomsky’s definitions of ‘univer-
sal grammar’ (to which we return to below), a motif in (1) and (2) is the assertion 
that generative grammar has adapted the term to a new context. If by ‘adapting’ Chomsky 
means that his usage preserves the essential sense of the expression while accommodating 
it to present-day language science, then he seems to endorse the continuity through 
time of a core meaning of the term. Chomsky’s (1966) controversial account of the 
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history of linguistics linked modern universal grammar to late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century general grammar. Others have identified earlier versions of univer-
sal grammar, whether or not they accept Chomsky’s assertion of continuity with genera-
tive grammar. Padley (1976: 157) located what he calls “the first self-consciously universal 
grammars” in the early 1600s, in works that explicitly use that term. Still others — among 
them Kelly (1971), Bursill-Hall (1976), Fredborg (1980), and Robins (1988) — go back 
to the thirteenth-century speculative grammarians for the first articulations of some-
thing like universal grammar, before the term itself came into circulation. I will accept 
medieval language science as the starting point, and move forward from there.
It is worth mentioning in this context the famous assertion of Roger Bacon (c. 1214–1292/94) 
from his 1270 Greek Grammar, that “the substance of grammar (grammatica) is one 
and the same in all languages, even if there are accidental variations” (ed. Nolan & 
Hirsch 1902: 27; trans. Kelly 1969: 354). Many of the profuse modern citations of 
Bacon’s remark treat it as signaling continuity of inquiry into universal grammar from 
the thirteenth century forward (Thomas 2002). But as Hovdhaugen (1990) has pointed 
out, when Bacon’s statement is read in its original context, what it actually asserts is 
the universality of techniques for linguistic analysis; that is, Bacon probably meant some-
thing like “[t]he science of describing and analysing language” is the same for all lan-
guages (Hovdhaugen 1990: 127). Therefore, Bacon’s claim is not the most appropriate 
launching-point for a history of universal grammar.
. The concept of universal grammar in the thirteenth century
Setting aside Roger Bacon, there is nonetheless work from his time that is relevant to 
our topic. One such text is a commentary on Priscianus Maior written around 1250 and 
ascribed to Robert Kilwardby (1215–1279), although Pinborg (1975), Lewry (1975), 
and Covington (1984: 134) dispute that attribution. The author of the commentary 
likens grammatica to the study of geometry, in the sense that just as geometry abstracts 
away from the properties of individual lines and figures to study shape itself, grammatica 
abstracts away from the properties of individual languages like Latin or Greek (Thurot 
1868: 127; Fredborg et al. 1975). This provocative simile conceives of grammar in a 
manner designed to meet Aristotle’s definition of a science: science investigates the 
properties of a genus, generalizing across exemplars of the genus; therefore gram-
matica is a science insofar as its object is not the features of (say) Latin, but rather the 
features that make a language, a language.
In this sense, the commentary attributed to Kilwardby seems to prepare the way 
for the late thirteenth-century flourishing of speculative grammar (Bursill-Hall 1971; 
Covington 1984). Speculative grammarians actually paid little attention to languages 
other than Latin. Their work, however, contributed to what later came to be called 
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‘universal grammar’, in that it re-oriented grammatica toward the study of the general 
properties of language. What is also of interest here is that although thirteenth-century 
grammarians adopted the expression ‘grammatica speculativa’ for their distinctive 
approach to language study, and although they freely coined many new terms for 
their conceptual innovations, they apparently did not create a label for their implicit 
notion of universal grammar. Rather, they re-defined — perhaps, in Chomsky’s terms, 
adapted to a new context — the familiar term ‘grammatica’. What ‘grammatica’ had 
meant before the late thirteenth century was a framework and categories for analysis of 
Latin, or else it was an alternate name for the Latin language itself. Among speculative 
grammarians, ‘grammatica’ came to refer to the properties of human language at large. 
Those properties included the grammatical superstructure that had been developed by 
Greco-Roman language scholars — now attributable to all languages — including eight 
parts of speech and four levels of increasing organizational complexity (littera ‘ele-
ments [including both letters and individual sounds], sillaba ‘syllables’, dictio ‘words’, 
oratio ‘sentences’). Speculative grammarians also developed an elaborate metalinguistic 
vocabulary for discussing relationships between semantic units and syntactic forms. 
They treated those relationships as universal on the grounds that they were based on 
parallels between thought and language.
.  Terms and concepts for universal grammar in the seventeenth  
and eighteenth centuries
The speculative grammarians’ specific style of inquiry into grammatica as they 
defined it was abandoned by the following generation of grammarians and the topic 
fell out of fashion. The chief complaint was that speculative grammar had developed 
excessive technical apparatus that provided little new insight. Moreover, critics argued 
against the isomorphism of thought and language, striking at the heart of the claim 
that grammatica was necessarily universal. But after a period when the notion lay fal-
low, interest in universal grammar re-emerged in the 1600s, now explicitly associated 
with that label (among others). Three characteristics of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century universal grammar stand out. First, grammarians identified an opposition 
between universal grammar — under various names — and the features that distin-
guish languages from each other, often called ‘particular grammar’. Pariente (1992: 
623) wrote that during the French Enlightenment, grammarians’ “inaugural gesture 
… [was to] cut themselves off from particular grammars.” A second characteristic is 
related: language science in this interval prioritized universal grammar over particu-
lar grammars. That prioritization was signaled in diverse ways, such as through the 
convention of first exposing foreign language learners to universal grammar, then 
subsequently to a particular grammar of the target language. Particular grammars 
continued to be produced and were valued for their utility in language pedagogy. 
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But in Pariente’s terms, universal grammar cut itself off from particular grammar, 
not vice versa.
A third characteristic is that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century terms and defi-
nitions of universal grammar varied, such that individual scholars employed expres-
sions like ‘universal’, ‘general’, and ‘rational grammar’, in heterogeneous ways. Some 
grammarians distinguished among them; others in the same period apparently treated 
them as equivalent; still others defined them on idiosyncratic grounds, or employed 
other expressions (Donzé 1967: 174–5). This complicates study of how concepts were 
developed and terms defined.
These general characteristics of universal grammar in the 1600s are apparent in 
the writings of German grammarians Wolfgang Ratke (1571–1635) and his sometimes-
collaborator Christoph Helwig (1581–1617) (see Padley 1985: 244–248; Juntune 1985). 
Ratke and Helwig both argued that foreign-language learning is best undertaken from 
a position of knowledge of the properties of language at large. Ratke (1619) assumed 
that learning necessarily proceeds from the general to the particular. Helwig’s 1619 
Libri Didactici comprises first a universal grammar, followed by fairly conventional 
learners’ grammars of Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and Chaldean. Helwig’s and Ratke’s texts 
show that from quite early in the seventeenth century, some grammarians presup-
posed the existence of a universal grammar distinct from the grammars of individual 
languages, and moreover accepted that language learning should be grounded in the 
common features of all languages.
Other grammarians held similar assumptions, although often under different 
terms. In England, Francis Bacon (1561–1626) divided grammar into “two sorts”: 
‘Philosophical’ and ‘Literary’ (1623/1905: 523). In Auroux’s (1983: 5) definition, ‘phil-
osophical’ as well as ‘rational’ grammars indicate “a linguistic theory providing an 
explanation of how reason functions in a given language.” These terms not only admit 
the existence of properties common across all languages, but assert that they exist 
because they are produced by human reason. Later, John Wilkins (1614–1672) used 
the expression ‘Natural Grammar’ (1668: 297), a label that brings along its own burden 
of connotations but shares with ‘rational’ and ‘philosophical’ the depiction of universal 
grammar as shaped by forces outside of human agency.
A variety of expressions for ‘particular grammar’ also sprang up. Bacon contrasted 
‘Philosophical Grammar’ not only to ‘Literary’, but also to ‘Simple’ (1623/1905: 524) 
grammar. In 1638, Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639) distinguished ‘philosophical’ 
from what he called ‘civil grammar’, the former based on human reason and the lat-
ter defined by “the authority of the best authors” (Padley 1976: 161–2). John Wilkins 
asserted that “Natural Grammar (which may likewise be stiled Philosophical, Ratio-
nal and Universal)” contrasts with ‘Instituted Grammar’, which “doth deliver the rules 
which are proper and peculiar to any one Language in Particular” (1668: 297). Thus 
on one hand, we have varied depictions of universal grammar as ‘rational’, ‘philosophi-
cal’, and ‘natural’. On the other hand, the expressions ‘particular’, ‘special’, ‘literary’, 
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‘simple’, ‘civil’, and ‘instituted’ emerged to label locally or culturally specified features 
of grammar.
The member of this family of terms most identified with the seventeenth century is, 
however, ‘general grammar’. The German scholar Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638) 
pioneered the term ‘general grammar’ in his 1630 encyclopedia, defining it as “the 
pattern of every particular grammar whatsoever”, including “features common to all 
languages” (1630: 265, 278; cited in Salmon 1988: 68–69). Auroux suggested that some 
scholars distinguished ‘universal grammar’, defined as “the exhaustive description 
of the elements of all known languages”, from ‘general grammar’, which referred to 
abstractions that generalized over the features of all languages (1983: 4). Some, but 
not all, grammarians distinguished ‘general grammar’ from ‘rational grammar’, on the 
grounds that while general grammar called attention to the shared properties of lan-
guages, rational grammar focused on the source of those properties. It is significant 
that Claude Lancelot (c. 1616–1695) and Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) named their 
famous 1660 Port Royal Grammaire générale et raisonnée both a ‘general’ and a ‘ratio-
nal’ grammar, as if to acknowledge, but then bridge, a gap between the two expres-
sions. Certain eighteenth-century French grammarians followed suit, separating 
but linking together general and rational grammar in works like Nicholas Beauzée’s 
(1717–1789) Grammaire générale, ou exposition raisonnée des éléments nécessaires du 
langage (1767/1974).
Joly (1972: 16), however, has pointed out that English grammarians of the same 
period avoided the term ‘general grammar’ so as to distance themselves from French 
Cartesianism, even if the two groups’ overall projects seem congruent (Auroux 1983: 4). 
Alongside Bacon’s ‘Philosophical Grammar’ and Wilkins’ ‘Natural Grammar’, James Harris 
favored ‘Universal Grammar’ (sometimes ‘Grammar Universal’) over the expression 
‘general grammar’. For Harris, universal grammar was “that Grammar, which without 
regarding the several idioms of particular Languages, only respects those Principles, 
that are essential to them all” (1751: 221; emphasis in the original). But regardless of 
their differences in point of view or focus of attention, English grammars shared with 
French grammaire générale a distinction between universal and particular grammars, 
and a prioritization of universal over particular grammar. In this sense all these terms 
are members of the same conceptual family.
What happened next was that the glamour of universal grammar again receded. 
Cohen (1977: 62–73; 81–85) has narrated the story of how commitment to philosophical 
and universal grammar eroded in England after 1730, as recorded in school textbooks. 
As a first step, grammarians abandoned the presentation of universal grammar sepa-
rately from, and prior to, particular grammars. Instead, texts began to introduce and 
define philosophical-grammatical terms alongside the details of specific languages 
rather than treating universal grammar as prerequisite knowledge. Then writers 
started to demote remarks about universal grammar into footnotes at the bottoms of 
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pages. As the eighteenth century advanced, such footnotes became less elaborate and 
printed in incrementally smaller type. Eventually, remarks about universal grammar 
were reduced to incidental comments or references to other texts. With that, universal 
grammar literally dropped off the pages of pedagogical texts in England.
Universal grammar did not, however, disappear without a trace. Jumping ahead to 
1860, a passage from Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899) makes an intriguing contribution 
to the history of universal grammar, even as it denies its existence. Steinthal wrote 
that “A universal grammar is no more conceivable than a universal form of political 
Constitution or of religion, or than a universal plant or animal form” (1860: 104–105; 
trans. Jespersen 1924: 48). Steinthal’s declaration that it is impossible, or even absurd, 
to imagine universal grammar deserves close attention. The passage communicates 
Steinthal’s rejection of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century craving for universals, 
probably in part motivated by a drive to declare his independence of his intellectual 
father-figure, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1836), for whom universals had retained 
a certain allure (Sweet 1980: 503). Steinthal’s comparison of universal grammar to 
the novel concepts of ‘universal plant or animal form’ is provocative. In debunking 
the plausibility of universal grammar in these terms, Steinthal took it for granted that 
readers would recognize a universal plant or animal form as patently impossible. Of 
course, there is no independent form that constitutes the essence of plant-ness or of 
animal-ness. But a universal plant or animal form does exist in the sense of sets of 
formal characteristics common to all plants or to all animals; if there were no such 
sets of characteristics, it is unclear how we would be able to use the terms ‘plant’ or 
‘animal.’ This also is true for the terms ‘political constitution’ and ‘religion,’ the other 
two legs of Steinthal’s comparison. Therefore, what Steinthal denies must be a form- or 
substance-oriented notion of universal grammar. It seems significant that in this passage 
he represented the key term as a singular count noun with the indefinite article, ‘[e]
ine allgemeine Grammatik’ — ‘a universal grammar’. That usage was not unique to 
 Steinthal, although the tradition in his day was to refer to ‘universal grammar’ as an 
abstract mass noun (except in contexts where the reference was to physical materials 
created to teach universal grammar). It is as if Steinthal needed first to make universal 
grammar particular and concrete so as to reject it, a move that leaves the door open for 
conceptualization of universal grammar on some other basis.
We will return below to another example of how the expression ‘a universal grammar’ 
has been used differently from ‘universal grammar’.
. Universal grammar in the twentieth century
Moving into the twentieth century, Ferguson (1978: 9) credited Aginsky and Aginsky 
(1948) with introducing the expression ‘language universals’, writing from within the 
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milieu of European-oriented linguistics transplanted to New York City during World 
War II. The terms ‘universals of language’ and ‘universals in language’ appear in free 
variation alongside the slightly different term ‘language universals’ in the work of 
Joseph H. Greenberg (1915–2001), who credited expatriate linguists Roman Jakobson 
(1896–1982) and André Martinet (1908–1999) as having influenced his early graduate 
studies at Columbia University (Greenberg 1986: 152–155).
Much has already been written about the bifurcation of twentieth century interest 
in universal grammar into Greenbergian versus Chomskyan strands, and about each 
group’s perception of what it does and doesn’t share with the other (e.g. Abraham 1989; 
Newmeyer 1995). Regarding these issues from the point of view of the words used 
to talk about universal grammar, Greenbergian employment of ‘language’ rather than 
Chomskyan ‘grammar’ is obviously salient. Nor does it appear accidental that Greenberg 
labels his central object of study with a plural count noun, ‘universals’, a term that 
admits the notion of a collection of linguistic features or claims even as it asserts their 
unity, in contrast with the synthetic, centripetal, term ‘universal grammar’.
Moreover, it is significant that Greenberg moves flexibly between the more explicit 
post-modified expression ‘universals of language’ and the pre-modified collocation 
‘language universals’. By supporting both expressions in a context where ‘universals’ 
remains as the lexical head of the phrase, the Greenbergian tradition cultivates a fine 
terminological distinction. The narrow-scope technical term ‘universals of language’ 
names Greenberg’s central object of typological interest, while the less explicit, more 
referentially diffuse term ‘language universals’ serves as a cover term for both Green-
bergian and Chomskyan approaches without adopting the nomenclature of generative 
grammar. By this light, it is not accidental that Greenberg’s milestone publications 
(1963, 1978) present his work as focusing on ‘universals of language’, while his essay 
arguing for the complementary nature of typological and generative linguistics (1991) 
capitalizes on the expression ‘language universals’.
Turning finally to the language used in generative literature to discuss univer-
sal grammar, the term emerges in three guises in Chomsky’s writings, each with its 
own complexities. It appeared first with the indefinite article — ‘a universal gram-
mar’ — in Chomsky’s depictions of what he identifies as ‘Cartesian linguistics’. Thus in 
an offhand remark in The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, completed in the mid 
1950s, Chomsky refers to (unspecified) ‘earlier attempts to develop a universal grammar’ 
(1956/1975a:108). Nine years later, he wrote that eighteenth-century grammarians aimed to 
supplement ‘the grammar of a particular language’ with ‘a universal grammar’ (1965: 6). 
Into the 1970s, Chomsky continued to refer to ‘a universal grammar’, and sometimes 
‘a rational’ or ‘a philosophical grammar’ (1972: 14–15), in discussion of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century language science. As Chomsky incorporated the term more and 
more deeply into his own theory-building — in his words, as he adapted it to the 
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new context of inquiry — the indefinite article disappeared. (3) and (4) are typical of 
Chomsky’s usage from the mid to late 1970s into the late 1980s.
3. Let us define ‘universal grammar’ (UG) as the system of principles, conditions, 
and rules … of all human languages not merely by accident but by necessity 
(Chomsky 1975b: 29)
4. We may think of universal grammar as a system of principles which characterizes 
the class of possible grammars by specifying how particular grammars are 
organized (what are the components and their relations), how the different rules 
of these components are constructed, how they interact, and so on (Chomsky 
1977: 180)
In these 1970s definitions of ‘universal grammar’ as a “system of principles, conditions, 
and rules” constraining human language, Chomsky treats the term as a mass noun. This 
contrasts with the historical concept, to which he refers to as ‘a universal grammar’. The 
difference is a small. But if as a thought experiment one were to invert the assignment of 
lexical forms to contexts, it becomes apparent that this small difference carries meaning. 
(For example, note how it would go against the grain if Chomsky were to write that the 
Port-Royal grammarians ‘elaborated on seventeenth-century universal grammar,’ while 
calling his own work ‘the development of a universal grammar’). The mass-noun form 
of the term that Chomsky seems to reserve for discussion of modern generative gram-
mar presupposes the existence and stability of universal grammar, whereas the indefinite 
article plus count noun version registers the referent of universal grammar into the dis-
course as if de novo. So within the tableau Chomsky sets for his readers, it makes sense to 
use ‘a universal grammar’ in historical references, and ‘universal grammar’ with respect 
to Chomsky’s own work. Moreover, for Chomsky to shift between the two provides an 
inconspicuous way for him to index their differences while asserting their relatedness.
Generative linguistics at large seems to have followed Chomsky’s lead in talking 
about universal grammar in these two subtly different ways, although the vast majority 
of that talk is about contemporary universal grammar, rather than universal grammar 
in the thirteenth or seventeenth centuries. But starting in the late 1980s into the early 
1990s, universal grammar in a third guise emerged in generative literature, namely in 
the re-creation of the term as a proper noun, signaled by the use of upper case initial 
‘U’ and ‘G’. Compare (1) from 1986 to (2) from 1995; and compare (3) and (4) from the 
1970s to (5) and (6) from 1995 and 2000.
5. In this conception, Universal Grammar (UG) is a system of subtheories, each 
with certain parameters of variation (Chomsky 1995a: 2)
6. The theory of the initial state [of the child language learner] is sometimes 
called “Universal Grammar” (UG), adapting a traditional notion to a somewhat 
different context (Chomsky 2000: 81)
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To be sure, seventeenth-century grammarians also varied in their practice of using 
upper versus lower case, but they did so in a context where standards of typography were 
just emerging. Writing in the late twentieth century, adoption of capital-U-Universal 
capital-G-Grammar seems more self-conscious and more likely to be intended as a 
communicative gesture. Once ‘Universal Grammar’ was introduced as a proper noun 
through Chomsky’s writings, it quickly became an industry standard, as if the com-
munity of generativists instantly recognized its utility and appropriateness. I sur-
veyed not only Chomsky’s writings, but also about 25 books on generative grammar 
by other writers — textbooks, monographs, summaries or digests of particular sub-
fields within generative linguistics — and discovered a sharp change around 1986 to 
1988. Before that point, lower-case ‘universal grammar’ is consistently indexed in 
the backs of books under the letter ‘G’ as in ‘grammar, universal’ and only occasion-
ally under ‘U’ for ‘universal grammar.’ But from the late 1980s, universal grammar 
is no longer listed in the indices as ‘grammar, universal,’ but rather exclusively as the 
proper noun ‘Universal Grammar’. With this change, generativism seems to stake 
out a copyright on the term, implicitly claiming the freedom to define the refer-
ent of proper-noun ‘Universal Grammar’ free of the impediments of convention. I 
suspect that the switch to upper case ‘Universal Grammar’ correlates with increas-
ing layers of abstractness in Chomsky’s definitions of universal grammar, from the 
1970s “system of principles” referenced in (3) and (4) to the present-day “system of 
subtheories” cited in (5), or “theory of the initial state” of the child language learner 
cited in (2) and (6).
As a final observation about the terms for talking about universal grammar, the 
ubiquitous alphabetic acronym ‘UG’ deserves notice. This abbreviation seems inevitable 
once proper-noun ‘Universal Grammar’ was established, and in fact, most texts only 
initiate the concept as capital-U-Universal capital-G-Grammar before abandoning 
that expression for the irresistible convenience and clubbiness of ‘UG’. As a further 
step in the speciation of Chomskyan universal grammar, the abbreviation ‘UG’ seems 
to take on an independent life. For example, in Gene Searchinger’s very successful 1995 
videotape The Human Language Series, Part 2, the expression ‘universal grammar’ is 
first heard in an interview with University of Pennsylvania psycholinguist Lila Gleitman, 
then repeated a few minutes later in a clip featuring syntactician Howard Lasnik, now of 
the University of Maryland. Both speakers exclusively employ the full expression ‘uni-
versal grammar’, not ‘UG’. However, following each speaker’s use of the term ‘universal 
grammar’, the videographer cuts to a black screen, across which large, white, capital 
letter ‘U’ and capital letter ‘G’ move from left to right. Thus the viewer is tutored in this 
expression, with its importance highlighted by presenting it in the absence of any other 
visual or auditory stimulus, despite the fact that the tape contains no subsequent use of 
the abbreviation ‘UG’, and therefore there is no communicative necessity for listeners 
to be introduced to it.
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. Conclusion
Shay (1981: 93) adverted to a remark by the twelfth-century philosopher John of Salis-
bury, who wrote that already by his day “more time has been taken up discussing uni-
versals than was required by the Caesars for conquering the world”. The term ‘universal 
grammar’ was not yet in circulation in the twelfth century, but grammarians conceived 
of the theoretical importance of defining the shared properties of human languages. In 
this way the history of universal grammar began before it was named. In the 1600s and 
1700s, European language scholars not only profusely named and re-named various con-
ceptualizations of universal grammar, but also separated study of universal grammar from 
study of particular grammars. By doing so, they defined the differences between the two, 
and confronted questions about their relationships to each other. Modern Greenbergian 
typological research and Chomsky’s generative grammar differentially carry forward 
these preoccupations. In Chomsky’s favored description, he has “adapt[ed] a traditional 
term to a new context”, by attributing new meanings to ‘universal grammar’, and by 
seeking out new ways of modifying the term to meet the exigencies of the roles assigned 
to it in generative theory. Thus in the study of language, discussion of universals has 
persisted up to the present in a Babel of terms and concepts.
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Migrating propositions and the evolution 
of Generative Grammar
Marcus Tomalin
This chapter considers the way in which linguistic theories develop (or ‘evolve’). 
Taking the ‘Research Program’ model of scientific theory development as a starting 
point, the discussion focuses on the intricate relationship between Generative 
Grammar and Relational Grammar during the period 1965–1988. In particular, 
the emergence of both the Unaccusative Hypothesis and the Universal Alignment 
Hypothesis in the Relational Grammar framework is discussed at length, and the 
subsequent incorporation of both these hypotheses into mainstream Generative 
Grammar during the early 1980s is closely scrutinised. This case study raises difficult 
questions about the circumstances in which particular linguistic propositions are 
able to migrate between distinct Research Programs. Explorations such as this 
inevitably rely greatly on the careful analysis of specific historical examples of theory 
construction. Consequently, this chapter argues that historiographical investigations 
must necessarily form an essential part of any general and theoretical assessments of 
the mechanisms of linguistic theory development.
1. Traditions, programs, and theories
This chapter examines the complex relationship between Generative Grammar (GG) 
and Relational Grammar (RG) during the period 1965–1988, a topic that has been 
strangely neglected in the historiographical literature. While texts such as Newmeyer 
(1986), Harris (1993), and Huck & Goldsmith (1995) have examined the relationship 
between GG and Generative Semantics in some detail, RG has received less sustained 
attention.1 Conveniently, though, Huck and Goldsmith’s discussion in particular 
provides a useful starting point for this chapter since it draws heavily upon specific 
theoretical models of scientific theory development. Crucially, they classify GG as a 
distinct Research Program (RP) which comprises ‘a body of falsifiable propositions’ 
1.  Other important accounts of the history of GG include Matthews (1993), Graffi (2001), 
and Tomalin (2006).
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and which has a ‘sociological dimension’ (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 5–6). Specifically, 
they distinguish between three different kinds of propositions:
–  core propositions: researchers adopt a consistent methodological policy of not 
allowing these hypotheses to be damaged by disconfirmation; the core is pro-
tected, unchangeable.
–  auxiliary propositions : researchers are willing to revise or replace these propositions.
–  orientational propositions: these determine the ultimate goals of the research pro-
gram; like core propositions they are ‘irrefutable in practice’, but the difference is 
that they express desiderata.
In this framework, the core of the RP is defended and remains largely unchanged, and sci-
entific progress occurs if changes to the set of auxiliary propositions leads to the discovery 
of previously unexpected facts without inducing a significant loss of empirical content.2
Over the years, a wide range of models for scientific theory development have been 
proposed, from the positivistic analyses of Pierre Duhem (1861–1916), Karl Popper 
(1902–1994), and Carl Gustav Hempel (1905–1997), to the more flexible approaches 
of Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994), Stephen Toulmin 
(b.1922), and Larry Laudan (b.1941), to more recent analyses that have been influ-
enced by research into computational models, non-classical logic, and model-theoret-
ical semantics.3 These approaches will not be compared and contrasted in this chapter, 
and the basic analytical framework adopted in the following discussion is essentially 
that outlined by Theo Kuipers in his ‘Laws, Theories, and Research Programs’ (2007).4 
One pleasing feature of this framework is that it synthesises ideas derived from the 
work of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), Lakatos, Laudan, Henk Zandvoort (b.1951), Ilkka 
Niiniluoto (b.1946) and others. Essentially, Kuipers identifies four distinct kinds of 
RPs — descriptive, explanatory, design, and explicative — and it is the second type that 
will concern us primarily. Explanatory RPs ‘are directed at the explanation and further 
prediction of the observable individual and general facts in a certain domain of phe-
nomena’ (Kuipers 2007: 59). They can be associated with specific Research Traditions 
2.  These propositions are given in Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 6. Huck and Goldsmith’s 
 approach draws heavily upon the work of Imre Lakatos.
.  Some of the key texts include Duhem (1954), Popper (1959), Hempel (1965), Lakatos 
(1970), Toulmin (1972), Feyerabend (1975), and Laudan (1977). For a pertinent example of 
more recent research that draws upon techniques developed in the context of modern logic 
and Artificial Intelligence, see Aliseda (1997) and (2006). The model-theoretic view of scien-
tific theories is discussed in Suppes (1969), Suppe (1989), and Chakravartty (2001).
4.  I will not discuss in detail important topics such as the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ phases of 
RP development, the epistemological stratification of an RP, and so on. For more information 
about such things, see Kuipers 2007: 1–95.
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(RTs). Therefore Kuipers proposes the hierarchical model in Figure 1 which provides 
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Figure 1. Hierarchical Model of an RT
RT is here associated with three constituent RPs which are in turn each associated 
with a respective core theory (e.g., C1, C2, C3) and a respective set of specific theo-
ries (e.g., T1.1, T1.2, T1.3), the members of which all share the same core. Adopting this 
model, Generative Linguistics (GL) (including generative syntax, generative phonol-
ogy and other sub-domains) can be identified as a distinct RT, and GG — that is, GL 
research that is concerned primarily with syntax — can be viewed as an RP which has 
a core and an associated set of theories. This seems reasonable since the phrase ‘gen-
erative grammar’ is standardly used to refer to different theories of generative syntax 
that have been proposed during the period 1950s-present, and, given this, it would be 
misleading to classify GG as being simply a ‘theory’. Indeed, Kuipers explicitly identi-
fies ‘transformational generative grammar’ as providing a representative example of an 
explanatory RP (Kuipers 2007: 60).5
These analytical categories will enable the development of GG to be examined in 
some detail in the following sections, and the emphasis will be descriptive rather than 
prescriptive throughout. In other words, no attempt will be made to legislate about the 
way in which linguistic theories ought to evolve. In particular, the emergence of both 
the Unaccusative Hypothesis and the Universal Alignment Hypothesis within RG will 
be assessed, and the subsequent incorporation of both these hypotheses into main-
stream GG during the early 1980s will be scrutinised. Curiously, although the general 
patterns of these interactions are quite well-known, they have never been examined 
in any great detail; yet a careful discussion of these complex topics sheds light both 
on these particular associations and (more importantly) upon the broader topic of 
linguistic theory development in general.
5.  It would be possible, of course, to view GL as forming part of a larger research endeavour 
that was explicitly associated with Structuralism. However, a broader analysis of this kind will 
not be attempted in this chapter.
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2. Aspects of the base
In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), Chomsky outlined the version of GG that 
became known as the Extended Standard Theory. In this approach, the syntactic compo-
nent generates two structural levels, Deep Structure and Surface Structure; the structures 
associated with the former are interpreted by the semantic component, while the struc-
tures associated with the latter are interpreted by the phonological component. The rules 
in the base generate Deep Structures, and transformations act upon Deep Structures to 
create Surface Structures.6 As Aspects progresses, Chomsky subclassifies rule types into 
lexical formatives, subcategorisation, and selectional rules, but despite these sorts of twists 
and turns, the central idea is always that the base constitutes a set of ordered rewriting 
rules that is located in the syntactic component, and that the Deep Structures it gener-
ates are interpreted by the semantic component. An example of the kind of tree-based 
representation advocated in Aspects is given in Figure 2. In this framework, traditional 
grammatical roles such as ‘subject’ and ‘direct object’ are represented primarily in configu-
rational terms. For example, if the ‘subject-of ’ relation holds between the NP of a sentence 
which takes the form NP-Aux-VP and the whole sentence, then ‘sincerity’ is the subject of 
the sentence in Figure 2 because it occupies this position in the tree. Similarly, if ‘direct_
object-of ’ is a relation that holds between the NP of a VP which takes the form V-NP, then 
‘the boy’ in Figure 2 is the direct object (Chomsky 1965: 68–69). Crucially, grammatical 
relations are defined in terms of linear order and phrase structure configurations.
S
NP Aux VP








Figure 2. Tree Diagram for ‘Sincerity may frighten the boy’
.  For more information concerning the role of the base in early GG, see Chomsky (1955), 
Chomsky (1957), and Tomalin 2006: 163–167.
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This much is uncontroversial, but how should Aspects-style Extended Standard 
Theory be analysed given the skeletal RT framework in Figure 1? This task is com-
plicated by the fact that (like other such texts) Aspects offers a gradual development 
of certain ideas — some propositions are rejected, new ones are added, and others 
are revised as the argument unfolds — and this process is not merely one of simple 
accumulation. Despite its mathematical tendencies, Aspects does not present (and, to 
its credit, never claims to present) a comprehensive, strictly axiomatic-deductive syn-
tactic theory. Rather it is a building-site, an incomplete work-in-progress that is full 
of hesitations, tentative assumptions, and extensive alterations. The opening sentence 
captures this perfectly: ‘[t]his study will touch on a variety of subjects in syntactic 
theory and English syntax, a few in some detail, several quite superficially, and none 
exhaustively’ (Chomsky 1965: 3). Since (as noted earlier) RTs are defined in part by the 
theories with which they are associated, these vagaries at the level of theory exposition 
are unavoidable.
Despite these non-trivial problems, though, Huck and Goldsmith boldly 
attempted to summarise the key elements of Extended Standard Theory, focusing on 
core and orientational propositions. However, the ontological stratification they offer 
can be stated in greater detail. Assuming that GL (as outlined in Chomsky (1955)) had 
arguably become an incipient RT by 1965, then it can be associated with a number of 
inter-related RPs which focused on different linguistic levels (e.g., syntax, phonology, 
semantics, and so on). Aspects (which concentrates primarily on syntax) provides a 
revised sketch of the GG program while expounding a particular cluster of theories. 
Conveniently, Chomsky states explicitly that the GG program is ‘explanatory’ rather 
than merely ‘descriptive’ (Chomsky 1965: 34), and he provides an itemised list of the 
core assumptions which form the basis of any generative syntactic theory. Such a theory 
should provide (Chomsky 1965: 31):
i an enumeration of the class s1,s2,… of possible sentences
ii an enumeration of the class SD1, SD2,… of possible structural descriptions
iii  an enumeration of the class G1, G2, … of possible generative grammars
iv specification of a function f such that SDf(i,j) is the structural description assigned 
to sentence si by grammar Gj, for arbitrary i,j
v specification of a function m such that m(i) is an integer associated with the gram-
mar Gi as it value
Any syntactic theories developed within the Extended Standard Theory RP must con-
form to these constraints. They are criteria for adequacy; therefore they form the core 
of the program, and they are common to all theories that are clustered with that par-
ticular RP. In addition, there are other orientational and methodological assumptions 
which also form part of the core. These mainly provide guidance as to the manner in 
which syntactic research should be undertaken, and they include such things as the 
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distinction between competence and performance, and the reliance on native speaker 
intuition to determine grammaticality.
While the core of an RP generally changes infrequently, the theory-specific auxiliary 
propositions are much more malleable. Indeed, Chomsky himself repeatedly modifies 
these as Aspects progresses. For example, he initially presents morphemes as being indi-
visible lexical items before subsequently arguing that they should be viewed as collections 
of sublexical features. Similarly, he suggests that the lexicon should be separate from the 
rewriting rules and that these rules should constitute a concatenation-system rather than 
a set-system.7 In all of these cases, there are many other options that could have been 
adopted instead, but doing so would not have a profound impact on the RP core.
. The creation of Relational Grammar
Aspects outlined a particular RP, and RG undoubtedly had its conceptual roots in the 
disputes that occurred when certain linguists began to probe Extended Standard The-
ory with sustained intensity.8 These disputes led to the creation of Generative Seman-
tics, and they eventually prompted Paul Postal (b.1936) and David Perlmutter (b.1938) 
to develop RG in the early 1970s. Although the complex relationships between GG, 
Generative Semantics, and RG have never been assessed in appropriate detail, some 
of the more obvious interconnections have been acknowledged. For instance, Randy 
Harris refers to the ‘partial competition, partial alliance’ (Harris 1993: 220) that initially 
existed between Generative Semantics and RG, and he observes that RG ‘headed off 
in an early dogleg from generative semantics’ (Harris 1993: 250). However, although 
RG is often viewed as providing an alternative to GG, it certainly originated as part 
of the GG program. This is most apparent in texts such as ‘The Relational Succession 
Law’ which Perlmutter and Postal drafted in 1972. This paper explores cyclic ‘ascen-
sion’ rules (e.g., it-replacement, pronoun-replacement, subject-raising), and the main 
contention is that the effect of certain transformations is determined by grammatical 
relations. Perlmutter himself has stated explicitly that this paper ‘antedates the devel-
opment of RG’ (Perlmutter 1983: x), yet he confirms that, with its focus upon cross-
linguistic regularities not captured by the GG framework, it was ‘one of the motivations 
for a relationally based theory of clause structure’ (Perlmutter 1983: x). Consequently, 
papers such as this provide alternative theories within the GG framework. A rough 
attempt to capture this state of affairs is given in Figure 3:
.  These topics are addressed in Chomsky 1965: 68–69, 75–84, 86, 124 respectively.
.  An engaging eye-witness account of some of these development can be found in Lakoff 
(1989), while Harris (1993) offers an approachable discussion of the whole GG vs. Generative 
Semantics conflict.




T1 T2 … TRG
Figure 3. RG within the GG Framework (c.1970–1974)
Here the early RG work is viewed as outlining a cluster of theories which forms an 
independent branch of the GG program. These alternative theories (e.g., TRG) share the 
GG core, but, at this stage of development, they are not associated with an alternative 
RP. However, as RG developed, some of the core GG assumptions were rejected, and as 
a result of this intricate process, the theoretical studies which provided the foundation 
for the later RG research of the mid to late 1970s began to elaborate a new RP.9 Writing 
in the early 1980s, Perlmutter recalled that ‘[t]he emergence of relation grammar (RG) 
in the 1970s was a direct challenge to some of the most basic assumptions of syntactic 
theory’ (Perlmutter 1983: ix). This can be seen clearly in its treatment of grammatical 
relations. In mature RG, these undefined, irreducible primitives (e.g., 1 = Subject, 
2 = Direct Object, and 3 = Indirect Object) are not defined in configurational terms. 
Instead, graph-theoretical structures, called relational networks, were introduced. 






Figure 4. Relational Network for an Active Structure
.  Johnson and Postal indentified two main ‘stages’ in the development of RG — Stage 1 
(1972–1975) and Stage 2 (1975–1980) — and they dated the origins of Arc Pair Grammar to 
1977 (Johnson & Postal 1980). In their analysis, Stage 1 involved several attempts to modify 
the basic GG framework, and it was not until Stage 2 that a clear separation from GG became 
necessary. A general overview of the RG approach to syntax can be found in Blake (1990).
1. These examples are taken (with minor modifications) from Perlmutter & Postal 1978: 16ff.
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Here ‘P’ identifies the predicate, while 1 and 2 indicate Subject, and Direct Object 
respectively. There is no attempt to analyse either the tense of the verb or the internal 
structure of the NP ‘that book’; the central focus is primarily upon the grammatical 
relations. Importantly, the relational networks abstract away from linear order: if the 
order of the elements P, 1, and 2 in Figure 4 were permuted (e.g., 2, P, 1), the grammati-
cal relations would remain the same.
The RG analysis of the passive form of ‘Louise reviewed that book’ is given in 
Figure 5. This network has two strata: the first is identical to that in Figure 4; the second 
indicates that two alterations have occurred. Specifically, the NP associated with the 
2-relation (i.e., ‘that book’) in the first stratum is associated with the 1-relation in the 
second stratum, while the NP associated with the 1-relation initially, is associated with 
the 2-relation in the second stratum. The notation 2 indicates that the subject NP has 
become a ‘chômeur’ (which means ‘unemployed’ in French): the subject of the active 
sentence (i.e., Louise) now occupies a peripheral, optional position in the passive sen-
tence, and therefore (using the RG-terminology) it has been put ‘en chômage’. As these 
examples indicate, the RG approach to grammatical relations was consciously chosen 
as an alternative to the standard tree-based GG framework, and Perlmutter and Postal 
were particularly disturbed by the fact that Extended Standard Theory did not enable a 
universal analysis of passivization to be constructed. They noted that in GG the passive 
transformation invariably postposed preverbal NPs and preposed postverbal NPs, and 
argued (robustly) that a ‘universal’ analysis of passivization was impossible in such a 








Figure 5. Relational Network for a Passive Structure
As this fleeting summary shows, although RG initially emerged within the GG 
program, it eventually came to provide a markedly different analysis of syntactic phe-
nomena. Therefore, if GG and RG had become distinct entities by the mid 1970s, what 
sort of entity was RG? Did it outline a new and distinct RT, or did it simply deter-
mine a separate RP within the GL tradition? Over the years, varying degrees of sepa-
ration have been suggested. For example, Perlmutter and Postal’s writings are littered 
with comments such as ‘it is necessary to abandon the structuralist-transformational 
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approach’ (Perlmutter 1983: ix), which suggests a complete separation. However, they 
also repeatedly acknowledge ‘the influence of the transformational framework out of 
which RG developed’ (Perlmutter 1983: xiv), and this suggests that some connections 
were retained, allowing for the possibility that RG defined a distinct RP within the 
GL tradition. More recently, though, Giorgio Graffi has argued that ‘RG goals were 
radically different […] from those of the ‘standard’ theory and of the Chomskian pro-
gram as a whole’ (Graffi 2001: 412), while in texts such as Susumu Kuno and Ken’ichi 
Takami’s Functional Constraints in Grammar (2004), RG and GG are explicitly treated 
as entirely separate ‘frameworks’ (Kuno & Takami 2004: 18). Comments such as these 
imply that (by the late 1970s) mature RG had effectively removed itself from the GL 
tradition, and initiated an alternative stance. However, if RG is to be viewed as defining 
a distinct RT, then it should be possible to identify distinctive orientational and core 
propositions which provide guidance for the research undertaken within that frame-
work. Helpfully, Perlmutter identifies two ‘basic claims’ which distinguished RG from 
GG (Perlmutter 1983: ix–x):
1.1 The grammatical relations needed for individual grammars and for cross-
linguistic generalizations cannot be defined in terms of other notions, but must 
be taken as primitive notions of syntactic theory.
1.2. It is necessary to posit distinct syntactic (i.e., nonsemantic, nonthematic) 
levels.
There is no doubt that these ideas were characteristic of the RG approach and that 
virtually all research conducted with that basic framework adopted these proposi-
tions. But how should these ‘claims’ be classified? Crucially, are they core or auxiliary 
propositions? To start with proposition 1.1, given the list of core assumptions that was 
presented in Aspects, the requirement for structural descriptions to be enumerated 
does not make strong claims about whether grammatical relations should be primi-
tive or not. Indeed, as the 1970s progressed, the notion of θ–roles became increasingly 
prominent in GG and analyses based on linear order and constituent structure were 
reconsidered. Clearly, this development suggests that the GG program was sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate changes of this kind. Proposition 1.2 is more problematical. 
The GG program explicitly identified Deep Structure and Surface Structure as distinct 
syntactic levels. Therefore any theory which rejected the centrality of these arguably 
modified the GG core and, as such, removed itself from the GG program.11 Conse-
quently, since RG analyses permitted multiple strata, it is reasonable to claim that (at 
11.  It should be noted that, during the late 1960s and 1970s various GG formalisms regularly 
adopted levels other than Deep Structure and Surface Structure. For instance, some transfor-
mational rules were associated with the syntax, others with the lexicon. Also, some movement 
operations could apply at the level of Logical Form. However, in all these variations, Deep 
Structure and Surface Structure were usually recognised as being crucial levels.
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some point in the mid 1970s) RG separated itself from the GG program and initiated 
a new RP. Nonetheless, it is not immediately apparent whether RG ever entirely freed 
itself from the GL tradition. In Figure 6, the dotted arrows indicate uncertain associa-





Figure 6. RG as an Independent RP
Larry Laudan (in particular) has argued convincingly that, in order to survive, 
theories need to be associated with specific RPs, and there seems to be little doubt that 
RG did indeed determine a new RP.12 However, whether it managed to establish its own 
RT is less clear (hence the notation ‘(RGRT)’ in Figure 6). Did a new RP (or RT) emerge 
in the mid 1970s when relational networks were introduced, or did the program/tradi-
tion not acquire a clear identity until the emergence of Arc Pair Grammar towards the 
end of the decade? Even in the latter case, the connections with GG are conspicuous. 
For instance, Arc Pair Grammar can be viewed as a model-theoretic approach to syntax since 
(like RG) it contains rules which define well-formedness criteria for syntactic objects. Con-
sequently, it explicitly rejects GG’s fundamental generative-enumerative assumptions.13 
However, rules of this kind were initially discussed at length in Perlmutter’s 1968 GG-based 
Ph.D. thesis where they were introduced as ‘filters’ on SSs, so it would be misleading to 
12.  Laudan discusses the way in which theories can pass from one research tradition to 
another in Laudan (1977), Chapter 3 (especially p.94).
1.  Concerning RG rules which specify well-formedness criteria, Perlmutter & Postal 
1983[1974] contains the following passage as part of a discussion of the Passive rule: ‘[t]he 
underlying idea is that the rules of grammar are of two types, those which positively sanction 
the presence of arcs in RNs [Relational Networks] […] and those which negatively sanction 
the occurrence of arcs […] The definition of well-formedness is then, very roughly, that an 
arbitrary RN is well-formed with respects to G [a grammar] if every arc in it is positively 
sanctioned by any rule in G’ (Perlmutter & Postal 1983[1974]: 18). Since it adopts this kind of 
approach more extensively, Arc Pair Grammar can be viewed as an early attempt to outline a 
form of Model-Theoretic Syntax. Approachable overviews to this broad topic can be found in 
Pullum & Scholtz (2001) and Pullum (2007).
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claim that this marked a complete break with GG. Rather, a formal procedure that 
had a less privileged status in GG was accorded a more fundamental role in Arc Pair 
Grammar (and in RG). In many respects, then, RG selected, re-emphasised, and refo-
cused particular ideas that had been presented less clearly within the GG program. 
Nonetheless, a persistent problem is that there are no watertight criteria for identify-
ing an RT-RP pairing, and most models of scientific theory development generally 
assume that these associations are one-to-many mappings (as in Figure 1). However, 
this reveals a weakness in the rather simplistic set-theoretical representations that are 
often used to represent the ontological stratification of RTs, RPs, and theories. Actual 
historical examples, such as the emergence of RG, demonstrate that it is quite possible 
for a given RP to be indeterminately associated with more than one RT (at least for a 
short period of time), and that it can exist in the twilight zone between several RTs. In 
order to capture this in a strictly set-theoretical analytical framework, mathematical 
objects such as non-classical sets (e.g., fuzzy sets) may be required in order to achieve 
greater representational accuracy.
Setting these thorny issues to one side for the time being, there is no doubt that 
two prominent hypotheses which were associated with RG proved to be remarkably 
influential. The consistent focus on primitive grammatical relations enabled Perlmutter 
and Postal (and others) to offer provocative reassessments of traditional notions 
such as transitive and intransitive verbs. In fact, RG predicts the existence of four 
kinds of ‘structure’:
i. A structure contains both a 1-arc and a 2-arc
ii. A structure contains a 1-arc and no 2-arc
iii. A structure contains a 2-arc and no 1-arc
iv. A structure contains neither a 1-arc nor a 2-arc
Intriguingly, structures of type (iii) had not been recognised as a distinct class. Adopt-
ing terminology that had been suggested by Geoffrey Pullum, Perlmutter and Postal 
proposed that an initial stratum in a relational network that is subjective and intransi-
tive should be classified as ‘unergative’, while a stratum that is objective and intransitive 
should be classified as ‘unaccusative’. Accordingly, the Unaccusative Hypothesis was 
proposed:
The Unaccusative Hypothesis:
The initial stratum of some basic clauses is unaccusative
Although unaccusatives had usually been lumped together with subjective intransitives, 
Perlmutter and Postal showed that sentences ‘Martians dream’ and ‘Martians exist’ can be 
associated with very different underlying structures, despite their superficial similarity. 
During the late 1970s Perlmutter (in particular) presented these provocative ideas at a 
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number of conferences, and, as a result, the RG formulation of the Unaccusative Hypoth-
esis gradually began to enter the consciousness of the wider linguistics community. 
Crucially, the Unaccusative Hypothesis has strong connections with similar ideas that 
had been proposed in earlier GG (and especially Generative Semantics) literature. For 
instance, in his 1962 thesis, Postal had commented that there were ‘strong formal reasons’ 
for analysing certain intransitive subjects as being derived from Deep Structure objects 
(Postal 1979[1962]: 25), and later GG syntacticians such as Charles Fillmore (b.1929) and 
Joseph Emonds (b.1940) adopted similar analyses with varying degrees of explicitness. 
Once again, then, the threads that connect GG and RG are apparent.14
Whatever the exact details of its origin, the Unaccusative Hypothesis emphasises 
the extent to which syntactic considerations depend upon ‘semantic roles’ (Perlmutter & 
Postal 1984[1978]: 97). In order partly to clarify this dependency, Perlmutter and 
Postal introduced the Universal Alignment Hypothesis (Perlmutter & Postal 1984 
[1978]: 97):
The Universal Alignment Hypothesis:
There exist principles of universal grammar which predict the initial relation 
borne by each nominal in a given clause from the meaning of the clause.
The basic insight is that semantic considerations (i.e., the ‘meaning of the clause’) deter-
mine the nature of the initial grammatical relations that are present in a given clause, 
and Perlmutter and Postal emphasised that, if the Universal Alignment Hypothesis 
holds, then ‘the assignment of initially intransitive clauses to the unergative or unac-
cusative type is completely determined by universal principles’ (Perlmutter & Postal 
1984[1978]: 97). Yet again, this claim has its roots in research that appeared as part of 
the GL tradition, specifically in the Generative Semantics program. For example, the 
Universal Base Hypothesis proposes that (at a particular level of representation) the lin-
guistic structures in all the world’s languages are produced by the same generative base, 
and, from the mid 1960s onwards, this idea had been explored extensively in the GG/
Generative Semantics framework by such people as George Lakoff (b.1941), Emmon 
Bach (b.1929), James McCawley (1938–1999) and John Robert (Haj) Ross (b.1938). For 
instance, in his 1970 paper ‘On Declarative Sentences’, Ross stated the Universal Base 
Hypothesis as follows: ‘[t]he deep structures of all languages are identical, up to the 
ordering of constituents immediately dominated by the same node’ (Ross 1970[1968]: 
260). When the various formulations of the Universal Base Hypothesis and the Univer-
sal Alignment Hypothesis are juxtaposed, it becomes clear that the latter provides yet 
14.  Perlmutter traced the origins of the idea back as far as a review that Edward Sapir had 
written in 1917 (Perlmutter 1978: 186n). For an entertaining attempt to track the development 
of the idea through the decades, see Pullum 1991: 147–158.
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another example of an idea that had surfaced within the GG program but which was 
effectively reformulated and re-expressed more explicitly in the RG program.15
4. Reformulating Relational Grammar
Initial research in the RG framework was presented in unpublished manuscripts and 
at conferences long before it appeared in print. Therefore the Unaccusative Hypothesis 
and the Universal Alignment Hypothesis became known to the wider linguistics com-
munity (gradually) during the period 1974–1977, and certain GG syntacticians were 
quick to recognise the importance of these hypotheses. Some people responded by 
attempting to re-express certain RG insights in terms of the GG program, and texts 
such as Andrew Radford’s Italian Syntax: Transformational and Relational Grammar 
(1977) and Alec Marantz’s Chomsky-supervised doctoral thesis, On the Nature of 
Grammatical Relations (1981), were largely inspired by RG. Other researchers followed 
this basic pattern, and, crucially, Luigi Burzio (b.1943) re-expressed the Unaccusative 
Hypothesis in terms of the P&P framework in a series of publications in the early 
1980s which culminated in his 1986 monograph Italian Syntax (a modified version of 
his 1981 M.I.T. thesis). In this influential work, Burzio considered sentence pairs such 
as ‘Giovanni arriva’ and ‘Giovanni telefona’ and he claimed that
The material […] will provide several arguments, some directly related to 
Perlmutter’s observation, for the idea that the superficial subject of verbs like 
arrivare [...] is the D-structure direct object: an idea which corresponds to the 
“Unaccusative Hypothesis” of Perlmutter (1978), and other related works in 
Relational Grammar. (Burzio 1986: 20–21)
Rather than using relational networks and other RG-specific paraphernalia, Burzio 
specified three verb classes — (i) transitive verbs (e.g., ‘Giovanni esamina il caso’), (ii) 
intransitive verbs (e.g., ‘Giovanni telefona’), and (iii) unaccusative verbs (e.g., ‘Giovanni 
arriva’) — and suggested that class (iii) was distinguished from class (ii) by the fact that, 
at the Deep Structure level, the Surface Structure subject initially occupies the direct 
object position before later moving to the subject position (as a result of Move α): 16
[e] arriva Giovanni → Giovannii arriva ti
15.  The specific works alluded to here are Lakoff (1965), Bach (1968), McCawley (1976[1967]), 
and Ross (1970). The basic insight of the Universal Base Hypothesis was influentially reformu-
lated by Richard Kayne (1994).
1.  In fact, Burzio strangely (and unhelpfully) changed Perlmutter’s terminology, using the 
term ‘ergative’ rather than the term ‘unaccusative’ (Burzio 1986, 27–31). I have used ‘unaccusa-
tive’ in the main text in a slightly anachronistic way simply in order to avoid confusion.
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In structures such as this, the NP is assigned a theme/patient role in the V-comp 
position, and this is required by the verb ‘arriva’. However, the Extended Projection 
Principle (EPP) forces the noun to move to the subject position. Crucially, the pre-
transformation position is not ungrammatical, but it does have a different discourse 
interpretation. Despite many critical differences in specific technical detail, the funda-
mental Unaccusative Hypothesis insight remains the same. During the 1980s, unaccu-
sative verbs were widely adopted in the mainstream GG literature, and the RG origins 
of this category were sometimes grudgingly acknowledged.17 As early as 1981, for 
example, Chomsky noted that Burzio’s analysis of unaccusatives was ‘based in part on 
ideas of David Perlmutter’ (Chomsky 1981: 282.n35). So, the Unaccusative Hypothesis 
migrated from RG to GG during the period 1978–1986, but this was not a unique 
displacement. Several other RG hypotheses were adopted/adapted by GG researchers, 
and the Universal Alignment Hypothesis experienced a similar fate.
In his 1988 monograph Incorporation (a revised version of his Chomsky-supervised 
1985 doctoral thesis), Mark Baker (b.1959) explored (amongst other things) alternative 
methods by which referential expressions are encoded in grammatical functions, and 
he analysed some of the ways in which complex predicates are built up out of elemen-
tary units. This prompted him to reconsider the semantic relationships specified by 
θ-roles in P&P; he introduced ‘a guiding principle of grammar which characterizes the 
level of D-Structure’ (Baker 1988: 46), and he called this principle The Uniformity of 
Theta Assignment Hypothesis:
The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis:
Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical 
structural relationships between those items at the level of D-Structure.
Despite lingering vagaries concerning θ-roles (Baker 1988: 47), the Uniformity of Theta 
Assignment Hypothesis ensured that semantic roles were assigned in a uniform man-
ner at the level of Deep Structure. Although Baker does not emphasise the conceptual 
lineage of the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis explicitly in the main body 
of his text, he does refer to its origins in a later footnote: ‘[t]here is also an important 
conceptual similarity between the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis and 
the “Universal Initial Assignment Hypothesis” of Relational Grammar [...] A simi-
lar idea motivated much of the work in generative semantics’ (Baker 1988: 449.n6). 
This comment creates a number of uncertainties. For instance, what exactly is/was 
the ‘Universal Initial Assignment Hypothesis’? While it is possible that this is simply a 
bizarrely bungled attempt to write ‘Universal Alignment Hypothesis’, this explanation 
would be more convincing if Alec Marantz had not also referred to a ‘Universal Initial 
1.  For more information see Levin & Rappaport (1995).
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Assignment Hypothesis’ in his 1984 monograph (Marantz 1984: 339). Since Marantz’s 
monograph is a revised version of his 1981 doctoral thesis, it is possible that he had 
access to earlier pre-publication drafts of Perlmutter’s and Postal’s RG articles which 
used this name instead. Unfortunately, none of the participants in these exchanges can 
now recall the details of these naming conventions.18 Despite these opacities, the Uni-
formity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis was enthusiastically adopted by the GG com-
munity, and it continues to retain a prominent (if disputed) place in the Minimalist 
Program (MP).19 Chomsky publicly endorsed it in 1988, commenting that while earlier 
versions of the hypothesis (in Generative Semantics and RG) had ‘proved unfeasible, 
in fact, more or less vacuous,’ Baker’s reworking of the same basic idea was ‘meaning-
ful, in fact extremely strong’ (Chomsky 1988: 66). Therefore, after almost twenty years, 
an hypothesis which had emerged as part of Generative Semantics and which had been 
refashioned in RG, was eventually (re)reformulated in the context of GG.
5. The mechanics of proposition migration
In order to model these developments using the theoretical framework adopted in 
this chapter, it is necessary to clarify the status of the Unaccusative Hypothesis and 
the Universal Alignment Hypothesis in RG. They are both self-professed ‘hypotheses’ 
(i.e., a particular kind of proposition), but where are they located in the ontological 
stratification outlined in Figure 1? Do they form part of the RG program core or are 
they optional auxiliary propositions which were initially associated only with a specific 
theories? To consider the Unaccusative Hypothesis first, this hypothesis was first dis-
cussed at length in Perlmutter’s 1978 paper ‘Impersonal Passives and the Unaccusative 
Hypothesis’, and since RG research had been progressing for several years by this point, 
1.  For some reason, these sorts of errors and confusions are frequent in texts discussing the 
relationship between RG and GG; even in supposedly expository and clarificatory historical 
studies. For instance, when discussing Baker’s 1988 reformulation of the Universal Align-
ment Hypothesis, Randy Harris refers to Baker’s hypothesis as the ‘Universal Theta Assign-
ment Hypothesis’ (Harris 1993: 254), where ‘Universal’ should in fact be ‘Uniformity of ’. Other 
popular expansions (which have been picked here virtually at random) include such things as 
‘Uniform Theta-Role Assignment Hypothesis’ (Vivian James Cook & Mark Newson 2007: 122), 
‘Uniform Thematic Alignment Hypothesis’ (Patrick Farrell 2005: 214), and ‘Uniform Theta-
Assignment Hypothesis’ (Andrew Radford 1997: 274). Given the inherent complexity of these 
topics even when the relevant terminology is used consistently, these creative reformulations 
are rather less than helpful.
1.  For one fairly recent discussion of the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis in an 
expository text that outlines the framework of the MP, see Adger 2003: 138–141.
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the Unaccusative Hypothesis seems to have been an auxiliary proposition (at least ini-
tially): it was not at first an essential component of the RG program, though arguably 
it became so eventually. As for the Universal Alignment Hypothesis, it cannot really 
be viewed as being a core proposition either, since its validity was debated explicitly 
in the RG literature. Most famously, Carol Rosen concluded that it was ‘untenable’ 
(Rosen 1984[1981]: 61). Seemingly, then, the Universal Alignment Hypothesis was an 
auxiliary proposition that could be optionally accepted or rejected by RG researchers.
Given this, since the Unaccusative Hypothesis and the Universal Alignment 
Hypothesis were both reformulated in the P&P framework during the 1980s, they pro-
vide revealing examples of auxiliary proposition migration. Simply, this occurs when 
an auxiliary proposition (e.g., an hypothesis) associated with a given RP is adopted 
and re-expressed by another RP. Obviously, this process can involve either RPs within 
the same RT (intra-RT migrations) or else RPs associated with different RTs (inter-RT 
migrations). Such migrations are of considerable interest since they appear to be cen-
tral to certain theory development strategies, but, despite this, they have received sur-
prisingly little attention so far. For instance, Laudan explicitly recognises that an entire 
theory can break away from one RT and associate itself with another, commenting that 
‘[t]his process of theory separation is a fascinating one and deserves to be studied in 
some detail’ (Laudan 1977: 94). However, in his 1977 monograph and in subsequent 
work he never focuses on this phenomenon in any great detail, and he certainly does 
not explore the way in which subcomponents of a given theory (e.g., specific proposi-
tions) are sometimes borrowed by an RP belonging to a separate RT.
A simple schematic representation of the kind of inter-RT auxiliary proposition 
migration that is exemplified in the Unaccusative Hypothesis and Universal Align-
ment Hypothesis case-studies is given in Figure 7. Here, hypothesis Pp (which is 
one of the propositions associated with the mth theory of the ith RP associated with 
RT1) migrates to the n
th theory of the jth RP associated with RT2. This alters the set 
of propositions associated with theory T2.j.n, and therefore that theory develops as a 
result of this modification. If other theories associated with RP2.j come to adopt the 
same proposition, then, in time, it may become part of C2.j — that is, a part of the 
propositional core of RP2.j. Figure 7 captures (albeit crudely) the main characteristics 
of this specific theory development strategy. However, an abstract, skeletal account 
such as this necessarily leaves many issues unaddressed. For instance, as mentioned 
earlier, the Unaccusative Hypothesis and Universal Alignment Hypothesis examples 
both involve auxiliary propositions. This raises the question as to whether it is pos-
sible for propositions in the core to migrate between RTs or RPs. Also, the Unac-
cusative Hypothesis and the Universal Alignment Hypothesis can both be stated 
in conveniently general terms without the need for highly specific program-inter-
nal structures, processes, and categories. Consequently, they can be reformulated 
fairly easily in different theoretical frameworks. By contrast, it would be much more 
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 difficult to migrate a proposition which depended upon core assumptions that were 






















Figure 7. Inter-RT Proposition Migration
Another complexity concerns successive migrations. The two examples discussed 
in this chapter demonstrate that a particular proposition can migrate repeatedly, mov-
ing from RP1 to RP2 to RP3 and so on, thus forming a migration chain. More specifically, 
the Unaccusative Hypothesis and the Universal Alignment Hypothesis both provide 
instances of circular successive migration: the Unaccusative Hypothesis, for example, 
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originated in the GG program (admittedly in an inchoate form); it then migrated to 
RG where it was reformulated; it then migrated from RG back into a later version of 
GG, where it was again reformulated. As a result of this odyssey, the hypothesis ended 
up back in the RP in which it originally developed, but with renewed prominence and 
in a modified form as a result of its journey through RG. And the same is true of the 
Universal Alignment Hypothesis. Circular migration patterns such as these have never 
been studied in the context of scientific theory development, yet they appear to be an 
essential aspect of certain kinds of RP evolution. If this is so, then it is reasonable to 
ask why it should occur, and again RG perhaps provides a few insights. For instance, 
it is certainly the case that during the 1970s, RG provided a framework that simpli-
fied the analytical task that GG had pursued ever since the mid 1950s. Specifically 
the relational networks proposed in the 1970s did not provide a detailed analysis of 
such things as internal-NP structure, although such detail was not beyond the scope 
of the RG framework. The guiding idea was to focus the analysis upon grammatical 
relations in order to account for phenomena such as passives, dative movement, rela-
tivization, topicalization, and so on. Consequently, RG intentionally concentrated on 
a more restricted range of linguistic structures, and this enabled it to elaborate and 
refine generalisations that had lurked within GG without ever rising to prominence. 
These generalisations highlighted structures and patterns that had not been revealed 
so clearly previously, and therefore they acquired influential status, as a result of which 
they were borrowed and re-expressed by certain GG researchers.
. Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, the intricate relationship between GG and RG during the 
period 1965–1988 provides an illuminating case-study of the way in which linguistic 
theories and RPs evolve. When analysed using the conventional framework sketched 
in Figure 1, the emergence of RG as an independent RP can be scrutinised in some 
detail. However, the sheer complexity of the connections that relate GG and RG, 
during the years 1972 to 1975 in particular, suggest that overly simplistic analytical 
models of scientific theory development can be unhelpfully misleading. For instance, 
as noted earlier, since it is clear that (in practice) RPs can be associated with more 
than one RT, even if only for a short stage in their development, then this should be 
reflected explicitly in the modelling of such phenomena. As a result, the conventional 
one-to-many mappings from RTs to RPs, and from RPs to theories, do not adequately 
capture the complex patterns that one observes in the available data. In addition, 
although some philosophers of science, such as Laudan, have commented on the way 
in which theories can disassociate themselves from one RP and associate themselves 
with another, far less attention has been paid to the way in which propositions from 
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one theory sometimes migrate to theories associated with different RPs. There is no 
doubt, though, that the GG program evolved in the 1980s partly as a result of certain 
propositions from RG being reformulated in the GG framework, and these exam-
ples of proposition migration merit close attention. In the case of the Unaccusative 
Hypothesis and the Universal Alignment Hypothesis, these were auxiliary hypotheses 
which had originated (in an imprecise way) within GG, but which had subsequently 
taken on greater importance and precision as part of RG, and which were eventually 
re-expressed (by Burzio and Baker respectively) in the P&P framework. Little is known 
for certain about the particular conditions which prompt these sorts of cyclic proposi-
tion migrations, and it is currently not at all clear whether they occur in some kinds 
of scientific enquiry more frequently than in others. In the context of the physical sci-
ences, texts such as Donovan et al (1988) have attempted to provide detailed historio-
graphical analyses of specific instances of scientific theory development in order to 
compare and contrast a range of different methodological perspectives. So far, few 
such studies have been published which focus primarily on the evolution of linguistic 
theories, yet clearly discussions of this kind could helpful elucidate many issues which 
currently remain opaque.
As the above comments demonstrate, in order to understand and how and why 
linguistic theories evolve, it is essential to delve deeply and carefully into the history of 
linguistics. Attentive historiographical explorations are of especial importance when 
the broad topic of linguistic theory development is addressed, partly because it is still 
sometimes assumed that since linguistics is a ‘science’ (whatever that means exactly), 
then it must necessarily behave precisely like every other scientific discipline. This 
rather naïve stance presupposes that all sciences operate in exactly the same way — an 
assumption that has been largely rejected by those who disavow the existence of a sin-
gle scientific method. Indeed, proponents of methodological pluralism maintain that 
a wide range of different scientific methods is deployed by a wide range of different 
sciences, and, accepting this, it is of considerable interest to determine whether there 
is anything distinctive about the particular methodologies and developmental strate-
gies used by researchers working in different sub-branches of linguistics.20 To this end, 
preliminary descriptive studies such as the one sketched in the present chapter provide 
a way of identifying and classifying distinctive approaches that have been adopted at 
key moments in the history of linguistics.
2.  For brief discussions of several different views concerning linguistics’ status as a science, 
see Koster 2005: 350–358 and Tomalin 2006: 198–200. During the past fifteen years or so 
there have been several explorations of the diversity of scientific enquiry of which Galison & 
Stump (1996) has been one of the most influential. For a recent discussion of methodological 
pluralism, see Sankey (2008; esp. Chapter 6).
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Universalism and human difference 
in Chomskyan linguistics
The first ‘superhominid’ and the language faculty
Christopher Hutton
The University of Hong Kong
Chomskyan linguistics is defined by its commitment to universalism and to belief 
in the existence of a shared species-wide language faculty grounded in human 
biology. The claim is that all human beings are linguistically one, and that human 
unity is the product of biological endowment. This paper argues that there is 
a profound contradiction at the heart of this project, which can be seen in the 
tension between universalism and rationalism on the one hand, and Romantic 
notions of mother tongue, native speaker, and intuitions about biological 
structure, on the other. There is one feature in common, however, between 
the universalistic framework and the Romantic-intuitive one. Neither is easily 
reconcilable with mainstream evolutionary theory. Conventional evolutionary 
theory is based on natural selection acting on intra-species variation, but 
Chomskyan linguistics seeks to avoid at all costs a characterization of humankind 
that includes any significant differences in biological inheritance or variation. In 
order to defend this core postulate of identity Chomsky is willing to present as 
reductionalist a view of the subject matter of linguistics as is necessary. Having 
linked language to biology, Chomsky must bracket out all forms of variation from 
his model in order to sustain this vision of human equality. But this idealization 
is only required because of the biolinguistic framework itself, and the insistence 
that there is a deterministic relationship between human biology and language. 
Ultimately the theory is driven by an ideological or political ideal of absolute 
human equality, a concept completely alien to the biological sciences. By linking 
human linguistic endowment to biology, Chomskyan linguistics is in danger 
of lending support to an idea quite antithetical to its universalism, namely that 
human beings and human societies are shaped by profound differences in their 
biolinguistic heritage.
1. Introduction
Chomskyan linguistics is defined by a fundamental commitment to universalism and 
to the existence of a shared species-wide language faculty grounded in human biology. 
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This biological endowment, the language faculty, is the defining feature of a common 
humanity, and is presumed to be in essence invariant. The initial state of the language fac-
ulty is ‘uniform for the species’; it is a ‘special characteristic of humans, with properties that 
appear to be unusual in the natural world’ (Chomsky 1995: 14; Lieberman 2006: 5). The 
universalism that this implies is not restricted to contemporary humanity. It radically 
separates human beings not only from all other animals, but also from humankind’s 
hominid ancestors. There is now, and only ever has been, one language faculty. For 
Smith (1999: 1), this implies the further claim that ‘there is really only one human 
language’ and that ‘the immense complexity of the innumerable languages we hear 
around us must be variations on a single theme’. The language faculty is an ‘organ’ of 
the human body, which ‘grows’ rather than is learned in the traditional sense.
Any theory based on a search for an underlying identity inevitably creates classes 
of phenomena which defy, or appear to defy, reduction to the underlying unity. In 
defending this core universalist thesis, Chomskyan linguistics must maintain and justify 
the boundary between system and environmental ‘noise’, the core and the periphery, 
sameness and difference. One such problematic class of phenomena is the variation 
acknowledged to exist in the rule systems of the world’s languages. With respect to this 
form of variation, Chomsky argues that the language faculty and Universal Grammar 
(UG) can permit only a highly constrained set of variant realizations of the same set 
of underlying principles, giving rise to the restricted class of the grammars of individ-
ual languages (Chomsky 2007). A further class of phenomena has been categorized as 
belonging to ‘performance’ as opposed to ‘competence’ (Chomsky 1965: 3–4), or more 
generally as ‘external language’ or ‘E-language’ as against abstract and internal language 
universals or ‘I-language’. The latter is defined as (Chomsky 2007: 14):
a state of the computational system of the mind/brain that generates structured 
expressions, each of which can be taken to be a set of instructions for the interface 
systems within which the faculty of language is embedded.
E-language is understood to lie outside the purview of the theory and to resist systematic 
study. In the context of Chomskyan discussions of evolutionary biology, the terms FLB 
(the faculty of language ‘in the broad sense’) and FLN (the faculty ‘in the narrow sense’) 
have also been employed (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002; Bever & Montalbetti 2002).
The claim of Chomskyan linguistics to be an empirical science has been formulated 
as follows (Smith 1999: 11):
Like physics, but unlike logic or literary criticism, linguistics is an empirical 
science. That is, on a Chomskyan interpretation, which takes the speaker’s 
mentally represented grammar to be the correct focus for investigation, it makes 
sense to claim that one analysis is right and another wrong. Every time a linguist 
describes a sentence or postulates a principle, he or she is making innumerable 
empirically testable predictions. […] By contrast, a literary critic who claims that 
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‘a song is a form of linguistic disobedience,’ or a logician who says that ‘nothing 
is both an X and a non-X’ are not formulating hypotheses to be checked out 
and tested by their colleagues. The observations may be useful, insightful, even 
inspired, but they are not empirical.
The question naturally arises as to which methodology should be brought to bear on this 
boundary between core and periphery, and by which criteria particular phenomena are appre-
hended and classified. Within Chomskyan linguistics, the primary data available for analysis 
has been provided by ‘native speaker’ intuitions. This allows the linguist to work with 
authentic sentences and test generalizations which can then be fed into the theoretical dis-
cussions of the model as a whole. The aim is to characterize the nature and boundaries of 
Universal Grammar, and to do this it must be shown that UG can account for any ‘naturally 
occurring’ feature of any human language. Chomskyan linguistics seeks to study lan-
guage (‘I-language’) as a natural object, analogous to the human heart or human vision, 
and this suggests an orientation towards natural science. But access to the basic data 
required to understand the properties of that organ is mediated through the culturally 
and historically quite ‘local’ notion of native speaker.
The concept of native speaker is rooted in a tradition of thought apparently quite 
antithetical to Chomskyan linguistics, namely the language and identity politics of 
European Romanticism and identity theory. To be a native speaker within that tradi-
tion is to have been shaped in a profound sense by the modes of thought, associations 
and emotional bonds of a particular linguistic-cultural complex. These structures of 
thought and habits of mind are pre-rational, in that their basic nature is formed in 
the intimacy of the domestic sphere in the earliest years of childhood. The child is 
not taught what to feel or how to speak, but absorbs a set of emotional associations, 
responses and associations which lay down the basic framework long before the child 
enters formal schooling and the domain of writing, and becomes aware of explicit 
notions of linguistic correctness. This view of language is integral to the Romantic 
notion of ‘mother-tongue’ (Grimm 1851; Hutton 1999; Davies 2003).
Yet there is no empirical, socio-culturally neutral way to demonstrate that a particular 
individual is a native speaker with intuitions of relevance to a particular set of sentences 
(Harris 1981: 76). The identification of a native speaker, and more importantly, the 
assumption of a relationship between a speaker and a particular sample sentence, 
invokes a set of socio-culturally-defined relationships and categories. Put another 
way, the knowledge of the native speaker stands in a very uncertain relation to the 
competence of what in Chomskyan theory the ‘ideal speaker-listener’ or the ‘idealized 
native speaker’ (Chomsky 1965: 3–4, 24). These are precisely the kinds of issues that 
Chomsky sees as a distraction from the core aims of the theory. Chomsky recognizes 
that, trivially, everyone is a native speaker of the steady state which they have reached 
in acquiring language (Paikeday 1985: 75). Yet for Chomskyan theory, the Romantic-
intuitive response to the language data remains necessary, since there must be a way of 
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producing and authenticating ‘data’ and the native speaker’s judgments must in theory 
be as far as possible uncontaminated by the explicit, normative meta-linguistics of 
the formal culture to which the native speaker belongs. In practice, the linguist often 
doubles as the native speaker, or the issue of the provenance of the data is simply 
ignored. ‘Natural language’, in addition to its biological associations, thus takes on an 
additional set of meanings associated within Romantic conceptions of the natural, 
including the spontaneous, the untutored, and the intuitive. A telephone directory, 
a brand name, a Dada poem, Finnegans Wake, a road-sign, a menu, the speech of a 
beginning second language learner, do not have native speakers in this sense. Further, 
the use of intuition in the classification of natural phenomena belongs to a tradition 
of scientific thinking associated with figures such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
(1749–1832), and Goethe’s anti-Darwinian successors within modern biological 
thinking (Seamon & Zajonc 1998).
On the surface, at least, there is a profound contradiction between Chomsky’s linguistic 
universalism and rationalism and the grounding of the theory in the Romantic ideal of 
the intuitive relationship to mother tongue. The first suggests that all human beings are 
linguistically one and that human unity is provided by virtue of biological endowment. 
The second regards human identity as shaped by social and cultural environment of 
early childhood, and as formed at the profoundest level by the conceptual world of the 
native language. There is one feature in common, however, between these two frame-
works. Neither sits comfortably with mainstream evolutionary theory, as it has been 
elaborated since the work of Charles Darwin (1809–1882). The idea of the absolute 
panchronic invariance of the language faculty across the species is difficult to absorb 
within the basic assumptions of evolutionary theory, since evolution is regarded as 
causing change by acting on variation. Chomsky occupies an exceptionalist and highly 
unorthodox position in relation to the general framework of evolutionary theory, 
even granted the complex contemporary debate about the place of natural selection 
and variation within evolutionary theory (Lieberman 1989: 223). On the other side of 
the intellectual divide, the heirs of the Romantic movement have been the strongest 
opponents of evolutionary theory. Darwin’s theory is seen as crudely materialistic, and 
as positing a universe without ultimate meaning or teleology. While this is not the 
rhetorical substance of Chomsky’s objections to evolutionary theory, Chomsky does 
appeal to Goethe’s notion of Urform (‘original form’, i.e. the ‘primordial plant’) as ‘a kind 
of generative principle that determines the class of physically possible organisms’, drawing 
a parallel with Humboldt’s notion of ‘linguistic form’ (Chomsky 2002: 66).
2. The object of study
Linguistics has been divided internally over whether its primary terminological and 
metaphorical commitment should be to the natural sciences or to the disciplines of 
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culture and society, or simultaneously to both. It has consistently invented and reinvented 
its object of study as ontologically sui generis, as a ‘third thing’ (tertium quid) between 
nature and culture. This has involved a state of continual alienation from the method-
ologies of both the sciences and the humanities, masked in part by the circulation and 
exchange of a wide range of terms and metaphors. In the nineteenth century, the use of 
organic or naturalistic metaphors, referred to by Alter (1999: 7) as ‘conceptual transfers’, 
masked what in retrospect can be seen as an increasingly profound disengagement 
from mainstream natural science, but this did not lead to an integration with the social 
sciences and humanities.
The ambiguities inherent in the exceptionalism of linguistics can be traced in relation to 
the rise of uniformitarianism in natural science, that is, the idea that the same processes or 
causes of change operate universally in the object under study (see Christy 1983). Uniformi-
tarianism reached its purest expression in the theory of natural selection, but had been elabo-
rated in various disciplines, notably geology in the writings of James  Hutton (1726–1797) 
and Sir Charles Lyell (1797–1875). It was contrasted with an often  Biblically-inspired 
‘catastrophism’, but in various forms the debate between gradualism and catastrophism 
continues to this day. If uniformitarianism were to be applicable within linguistics, then 
this would suggest that the individual human will, and human culture, played little or no 
role in language change. If language were subject to the same laws regardless of culture, 
geography or history, then it could be studied within the framework of the natural sci-
ences. If by contrast language were a creature of the human will operating within the 
matrix of time, context and culture, then there could be no general propositions that 
science could prove about it. Thus Jacob Grimm (1785–1863), in his essay on the origin 
of language, was moved to stress that language was not subject to ‘rigid and eternal 
natural law’, with its universal concepts such as ‘light’ and ‘gravity’, and that it partakes of 
human freedom (Grimm 1851: 51): ‘Nicht starr und ewig wirkendem naturgesetz, wie 
des lichts und der schwere, anheim gefallen waren die sprachen, sondern menschlicher 
freiheit in die warme hand gegeben’ (‘Languages are not subject to rigid and eternal 
natural law as are light and gravity. They were proffered unto the warm hand of human 
freedom’). But this position ultimately condemned the study of language to marginality 
when set against the rising power of modern science.
The challenge for linguistics became that of clarifying the scientific status of its 
organicist terminology. Grimm’s essay is full of organic metaphors consistent with his 
Romantic heritage, and ‘references to botany, comparative anatomy, physiology, and 
natural sciences’ were common among Grimm’s contemporaries (Koerner 1989: 357). 
But were these merely botanical metaphors, or was there a sustainable claim to be made 
for the study of human language to be classified under the natural sciences, following 
the same methods and with the same epistemological status? In the history of this 
question, the case of August Schleicher (1821–1868) is clearly fundamental, given 
his famous assertion that languages are ‘natural organisms’ (Naturorganismen) which 
escape control of the human will (Schleicher 1873: 6–7). However this should not be 
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read as implying that all aspects of languages fall under the natural sciences (see Schleicher 
1865; Koerner 1989: 210–232). The study of language responded to these challenges by 
embracing uniformitarianism, for example in the programmatic statements of the Neo-
grammarians (see Koerner 1989: 79–100), but the status of its biological metaphors was 
left unclear. Biological processes operated on and within the speakers of languages, but 
to what kinds of forces were their languages subject?
To put the matter at its simplest, a plant could be examined through a microscope, 
but a language was only available as a stable object of the gaze through the medium of 
writing, or later was to be graspable and reproducible through sound recording and 
the instruments of acoustic phonetics. While the genealogical tree was a powerful and 
resonant image of linguistic evolution, the overt mechanisms of linguistic transmission 
were entirely social. At the same time, there seemed to many to exist an unbridgeable 
gulf between human language and the rest of the animal kingdom, and this was taken 
as a strike against Darwin’s theories: ‘I must call it inconceivable that any known animal 
could ever develop language’ (Müller [1873] 1996: 182). Arguably the nineteenth century 
encounter was inconclusive, with the study of language torn between assimilation to 
the natural sciences, and methodological and disciplinary autonomy.
In the Cours de Linguistique Générale (Saussure 1922), the organicism of linguistics 
was buttressed by an explicit methodological defence of the need for idealization. The 
synchronic system was viewed as an organic whole, an organism (Koerner 1989: 275), a 
mutually-defining structure that was neither directly steered by considerations of evo-
lutionary competition nor by the human will. The phenomenon of human language 
could not be studied as a totality, but the underlying systems of each langue could be 
represented within a single, universal framework, a ‘general linguistics’. There was no 
way to apply biological understandings of variation and adaptation to Saussure’s model; 
nor was there a teleological direction to language change which might be dictated by 
culture, human intervention, or agency. When viewed from the point of view of culture, 
language was a complex organism that escaped the operation of the human will. When 
viewed from the point of view of biology, the system of langue was a socio-cultural, 
not biological, organism, identified and apprehended only through a conscious act 
of idealization and systemization. Linguistics was able to meet the demands of uni-
formitarianism, but only through idealizing out the dimension of time from its core 
construct, langue.
. Evolutionary theory
Evolutionary theory is grounded in variation or difference. Without variation, there 
can be no evolution: ‘Competition + variation + replication = natural selection + evolution’ 
(Sterelny 2007: 18). If the language faculty or ‘language organ’ is invariant across the spe-
cies, then there are two possible scenarios. Either this cross-species identity evolved 
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out of intra-species variation (so that invariance was the outcome of  evolutionary 
processes acting on variation), or it sprang fully-formed into being in a ‘catastrophic’ 
leap. The first view is that of Steven Pinker, i.e. that the modern singular invariant unity 
of human language is derived from conventional, gradualist evolutionary processes 
(Pinker & Bloom 1990). The second ‘saltational’ (i.e. the anti-gradualist or ‘leap’) view 
is that of Chomsky. Attempts to defend Chomsky’s paradigm within an evolutionary 
framework have been argued in terms of an organ evolving for one reason, but then 
in a ‘catastrophic leap’, beginning to function as a language organ (Bickerton 1990; 
Pinker 1992: 378). For Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) the faculty of language ‘in 
the broad sense’ (FLB) includes a sensory-motor system, a conceptual-intention sys-
tem, as well as computational mechanism for recursion. In the narrow sense, it consists 
only of recursion, and ‘currently appears to lack any analog in animal communication’ 
(Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002: 1571). This faculty is held to be relatively recent in 
human evolutionary history, and rather than emerging as an adaptive product of natu-
ral selection, aspects of FLN are hypothesized to be ‘spandrels, by-products of pre-
existing constraints rather than end products of a history of natural selection’ (Hauser, 
Chomsky & Fitch 2002: 1574). In particular, it is denied that FLN evolved ‘from direct 
shaping by natural selection targeted at communication’ (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 
2002: 1574).
A spandrel is a design feature which arises as a side-effect of adaptation, rather 
than through natural selection, and then acquires what is termed ‘exaptive value’, 
where a feature which has evolved under one set of conditions finds a use or function 
in another, quite independent of its evolutionary history (see Gould & Lewontin 1979; 
Gould 2002). Simply put, the language faculty evolved for one reason (not communi-
cation), perhaps as a contingent by-product of adaptation, but then relatively suddenly 
took on a new specific and fundamental role. It did not arise out of a highly protracted 
gradual process of evolution. This puts Chomsky firmly in the anti-gradualist or ‘cata-
strophist’ camp, seemingly aligned with the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould 
(1941–2002). Gould offered a view of evolution as much more conservative than classic 
gradualist theory would suggest, characterized by ‘punctuated equilibrium’, and driven 
by catastrophic events as much as by gradual, adaptive selection. Gould’s main intellectual 
opponents have been Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett (Sterelny 2007), the latter 
also, not surprisingly, a strong critic of Chomsky (Dennett 1995).
More recently, Chomsky has aligned himself with evolutionary developmental 
biology or ‘Evo Devo’. For example so-called ‘Hox genes’ (genes that regulate fun-
damental aspects of morphological development) can be shown to exist in virtually 
every species of animal, but their function varies dramatically depending on the action 
of ‘genetic switches’ (Carroll 2005). The emphasis within Evo Devo on modularity, 
and the finding that the diverse range of morphological phenomena is not necessary 
reflected in terms of diversity at the gene level, have obvious appeal for Chomsky, given 
his understanding of linguistics (Chomsky 2007: 18). Chomsky also sees new trends in 
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contemporary evolutionary theory as undermining the idea that proponents of ‘ahistorical 
biological explanation’ occupy an extreme position (Chomsky 2007: 12).
In Chomsky’s account, the transition from an initial state (no language organ) to 
a final state (fully modern language organ) is viewed as instantaneous, as ‘the result of 
some genetic event that rewired the brain, allowing for the origin of modern language 
with the rich syntax that provides a multitude of modes of expression of thought’ 
(Chomsky 2005: 3). What is the nature of this ‘rewiring’ or ‘Great Leap Forward’ 
(Chomsky 2005: 12)?
An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete 
infinity. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes n objects 
already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest 
case, the set of these n objects. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some 
equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an 
unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account 
of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in the evolution of humans would be that the brain 
was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge, at 
once laying a core part of the basis for what is found at that dramatic ‘moment’ of 
human evolution, at least in principle; to connect the dots is no trivial problem.
Chomsky considers then rejects the idea of a two-stage development (Chomsky 2005: 12):
There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far 
more complex process: first some mutation that permits two-unit expressions 
(yielding selectional advantage in overcoming memory restrictions on lexical 
explosion), then mutations permitting larger expressions, and finally the Great 
Leap that yields Merge. Perhaps the earlier steps really took place, but a more 
parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was 
effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with 
intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and 
coming to predominate, perhaps linked as a secondary process to the SM system 
for externalization and interaction, including communication as a special case.
That individual must have been in that time and place a kind of superhominid, who then 
was able to dominate in evolutionary terms, produce more offspring than competitors, and 
ultimately populate the entire planet. Accepting this as historically plausible involves 
the proposition that, at historical moment T, there was an individual A (the ‘linguistic 
Adam’) who by virtue of genetic endowment is superior to all others. This superiority 
was based on the biology of the language faculty. This implies that one human being 
can be biologically superior to another by virtue of linguistic-genetic endowment.
Chomsky’s desire to avoid even a two-stage gradualism leads him to affirm that it 
is possible for human beings to have radically, i.e. qualitatively, different abilities based 
on their genetic endowment, and for this to be produced by an apparently causeless, 
or random, mutation. Given this scenario, it is hard to see why there should not be 
an unbounded number of subsequent moments like T (T1–Tn), and many individuals 
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like Adam (A1–An). If this form of mutation happened once, then similar or even quite 
distinct mutations could have arisen many times. The argument against this is that the 
modern language organ is in fact identical across the species. But this requires accepting 
the characterization of language, linguistics and the language faculty put forward by 
Chomsky himself, within the closed circle of definitions through which it operates.
Extrapolating from Chomsky’s position, the inference must be that A, living at 
time T, was the first ‘superhominid’, that is, the first modern human being. A’s parents 
and all other hominids living at that time were on the other side of the species divide. 
An evolutionary leap was made through one mutation from non-human or pre-human 
to human, which ‘rewired’ the brain to produce a qualitatively different and cognitively 
more sophisticated being. Since pre-humans and humans could interbreed, the muta-
tion spread, and all the off-spring of the original superhominid ultimately became 
superhominids, or modern humans. If possession of the language faculty is the defin-
ing quality of the human species, then the claim is that modern humans emerged with 
a single, instantaneous ‘catastrophic’ mutation. Not only that, but — for Chomsky — 
this is the simplest explanation available which is consistent with the state of knowl-
edge in evolutionary biology. Chomsky’s discussion finishes with a characteristic piece 
of rhetoric (2005: 12):
At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the 
simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly 
surmised. In fact, it is hard to see what account of human evolution would not 
assume at least this much, in one or another form.
Put another way, in order to preserve the outlines of Chomsky’s linguistic theory, the bio-
logical history of humanity must include a ‘Great Leap Forward’ of the kind he outlines. 
Indeed this must be the central and defining moment in the history of humankind.
. Instant linguistics
The evolutionary leap from no-language to language is paralleled in Chomsky’s account 
of the language learning abilities of the child (Chomsky 2005: 12):
Similar questions arise about growth of language in the individual. It is commonly 
assumed that there is a two-word stage, a three-word stage, and so on, with an 
ultimate Great Leap Forward to unbounded generation. That is observed in 
performance, but it is also observed that at the early stage the child understands 
much more complex expressions, and that random modification of longer ones — 
even such simple changes as placement of function words in a manner inconsistent 
with UG or the adult language — leads to confusion and misinterpretation. It 
could be that unbounded Merge, and whatever else is involved in UG, is present 
at once, but only manifested in limited ways for extraneous reasons (memory and 
attention limitations and the like […]).
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In other words, there is an instantaneous developmental leap in the child’s biological 
development, which is masked from clear view by aspects of performance. From the 
diversity of experience, children ‘arrive at comparable grammars, indeed almost identical 
ones’ (Chomsky 1977: 98). One formulation can be found in Hauser, Chomsky and 
Fitch (2002: 1577):
A child is exposed to only a small proportion of the possible sentences in its 
language, thus limiting its database for constructing a more general version of 
that language in its own mind/brain.
However it is unclear to which developmental process the acquisition of language is 
being compared: vision, walking, sexual maturation? It is asserted that children ‘receive 
little or no explicit instruction’ (Salkie 1990: 23), and language learning is described in 
terms of its effortlessness, instantaneous, or remarkable rapid accomplishment. In what 
sense do the thousands of hours spent by children immersed in, and interacting with, 
the linguistic world around them, amount to an effortless or near-instantaneous accom-
plishment? Pinker claims that children are ‘not corrected for speaking ungrammatically’ 
(Pinker 1996: 1). But how do we know when a child is being corrected for speaking 
‘ungrammatically’ or when some other moral, cultural or linguistic principle is at stake? 
Again, the answer lies solely within the definitional circle of Chomskyan theory itself.
Within the Chomskyan paradigm, a familiar motif is that language is not learned, 
it grows, in a way which is intended to be more than a metaphorical parallel with other 
organs such as the heart or lungs (Smith 1999: 23):
Chomsky has strikingly suggested that, just as the heart and the rest of the 
circulatory system are organs with their own structure and functions, language is 
a kind of ‘mental organ’ interacting with other mental organs. Like the circulatory 
system, language is common to the species; like the circulatory system, it 
develops largely under genetic control, rather than being the fruit of learning or 
manipulation; like the circulatory system it is subject to impairment or failure 
independently of other organs.
The developmental process involved has even been compared to the growth of hair 
(Lightfoot 2005: 58).
The sui generis nature of this construct of the language faculty makes it difficult to 
give an empirical basis to the claim about language acquisition. One cannot compare 
something which the theory itself has set up to be incomparable. This is to leave aside 
the documentation by Tomasello (2003) of the intensive imitation involved in child 
language learning. The underlying issue with acquisition can also be put in terms of 
how unity arises out of diversity, that is, the question of how the experiential diversity 
of the child nonetheless leads to underlying unity of the final state. For Chomsky, that 
the child achieves the final state so rapidly and unerringly is proof of the underdeter-
mination of language by experience, and of the implausibility of empirical models of 
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language learning given the ‘poverty of stimulus’ (Chomsky 2007: 18). Even the severest 
of the Darwinist critics of Chomsky, Daniel Dennett, accepts that a small number of 
‘developmental triggers’ set in motion the processes of language-acquisition, and ‘a 
few environmental conditions subsequently do some minor pruning or shaping, into 
which ever mother tongue the child encounters’. The child can discern in the environ-
mental noise enough to set the system to accord with the particular variant or ‘mother 
tongue’ (Dennett 1995: 388).
There are further parallels to set alongside that between the superhominid and 
the child. The first is that between the child and the linguist: ‘language acquisition 
is rather like theory construction’ (Chomsky 2009: 20). The second is between the 
‘leap’ of the first superhominid and the Chomskyan ‘revolution’ itself, with Chomsky’s 
own Great Leap Forward at its centre. Linguistics in its pre-Chomskyan state was a para-
digm that understood language in taxonomic terms or as a ‘finite state grammar’ (Hauser, 
Chomsky & Fitch 2002: 1577). The implication was that this model was suitable only 
for describing the primitive language of animals, pre-human hominids, and the 
child in the brief developmental period before its grammar reaches the completed 
final state. The Chomskyan ‘leap’ was to a system of linguistics that could explain and 
reflect the qualities of human language, in particular its formal properties. As with the 
first superhominid, the Chomskyan mutation did not have an identifiable pre-history, 
and involved the original application of the properties of formal systems which had 
been elaborated outside linguistics as a discipline. Chomskyan linguistics understood 
itself as a revolutionary break with the past, and this self-understanding has been on 
the whole been successfully communicated to the wider academic world. Against this 
rhetoric of revolution, we can set Koerner’s ‘gradualist’ deconstruction of Chomsky’s 
own historical narrative (Koerner 1989: 101–146), as well as Tomasello’s painstaking 
empirical documentation of the gradual acquisition of language and the central role 
played by repetition therein (Tomasello 2003).
. Linguistics and systems theory
One paradigm within which the Chomskyan construct can be usefully discussed is 
modern systems theory, including the foundational semiotic theories of C.S. Peirce 
(1839–1914) and the ecological semiotics of Jakob Johann von Uexküll (1864–1944). 
Systems theory, associated in particular with Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972), 
covers a wide range of approaches, with a complex relationship to evolutionary theory 
as well as to the social and political sciences. The notion of autopoiesis, for example, 
a term derived from evolutionary biology, is used to refer to systems that reproduce 
themselves autonomously: ‘law produces by itself all the distinctions and concepts 
which it uses […] the unity of law is nothing but the fact of this self-production, this 
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“autopoiesis”‘ (Luhmann 2004: 70). Within this conception of systems theory, the auton-
omy of biological and social systems means that there is no systematic or causal link 
between system-internal processes and the external environment. While the external 
environment is necessary for the system, since it provokes and stimulates it, there is no 
systematic or causal relationship. From the point of view of the system, the environment 
is unstructured and disordered ‘noise’. The system only communicates with itself through 
its autopoieitic codes. In social science, systems theory is associated with a rejection of 
the relevance of subjectivity, intention and human agency in steering and changing the 
direction of system. A striking example of this is the vision of a systems linguistics laid 
out in Saussure’s Cours (1922). The nature of langue is such that it cannot be steered 
by the conscious intervention of its speakers; it is a social and psychological fact, but 
of an abstract kind emerging into view through the adoption of a particular point of 
view by the linguist. The system changes under the stimulation of individual acts of 
speaking, but there is no systematic or predictable causal link between the system of 
langue and its unstructured and multifarious environment. Under stimulation from 
parole, the system of langue restructures itself through autopoeisis. The system is made 
up of interdefining elements and self-referential quality contrasts with the lack of any 
principled relationship to the external world. In Chomsky’s case, the disorder, which 
he characterizes, citing William James’ (1842–1910), as ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ 
(Chomsky 2007: 17), triggers particular parameters in the system, but does not, and 
cannot, impact on the core nature of the system itself.
Chomskyan theory, even within the broad range of system theoretical 
approaches, stands out in the extremity of the divorce between system and ‘noise’ 
or ‘chaotic environment’ (Lightfoot 2005: 48). In contrast to Luhmann’s systems 
model of law, time plays no role in Chomskyan linguistics. The system is in its 
essence invariant, and, once the Great Leap Forward has been accomplished by 
genetic mutation (itself non-causally linked to any particular external or internal 
event), and spread by the evolutionary success of its bearers, the system itself never 
fundamentally changes.
. Conclusion
One line of argument has been that there is a set of practices that we call science and 
that Chomskyan linguistics falls short of this in one or other respects, in particular 
because it appears to reject the neo-Darwinian synthesis. While it might be possible 
to make such an argument, that is not what is being proposed here. What is striking, 
however, is that Chomskyan linguistics seeks an affiliation with the biological sciences, 
at the same time as it proposes the most fundamental revision in evolutionary thinking 
since Darwin. The basic assertions about the language faculty have remained constant 
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through the shifts in the nature of the formal model, the formal complexities of which 
have masked a radically reductive biolinguistic framework. As the biolinguistic frame has 
become more explicit, the inner logic of the theory and its core idealization of the language 
faculty has increasingly brought into focus Chomsky’s radical exceptionalism with regard to 
evolutionary biology. Yet there has been no sophisticated and genuinely cross-disciplinary dis-
cussion of the role of idealization within linguistics in relation to scientific methodology. An 
education in linguistics, if it merely takes the form of induction into one of the contemporary 
schools of formal linguistics, is highly impoverished intellectually. To present the human 
language faculty as a radically autonomous, timeless and perfectly self-referential entity 
requires a great deal more theoretical justification than assertions about the centrality of 
idealization to science.
Chomsky identifies the language faculty as the essence of what it is to be human. 
He seeks to avoid at all costs a characterization of humankind that includes any sig-
nificant differences in biological inheritance or variation. In order to defend this core 
idealization Chomsky is willing to present as reductionalist a view of the subject mat-
ter of linguistics as is necessary. The authenticity of the native speaker in Romantic 
terms is required to create data for the operation of the theory, in that only a ‘naturally 
occurring’ native speaker can authenticate ‘naturally occurring’ data. The concept of 
native speaker remains however an awkward and indigestible ‘trace’ of the world of 
E-language in the architecture of the theory, symptomatic of the problematic uses of 
the ideas of the ‘natural’ within the modern study of language.
Chomskyan theory offers a rationalist, universalist account of human nature. Ulti-
mately, the central idealizations of the theory serve a political-ideological purpose rather 
than any recognizable scientific goal. Having linked language to biology, Chomsky must 
bracket out all forms of variation from his model in order to sustain this vision of 
human equality. But this idealization is only required because of the biolinguistic 
framework itself, and the insistence that there is a deterministic relationship between 
human biology and language. The underlying presumptions of the model could be 
used to explain or justify human inequality by pointing to the competitive evolution-
ary advantage of exaptive changes in the human language faculty. This is not to imply 
that Chomsky believes that human beings vary biologically as individual and groups 
in respect of their language faculty. But for someone who has linked empiricist ideas of 
human plasticity to ‘manipulation and domination and control’ (Chomsky 1988: 244; 
McGilvray 1999: 16–17), this is a remarkable blind-spot. Ideas of human genetic fix-
ity (rather than plasticity) have been similarly open to abuse, with individuals and 
groups deemed incorrigible on the basic of their inherited biological nature (Hutton 
2005). Like Oedipus at the crossroads before Thebes, Chomskyan linguistics has by 
its own internal logic threatened to stumble onto the very conclusion it seeks at all 
costs to avoid, namely that human beings and human societies are shaped by profound 
differences in their biolinguistic heritage.
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The evolution of meaning and grammar
Chomskyan theory and the evidence 
from grammaticalization*
T. Craig Christy
University of North Alabama
Central to Chomskyan language theory, often seen as a Kuhnian revolution, is the 
claim that universal grammar (UG) is innate and that it comprises the principles 
and parameters which constitute and constrain possible human language 
grammars. In this model, grammar is essentially a programmed fait accompli, and 
the causes of language change are sought principally in the reanalyses resulting 
from the language acquisition process.
  An alternate approach, grammaticalization, would appear to be potentially 
at odds with this view, depending on the degree of specificity assigned to UG. 
In studies of grammaticalization, distinct, restricted, and therefore virtually 
predictable pathways of change (as opposed to random parameter settings) and 
evolving (as opposed to innate) grammatical categories have been identified 
as the linguistic/pragmatic outcomes of children’s and adult speakers’ use of 
language. In the generative perspective, language change is seen as resulting 
directly from the acquisition process, rather than from language usage. Evidence 
from grammaticalization studies makes it clear that understanding the nature 
of language development and change requires that actual usage, performance, 
be taken into account — not just competence. In assessing whether these 
approaches can be brought into alignment, a variety of issues are examined: 
unidirectionality in grammaticalization, the linguistic views of Antoine Meillet and 
Michel Bréal, the poverty of the stimulus argument and UG, grammaticalization 
and uniformitarianism, the central role of pragmatics and discourse analysis, the 
relationship between UG and grammatical categories, evidence from pidgin and 
creole studies as a challenge to the bioprogram hypothesis, acquisition of ASL 
as evidence of UG being innate abstract patterning, the loss of expressivity as a 
factor in grammaticalization, and the emergence of apparently new linguistic 
categories and their relation to cognition.
*This research was supported by the University of North Alabama, and by Friends of the 
Department of Foreign Languages.
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1. Introduction
Central to Chomskyan language theory, which some have accorded the status of a 
Kuhnian revolution,1 is the claim that all languages share a common underlying uni-
versal grammar, that this universal grammar is innate, and that it is comprised of a 
set of principles (fundamental configuring forces) and parameters (selection options 
for the resulting configurational transformations) which constitute and constrain pos-
sible human language grammars. In this model, grammar is essentially — and, in all 
events, ultimately — a programmed fait accompli, and the causes of language change 
are sought principally in the reanalyses characteristically carried out and observed in 
the course of language acquisition. Based on unique inferences about the systemic pat-
terning informing input from adult speech, the grammar each child constructs is nec-
essarily different from that actually underlying this input, and is, consequently, capable 
of generating output that would not emerge from the adult grammar.
An alternate approach, grammaticalization, so christened by Antoine Meillet 
(1866–1936)2 in 1912, and the focus of intense research over the past two decades, would 
appear to be potentially at odds with this view (depending on the degree of specificity 
assigned to UG) for the simple reason that, in studies of grammaticalization, distinct 
pathways of change and evolving (as opposed to innate) grammatical categories have 
been identified as the linguistic/pragmatic outcomes of speakers’ use of (as opposed to 
children’s acquisition of) the language. Thus, on the one hand, grammaticalization stud-
ies, which have multiplied exponentially since the 1980s to become a major current 
in linguistic research, have yielded firm evidence of the evolution of grammatical dis-
tinctions; of grammar. In Chomskyan theory, on the other hand, universal grammar, 
being innate, is by definition fixed, not evolving. Whether these two approaches are 
seen as incompatible hinges largely on the scope assigned to ‘universal grammar’, on the 
one hand, and to ‘grammar’ as used to designate the systematic regularities and struc-
tures of languages, on the other. And while Chomsky’s formalist approach recognizes 
autonomous phonological, morphosyntactic and semantic components, and privileges 
‘competence’, the functional, usage-based orientation of grammaticalization research 
underscores the blurring of categorical boundaries involved in language changes, and 
accords priority to ‘performance’. Despite these differences, which have been hotly 
debated in the literature, a rapprochement of these two approaches is by no means 
beyond reach, a position for which Newmeyer (1998), for example, has advocated: “…cru-
cially,” he says, “there is nothing that we find in grammaticalization that is  incompatible 
1. See, e.g., Searle 1972, Murray 1980, and Newmeyer 1980.
2. For a brief overview of Meillet’s linguistic work see Christy 2005.
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with any well established principle of generative grammar” (292).3 In a similar vein, 
Bisang (2001) advocates for “…the serious and open-minded cooperation of different 
linguistic schools” if we are to achieve a better understanding of both universal grammar 
and the evolution of linguistic structures (218).
Does the evolutionary nature of grammaticalization challenge the revolutionary 
status of Chomskyan theory? The fundamental categorical nature of some grammatical-
ization outcomes suggests that these may not be simply selection options within uni-
versal grammar. Meillet, for instance, maintained that “…the 〈〈grammaticalization〉〉 
of certain words creates new forms, introduces categories which had no linguistic 
expression, [and] transforms the system as a whole” (1921 [1912]: 133).4 On the other 
hand, the fact that the universe of paths of grammaticalization appears to be relatively 
restricted could be seen as suggesting that grammaticalization operates exclusively 
within the ‘principles and parameters’ of universal grammar. In exploring these ques-
tions I will also consider the complications associated with strictly segregating dia-
chronic from synchronic data, as well as the lexical-to-functional semantic trajectory 
associated with grammaticalization, which can also be seen as a development from a 
more iconic or motivated to a more arbitrary or unmotivated state. In this regard it will 
also be useful to consider whether the transparency-to-opaqueness cline associated 
with etymological development is of a kind with the overall process of grammatical-
ization (often called ‘semantic bleaching’); that is, with the evolution from lexeme to 
grammatical marker.
1.1 Universal grammar
Recognized as the chief exponent of linguistic nativism/rationalism in modern lin-
guistics, Noam Chomsky (1928-) is well known for his view that all languages share a 
common structural basis — common foundational rules that define the organizational 
pathways available to languages. These common rules constitute a master template, a 
. See particularly Chapter 5, “Deconstructing Grammaticalization”, in which he acknowl-
edges contributions from both approaches while discounting claims that grammaticalization 
challenges generative grammar. Everett (1996) declares: “Setting aside rather wild claims from 
both sides … it doesn’t seem to me that there is any incompatibility at all between gram-
maticalization and Chomskyan theory”. Von Fintel (1995: 176, note 1)considers “… whether 
the very phenomenon of grammaticalization presents a threat to the legitimacy of generative 
grammar” and concludes “It seems to me that it doesn’t even though some authors do see the 
apparently gradual and squishy nature of grammaticalization as an embarrassment for the 
clear-cut lexical/functional dichotomy built into generative grammar”.
4. “…la 〈〈grammaticalisation〉〉 de certain mots crée des formes neuves, introduit des catégo-
ries qui n’avaient pas d’expression linguistique, transforme l’ensemble du système” (1921: 133; 
translations mine:CC).
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universal grammar that channels and limits linguistic structure. The absence of specific 
kinds of expressions in child language acquisition — despite the fact that children have 
no evidence that these expressions are grammatically illicit — is often cited as cor-
roborating the existence of an underlying, universal set of constraints. Thus the kinds 
of errors children do make, as they acquire language, appear to be underwritten by 
the rules of grammar as manifested in one or another language, though not in their 
own. Expressions that would never occur in any language, at least not in any known or 
studied language, are simply not observed. A parallel might be drawn here with phonet-
ics: certain sounds — for example whistles, or labiodentals produced by bringing the 
lower front teeth into contact with the upper lip — simply do not figure in the inven-
tory of known language sounds, though both are readily produced. Coupled with the 
poverty of the stimulus argument — that is, the claim that children acquire language 
from a comparatively impoverished inventory of examples — the fact that children’s 
overall language performance falls consistently within the limitations of rules known 
to inform the structures of all languages provides strong evidence of universal gram-
mar, of the language faculty being in some sense hard-wired in the brain.5 Chomsky’s 
focus, in short, is not so much on the observable data of language as on the implications 
the data portend for an understanding of the basic functioning of the mind. Chomsky 
challenged prevailing linguistic theory with questions it was at pains to answer: How 
do children acquire language in such a remarkably brief period of time? Why do all 
languages, despite surface variations, show an underlying uniformity of structure and 
organization? How does child language acquisition relate to language change? In doing 
so he expanded the purview of linguistics beyond what he saw as essentially a focus 
on the classification and analysis of surface phenomena, and in effect set in motion 
in linguistic science what Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), in his well-known Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962), defines as a revolution. However, Chomsky himself would 
sooner see his contribution as being, instead, pre-Galilean; as at best laying the ground-
work for a more comprehensive future theory of language that would perhaps incorpo-
rate advances from biology, cognitive science and other areas. Chomsky’s approach set 
in motion a ‘paradigm shift’ in which the study of language facts and language behavior 
ceased to be an end in itself, and became, instead, the means for inferring the otherwise 
not directly observable workings of the mind. In aspiring, for example, to elucidate the 
deep-rooted differences at large in sentences which, on the surface, seemed syntactically 
identical, or whose ambiguity suggested multiple resolutions of what appeared to be a 
. As Chomsky asserts, “Knowledge of the properties of empty categories is part of the 
framework that the human mind brings to the problem of language acquisition. The elements 
of this framework are not learned and could not be learned by the child in the time available 
and on the evidence available…” (1988: 91).
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single simple structure, Chomsky brought a formalist and mentalist perspective to what 
had been a predominantly objectivist method of analysis.
1.2 Causes of language change
The special importance of language acquisition in Chomskyan theory extends beyond 
the evidence it appears to offer of a universal, biologically determined language faculty. 
Central to the theory is the claim that language change is primarily to be accounted for 
as the result of language learners’ reanalyses, that it is rooted in inter-generational dif-
ferences. In acquiring language, each child in effect, albeit unconsciously, constructs a 
grammar that can generate the observed forms, but which is in fact different from the 
grammar behind the parents’ speech. Overtly, the speech of parents and children appears 
uniform, though this apparent uniform output is in fact something of a mirage, to the 
extent that it is actually the product of different underlying grammars. Over time, these 
underlying differences in the child’s grammar will give rise to linguistic forms that would 
never have been generated by the parent’s grammar. In this way language, both gradually 
and imperceptibly, undergoes changes, and these changes are regular because they are 
the output either of rules, or of rule reorderings. The grammar of adults, by contrast, is 
seen as essentially fixed, invariant in any significant way. That is, the overall architecture 
of linguistic structures, fixed during the acquisition process, remains essentially intact, 
impacted only by superficial changes. Once the language acquisition process has run its 
course, the resulting rule architecture is for all practical purposes permanent, immu-
table, and subject only to rule additions, which, as regards their impact on the grammar, 
are merely supplementary rather than transformative in nature.
1. Grammaticalization and language change
This rather rigid, and limiting, account of language change runs counter to the find-
ings of current research in grammaticalization. Although in some ways a moving 
target, with linguists differing at times markedly in their understanding of its reach, 
fundamentally grammaticalization is the process whereby lexical terms, through fre-
quent recurrence in specific contextual frames, and under the influence of discourse-
pragmatic cues, take on routinized, grammatical meanings. This process is continuous, 
with grammaticalized forms themselves in time becoming potential candidates for 
further grammaticalization. It is also generally agreed that this process is unidirec-
tional in that it almost always shows a movement from a less grammatical to a more 
grammatical state.6 The definition of grammaticalization as “…an evolution whereby 
. The claim for unidirectionality in grammaticalization has been the topic of heated debate. 
For an overview and indication of potential counterexamples see Traugott 2001.
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linguistic units lose in semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, 
and phonetic substance, respectively” (Heine & Reh 1984: 15) underscores the mani-
fold nature of this process which, in effect, steers and suffuses language development 
on all levels of analysis. The net impact of grammaticalization, a movement from a 
more motivated to a less motivated state, from more independent to less independent,7 
from more concrete to more relational meaning, is an increase in form at the expense 
of content, an evolution that can be seen as a shift from a state of greater iconicity or 
relative transparency to a state of increased arbitrariness and etymological opacity. The 
following examples illustrate the grammaticalization process:8
 (1)  The French pas, as in Il ne va (pas) [He doesn’t go (a step)] started as a way of 
reinforcing negated motion verbs, but was then extended to non motion verbs 
and understood as part and parcel of negation: Il ne sait pas [He doesn’t know].
 (2)  The motion verb going to in I am going [in order] to see the castle becomes a 
marker of futurity, and is then extended to such sentences as I am going to like Bill.
In both cases reanalysis, analogy and reinterpretation propel the development of 
grammatical meaning out of lexical meaning. The fact that grammar appears to be in 
a constant state of emerging,9 guided by conversational implicatures and associated 
inferences, presents a challenge to the Chomskyan position which considers gram-
matical — more specifically syntactic– categories innate, with grammar being effec-
tively shielded from language usage. Grammaticalization theory seeks the locus of 
change, and thereby the genesis of grammar, in the usage of all speakers, and does not 
disproportionately value those changes that are generated by speakers whose overall 
grammatical structure has not yet been finalized. The issue of whether or when the 
grammatical blueprint of a language is fixed or ‘finalized’ is itself in fact crucial.
It is a commonplace of linguistics since at least the nineteenth century that there 
is no essential difference separating the processes of language origin and development 
from those of change. This is the uniformitarian axiom.10 If we take grammaticalization 
. Hopper & Traugott 1993: 62.
. These examples are excerpted from Hopper & Traugott 1993: 58–61.
9. On emergence cf. Hopper in his article “Emergent Grammar”: “The notion of emergence 
is a pregnant one. It is not intended to be a standard sense of origins or genealogy, not a 
historical question of ‘how’ the grammar came to be the way it ‘is’, but instead it takes the 
adjective emergent seriously as a continual movement towards structure, a postponement or 
‘deferral’ of structure, a view of structure as always provisional, always negotiable, and in fact 
as epiphenomenal, that is, at least as much an effect as a cause” (1987: 142).
10. See Christy 1983. Cf. Bréal’s statement in his 1883 essay “The Intellectual Laws of Lan-
guage: a Sketch in Semantics”: “…the same laws whose operation we can observe in accessible 
periods operated also in the most distant past” (Wolf 1991: 137), and,in his 1887 review of 
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to be the quintessential process for linguistic development and change throughout the 
history of language, this could be seen as ultimately and paradoxically implying a non-
uniformitarian “…stage of language in which there were only lexical items”, a conclu-
sion which Traugott (2001), for example, opposes:
…claiming that grammatical items originate in lexical ones does NOT entail 
hypothesizing a language state in which everything is lexical. This would be true 
only on a creationist view of language development, the Chomskyan position that 
the language capacity emerged suddenly, full-fledged. I submit that the creationist 
view is in error, not unidirectionality (5–6).
The innovations emerging from the grammar underlying the usage of language learn-
ers as well as those emerging from the grammar underlying the usage of adult speak-
ers have, in consonance with this axiom, at all times and in all languages contributed 
to the emergence and restructurings of grammar. Thus to localize language change 
exclusively in the language acquisition process is a distortion. Moreover, just as the 
generativists emphasize that divergent grammars underlie the speech of adults and 
children, we can also say that no two individuals of any age share an identical gram-
mar. Given this built-in potential for variation, innovations should be just as likely to 
emerge in adult speech as in children’s speech. In this sense it is absurd to speak of 
‘finalized’ grammatical structure constraining the innovation potential of adult speak-
ers. To insist on this is the equivalent of imposing on adult language functioning the 
equivalent of a critical period hypothesis. The evidence of grammaticalization sug-
gests, instead, that language acquisition, in the broadest sense, is an ongoing, open-
ended process in which the ratios of thought and linguistic structure are in fact ever in 
flux. The elements of language, precisely because they function in combinations, not 
in isolation, are constantly subject to reinterpretation and redeployment to signal new 
gradations of meaning and aspectual nuance.
The French linguist Michel Bréal (1832–1915) speaks in this regard of words ‘con-
taminating’ each other (Wolf 1991: 137), of yielding their autonomy to expedite the 
expression of thought, observing that “…meaning subordinates the matter of language 
to itself ”; “…the operation of thought…separates itself from the form to which it is 
linked…[and] works to change that form…Mens agitat molem [Mind moves matter]” 
Arsène Darmesteter’s La vie des mots, where he observed that “Whoever takes note of how 
meanings change will find himself in the process of discovering how they developed in the 
first place” (Wolf 1991: 174). Equally explicit is this statement in his 1866 “On the Form and 
Function of Words”: “It is therefore not just at the origin of races that the creation of languages 
is to be placed: we create them at every moment; for every change which affects them is of our 
own doing. …even the most insignificant of grammatical changes find their principal cause in 
human thought” (Wolf 1991: 61).
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(Wolf 1991: 171, note 30;173). Once a lexical item is perceived in such a fashion that 
its original content no longer enters consciousness, it is, as it were, free to become the 
vessel of a re-imagined relational matrix.11 “It is the mind,” Bréal says, “which animates 
the verb by endowing it with transitive force, links and subordinates prepositions, and 
strips words of their proper meaning in order to redeploy them as the limbs and joints of 
speech” (Wolf 1991: 91) [italics added].
This statement of grammaticalization, avant la lettre, would today be expressed as 
lexemes losing their autonomous status to become grammatical markers. Importantly, 
Bréal realizes that grammatical categories are neither immutable nor innate, but rather 
the current exponents of a process which is ongoing and which benefits from losing 
track of its origins:
The parts of speech given in grammars — nouns, verbs, pronouns, adverbs, prepo-
sitions, conjunctions — have not always existed. They are the result of long evolution, 
whose most recent consequences are still coming to light (Wolf 1991: 170).
In Bréal’s view, sound change, by efficiently effacing word origins, is actually a boon to lan-
guage evolution: it “free[s] words from the shackles of tradition…” (Wolf 1991: 168), 
thus rendering them sign vehicles much more able to accommodate abstract thought: 
“Overawareness of etymology is often harmful to the expression of thought, for it may 
disturb that thought with all kinds of false reflexions” (Wolf 1991: 168).12
The fact that what are acknowledged as grammatical categories evolve over 
time — and in different ways and to varying degrees across languages — makes it 
clear that the elements of universal grammar, the operations of the human faculty of 
reason,13 must be principles of intellection of a far more fundamental nature than those 
represented by traditional grammatical categories suggest. While this may seem at first 
a trivial observation, it calls due attention to the very real issue of delimitation involved 
in comparing and contrasting whether and to what extent Chomsky’s approach to 
language is at variance with the claims and findings of grammaticalization. One is 
11. Bréal uses the term specialization, along with contamination to refer to the product and 
process involved in the evolution of grammatical relations (See Wolf 1991: 143). In current 
usage, grammaticalization refers to both the process and its outcome.
12. See Christy 2000 for further discussion of the importance, to linguistic devleopment, of 
the etymon lapsing from awareness.
1. In his scathing critique of Chomsky, “The History of Linguistics and Professor Chomsky” 
(1970: reprinted in Aarsleff 1982), Aarsleff underscores the need to understand universal 
grammar as a concept implicit in empiricist (Locke, Condillac)as well as in rationalist 
 (Descartes, Port-Royal grammaire générale)conceptualizations of language: “Both modes in 
the study of language made the same basic assumptions regarding reason and the uniformity 
of human nature, and both were directed toward the same subject matter and aim; only their 
methods of approach were different” (1982: 111).
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reminded of the nature-nurture debates that once dominated, and detained, debates 
in the biological and social sciences. Whether these two approaches are adjudged anti-
thetical and incompatible hinges entirely on the degree of specificity assigned to the 
innate versus the experiential component. The importance of evidence from gram-
maticalization research to generative grammar might in fact be usefully likened to the 
proclaimed ‘paradigm shift’ in biology, where the tree-of-life conceptualization of life, 
premised exclusively on vertical inheritance from progenitors, has had to make room 
for the evidence of horizontal gene transfer.14 Crucial in both cases is the sustained 
interaction of synchronic with diachronic elements.
On the one hand we could maintain that there is no ultimate incompatibility 
between the Chomskyan and grammaticalization positions, since the necessarily 
highly abstract nature of universal grammar would not exclude subsequent grammati-
cal developments. On the other hand, just because new grammaticalizations emerge 
from the common universal grammatical core does not require that they are already 
present in this core. Then again, it is by no means certain that we can declare a category 
absent just because it has no formal expression. Bréal was explicit on this point, par-
ticularly in his 1868 essay “The Latent Concepts of Language” in which, as if in antici-
pated commentary on the relative reach of explanations rooted in universal grammar 
versus grammaticalization, he declares that we must not
…deny a priori to other races the existence of any notion not formally marked 
in their language. The mind penetrates the matter of language and fills in its 
cracks and crevices. By refusing to acknowledge in a people any concepts except 
those which are formally represented, we lay ourselves open to the possibility of 
neglecting what is most lively and original in their thought. Since languages do 
not all express the same things, it is also possible for them to differ in what they 
leave unexpressed. It is not enough, in order to grasp the structure of a language, 
to analyze its grammar and to reduce its words to their etymological meanings. 
We must enter into a people’s way of thinking and feeling. It is solely on this 
condition that comparative philology can fulfill its ultimate goal, which is to help 
us to discover the workings of human reason, and to reveal the historical laws of 
its development. (Wolf 1991: 92)15
We might say that language merely suggests, while the mind interprets. The circum-
stances of usage, today the subject matter of pragmatics and discourse analysis, ani-
mate the manifest message, imbuing it with the emotional and intellectual content to 
which the elements of language can only point. Accordingly, all manner of contextual 
1. Cf. Gogarten 2000: “Once thought to be a static, unchanging record of the history of life, 
the genome is actually plastic and ever evolving.”
1. On Bréal’s latent concepts see Christy 2003. On the role of absence and unexpressed 
 elements in language see Christy 2007.
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content, including what is not expressed linguistically, must be factored in if we are 
to have a chance at “enter[ing] into a people’s way of thinking and feeling”. This same 
point is made again in Bréal’s 1887 review of Arsène Darmesteter’s (1846–1888) La vie 
des mots (1887):
A language derives its character as much from what it leaves understood as it does 
from what it makes explicit. A good balance here makes a good language, just as 
the balance of solid and void makes good architecture (Wolf 1991: 172).
Bréal’s claim that “We must enter into a people’s way of thinking and feeling” calls to 
mind his discussion of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s (1767–1835) concept of the ‘inner 
form’ of language,16 which Bréal understands to refer to that component, unique to 
each and every language, which is non-innate, subject to change over time, and which 
is and functions as the “memory of the maternal language [which] …imposes itself on 
the parts of the language which have remained free-floating, and guides them into pre-
established frameworks” (Wolf 1991: 170–171). We might take this somewhat obscure 
interpretation of Humboldt’s obscure concept as meaning that the transformations any 
given language undergoes betoken cumulative pressures and constraints associated 
with the history of that language. In this view, change in language reflects first and 
foremost the influence of internal forces specific to a given language, and only indi-
rectly, if at all, universal grammar. It is easy to see how the question of the compatibil-
ity, or incompatibility, of universal grammar and grammaticalization might ultimately 
devolve into an academic quibble, predicated on definitions and issues of specificity.17 
Thus Meillet’s claim that grammaticalization “… creates new forms [and] introduces 
categories which had no linguistic expression [and] transforms the system as a whole 
(1921 [1912]: 133) could be understood to mean that new linguistic categories evolve 
for the very first time in language, or that they evolve for the first time in a given lan-
guage. Moreover, these categories, even though hitherto unexpressed in language, may 
have always already been latent components of a universal innate intellectual endow-
ment, ‘categories in waiting’, as it were, or may be entirely novel outcomes of complex 
linguistic and pragmatic forces interacting to package and deliver meaning. The net 
impact of Meillet’s observation, and of grammaticalization, is a recalibration of the sys-
tem of language, a shift towards greater efficiency18 in the delivery of meaning, more 
1. On Humboldt’s concept of inner language form see Christy 1985.
1. See 1.4 below regarding attempts to square non-random pathways of grammaticalization 
with requirements of principles and parameters theory.
1. Van Gelderen (2004) sees grammars that are more grammaticalized as being simultane-
ously more economical.
 The evolution of meaning and grammar 
specifically a shift in the ratio of meaning delivered grammatically versus meaning 
delivered lexically, a ratio that might conceivably be used as a criterion in language 
typology.19
After discussing grammaticalization in relation to the principles and parameters 
approach of universal grammar, Hopper and Traugott, in their pioneering work Gram-
maticalization (1993), advocate a compromise position in which universals are them-
selves understood as more abstract potentialities subject to modification:
An alternative approach, more akin to the objectives of researchers in 
grammaticalization, is to regard the universal component as one which does 
not ‘completely determine the nature of linguistic structure,’ but rather as one 
which characterizes broader properties of the human constitution and can be 
modified by outside stimuli (Jackendoff 1983) and by the functional purposes 
to which language is put (Givón 1989). We will adopt this more flexible view of 
universals. (35)
Bréal’s persuasive pronouncements on the unexpressed in language certainly leave 
room for this latter interpretation, which is otherwise seemingly buttressed by the fact 
that grammaticalization is somewhat predictable precisely because it appears to draw 
on a limited inventory of cognitive pathways. A few examples will help drive this point 
home.
1. Universal grammar and pathways of grammaticalization
One of the more profound findings of grammaticalization research has been that, 
cross-linguistically, the same pairings of lexical items with grammatical forms recur 
19. Cf. Hopper and Traugott’s formulation: “It is often difficult to establish firm boundaries 
between the categories represented on clines [of grammaticalization], and indeed the study 
of grammaticalization has emerged in part out of a recognition of the general fluidity of so-
called categories” (1993: 7). In his 1869 review of Bréal’s “Les Idées Latentes du Langage” [“The 
Latent Ideas of Language”] of 1868, Steinthal pondered whether a typology of languages might 
be established based on what languages leave unexpressed, but acknowledged the challenges 
that constructing such a typology would entail: “Wie sollen wir die Denkoperationen des 
Polynesiers erforschen, wenn sie von den unsrigen abweichen und doch nicht ausgedrückt 
sind?” [“How are we to investigate the thought processes of the Polynesian if they diverge 
from our own yet are not expressed?”](284; cf. Christy 2002: 4). Since the products of gram-
maticalization are still expressed forms, albeit with a higher degree of understood content,they 
might sooner provide a basis for establishing a linguistic typology which would track the ratio 
of meaning delivered grammatically versus meaning delivered lexically.
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over and again. For example, be going to figures frequently in future constructions 
(English We’re going to eat; French Nous allons manger), as do want/desire (English 
I will go; Chinese Wo yao qu [yao = want]). The fact that fulfilling a purpose is, by 
default, activity in the future gives rise to the inference that go is a signal of future 
time, as does the movement from place to place implicit in the meaning of go.20 Like-
wise with want/desire (Old English willan), where the inference of futurity arises from 
the fact that what is desired is clearly absent in the present. In their World Lexicon of 
Grammaticalization (2002), a superb resource for grammaticalization research, Heine 
and Kuteva synthesize an enormous amount of data from a wide variety of languages, 
the net impact of which is to document the astonishing uniformity of grammatical-
ization pathways. This element of uniformity, of virtual predictability of pathways of 
change runs counter to the generativist assumption that parameter setting is entirely 
random.21 As Roberts and Roussou (2003) point out,
The claim that grammaticalization follows a pathway of language change, that is, 
expresses a tendency, poses a challenge to the standard Principles and Parameters 
approach to syntactic change…the principle theoretical question that arises is 
whether language change is a deterministic process…whether we can identify 
clear pathways of change that make languages converge onto certain parametric 
settings (3).
To reconcile the undeniable evidence of non-random pathways of grammaticaliza-
tion with the theoretical requirement that parameter setting be a random process, that 
no pathways or ‘drift’ be identifiable in diachronic change, they observe that by far 
the majority of parametric changes, but not all, exhibit a reduction in markedness, 
though this analysis seems more an attempt to defend principles and parameters at 
all costs than an acceptance of compelling evidence from grammaticalization studies 
20. While Heine and Kuteva (2002: 160–164) differentiate among allative go to,expressing 
motion toward a place,future go to, and purpose go to, all three appear to apply in a sentence 
such as We’re going to eat. The future sense of the going to/gonna construction is also referred 
to as the planned or intentional future (Cf. Andersen 2001: 34).
21. As Roberts and Roussou put it, “In the context of the theory of principles and parameters 
(whether in its minimalist formulation or otherwise), we can view parameters as creating a 
space of possible variation within which grammatical systems are distributed. The natural 
view of synchronic variation among grammatical systems is to think of them as randomly 
scattered in this space; and the natural view of diachronic change is to see it as a natural ‘walk’ 
around this space. The prediction is then that there are no pathways or ‘drift’in diachronic 
change …” (2003: 3–4).
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(2003: 4; Klausenburger 2008: 175–176). 22 The following examples from the World 
Lexicon convey a sense of the uniform cognitive pathways under discussion:23
FRONT > BEFORE: Chinese qian ‘front’ > qian san nian ‘the last three years’
INSTRUMENT > MANNER: German mit ‘with’ as in mit dem Schirm ‘with the 
umbrella’ > mit as in mit Absicht ‘with purpose = on purpose’. Cf. Sie schlug ihn mit dem 
Schirm ‘She hit him with her umbrella’/Sie schlug ihn mit Absicht ‘She hit him on purpose’.
GIVE > DATIVE: Chinese gei ‘give’ > gei ta ‘to him/her’
KEEP > CONTINUOUS/DURATIVE MARKER: English keep > keep signaling
COME TO > CHANGE OF STATE: English come > come true, come undone
Abstracting common cognitive denominators from a mass of widely divergent 
languages whose grammatical categories, at least from the perspective of formal 
analysis, intersect and overlap in irregular ways, is no easy task: indeed, the ultimate 
nature of the underlying conceptual processes is frequently less than clear. Accord-
ingly, we find, throughout the Lexicon, improvisational statements of the following 
sort, which serve simultaneously to illustrate just what is understood by ‘pathways of 
grammaticalization’:24
‘This appears to be (an instance of) a (more general) process whereby/according 
to which’
–  “…verbs are grammaticalized to auxiliaries denoting tense or aspect functions” 311)
–  “…lower numerals are pressed into service to function as number markers, typically 
on nouns” (303)
22. Using “…a theory of markedness which has the effect of creating ‘basins of attraction’(in 
the sense of complexity theory)within the parameter space …we retain the explanatory force 
of the notion of parametric change, but make it compatible with the evidence that changes tend 
naturally to go in certain directions but not others — grammaticalization being a prime example. 
More generally, we see this as a way of reconciling the tension between descriptive and explanatory 
adequacy in diachronic syntax…” (Roberts and Roussou 2003: 4). As Klausenburger concludes, 
“Ockhamite reasoning selects the invisible hand approach over the markedness account, as this 
extra layer leads to a less parsimonious solution in Roberts and Roussou 2003” (2008:182).
2. These examples, with selected evidence from more widespread languages,are excerpted 
from Heine & Kuteva 2002.
2. The importance of the ‘pathways’ concept to research in grammaticalization is under-
scored by its prominence in the literature. Cf., e.g., Fischer et al. 2000, Brinton 2009, Hopper 
and Traugott 1993: 30, Bybee et al. 1994: 253 ff., Givón 2000: 209 ff., Heine and Kuteva 2007: 
53 ff., Lehmann 1985, Diessel 1999: 115–155, Bisang 1998: 19, Yap and Matthews 2008: 309 ff., 
Givón 2009: 97–120, Croft 2000: 156–165, and Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer 1991: 171 ff.
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–  “…certain body parts, on account of their relative location, are used as structural 
templates to express deictic location” (214)
–  “…generic nouns like ‘person’ and ‘thing’, either on their own or as part of some 
noun phrase, are grammaticalized to pronouns” (209)
–  “…grammatical markers having a spatial base serve as conceptual templates for 
comparative markers” (201)
– “…locative markers are grammaticalized to markers of cause” (200)
–  “…process verbs are grammaticalized to auxiliaries denoting tense or aspect func-
tions” (185)
–  “…spatial concepts, including motion in space, are used as structural templates to 
express temporal concepts” (183)
–  “…grammatical aspect functions are conceptualized and expressed in terms of 
locative concepts” (179)
–  “…spatial concepts are used to also express causal relations” (172)
–  “…process verbs, on account of some salient semantic property, give rise to gram-
matical markers expressing case relations” (165)
–  “…verbs denoting location or motion serve as structural templates to express rela-
tional adpositional or subordinating concepts” (79)
At a minimum this uniformity makes explicit that grammars are constructed in ways 
that reveal the workings of fundamental common cognitive strategies, but whether we 
are dealing here with reflections of the delimiting principles and parameters underlying 
universal grammar, or simply with artifacts of a combinatorial regime which generates 
a finite number of possible sequencing configurations, remains beyond demonstra-
tion. On the other hand the ultimate status of cognitive and structural uniformity is, at 
least as regards differences between the perspectives of universal grammar and gram-
maticalization, perhaps less important than determining whether language change is 
to be traced predominantly to the language acquisition process.
1. Evidence from Pidgins, Creoles, and ASL
Pidgin and creole languages have often been viewed as optimal crucibles for gleaning 
a glimpse into the evolution of language. As macaronic amalgams bereft of grammar, 
pidgins, so the argument goes, should, in the process of being acquired by children and 
morphing into creoles, reveal exclusively the unfolding of the unadulterated innate 
language program. While the concept is not without appeal, it is nevertheless fraught 
with complications. A possible test of the hypothesis — one thinks, for instance, of 
Bickerton and Givón’s once proposed desert-island experiment (Banks 2008) — entails 
complications ranging from ‘forbidden-experiment’ ethical concerns to the dangers of 
underestimating elusive grammatical undercurrents that might in fact be bubbling up 
from one or more of the languages here in contact. In the final analysis, what appears 
clear is that, along with young children, older children and adults also contribute to the 
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innovations which spawn grammaticalizations. As Hopper & Traugott point out, “…
the study of creoles confirms the conclusion that children and adults do not  contribute 
to change in fundamentally different ways” (1993: 209),25 though Slobin (1994: 129–
130),26 looking at language acquisition in general, sees the contributions of adults and 
children as resulting from different processes:
I propose …that children come to discover pragmatic extensions of grammatical 
forms, but they do not innovate them; rather, these extensions are innovated 
diachronically by older speakers, and children acquire them through a prolonged 
developmental process of conversational inference (Slobin, 1994: 129–130).
Thus it is a gross oversimplification to speak of grammarless pidgins of adults and 
grammaticalized creoles of their children. At the most, we are dealing with a difference 
not of kind, but of degree.
This conclusion crucially challenges the nativist position that the grammar of cre-
oles, which seemingly emerges ex nihilo (with pidgins seen as lacking a formal gram-
matical system), is in fact a reflection of the innate language program, and therefore a 
certain confirmation of Chomskyan theory, a view reflected in Bickerton’s (1988) bio-
program hypothesis. Creole grammar, like the output of grammaticalization as docu-
mented cross-linguistically, no doubt does reflect certain innate cognitive limitations 
and dispositions, but these are not limited to the language acquisition process. From 
the perspective of grammaticalization, the evidence from pidgins and creoles thus 
appears to provide a corrective to the Chomskyan position on language change and 
universal grammar, as well as a unique window on the grammaticalization process as 
it operates on the input from a variety of languages in contact. Newmeyer (1998), how-
ever, does not see this evidence as undermining the generativist position, but instead 
as supporting the claim for universal grammar: “…while adults,” he says, “may modify 
pidgins into something more creole-like, it is only children who literally have the abil-
ity to create creoles, that is to create a new grammatical system” (73). Once again, if 
viewed in a relative, rather than absolute, perspective, the issue of whether common 
pathways of grammaticalization betoken constraining parameters of universal gram-
mar, or rather simply common cognitive strategies that emerge as consequences of 
certain semantic nuclei co-occurring in certain combinations, is much less important 
than the reality that these common pathways do in fact exist. The fact that they have 
been detected in both the homogenous context of development in a given language as 
well as in the heterogeneous context of languages in contact does strongly suggest the 
influence of common cognitive constraints, whether or not these are seen as innate 
imprints.
2. In this regard Hopper & Traugott also refer to Bybee & Slobin 1982.
2. Cited in Comajoan and Saldanya (2005: 45).
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The operation of common cognitive as well as neurologically based constraints 
is furthermore indicated by evidence from child acquisition of American Sign Lan-
guage (ASL), in which yet a third input stream is in play, namely ‘language on the 
hand’. In her article “How the Brain Begets Language”, Petitto (2005) finds that “…
innate abstract patterning in the mind emerges, whether through speech or sign-
ing…”, in the form of similar syllabic structures (92), and that sensitivity to pattern-
ing, “…in particular, the rhythmic patterns that bind syllables …into babbles, and 
then into words and sentences” (93), is localized in Wernicke’s area of the brain, the 
implication being that this brain tissue is specialized not just for the processing of 
speaking and hearing, but, more abstractly, for “…aspects of the patterning of natu-
ral language” (96). In other words, for “…both language on the hands and language 
on the tongue … there exists tissue in the human brain dedicated to a function of 
human language structure independent of speech or sound” (97). Petitto’s finding that 
language appears to be “…written into neural tissue” (101), which she sees as cor-
roborating the universal principles proposed by Chomsky, meshes equally well with 
the idea of fundamental cognitive constraints on language evolution, which leaves 
aside the polarized issue of which speakers initiate language change and when. While 
fundamental, universal cognitive principles figure in both universal grammar and 
grammaticalization, there remain differences in regard to the degree of specificity of 
these principles and their domain of operation. As grammaticalization research has 
documented, common grammaticalization pathways are always subject to erupting, 
in the speech of speakers of all ages, given the appropriate discourse-pragmatic con-
textualization. As Hopper and Traugott claim:
The perspective of grammaticalization challenges virtually all of these claims 
[of changes being the result of new parameter settings]. Fundamentally, the 
approach from grammaticalization argues that the grammaticalization of 
lexical items or constructions is enabled by pragmatic factors; indeed, much of 
grammaticalization in its early stages is the conventionalizing in certain local 
contexts of conversational inferences as morphosyntactic reanalysis occurs. 
(1993: 207)
Thus, contrary to the Chomskyan perspective, which privileges child language acquisi-
tion as being the sole source of rule reordering, simplification or loss, while acknowl-
edging only the possibility of rule addition in post-acquisition speech, it is clear that, 
under conducive contextual conditions, grammaticalization can and does emerge, 
with no associated restrictions as to speaker age. For that matter, since no two speak-
ers of any language have an identical understanding of that language, it follows that all 
communication is ultimately inference based. And since inferencing is always in play, 
the potential for grammaticalization to take place is always present.
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Meillet suggested that the ground for grammaticalization was particularly fer-
tile in cases where words and phrases were operating under diminished expressivity 
owing to their frequent occurrence in fixed contexts.27 In this sense, the net impact of 
grammaticalization can be seen as a mechanism which cyclically replaces one marker 
of a specific category with another, as illustrated by, for instance, the replacement of 
inflected with periphrastic future forms in the development from Latin to French, 
with these periphrastic future forms themselves subsequently transitioning back into 
inflected forms: Latin amabo > amare habeo > French aimerai (Hopper & Traugott 
1993: 22). This is not to suggest that speakers were in any way aware of diminished 
expressivity, but rather that, once spawned in the interplay of context and inference, 
equivalent new, and therefore more expressive, forms would come to be favored. 
Grammaticalization thus makes available alternate means of signaling specific seman-
tic content, means which, since novel, are also more expressive, and therefore come to 
be used more often, become routinized, lose expressivity, and thus themselves become 
potential input for subsequent grammaticalizations.
However, while grammaticalization is an open-ended process in which gram-
maticalized forms themselves are subject to further grammaticalization, it is not 
limited to revitalizing existent categories. To repeat Meillet’s prolific insight, gram-
maticalization “… creates new forms [and] introduces categories which had no lin-
guistic expression” (1921 [1912]: 133). Of course absence of linguistic expression 
does not necessarily equate with an absence in thought, as Bréal’s position on latent 
ideas makes clear. Thus it could be debated whether evolution in grammar reflects 
evolution in thought, or rather merely the unfolding of cognitive constraints and 
potentialities.
1. Grammaticalization in diachronic and synchronic perspective
One thing that grammaticalization studies make abundantly clear is that it is coun-
terproductive to segregate synchronic from diachronic analysis. The interpenetration 
of the two perspectives is indispensable to charting the pathways along which change 
takes place, and revitalized, or even novel, grammatical categories evolve. The key 
word here is perspective: whether the diachronic or synchronic perspective is adopted, 
the fact remains that the subject of analysis is a single ongoing process of reanaly-
sis and reinterpretation in which the substance of language takes a back seat to the 
substance of thought. Hopper and Traugott’s assessment underscores the interplay of 
2. “If then a grouping of words becomes frequent, if it is often repeated, it ceases to be expressive 
and is more and more reproduced automatically by speakers” (1921 [1912]:135–136).
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these two perspectives (note in particular such qualifying terms as “more synchronic” 
and “primarily”):
From this [diachronic] perspective, grammaticalization is usually thought 
of as that subset of linguistic changes through which a lexical item in certain 
uses becomes a grammatical item, or through which a grammatical item 
becomes more grammatical. The other perspective is more synchronic, seeing 
grammaticalization as primarily a syntactic, discourse pragmatic phenomenon, 
to be studied from the point of view of fluid patterns of language use. (1993: 2)
Seen broadly as a source of ongoing reanalyses and recalibrations of the material of 
language, grammaticalization is so fundamental, so pervasive, that it is often difficult 
to decide just what can and cannot be ascribed to it. Consistent with his view of gram-
maticalization as being related to a loss of expressivity in language, Meillet, for instance, 
also associated this process with word order phenomena. In Latin, he observed, word 
order could be used expressively to emphasize specific sentence elements since explicit 
grammatical endings conveyed syntactic relations. This contrasts sharply with, say, 
modern English or French, where syntactic relations are conveyed by word order itself. 
Grammatical word order is thus yet another manifestation of the grammaticalization 
process, of the creation of grammatical tools:
The phenomenon is of the same order as the ‘grammaticalization’ of this or that 
word; in place of having a word, used in a group of others and taking on the character 
of a ‘morpheme’ through routinization, we have here a manner of grouping words. 
And here we truly have an instance of the creation of new grammatical tools, not 
just transformation (1921[1912]: 148).28
It could even be maintained that this particular type of grammaticalization, where 
position alone now conveys the meaning previously attached to linguistic substance 
(word endings), in fact represents the extreme case of this process in which content is 
ever yielding to form. In this case the ‘cline of grammaticality’ laid out by Hopper and 
Traugott as “content item > grammatical word > clitic > inflectional affix” (1993: 7) 
might be revised to ‘content item > grammatical word > clitic > inflectional affix > ø’.
1. Conclusions
Though he does not use the term grammaticalization per se, the description of the 
language ‘machine’ Langacker gives in his 1977 article “Syntactic Reanalysis” aligns 
closely with the central features of the grammaticalization process, and is particularly 
apt as a characterization of the overarching nature and impact of this process:
2. Expressive inversions in languages with grammatical word order are essentially reserved 
for stilted or theatrical registers: for example, To the market we shall go.
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It would not be entirely inappropriate to regard [each] language…in [its] 
diachronic aspect as [a] gigantic expression-compacting machine …requir[ing]…
as input a continuous flow of creatively produced expressions formed by lexical 
innovation,… lexically and grammatically regular periphrasis, and…the figurative 
use of lexical or periphrastic locutions. The machine does whatever it can to wear 
down the expressions fed into it. It fades metaphors by standardizing them and 
using them over and over again…[,] attacks expressions of all kinds by phonetic 
erosion…[,] bleaches lexical items of most of their semantic content…[,] and 
forces them into service as grammatical markers. It chips away at the boundaries 
between elements and crushes them together into smaller units. The machine has 
a voracious appetite. (106–107; cited by Campbell & Janda 2000: 3; italics mine)
Morphosyntactic change, idiomatization, cliticization, lexicalization, even etymology 
writ large can in effect all be subsumed under grammaticalization: “It is a macro-level 
phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the properties of the corresponding micro-
level phenomena” (Haspelmath 2004: 26; cited in Brinton & Traugott 2005: 22).
Tracing, diachronically, the etymology of a word, noting gradual shifts in its 
meaning over time is, in essence, analogous to tracing, synchronically, pathways of 
grammaticalization that are dependent likewise on gradations of meaning, in this case 
multiple meanings associated with context-driven ambiguity. In the case of going to 
cited above, for example, the two interpretations — motion towards or future action — 
are co-present and the “bridging context” (Brinton & Traugott 2005: 26) powering the 
grammaticalization is evident.29 As Brinton & Traugott emphasize, “An ambiguous 
bridging context, in which both the old and the new meaning can occur, is a prereq-
uisite for grammaticalization” (2005: 109).30 With gonna (< going to), in addition to 
the associated sound change and boundary loss, the resulting new sense of ‘planned 
future’ — as opposed to ‘future tense’ — once again underscores the ability of gram-
maticalization to not only revitalize existing categories, but to create new ones.31
Where does this leave us in assessing whether the categories and meanings 
spawned in the grammaticalization process support or undermine Chomskyan lin-
guistic theory, which privileges both universal grammar and the language acquisition 
process? Meillet’s early claim that grammaticalization “…creates new forms, [and] 
29. “ ‘Gradualness’ is thus a primarily diachronic term characterizing changes from one state to 
another over time. It should be contrasted with ‘gradience,’which is a synchronic term character-
izing the continuum between one linguistic category and another” (Brinton & Traugott 2005: 27).
0. Consider He is going to work (ambiguous) vs. He is going there to work (unambiguous). 
Similarly, while He must be here could signal either obligation or surmisal, He must be here by 
eight is unambiguous.
1. That be going to takes on the meaning of “…planned future…is not surprising considering 
its origins in a purposive construction” (Brinton & Traugott 2005: 30).
2 T. Craig Christy
introduces categories which had no linguistic expression…” (1921 [1912]: 133) has 
been robustly substantiated by decades of research. But do these categories, more 
often fluid than fixed, in any way map onto cognitive categories? Are the remarkably 
 uniform pathways of grammaticalization a reflection of underlying principles of uni-
versal grammar? Are linguistic categories then epiphenomenal, or are they, instead, 
emergent? Clearly there are certain biologically rooted constraints on neural activ-
ity and operations, but just how specific are these constraints and how strictly do 
they shape and delimit linguistic processes? Does the complex, non-linear nature of 
 language evolution not tip the scales in favor of emergent features, of new cognitive 
categories? All these are questions which defy certain or easy answers. That being said, 
and leaving aside hairsplitting over theoretical and ideological tenets and terminology, 
the Chomskyan and grammaticalization perspectives, as regards the extent to which 
principles of universal grammar and pathways of grammaticalization are potentially 
in alignment, are far from being diametrically opposed. Nevertheless, actual language 
usage, critical to grammaticalization — to the evolution of grammar — remains periph-
eral in Chomskyan theory, which privileges innate grammar.
On the issue of language change, therefore, there is significant divergence. There 
is no doubt that language usage is grossly undervalued in Chomskyan theory. Further-
more, grammaticalization research has made it absolutely clear that speakers of all ages 
are involved in the negotiation of meaning and the resultant evolution of linguistic 
forms. Language change cannot, therefore, be accounted for exclusively as an artifact 
of the language acquisition process, a conclusion further buttressed by research of pid-
gin and creole languages. Current and future research into the evolution of grammar 
will no doubt contribute to the forging of a middle ground between these two posi-
tions. As we await that day, and monitor the mechanics of the ‘expression-compacting 
machine’, of grammaticalization, we can ponder, with Bréal, Vergil’s sage dictum: Mens 
agitat molem.
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This paper follows the changing fortunes of Chomsky’s search for a pedigree in 
the history of Western thought during the late 1960s. Having achieved a unique 
position of supremacy in the theory of syntax and having exploited that position 
far beyond the narrow circles of professional syntacticians, he felt the need to 
shore up his theory with the authority of history. It is shown that this attempt, 
resulting mainly in his Cartesian Linguistics of 1966, was widely, and rightly, 
judged to be a radical failure, even though it led to a sudden revival of interest in 
the history of linguistics. Ironically, the very upswing in historical studies caused 
by Cartesian Linguistics ended up showing that the real pedigree belongs to 
Generative Semantics, developed by the same ‘angry young men’ Chomsky was so 
bent on destroying.
1. “Bitter”
Before we engage in a discussion of Chomsky’s (b. 1928) historical vagaries, a few words 
must be said about the other great dispute Chomsky was involved in during the late 
1960s and early 1970s: the vexed question of ‘lexicalism’ versus ‘transformationalism’, 
intricately mixed up with the debate between interpretive and generative semanticists.
In his 1976 book on word formation, Mark Aronoff, who was perhaps the first 
but in any case the most important linguist to restore to morphology its rightful place 
in generative linguistics, makes a central reference to Chomsky’s ‘Remarks on Nomi-
nalization’ of 1967 (published in Chomsky 1972a). This study, he says, heralded the 
rebirth of morphology in the new paradigm. Yet not everybody was equally enthusi-
astic (Harris 1993: 139). Aronoff writes (1976: 6): “ ‘Remarks on Nominalization’ was 
long and bitterly opposed, mainly, I believe, on esthetic grounds.” And a few lines 
further down he speaks again of the “critics of the new esthetic.”
Aronoff was not the only one who spoke of bitter strife. The same word “bitter” is 
used by Huck & Goldsmith (1995: viii–ix):
Among these [academic arguments], Chomsky’s dispute with the Generative 
Semanticists in the late 1960s particularly stands out. The dispute was notable 
not simply because it became so bitter, but also because it involved a goodly 
 Camiel Hamans & Pieter A.M. Seuren
proportion of the theoretical linguistics community of the time and represented 
what has clearly been the most serious organized challenge to Chomsky’s vies 
to date.
The qualification “bitter” is also found in Seuren (1998: 520): “What followed was a 
bitter and personal conflict between the so-called ‘lexicalists’, who sided with Chomsky, 
and the generative semanticists’ school of ‘transformationalists’.” In this connection, it is 
hardly surprising that Randy Harris (1993) qualifies this episode as a “linguistics war.”
As it was, the opposition between the lexicalists and the transformationalists was 
just one aspect of the wider, and even more bitter, conflict between the advocates of 
Autonomous Syntax, commanded by Chomsky, and those of what came to be called 
Generative Semantics, mainly George Lakoff (b. 1941), James D. McCawley (1938–1999), 
Paul M. Postal (b. 1936) and John R. (Haj) Ross (b. 1938). For the Chomskyans,  syntax 
was “autonomous and independent of meaning” (Chomsky 1957: 17). Any semantics 
for natural language had to be grafted upon already given syntactic structures, be they 
surface structures or deep structures or both. Autonomous syntax was thus closely asso-
ciated with what became known as interpretive semantics. By contrast, the generative 
semanticists gave primacy to meaning and regarded language as an intermediary device 
to convert semantic representations into surface structures according to well-defined 
grammatical processes. In Koerner & Asher (1995), an encyclopedic survey of the history of 
linguistics, ample attention is paid to the ‘war’ between Autonomous Syntax and Gen-
erative Semantics, as can be seen from the fact that two sizeable articles are devoted to 
this issue (Harlow 1995; McCawley 1995).
In this context, it is at least remarkable that so little is said about this issue in Barsky 
(1997), which is partly based on extensive correspondence between that author and 
Chomsky. Two pages, from page 149 to page 151, is all Barsky spends on the question, 
while ten pages are devoted to this subject in Chomsky & Ronat (1979). What is most 
striking is that Chomsky minimizes his own role in this respect and dismisses the whole 
issue as a quarrel between two groups of his students or followers. In a letter to Barsky of 
April 3rd 1995, Chomsky writes:
The ‘discussion’ between, say, Jackendoff and others (many of them not any 
student: Lakoff, Postal, etc.) was from about 1966 or so. I was never really part of 
it. […] My own participation in the debate was in 1969, at a conference in Texas, 
where I flew in and flew out immediately at the impassioned request of a former 
student there, Stanley Peters, who wanted me to make some public response to 
the by then rather hysterical tone of the generative semanticists, all pretty childish 
in my opinion, and in 1969 I had quite different things on my mind.
These “quite different things” were, of course, his anti-war activity with regard to the 
Vietnam War, which was raging at the time. “Therefore,” Chomsky wrote on August 
14th 1995 (Barsky 1997: 151) “I hardly would have had time for ‘power struggles’, even 
if I had been interested.” Yet Huck & Goldsmith (1995) quote extensively from the 
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private correspondence conducted during the period concerned between Chomsky 
on the one hand and McCawley and Ross on the other. Some of these letters, which 
deal explicitly with the different views of the authors concerned, have the length of a 
publishable paper. Moreover, the last two papers, of a total of three, in Chomsky (1972) 
specifically aim to destroy Generative Semantics — despite the Vietnam War. All this 
lends little credibility to what Chomsky wrote about the matter to Barsky.
2. “Remarks on Nominalization”
Of course, everyone is entitled to their own memories and everyone will no doubt 
be inclined to bend their own history in their own favor. Yet one may say with equal 
validity that others are entitled to a correction of such subjective memories, especially 
when the record is there. And the record says that Chomsky’s 1967 M.I.T. lectures, 
prepared during his sabbatical leave at Berkeley in 1966–1967 and issuing in his paper 
‘Remarks on Nominalization’, were widely perceived as a counterattack by Chomsky 
against the burgeoning Generative Semantics ideas that were being developed (Harris 
1993: 139):
There was no puzzlement about where these lectures — the ‘Remarks’ lectures, 
named after the famous paper that came out of them […] — were aimed. Everyone 
immediately perceived them as an attack on generative semantics, a reactionary 
attempt to cut the abstract legs out from underneath the upstart model. The best 
term for the lectures is Newmeyer’s. He calls them a “counteroffensive” (1980: 114; 
1986: 107), which captures the air of reaction, assault, and upping-the-ante in which 
they were received. Chomsky, though — here the story gets particularly bizarre — 
says he wasn’t much interested in generative semantics or in abstract syntax at the 
time, that he knew “virtually nothing about” either, that he barely noticed the work 
that Postal, Lakoff, Ross, and McCawley were up to. His 1967 lectures, he says, 
were just a delayed reaction to Lees’ Grammar of English Nominalizations (written 
in the very late fifties with considerable input from Chomsky).
That Chomsky’s 1967 ‘Remarks’ lectures should merely be a “delayed reaction” to Lees’ 
1960 book is highly implausible. In the feverish climate of M.I.T. linguistics of the day, 
reactions were never delayed. And Chomsky had already reacted to Lees’ views on 
nominalization in Aspects (1965: 184–192). Moreover, the ‘Remarks’ paper was pub-
lished in Chomsky (1972), a collection of three papers, two of which were explicitly 
directed at Generative Semantics. It would hardly make sense to include the ‘Remarks’ 
paper if it were not meant to serve the same purpose.
There can be little doubt that those who saw these lectures as an “attack on gen-
erative semantics” did so because Chomsky’s lexicalism would reduce the ‘depth’ and 
the abstractness of grammars compared with those envisaged by the ‘transformationalists’, 
who were at the same time generative semanticists.
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Curiously, however, this ‘attack’ missed the central issue, as the question of lexical-
ism versus transformationalism is, in fact, independent of whether one prefers Autono-
mous Syntax or Generative Semantics. Even though ‘transformationalism’ implied 
greater abstractness, one could, at the time, perfectly well be a generative semanticist 
and accept Chomsky’s lexicalism, or be an autonomous syntactician and accept the 
transformationalism of Ross, Lakoff, McCawley and Postal.
What Chomsky implicitly attacked, in his ‘Remarks’ paper, was the general 
movement in the direction of what was perceived at the time as greater ‘abstract-
ness,’ but was, in fact, the still mysterious, closed gate of semantics — a movement 
that had already become apparent in Bach & Harms (1968), a collection of four 
papers from a symposium held at the University of Texas in April 1967 on ‘Universals 
in Linguistic Theory’.
Meanwhile, Chomsky’s following had dwindled, as most of his followers had 
moved over to Generative Semantics. In 1972, the Berkeley philosopher Searle wrote 
(Searle 1972):
It is one of the ironies of the Chomsky revolution that the author of the revolution 
now occupies a minority position in the movement he created. Most of the 
active people in generative grammar regard Chomsky’s position as having been 
rendered obsolete by the various arguments concerning the interaction between 
syntax and semantics.
This movement away from Chomsky and towards Generative Semantics had started 
some four or five years earlier. In 1968, Lakoff, McCawley and Ross gave very successful 
courses during the Linguistic Institute summer course at Illinois, organized by the pres-
tigious Linguistic Society of America, which provided Generative Semantics with wide 
publicity throughout the world of linguistics. This was followed, in 1969, by a meet-
ing of the Chicago Linguistics Society dominated by the ideas developed in the now 
publicly recognized Generative Semantics movement. Seuren concludes (1998: 503): 
“By 1969 virtually the whole world of theoretical linguistics was agreed that Generative 
Semantics was the word.” At that moment the ominous second Texas Conference took 
place, where Chomsky clashed publicly and with great bitterness with the generative 
semanticists, whose “by then rather hysterical tone” he found “pretty childish.”
Huck & Goldsmith (1995: 115, 125, 134, 162) quote Lakoff, Ross and Postal in 
regard to an incident that happened during this meeting. After Chomsky had presented 
his paper, Ross stepped forward during question time presenting counterexamples (no 
doubt in the brilliant and playful fashion that those who know Ross are well-acquainted 
with). Chomsky, however, cut him short saying that “no individual linguistic examples 
could possibly be counterexamples to his proposals” (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 115), 
upon which Ross turned round and walked away. “We saw this treatment of Ross as 
scandalous and aggressive behavior” (ibid.). Postal concluded (Huck & Goldsmith 
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1995: 162) that “disagreeing with Chomsky, even then the most renowned and influ-
ential person in the field, would have a high price.”
. Appointments
In the same letter to Barsky as has been quoted from above (Barsky 149–151), 
Chomsky depicts himself as an impartial figure standing above the warring fac-
tions. This, Chomsky says, appears from the fact that not one of his own associates 
was appointed at the M.I.T. linguistics department, while all departmental vacan-
cies were systematically filled with generative semanticists. Again, this is more than 
a little disingenuous. Jim McCawley accepted an appointment at the University of 
Chicago as early as 1964. Paul Postal left for New York in 1965 — that is, before 
Chomsky’s sabbatical year at Berkeley. George Lakoff was never formally associated 
with M.I.T. in any way whatsoever. After he obtained his Ph.D. at Indiana in 1967, 
he had a brief spell at Harvard, exchanged for an appointment at the University of 
Michigan in Ann Arbor, after which he moved to Berkeley. The only one among 
the generative semanticists to have full-time employment at the M.I.T. linguistics 
department was Haj Ross. Ross was appointed in 1966, while he was still working 
under Chomsky, who supervised his brilliant 1967 dissertation Constraints on Vari-
ables in Syntax. He was dismissed from M.I.T. in 1985 on charges of corruption of 
minors, because he had allegedly brought some wine or pot to a student party.
4. “Gutter”
The debate between transformationalists and lexicalists, or between generative and 
interpretive semanticists, was not the only one that Chomsky was involved in at the time. 
In 1966 he published Cartesian Linguistics, his view of the history of linguistics and of 
his intellectual predecessors, followed by a few pages in Language and Mind (Chomsky 
1968: 5–20) on the same subject. In 1962, at the International Congress of Linguists held 
at Harvard, Chomsky had given one of five plenary lectures (Koerner 1989: 116–117). 
Here, he professed, for the first time, his intellectual debt to De Saussure, Humboldt 
and Port-Royal, in particular the Grammaire générale et raisonnée (1660), written by 
Arnault and Lancelot (see Seuren 1998: 47–48). Cartesian Linguistics elaborates on 
that first plenary lecture. It was written for a lecture course at Princeton, preceded by 
a sabbatical period. Barsky (1997: 104) writes that the lectures were well received. Yet 
this cannot be said of the reception of Cartesian Linguistics in the world at large.
Apart from the over-enthusiastic Kampf (1967), written by one of those who had 
attended the lectures and published in a Princeton in-house publication, and from 
2 Camiel Hamans & Pieter A.M. Seuren
“the nearly hysterical reception that has greeted Cartesian Linguistics” among non-
specialists (Aarsleff 1970: 583), its reception among those who were better informed 
was highly critical (cp. Miel 1969; Salmon 1969; Aarsleff 1970, 1971). Chomsky never 
replied in public to his critics. According to a letter he wrote to Barsky on March 31st, 
1995 (Barsky 1997: 105):
I’ve never bothered to respond, because […] my contempt for the intellectual 
world reaches such heights that I have no interest in pursuing them into their 
gutter, unless there are serious human interests involved.
Yet in the same letter he does present a response, of sorts (Barsky, ibid.). Referring to 
Aarsleff (constantly mis-spelt “Aarslef ” by both Chomsky and Barsky), and acknowl-
edging that Aarsleff ’s critique had by then been widely accepted, Chomsky writes 
(Barsky, ibid.):
Aarslef[f] wrote savage denunciations of Cartesian Linguistics (in Language, and 
elsewhere), claiming that I had made this idiotic error, which he did make a year 
after Cartesian Linguistics, and which is explicitly and unambiguously rejected in 
Cartesian Linguistics.
This “idiotic error” would have been that, in his monumental work The Study of Lan-
guage in England, 1780–1860 of 1967, Aarsleff “described traditional universal gram-
mar as solely ‘Cartesian’ in origin, completely ignoring the quite obvious Renaissance 
and earlier origins that are emphasized in Cartesian Linguistics” (Barsky, ibid.).
Chomsky was not the only one to react negatively with regard to Aarsleff’s critique of 
Cartesian Linguistics (further discussed below). Harry Bracken (1984: xi) describes Aarsleff 
in terms that one would use for a charlatan: “The kind of scholarship manifested by Aarsleff 
differs in quantity but not in quality from that recently displayed by Trevor-Roper in iden-
tifying the Hitler ‘diaries’ ” (which as one remembers, turned out to be a forgery). Bracken’s 
book contains two essays “dealing with propaganda directed against Chomsky” (Bracken 
1984: x). In the book, he argues that the opposition to Chomsky, especially that coming 
from Aarsleff, is politically motivated, as Chomsky’s stance, both academically and politi-
cally, is a menace for the powers that be. We read (Bracken 1984: 123):
Aarsleff is not really engaged in a dispute over scholarship. He correctly sees that 
Chomsky’s efforts threaten liberalism itself. He correctly sees that Chomsky is 
seeking to ‘corrupt the youth’. […] [H]e is responding as a guardian of one of 
our ideological heroes. To that end he has produced two papers calculated to 
intimidate those who challenge the accepted version of our intellectual history.
It will be obvious to any impartial beholder that this kind of ‘exegesis’ has nothing 
whatsoever to do with academic argument and is more akin to what Chomsky (2002b: 18) 
describes as “manufacture of consent,” something the established order is said to be 
guilty of. Yet Chomsky does not dissociate himself from Bracken, as he should have 
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done if he really preferred not to “pursue [the intellectual world] into [its] gutter” 
(Chomsky 1998: 92–93):
There has been some interesting work in the past few years, for example, on the 
philosophical origins of racism, particularly by Harry Bracken, which suggests 
a much more complex history. […] I think it is not an exaggeration to see in 
Cartesian doctrine a conceptual barrier — a modest one, as Bracken carefully 
explains — against racism.
5. “Professor”
Let us now have a closer look at Aarsleff’s influential critiques (1970, 1971). First, however, it 
must be mentioned that there is an, again bitter, emotional side to the story: Chomsky 
was extremely angry at Aarsleff ’s critiques. This is perhaps understandable, in that 
Aarsleff ’s style of writing shows his irritation at Chomsky’s cheek in writing with 
apparent authority on matters Aarsleff felt he didn’t know the first thing about. The 
title alone of his 1970 article in Language shows his temper: ‘The history of linguistics 
and Professor Chomsky’ (italics added).
Aarsleff formulates two requirements for adequate historiography (Aarsleff 1970: 571): 
“adequate scholarship; and the over-all coherence of the entire history that is presented, 
without omission or neglect of material that is relevant, either by the writer’s own 
standards or by those of the figures he deals with and cites.” In the eyes of Aarsleff, 
Chomsky failed dismally on both counts. Chomsky’s references and quotes are highly 
selective. Thus, in his discussion of the encyclopédiste Du Marsais (1676–1756) — an 
essential figure in Chomsky’s story — Chomsky cites a memorial article by D’Alembert. 
Yet, in doing so, he (no doubt on purpose, in Aarsleff ’s view) omits the passage imme-
diately preceding his quote, in which Du Marsais is described as an anti-mentalist 
and an opponent of Cartesian ideas. According to Aarsleff, Chomsky used antiquated 
and thus inferior secondary sources, and had not read the essential primary texts. The 
lineage Chomsky sees in the history of universal grammar from Descartes, via the 
British Platonists, Leibniz, Kant, the Von Schlegel brothers, to Humboldt is, therefore, 
basically flawed.
As regards the history preceding the great works of Port-Royal and their alleged 
indebtedness to Descartes, Aarsleff merely summarizes (1970: 572–573) the critiques 
by Karl Zimmer (1968), Robin Lakoff (1969), Vivian Salmon (1969) and Jan Miel 
(1969), all of whom point out that the idea of a universal theory of language and of uni-
versal grammar does not go back to Descartes or to the Port-Royal educationalists but 
to a much older tradition that was still very much alive in the seventeenth century.
Moreover, Aarsleff points out that there is a clear historical line from Port-Royal 
to Locke, so debunked by Chomsky as a die-hard adherent of empiricism — a label 
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Chomsky apparently confuses with ‘positivism’, the much later philosophy according to 
which all reality is matter and all knowledge is based on observables. In fact, however, 
Locke was much more of a rationalist than nineteenth-century scholarship had him be. 
Chomsky should have seen this in the literature cited by him (Aarsleff 1970: 572–573):
Locke was very sympathetic to the Jansenists of Port-Royal; he owned their works 
and read them. His political philosophy would seem to have received significant 
impulses from Pierre Nicole, who with Arnauld was responsible for the Port-
Royal logic, which is so closely related to the Grammar that it must be called its 
twin. Apart from the last point about Locke, this could all quite easily have been 
learned from the relevant secondary sources, most of it in fact from Sainte-Beuve’s 
Port-Royal, now one hundred and ten years old, to which Chomsky makes some 
convenient references (e.g. 1966: 75, 104, 105). It would also seem potentially 
dangerous to ignore the fact that the Port-Royalists had significant disagreements 
with Descartes — Arnauld, for instance, over innateness.
The opposition between rationalism and empiricism, during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, was not nearly as deep and fundamental as claimed by Chomsky 
in Cartesian Linguistics. In fact, as Aarsleff tries to make clear, Locke felt that he was 
building on and elaborating Descartes’ work.
Aarsleff clearly shows that Du Marsais, far from being the staunch supporter of 
Descartes that Chomsky describes him as, differed considerably with Descartes on the 
issue of innate ideas and was more in agreement with a Lockean version of rationalism, 
also expressing his indebtedness to Sanctius (see Seuren 1998: 67–69). Needless to say, 
Aarsleff is keen to point out that Chomsky would have found all that in the sources 
cited by him, had he been more diligent in reading them.
By far the most important figure, however, in the tradition of universal grammar 
was Condillac, whose Essai sur l’origine des connoissances of 1746 appeared ten years 
later in an English translation with the subtitle “A Supplement to Mr. Locke’s ‘Essay on 
the Human Understanding’’’. Aarsleff (1974) describes in detail the enormous influence 
of this work on several generations of philosophers not only in France, in particular 
the ‘Idéologues’, but also in Germany. It cannot be denied, therefore, that Locke had a 
considerable influence on eighteenth-century linguistic theory. One can thus only con-
clude that Chomsky badly underestimated the place and role of Locke in the debates on 
universal grammar that took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The next milestone in Chomsky’s pilgrimage, Johann Gottfried Herder, was no 
more an heir to Descartes than Du Marsais or Condillac were. In fact, Herder leans 
heavily on Condillac in his famous and prize-winning treatise Abhandlung über den 
Ursprung der Sprache of 1772. It is fair to say that, through Condillac, who, though 
rather misrepresented by Herder, still influences him throughout, Herder lands in the 
non-Cartesian camp rather than anywhere else. Or, as Aarsleff puts it (1970: 579), his 
work is “simply a reflection of Locke’s rationalism through Condillac.”
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Not even the last of Chomsky’s chosen forbears, Wilhelm von Humboldt, was 
a Cartesian. The traditional view (Salus 1976: 96) has it that Humboldt was strongly 
influenced by Herder. Aarsleff (1982: 335–353) disagrees. According to him, the tra-
ditional view goes back to two nineteenth-century biographies by Rudolf Haym, one 
about Humboldt and one about Herder. Aarsleff places von Humboldt in the tradition of 
Condillac and the Idéologues, whom he met and frequented personally in the Parisian 
salons towards the close of the eighteenth century, as he conducted his studies. Seuren 
(1998: 108–120) devotes an extensive section to von Humboldt, in which he stresses 
his lack of theoretical consistency. In any case, no matter how or to what extent Herder, 
Condillac, the Idéologues or Madame de Staël and her guests may have influenced 
him, von Humboldt’s lineage must be traced back to Locke, not to Descartes.
6. “Cartesian”?
Other commentators on Cartesian Linguistics were equally critical. In his (1972) article, 
Keith Percival takes a dim view of Chomsky’s interpretation of what Descartes said 
about language. Then, in Percival (1976), he concludes, having compared the method 
applied by Vaugelas (1647) with that employed in the Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée 
(1660) (Percival 1976: 381–382):
[T]he Grammaire Générale was not a reaction against a previously held linguistic 
theory. Arnauld and Lancelot did not repudiate Vaugelas — they transcended 
him completely and in the process incorporated many of his ideas. The term ‘pure 
descriptivism’ does not seem particularly apt as a characterization of Vaugelas’ 
attitude to usage, and if Vaugelas is to be described as a pure descriptive, then so 
must the authors of the Grammaire Générale, for they too accepted the classical 
view of the role of usage in grammatical description.
This makes one wonder if the Grammaire Générale itself does indeed have to be reck-
oned to be part of the tradition of universal grammar. Seuren (1998: 47) brands the 
Grammaire Générale, apart from a few passages that are reminiscent of Sanctius, the 
great Spanish innovator of linguistic theory discussed further below, as a more or less 
conventional work, written along the lines of current grammar books of the period.
Another critic was Peter Salus in his (1976) survey of theories of universal gram-
mar between the years 1000 and 1850. Salus shows that universalist theories of gram-
mar do not originate with Descartes and Port Royal, and perhaps a few early isolated 
Medieval or Renaissance harbingers, as is suggested in Chomsky (1966, 1968), but 
can boast an age-old tradition that can be traced back to the Athenian Academy as it 
developed after Plato. From there, it found its way to the Alexandrian grammarians (in 
particular the world’s first syntactician Apollonius Dyscolus, who lived and worked in 
Alexandria during the second century CE), to the Neo-Platonists Philo ( ± 25 BCE– ± 
6 Camiel Hamans & Pieter A.M. Seuren
50CE) and Plotinus (205–270) with his school, till it found its final formulation in 
Antiquity in Priscian’s Institutiones Grammaticae (early sixth century). Similar views 
are found in the writings of leading Medieval authors and Church Fathers, such as 
Anselm of  Canterbury (1033–1109), Abelard (1079–1142), Bonaventure (1217–1274), 
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1294) or Roger Bacon (± 1214– ± 1293).
The highly influential school of the Modists (± 1250– ± 1320) likewise held a uni-
versalist theory of grammar. Salus writes (1976: 86–87):
The Modistae, who follow close on the heels of Kilwardby and Bacon, attempt to 
derive their grammatical formulations from formal logic and from metaphysics. 
Unfortunately, the Modistae used Latin as their metalanguage — in fact, they seem 
to have seen Latin as the ideal underlying the other (European) languages or at 
least as the most perfect shadow of the ideal (underlying) form. “Latin became for 
them the specification of the general grammar, the word-classes and syntax of the 
perfect language” (Bursill-Hall 1972: 19). […] [W]e can consider the Modistae, 
with their many treatises and conflicting views, as the ‘second wave’ of speculative 
grammarians and view Bacon, Kilwardby, et al. as the ‘première vague’. […] The 
Modistae framed their theory within the system of Donatus and Priscian, but 
they restated the definitions of the word-classes and their accidents in semantic 
terms, deriving their terminology from the logical theories of the two Englishmen 
mentioned so often (Bacon and Kilwardby), Petrus Hispanus (1205–1377), and 
St. Anselm. […] Modistic grammatical theory depended upon a relationship of the 
closest type between the operation of the mind and the structure of reality and the 
central concerns of the Modistae were those of universals, adequacy, deep structure, 
and the incorporation of meaning into general grammatical statements.
By about the middle of the fourteenth century the Modistae had lost out to the nomi-
nalists. Yet, as observed by Covington (1982: 40–41), the nominalists had no gram-
matical theory to replace Modistic doctrine, as a result of which “Modistic grammar 
kept being taught in the schools, in less philosophical and more practical versions, as 
late as the 16th century” (Seuren 1998: 31–32).
. “Misleading survey”
Later commentators tend to reject the historical claims made by Chomsky in Car-
tesian Linguistics. In a study on the Dutch grammarian Vossius, Rademaker writes 
(1992: 121–122):
In his preface to the Nouvelle Méthode, Lancelot declared explicitly his indebtedness 
to Sanctius and his imitators Scioppius (1576–1649) and Vossius. […] Very 
important is the treatment of ellipsis in the Nouvelle Méthode, and it is clear that 
Lancelot owed much to the treatment of ellipsis in Sanctius and Vossius.
In the Grammaire Générale of 1660 we do not find explicit reference to the work 
of Vossius, but here, too, we can find traces of his influence. The authors of this 
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famous book made the claim to write a general or universal grammar enunciating 
principles applicable to all languages, but they used as their sources the studies on 
the Latin language of precursors such as Scaliger, Sanctius, Scioppius and Vossius. 
In fact, the Grammaire Générale is following an impressive amount of Humanist 
and 17th-century practice.
A further comment that is typical of the way Cartesian Linguistics has been received is 
Subbiondo (1995: 176):
The critics of Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics attacked the interpretation of the 
history of seventeenth-century linguistics for giving too much credit to Descartes 
for advancing rational grammar in the seventeenth century. For example, 
Vivian Salmon (1969: 178) convincingly argued “The essential features of the 
theory, however, were derived from a logical and grammatical tradition which 
had been developing, without any real interruption, since the early Middle Ages.” 
Salmon’s review, as well as that of [Robin] Lakoff (1969), sketched a rich and diverse 
panorama of grammarians who had connected theories of language with those of 
mind long before Descartes and who influenced seventeenth-century linguistics.
Sharbani Banerji, who is generally appreciative of Cartesian Linguistics, frankly admits its 
weak points. In particular, he is of the opinion that the book does not deserve the quali-
fication “survey”, even though Chomsky (2002a: 104) calls it that, though Chomsky admits 
that this “survey is very fragmentary and therefore in some ways a misleading one.” One 
of the reasons why Cartesian Linguistics cannot be called a “survey” is, according to 
Banerji (2003), that:
[…] many of the thinkers, scholars, philosophers, etc., whom Chomsky quotes 
profusely in this book, were not at all engaged in linguistic or grammatical studies. 
For example, Descartes hardly paid any attention to language. […] Several of 
them were even antagonistic to the ‘Cartesian Doctrine’ that Chomsky draws out 
from their works. For example, Vaugelas, de la Mettrie, J.G. Herder etc., were 
more of empiricists.
James McGilvray, who wrote the well-nigh jubilant Introduction to the second edition 
of Cartesian Linguistics, goes even further, commenting (2002a: 15–16): “Descartes did 
little more than put a label on the problem.”1
1. During 1973 there was an, again extremely bitter, exchange between George Lakoff and 
Chomsky in The New York Review of Books (George Lakoff 1973; Chomsky 1973), brought on 
by a letter that George Lakoff wrote in response to John Searle’s lengthy article in the same 
New York Review of Books (Searle 1972). The main bone of contention was Chomsky’s search 
for a pedigree in Cartesian philosophy. Although this exchange attracted a great deal of public 
attention at the time, both authors are guilty of such notional, terminological, textual, and 
historical confusions, both being driven by a personal animosity of such proportions, that a 
detailed analysis would reveal more about their personalities than about the issues at hand.
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. Minerva
At the University of Salamanca, the Spaniard Franciscus Sanctius or Sánchez de las 
Brozas (1523–1600), already referred to earlier, went his own universalist way. Sanctius 
was a converted Christian, of Jewish or Muslim extraction, which made him politically 
suspect and an obvious prey for the savage officers of the Holy Inquisition who badly 
harassed him for extended periods. His principal work Minerva, seu de causis linguae 
Latinae (Lyon 1562; Salamanca 1587) leaves no doubt that for Sanctius all languages are 
essentially ‘logical’ in their universal underlying structure  but not, or much less, in their 
manifold external manifestations. This makes it necessary to postulate rule systems to 
fill the gap between, on the one hand, the underlying universal ‘logical language’ and, on 
the other, the less ‘logical’ vernaculars found in the world at large. Sanctius is particularly 
impressed by the fact that the underlying ‘logical language’ must be taken to contain ele-
ments that do not appear in actual spoken languages and must thus have been lost on 
the way from the depths of thoughts to the surface sounds of the words spoken. This led 
him to posit an essentially transformational theory of grammar, in which ellipsis plays a 
central role, along with other transformational processes (see Seuren 1998: 41–46).
Around the year 1650, Sanctius was discovered and then carefully studied by the 
Frenchman Lancelot, who was so impressed with Sanctius that he radically rewrote, 
and quadrupled the size of, his textbook Nouvelle Méthode pour facilement et en peu 
de temps comprendre la language latine for its third edition of 1653 (see Robin Lakoff 
1969). Lancelot subsequently tried to incorporate Sanctius’ ideas into the Grammaire 
générale et raisonnée of 1660, only to find that this would have provoked the displeasure 
of king Louis XIV, who, in his policy of imposing strict Roman-Catholic orthodoxy, 
was set to eradicate Jansenism and Port Royal with it, and who would have looked on 
any ‘promotion’ of Sanctius’ ideas with considerable suspicion, given that Sanctius had 
been targeted by the Inquisition (see Seuren 1998: 46–48). As a result, whatever of 
Sanctius’ radically universalist concept of grammar found its way into the Grammaire 
générale et raisonnée turned out, in the end, to be precious little.
Before Robin Lakoff published, in 1969, her masterful review of Brekle’s edition 
of the Grammaire générale et raisonnée, she had had occasion to discuss its con-
tents with Chomsky and others, which explains how and why Chomsky reacts to her 
views in Chomsky (1968), before the review had appeared. There we read (Chomsky 
1968: 15–16):
It seems, however, that the concept of ellipsis is intended by Sanctius merely as 
a device for the interpretation of texts. Thus, to determine the true meaning of 
an actual literary passage, one must very often, according to Sanctius, regard 
it as an elliptical variant of a more elaborate paraphrase. But the Port-Royal 
theory and its later development, particularly at the hands of the encyclopedist 
Du Marsais, gave a rather different interpretation to ellipsis. The clear intent of 
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philosophical grammar was to develop a psychological theory, not a technique 
of textual interpretation.
Robin Lakoff ’s reply to this sad misconception was as simple as it was lethal 
(Robin Lakoff 1969: 367–368):
Sanctius, Chomsky would say, was an applied linguist, not a theorist. But since 
the Minerva is inaccessible to anyone who does not read Latin, Chomsky has 
been forced to rely on the judgments of writers like Sahlin (1928), some of whose 
comments on S[anctius] demonstrate an amazing lack of perception, much like 
her lack of perception that Chomsky derides with reference to the G[rammaire] 
G[énérale] R[aisonnée]. But no one who takes the trouble to read S[anctius] 
carefully could think of him as primarily a textual critic. The first passage Sahlin 
cites […] should be sufficient evidence that he is not.
In addition to rubbing in that Chomsky lacks the scholarly preparation necessary for 
independent historical work, Lakoff then stresses, correctly, that Sanctius, and, accord-
ingly, the third edition of Lancelot’s Nouvelle Méthode, cannot be regarded as precur-
sors of the ideas Chomsky held around 1969 but are a clear prelude to the school of 
Generative Semantics that Chomsky had just begun to attack so savagely.
In this connection, it must be mentioned that the debate between Chomsky 
with his autonomous syntax theory on the one hand and the angry young generative 
semanticists on the other had focused on the question of whether or not one should 
assume the reality of an underlying purely syntactic deep structure. The generative 
semanticists maintained that whatever ‘deep structure’ is reasonably assumed should 
count as both an underlying syntactic and an underlying semantic structure. In their 
view, ‘deep structure’ is both syntactically and semantically relevant and explanatory. 
Chomskyan ‘autonomous syntax’, by contrast, maintained that the notion of ‘deep 
structure’ made sense only in the context of syntax, whereas any semantic interpre-
tation should be considered a totally independent matter (one that did not really 
interest him).
Despite the numerous notional and terminological equivocations in the debates 
that went on during that period, it was clear that this was the real issue (see Seuren 
1972). It is the question of whether language as a whole and grammar in particular 
should be considered ‘mediational’ (Seuren 2004) between thought and sound, which 
is the traditional view implicitly held by all philosophers of language during the ages, 
or should be taken to constitute a separate, essentially syntactic, system that happens 
to be used for the expression of meanings but could conceivably equally well be used 
for quite different purposes, the view held by Chomsky and his followers but by no-one 
else in the history of mankind. What Robin Lakoff showed in her 1969 review was 
(a) that Descartes has little to do with the whole issue but that Sanctius is the relevant 
historical source to go to, and (b) that Chomskyan autonomous syntax has no roots 
at all in history, while Generative Semantics does, being of a piece with the whole of 
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tradition and with Sanctius’ theory of language in particular, that being the first more 
or less explicit account of the traditional view.
Peter Salus was another early critic drawing attention to the pivotal role played 
by Sanctius in shaping the notion of ‘deep structure’ (Salus 1969, 1971). In his much 
longer article in Parret (1976), he concludes (Salus 1976: 89):
That this, plus the Cartesian notions of innateness, gave rise to the universalist, 
rationalist notions of language of Du Marsais and many others from the late 
seventeenth century on is beyond question.
In dealing with Leibniz and Locke, Salus follows Aarsleff. According to Salus (1976: 91):
[Locke] is not the hard-nosed empiricist he is frequently set up to be. Further, 
Locke seems to see ideas as mediated to the mind through language. […] 
Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz [are] closer than one would think them to be from 
a reading of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship. […] Schools and 
opinions are not as easily separated as people would like them to be.
The same point can be made regarding James Harris (1709–1780), whom Chomsky 
describes as a fervent anti-Cartesian although Harris, in his Hermes of 1751, never men-
tions the names of Descartes, Arnauld, Lancelot or Port Royal, while often respectfully 
referring to Sanctius. Salus comments (1976: 93) that this shows “how deep the roots 
of English philosophical grammar lie.”
. Conclusion
In general, one cannot but come to the conclusion that history lends no support to 
Chomsky’s claim that the ideas he put forward in his ‘Remarks on Nominalization’ of 
1967 are to be traced back in any sense whatsoever to Descartes. On the contrary, 
there is overwhelming evidence that the entire tradition of philosophical grammar led up 
to the ideas propagated by his enemies, the generative semanticists. American structural-
ism and early, strictly syntactically oriented, generative grammar were no more than 
temporary deviations in the history of linguistic ideas.
By 1965, Chomsky could rightly have the feeling that he had won over those parts 
of the world of linguistics that mattered. After the explosive publication of Syntactic 
Structures (1957), which was, however, very limited in scope, and after the ensuing 
crusade carried out with all means at his disposal (see Koerner 1989), the publication 
of Aspects in 1965 appeared to have settled the issue, at least as far as the theory of 
syntax was concerned. This is how John Joseph describes the situation of that moment 
(Joseph 2002: 62–63):
Chomsky attracted talented disciples from various fields and was enormously 
successful in getting both publicity and government funding. Despite the 
begrudging stance of many senior structuralists against its leading ideas, 
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transformational-generative grammar became mainstream linguistics in America 
around the mid-1960s and was on its way to having this status world-wide, the 
first unified paradigm since the Neogrammarians to do so.
The time had now come for further expansion. The first priority was phonology, which 
could do with a generative shot. This materialized in the long delayed publication of 
The Sound Pattern of English in 1968, written with the help of his associate Morris 
Halle. Excursions into philosophy became more and more frequent, though the phi-
losophers proved less obliging than the phonologist Morris Halle in shoring up his, on 
the whole insubstantial or at any rate unoriginal philosophical ideas.
Semantics was obviously another urgent priority, but here he only found enemies. 
The Californian logician Richard Montague, in particular, was extremely hostile to 
Chomsky’s approach, which he considered basically misguided. He begins his ‘English 
as a formal language’ of 1966 as follows (Thomason 1974: 188):
I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between 
formal and natural languages. On the other hand, I do not regard as successful 
the formal treatments of natural language attempted by certain contemporary 
linguists. Like Donald Davidson, I regard the construction of a theory of truth — 
or rather, of the more general notion of truth under an arbitrary interpretation — 
as the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the developments emanat-
ing from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology offer little promise towards 
that end.
Not being at all a ‘semantic animal’ himself, Chomsky understandably refrained from 
further attempts at developing a semantics for his grammar, preferring, in the end, to 
stick to what he had learned from logicians in his earlier years, that formally defined 
languages should be ‘interpreted upon’ a model. And he left it at that, contenting him-
self with the half-baked notions of his ‘interpretive semantics’.
To make things worse, some of his own students and colleagues went their own 
way in broaching semantic themes — a development that Chomsky saw as little less 
than treason, especially because he was rapidly losing his formerly numerous audience 
to Ross (McCawley and Postal had already left M.I.T. and Lakoff never was there). 
Joseph comments (Joseph 2002: 63):
Within a short time, however, dissent erupted within the generative ranks, led 
by some of Chomsky’s most talented followers. The central issue was Chomsky’s 
insistence upon the radical autonomy of syntax. […] This radical version of the 
structuralist priority of form over meaning conflicted with the common intuition 
that meaning perhaps need not, but can, determine syntax to a degree sufficient 
to render the ‘autonomy’ of syntax virtually non-existent.
In his interview with John Goldsmith, Jackendoff says (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 100): 
“What was significant about that time was it was the first time that generative grammarians 
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had broken rank. […] That period was the first time that there was disagreement.” It 
all looked very much like revolt in an army that is about to win the battle, and it put an 
end to any hopes Chomsky may have had of launching a semantics campaign.
What remained was the consolidation of what he desired to see as his supremacy 
by means of a historical pedigree. Hence his Cartesian Linguistics (1966), and to some 
extent also his Language and Mind (1968). But here, too, he was thwarted by an over-
whelming majority of critics, all showing, politely or harshly, his lack of expertise and 
his partisan quasi-scholarship. Yet, owing to the position Chomsky had meanwhile 
managed to acquire in the media, the publication of Cartesian Linguistics did lead to a 
general upswing in studies on the history of linguistics and related subjects. Ironically, 
however, this upswing in historical studies ended up showing that the real pedigree 
belongs to the school of Generative Semantics, formed by the very same bunch of 
‘angry young men’ he was so bent on destroying.
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The “linguistic wars”
A tentative assessment by an outsider witness
Giorgio Graffi
University of Verona
In the last two decades a debate developed about the historiography of the 
so-called “linguistic wars” of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the fight 
between “generative semantics” (GS) and “extended standard theory” (EST). 
This historiographical debate looks as rough as the original “wars” themselves: 
according to Newmeyer (1986; 1996), the collapse of generative semantics was 
mainly due to its intrinsic weaknesses, while several other scholars (e.g., Huck & 
Goldsmith 1995; R.T. Lakoff 1989; Murray 1994) stress sociological reasons for 
the victory of EST, notably the rhetorical ability and the academic strength of 
Chomsky and his staunch followers. The aim of this article is to offer an external 
assessment of the “linguistic wars” based on the evidence provided by an outside 
observatory: the community of Italian linguists during the 1970s. The article first 
reviews the recent debate about the “linguistic wars”. Then the Italian reception 
of both GS and EST is sketched: it is shown that GS was initially preferred, but 
later abandoned. Since every kind of generative linguistics had very little space in 
Italian universities at that time (Italian academic linguistics was almost exclusively 
historically-oriented), sociological factors cannot be assumed to have played any 
role in this abandonment. Therefore, a not merely sociological explanation for the 
“victory” of EST over GS has to be found.
1.  The linguistic historiography concerning the generative semantics  
vs. interpretive semantics debate
In the last two decades or so a debate has developed about the so-called “linguistic 
wars” of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, namely those between “generative seman-
tics” (henceforth GS) and “interpretive semantics” (IS), also called “extended standard 
theory” (EST). This debate sometimes looked as rough as “linguistic wars” themselves 
(see, e.g., Newmeyer 1986; 1996; R.T. Lakoff 1989; Harris 1993; Huck & Goldsmith 
1995). It is clear that these “wars” ended with the “victory” of EST over GS. Less clear 
are the factors of the demise of GS. The basic historiographical problem in need of 
solution is therefore the following one: was the fall of GS mainly due to its lack of con-
sistency and to its empirical falsification (as suggested by Newmeyer 1986 and 1996) 
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or to sociological reasons (as the other historiographers maintain)? Let’s begin 
by reviewing the different positions of those who have tried to characterize the 
 “linguistic wars”.
The initial impetus for the debate was provided by Newmeyer’s overview of 
 generative grammar (Newmeyer 1986), the first edition of which dates back to 
1980. Frederick J. Newmeyer (b. 1944), a former adherent of GS, devoted a chapter 
 (Chapter Four) to “the rise of Generative Semantics”, and the subsequent one to “the 
linguistic wars”, which deals, among other things, with “the collapse of Generative 
Semantics” (see Newmeyer 1986: 132–8). According to Newmeyer (id.: 133), “the fact 
was that generative semantics destroyed itself ”. Summarizing Newmeyer’s discussion, 
it can be said that the causes of this ‘self-destruction’ were: (1) the failed attempt by GS 
to represent every aspect of linguistic behavior (including typically pragmatic facts) 
by means of structural representations (in general, tree diagrams); (2) its “whimsi-
cal style of presentation”, which caused many people to feel that such a theory lacked 
scientific seriousness; (3) the lack of a firm institutional organization: even though at 
a given time (approximately, between the late 1960s and the early 1970s) generative 
semanticists were the majority among generative linguists, they were never able to 
create a research center comparable to the M.I.T. linguistics department, where in this 
same period EST was being worked out by Chomsky and his students. The end result 
of all such factors was the abandonment of GS by its leaders (the most outstanding of 
whom were George Lakoff [b. 1941], James D. McCawley [1938–1999], Paul M. Postal 
[b. 1936] and John Robert Ross [b. 1938]) and the consequent “victory” of EST. In the 
final section of the chapter, Newmeyer speaks of “the legacy of Generative Semantics”, 
namely its insights that were later taken over by EST and its descendants: among them, 
“the idea of lexical decomposition” as well as “the nonexistence of extrinsic rule order-
ing, post-cyclic lexical insertion, and treating anaphoric pronouns as bound variables” 
(Newmeyer 1986: 138).
One of the first reactions to Newmeyer’s reconstruction came from Robin Tolmach 
Lakoff (b. 1942). In her view, Newmeyer “is to be admired for working through a 
formidable amount of complex, contradictory, and often ill-expressed prose in an 
attempt to make sense of fifteen years of theoretical developments in linguistics” 
(R.T. Lakoff 1989: 939). Nevertheless, “Newmeyer misleads the reader and distorts the 
facts”, since “[n]o one who lived through the period as a participant in the ‘linguistics 
wars’ can claim the status of disinterested observer” (id.: 940). Since Newmeyer was a 
participant in such “wars”, his reconstruction of them is unavoidably biased. Actually, 
the space devoted by R.T. Lakoff to the discussion of Newmeyer’s book is rather limited: 
little more than a couple of footnotes (p. 956 and 976) and some scattered references.
R.T. Lakoff ’s paper is, however, important, since it explicitly makes an attempt 
at reconstructing both the basic theoretical tenets of GS and the overall climate in 
which the “linguistic war” between GS and EST (or IS) developed. According to her 
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reconstruction, the seed of the bitter fight between generative semanticists on the one 
hand and Chomsky with his staunch followers on the other lies in a deeply different 
conception of what language is and what the goals of linguistics are. The first group 
(GS) would have been constituted by “humanists […] For them, the promise was made 
in Chomsky’s statement that language was a window to the mind, a way to enter that 
black box, to see how people actually worked” (R.T. Lakoff 1989: 945). The other group 
(EST), mainly formed by “mathematicians and logicians, by temperament if not by 
trade […] were concerned with predictable regularities, patterns that recurred, and the 
formalisms necessary to capture those generalizations” (id.: 944). In Lakoff ’s view, the 
first approach to language and linguistics (namely, the “humanistic” one) is by far the 
more adequate, or, at the very least, the “formalistic” approach is in itself insufficient: 
“only part of our work can be concerned with recurring regularities for which formal 
rules can be written — the rest is more like exegeses of Hamlet” (id.: 985). Given this 
essential difference between the basic views of the two groups, and given the fact that 
the “humanists” were attracted by Chomskian linguistics as offering “a window to 
the mind”, it was somewhat obvious that the generative semanticists first found their 
inspiration more in Chomsky’s non-technical works, such as Cartesian Linguistics or 
Language and Mind, than in his “paradigm-making” Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. 
In fact, they were especially fascinated by the idea of “linguistic universals”, and such 
universals were basically conceived as being of a semantic nature: “deep structure” as 
exemplified in Aspects, which contained categories such as articles or modals, and 
was presented in a SVO order, could clearly not claim to be universal (cf. R.T. Lakoff 
1989: 941). Of course, “Chomsky in Aspects spoke of universals of form and substance, 
clearly indicating that the former were the more interesting” (id.: 980). Generative 
semanticists, on the other hand, were interested in substantive universals. Accord-
ing to R.T. Lakoff (id.: 962), “[t]he operative assumptions defining generative seman-
tics were these: universality, natural logic, abstractness, continuousness”. As she notes 
(p. 961), the last mentioned assumption, namely that there are no definite boundaries 
between linguistic categories, nor between the notions of “grammatical” and “ungram-
matical”, “was perhaps the only one (maybe because it came late) not to be vigorously 
resisted by CTG (‘Classical Transformational Grammar’)/EST”. This remark is more 
significant than it would appear to be at first sight: the assumption that linguistic cat-
egories are “continuous” marks, in a sense, the “beginning of the end” for GS, as will 
be seen in Section 3., below. This is probably the reason why this assumption was not 
“vigorously resisted” by GS opponents, namely EST linguists.
R.T. Lakoff ’s article also contains much material of an anecdotal character which 
deals with the atmosphere of the struggle between GS and EST in the years between 
late 1960s and early 1970s. She describes this struggle as a more or less direct offshoot 
of the attitude held by generative grammarians against the so-called “Bad Guys” (i.e., 
the post-Bloomfieldian linguists) and, in general, against any people not inclined to 
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accept Chomsky’s approach to language. This deeply polemical attitude subsequently 
developed within the generative school itself. “Much of the fun was in the fighting, 
and without fun, there was no GS” (R.T. Lakoff 1989: 970). One interesting, as well as 
puzzling, feature of Lakoff ’s reconstruction is her assessment of the positions of GS on 
the one hand and of EST on the other in terms of gender differences: EST showed a 
prevailing interest for what is formal and structural, whereas GS was more concerned 
with the complexity of linguistic data. These different attitudes may be traced back to 
the different ways in which males or females relate themselves to the world:
We can see formalism as maximally non-interactive; and autonomous language 
theories as treating language as an external, impersonal object. On the other 
hand, a theory that is concerned with language as an interactive strategy, linking 
people with one another more or less successfully, is closer to the way women 
tend to approach the world. (id.: 974)
I leave readers to form their own assessment of this line of argument.
The final part of the article is devoted to the cause of the decline of GS. According 
to R.T. Lakoff (1989: 981), this lay mainly in the admission that the complexity of lan-
guage could not be constrained in the format of a grammar: “we began to move away 
from the idea that social and psychological context could be represented as the basis of 
syntax in a syntax-central grammar such as GS was”. Generative semanticists therefore 
turned their attention to the pragmatic and social aspects of language, and did away 
with a formal approach to linguistic facts. They adopted a “functional” approach to 
language: “the forms language takes are determined in large measure by the functions 
to which it is put […] Any theory of language must begin with these functions, and 
see linguistic form as an artifact thereof ” (id.: 984). According to Lakoff “[t]he fissures 
separating early T(ransformational) G(rammar), classical TG, EST, and G(overnment) 
B(inding) are at least as deep as those dividing GS and what its developers are doing 
today” (id.: 983).
In short, it can be said that R.T. Lakoff sees the “linguistic war” as due to an irrec-
oncilable difference between the views of language held by generative semanticists on 
the one hand and EST-representatives on the other. She names the abandonment of a 
formal approach to language as the reason for the decline of GS. According to her, the 
development of both theories contains some unbridgeable “gaps” between their differ-
ent chronological phases.
The first book-length treatment of the debate between GS and IS/EST is 1993 
book by Randy A. Harris (b. 1956), which gives a detailed and colorful picture of the 
“linguistics wars” (the shift from adjective to substantive is Harris’ work, I think). 
 Harris’ attitude is certainly well-balanced: he is neither an enemy of GS nor of EST. His 
review of the theses and of the arguments of both sides is a correct and very detailed 
one; his portrayal of the main figures involved in the “wars” (Chomsky, G. Lakoff, 
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McCawley, Postal, and Ross, above all) is never unfair (with the exception of his quali-
fication of Dougherty, too hastily dismissed as a “mere polemicist”: Harris seems to 
ignore Dougherty’s important contribution to the interpretive theory of pronouns; 
see Dougherty 1969; also Koerner 2002: 113, which qualifies Harris’ assessment of 
Dougherty as “uncharitable”).
In Harris’ reconstruction, the decline of GS was mainly due to the lack of a unitary 
research program: Postal turned from GS to Relational Grammar; G. Lakoff adopted 
various kinds of “cognitive grammar” in successive years; Ross stressed the continuous 
(“squishy”, in his own terms) nature of linguistic phenomena, but he never worked 
out an organic model to describe them (Lakoff himself attempted a similar enterprise, 
developing what he called a “fuzzy grammar”, but, as has just been said, he successively 
developed his research in other directions); and McCawley continued developing a 
kind of “abstract syntax” which was reminiscent of the 1960s and therefore was “out of 
step with the times” (Harris 1993: 224). On the other side of the battlefield,  Chomsky 
worked out a research program, firstly dubbed R(evised)EST, then G(overnment)
B(inding)-theory, headed by himself and by himself alone, and “anyone in his  [Chomsky’s] 
immediate framework who begins working on a strand that is uncongenial to him, 
or even just uninteresting, rapidly becomes, by definition, out of the program” 
(id.: 234). Furthermore, one typical feature of GS was that of stimulating interest in a 
whole series of problems, without offering a clear solution to any of them.
Generative semantics […] failed for the reason most research programs fail. You 
can’t keep scientists’ attention for too long without giving them something to 
do. They need handles. They need results. The motive forces that gave rise to 
generative semantics never went away, but Montague grammar, and relational 
grammar, and nongenerative approaches now looked much more promising. Too, 
Chomsky engineered another motivation for linguists, restricting the grammar, 
and provided them with a new set of tools. (id.: 242)
Harris (1993: 248ss.) states that GS left two kinds of legacy: on the one hand, it gave 
impulse to many models which became alternatives to the Chomskian one, such as 
pragmatics-oriented linguistics, relational grammar, and, to a certain extent, even 
sociolinguistics or functionalism; however, the most direct descendant of GS is surely 
Cognitive Grammar. On the other hand, many GS insights were later adopted by the 
Chomskian approach: for example, lexical decomposition, or May’s (1977; 1985) treat-
ment of quantifiers. This, however, had already been noted by Newmeyer (1986: 138), 
as Harris (1993: 254) explicitly recognizes.
The “linguistic wars” are also the topic of Chapter 15 (“Permanent Chomskian 
Civil War in Linguistics”) of Murray (1994), which is a “social history” (as its sub-
title expressly says) of North American linguistics during the 20th century. The basic 
tenet underlying Murray’s book is “[t]hat ‘good ideas’ are not sufficient to account 
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for the history of science” (p. 22); such a tenet, Murray continues, “is the raison d’être 
for the sociology of science” (ibid.). Decidedly, Murray does not consider Chomskian 
linguistics as a ‘good idea’: in general, Murray (possibly because he is a sociologist) 
fully disagrees with approaches to languages and linguistics such as the Chomskian 
one, given its programmatic discarding of any social or communicative consideration. 
Murray (1994; see especially ch. 9) also rejects Chomsky’s reconstruction of the begin-
nings of generative grammar: in Murray’s view, this linguistic theory was not so hin-
dered by post-Bloomfieldians as Chomsky likes to stress. Rather, it was Chomsky’s 
and other generative grammarians’ attitude towards post-Bloomfieldians that was 
highly aggressive.
The most central of them [the post-Bloomfieldians, G.G.] actively fostered 
Chomsky’s and Lees’s careers. In terms of aggression, the Chomskians struck first. 
Their revolutionary rhetoric was not a reaction to the incomprehension of the 
‘establishment’, nor a defense against neophobia or persecution by angry elders 
(Murray 1994: 244).
According to Murray (p. 434), Chomsky’s subsequent attitude towards generative 
semanticists was not so different from that which Chomsky held towards linguists 
of the past generation, and the latter attitude can even be considered as a direct off-
shoot of the former. This thesis has already been advanced by Harris (1993), as Murray 
stresses, and also by R.T. Lakoff, as has been seen above. According to Murray (1994: 436), 
the decline of GS was essentially due to the lack of “intellectual leadership”. By contrast, 
Chomsky was a real “intellectual dictator”:
Constant purges, persistent rhetoric about a sacred ‘revolution’ accompanied by 
persistent misgovernment as judged by any external standards recall Stalin […]. 
The ‘Cultural Revolution’ of Mao Zedong (another Stalinist) is an even better 
political analog for the Chomskian regime: the aging dictator questions the zeal 
and loyalty of his former followers, and encourages the ferocity of the young, who 
gladly challenge ‘traditions’ of all ages. (Murray 1994: 445).
Let’s now turn to the assessment of “linguistic wars” by Geoffrey J. Huck (b. 1944) 
and John A. Goldsmith (b. 1951). Their central point is the rejection of the thesis that 
GS was abandoned because it was falsified. According to their view, “if the theory of 
Generative Semantics had been falsified, why are its central claims by and large still 
accepted?” (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 92). Among such “central claims”, Huck and 
Goldsmith list those already stressed by Harris, such as lexical decomposition and 
the analysis of quantifiers, to which they add the attempt to constrain the power of 
grammars:
The idea that there are target structures that the derivational constraints applying 
to semantic representations conspire to make surface structures conform to in 
fact offered a Generative Semantics equivalent of Emonds’s theory of structure 
preservation. (id.: 50–1).
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In Huck and Goldsmith’s view, both Generative Semantics and Interpretive Seman-
tics had similar aims and both made important contributions to the development of 
theoretical syntax, but all too often they were unable to understand each other. This 
appears clearly from the debate over certain empirical issues. Huck and Goldsmith 
quote three of them as typical: the respectively transformation (McCawley 1968 vs. 
Chomsky 1971); the “Adverb Preposing” rule (G. Lakoff 1972 vs. Chomsky 1975a); 
and the analysis of remind as a “surface verb”, namely as a case of a lexical insertion 
following transformational rules (Postal 1970 vs. Chomsky 1972).1 “Real issues were 
in fact raised in these exchanges, but were obscured as each side proved unwilling 
to engage with the other on exactly the other’s terms” (Huck & Goldsmith 1995:77). 
The reasons for this “lack of communication” between the two sides lay, according to 
Huck and Goldsmith, in the different view of linguistics held by GS on the one hand 
and by IS/EST on the other: the former mainly held a “mediational orientation”, that 
is it attempted to give an explanation of the sound/meaning relation; the latter held a 
“distributional orientation”, since it aimed at describing and explaining the rules gov-
erning the occurrence of the linguistic elements (see Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 7–21). 
In the year following the publication of Aspects, Chomsky shifted from such a distri-
butional orientation to a “psychological orientation” (cf. id.: 24–27): but GS did not 
accept this shift, since it was itself nearer to the more formal approach of LSLT (Chomsky 
1975c[1955–56]; cf. Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 25). Generative semanticists “were in 
general committed to discovering structural solutions to semantic problems” (id.: 26) 
and “the psychological and distributional orientations of the Aspects program were 
linked in a way that was simply not possible in the Generative Semantics program” 
(id.: 27). Huck & Goldsmith therefore conclude that one cannot speak of any “winner” 
or “loser” of the “linguistic wars”. The decline of Generative Semantics was mainly due 
to external and organizational reasons: while Interpretive Semantics could rely on a 
1. McCawley’s “respectively transformation” and Lakoff’s analysis of some cases of “Adverb 
Preposing” aimed at demonstrating that the same rules would account both for syntactic and 
semantic phenomena, and therefore there would be no more need for two kinds of rules 
(i.e., syntactic and semantic) and for a level of deep structure distinct from semantic inter-
pretation, contrary to what was assumed by Chomsky (1965). Postal’s analysis of remind as a 
“surface verb” derived the sentence John reminds me of a gorilla from an underlying structure 
more or less as I perceive John similar to a gorilla: the verb remind would then be inserted 
after the application of some transformations, and this would falsify another assumption of 
Chomsky (1965), i.e., that all lexical insertions apply before the application of any transforma-
tion. Chomsky essentially replied that all such analyses were based on several equivocations. 
In his view, McCawley treated two different phenomena, one syntactic and the other semantic, 
as a unitary one; Lakoff maintained that the “standard” approach would have to resort to two 
different rules of Adverb Preposing, while it actually needed just one; and Postal’s analysis of 
remind, besides postulating some transformations which are not fully motivated, missed some 
important regularities which can be stated only at the deep structure level.
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definite and strong academic location (the Linguistics Department of M.I.T.), no simi-
lar opportunity was offered to Generative Semantics. The Linguistics Department of 
the University of Chicago, which could have been the center of a Generative Semantics 
school, thanks to the presence in its staff of people like James D. McCawley, N. Akatsuka 
McCawley, and Jerrold Sadock, was generally an eclectic department where a lot of dif-
ferent research trends were cultivated. The other main generative semanticists besides 
J. McCawley (namely, G. Lakoff, Postal and Ross) were scattered throughout the USA 
(Lakoff at Berkeley, Postal at the IBM research center, and Ross at M.I.T., where he was 
obviously isolated). Hence, the organizational structure of GS was much less than that 
of IS: and this explains why, whereas IS (EST) subsequently developed into GB theory 
etc., GS as such disappeared.
The second part of Huck & Goldsmith’s book consists of four interviews with as 
many protagonists of the “linguistic wars”: Ray S. Jackendoff (b. 1945), George Lakoff, 
John Robert Ross, and Paul Postal, whose opinions about the story only partly confirm, 
in my view, the authors’ reconstruction of events. In particular, Lakoff ’s listing of the 
commitments of the four leaders of GS movement (beside himself, McCawley, Ross 
and Postal) shows an attitude toward the “psychological orientation” which is more 
problematic than it appears from Huck & Goldsmith’s discussion. According to Lakoff 
(see Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 109 ff.), the four linguists shared the same commitments 
during the years when they worked within a common framework, but they “gave them 
different priorities” (id.: 109). Such commitments, in Lakoff ’s words, were: the Cogni-
tive Commitment (“to take seriously empirical results about the nature of mind and to 
make the theory of language fit with those results”); the Generalization/Full Range Com-
mitment (“to seek maximal generalizations over the full range of linguistic data, both 
within and across all domains of language”); the Fregean Commitment (“to characterize 
semantics using the tools of formal logic”); and the Formal Symbol System Commitment 
(“the commitment to the central Chomskyan metaphor, namely, that a language is a 
formal symbol system”). Lakoff, in his own words, had his “priorities in the order given” 
and, at the time of the interview (1992), he declared to “still hold the Cognitive and 
Generalization/Full Range Commitment”, while he had been “forced by empirical data 
to abandon both the Fregean and Chomskyan commitments” (id.: 109–110).
Ross had the Generalization/Full Range Commitment first, the Chomskyan 
Commitment second, the Cognitive Commitment third and the Fregean 
Commitment, if at all, at a distant last. […] Postal also placed the Generalization/
Full Range Commitment first and the Chomskyan Commitment second, with the 
Fregean Commitment a distant third (if at all), and no Cognitive Commitment at 
all. […] McCawley’s story is much more complicated. McCawley had an additional 
commitment that was (and still is) primary — what we will call the Solid Ground 
Commitment. McCawley wants to do theoretical linguistics at all times using 
ideas and representational techniques that he feels are well understood, like formal 
logic and classical transformational grammar. […] He would split the Fregean 
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commitment into two parts: (Frege-1) a commitment to empirically established 
ideas in logic. (Frege-2) a commitment to the formal mechanisms of existing 
logic. He ranks (1) above (2). […] Jim [McCawley] also has a subtler version of 
the Chomskyan Commitment, which again is split into two parts: (Chomsky-1) 
a commitment to make use of the symbolic representations that have come out of 
generative grammar to the extent that they are useful for characterizing syntactic 
phenomena. […] (Chomsky-2) a commitment to the detailed entailments of the 




Frege-1 (apparently a consequence of (2))3. 
Chomsky-1 (apparently a consequence of (1))4. 
Frege-2 (apparently a consequence of (1))5. 
Cognitive6. 
(id.: 110–1).
According to Lakoff, the commitments of generative semanticists and those of 
 Chomsky “were incommensurable and no amount of evidence or argument would 
have mattered” (id.: 112). As far as the decline of GS is concerned, Lakoff seems to 
adhere both to an external and an internal explanation. The external reason was that 
the generative semanticists were too weak with respect to Chomsky:
In 1967, when Chomsky started attacking us, I was 26, Haj [i.e., Ross] and Jim 
[i.e., Mc Cawley] were 29, and Paul [i.e., Postal] was 30. We were kids, with no 
position at all, and we got sucked into a fight with the most powerful linguist in 
history — a fight on his terms. (id.: 116).
The internal reason was that both Generative and Interpretive Semantics failed from 
an empirical point of view:
If the Interpretivists had given up and declared Generative Semantics to have 
“won,” I would still have given up on formal logic and transformational derivations 
and moved on to work on Cognitive Linguistics, and so would be at odds with 
both Generative Semanticists and Intepretive Semanticists. (id.: 117)
Huck & Goldsmith (1995) was directly answered by Newmeyer (1996: ch. 10). Newmeyer 
maintains a position which was more alluded to than explicitly stated in his 1986 book: 
GS was abandoned because it was falsified. This happened because
...its core principles were refuted. Phenomenon after phenomenon in the 1970s 
was uncovered that pointed to nonsemantically based principles applying at the 
level of deep or surface structure. Linguists abandoned generative semantics to 
develop models of grammar which gave prominence to those levels. (Newmeyer 
1996: 137)
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In particular, two core principles of GS were falsified: the non-existence of a level 
of deep structure, that is of “a level segregating the lexical and nonlexical rules” 
(p. 135) and the idea that “all profound syntactic generalizations are semantically 
based” (ibid.). About the alleged shared positions of both GS and IS (the analysis 
of quantifiers, lexical decomposition, constraints on grammatical rules), Newmeyer 
maintains that such similarities are only apparent, to a large extent, and the inter-
pretive approach showed itself to be superior. Newmeyer (ibid.) is also skeptical 
about “external” explanations of the fall of GS, such as those proposed in Huck & 
 Goldsmith (1995: ch. 4), which attempt to motivate the decline of GS on the basis of 
its overly weak roots in the US academic system. If the eclecticism of the Linguistics 
Department of the University of Chicago was actually an obstacle to the develop-
ment of GS, the same theoretical framework was predominant in other departments 
(Newmeyer quotes Berkeley,  Illinois, Michigan, Ohio State and Texas). Newmeyer’s 
conclusion is therefore that “people ceased to do generative semantics because they 
ceased to believe it” (Newmeyer 1996: 137). That conclusion is based on a precise 
position about what can effect changes in scientific paradigms: “I believe that, in 
general, scientists can be counted on to make their theoretical choices on rational 
grounds” (ibid.).
The “linguistic wars” are dealt with in the final pages (493–527) of Seuren’s (1998) 
very original contribution to the history of linguistics, and especially of seman-
tics. Pieter A.M. Seuren (b. 1934), who has been one of the European linguists who 
adhered to the GS movement, to which he made some important contributions (see 
e.g., Seuren 1969; 1974), is clearly sympathetic with it and bitterly opposed to the EST 
linguists and to Chomsky in particular. He first states that “[g]enerative semantics 
was less a theory of meaning than a contribution to the theory of syntax” (Seuren 
1998: 474–5). Concerning the impact of generative semantics, Seuren (p. 475) writes 
that “by 1970 generative semantics was the dominant trend in theoretical linguistics.” 
In his view, the GS movement “is comparable in important respects to that of the 
Neogrammarians in 19th century Germany, except that its history has been a great 
deal less fortunate.” (p. 502)
What, then, were the causes of the decline of a movement that, at a certain date, 
appeared to be the “winning” one on the world linguistic scene? According to Seuren, 
they were mainly sociological reasons, connected with Chomsky’s rhetorical skill: 
“[t]he onslaught on generative semantics was based entirely on claims to prestige and 
on other sociological factors, leading to wholesale rejection and even utter derision” 
(p. 475). Chomsky and his followers were so clever as to attack generative seman-
tics “where it was most vulnerable” (ibid.). For their part, the defenders of GS “were 
unable to separate essential from peripheral issues” (p. 510). In fact, the debate cen-
tered around seven topics: (a) Ross’ analysis of auxiliaries as main verbs; (b) the status 
of nominalizations as transformations or lexical entries; (c) the question of lexical 
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insertion and the status of ‘deep structure’; (d) the analysis of lexical predicates (‘prel-
exical syntax’); (e) the derivational constraints; (f) Postal’s analysis of remind; and (g) 
the status of thematic roles or functions (cf. p. 518). In actual fact, Seuren maintains, 
the choice in favor of GS or EST was not determined by the solution of any of these 
topics; and the debate brought about no decisive proofs (or disproofs) for any of the 
competing theories. “The real issue was, and is, whether the transformational rules 
should take semantic representations as input. It is a question of the overall superior-
ity of one theory over another” (p. 521).
It would seem, in hindsight, that the sudden collapse of generative semantics […] 
was due […] mostly to the generative semanticists’ inability to find an answer to 
the obfuscations, equivocations, false rhetoric and other unprofessional forms of 
sophistry employed by Chomsky in his war against them. (ibid.)
The sociological factors that led to the decline of generative semanticists was the atmo-
sphere of freedom and anarchy which prevailed among them, contrasted with what 
happened in “the circles around Chomsky, where strict discipline and obedience (‘loy-
alty’) is exacted” (p. 513). “This idealistic attitude inspired many but it had disastrous 
organizational consequences for the movement, which lacked the machinery required 
for a systematic spreading of the word” (ibid.). Seuren’s conclusion about Chomsky’s 
attitude is very critical: “Largely as a result of Chomsky’s actions, linguistics is now 
sociologically in a very unhealthy state” (p. 526).
Koerner (2002: ch. 6) makes an attempt both at providing a new assessment of 
the “linguistic wars” and at “assessing the assessment”, namely at providing a critical 
evaluation of such works as Newmeyer 1986, R.T. Lakoff 1989, Harris 1993, Huck & 
Goldsmith 1995 and Seuren 1998. He first observes that the debate in the historiog-
raphy of linguistics about such a rather limited episode has been surprisingly large; 
and the episode itself, consisting of “theoretical disagreements and counter-proposals, 
which ought to have been quite normal within any given framework”, looks, “at least 
in hindsight, to have been blown out of all proportion” (Koerner 2002: 108). He also 
states that
This episode saw some rather bitter exchanges between Chomsky and several 
of his students on the place of semantics in syntax, all of which appear to have 
ended with Chomsky’s position holding ground, though perhaps not because he 
necessarily had all the best arguments on his side. (p. 106)
As far as Koerner’s “assessment of the assessment” is concerned, it should be noted 
that he shares R.T. Lakoff ’s judgment that Newmeyer’s account is essentially biased. 
Koerner (2002: 111) also remarks that “Lakoff ’s exposé is biased, too, but it has the 
advantage that the reader is aware of this right from the start.” About Harris (1993), 
Koerner (id.: 112) says that it could be ranked “higher […] in scholarly terms than 
Newmeyer’s Linguistics in America”. Koerner, however, is also not completely satisfied 
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with Harris’ book: he remarks that it is exaggerated, exactly as Newmeyer’s is, the lat-
ter by its restraining linguistic theory in America to generative linguistics, the former 
“since in order to have ‘war’ one must also have, for of all intents and purposes, troops 
and not a mere handful of soldiers, most of whom want to be captains” (ibid.). Further-
more, Koerner does not share Harris’ final assessment of the GS/IS debate, namely that 
GS “helped ensure a healthier and more diverse field” (Harris 1993: 432). On the other 
hand, Koerner certainly does not share Seuren’s catastrophic conclusion quoted above. 
Indeed, Koerner is critical of the generative framework as a whole. In his view, “where 
the treatment of meaning is concerned, GS provided many more promissory notes than 
actual solutions” (Koerner 2002: 126). To support this conclusion, Koerner quotes an 
important witness in Chafe (2002: 251), where the following statement can be read: 
“the generative semanticists conceived of semantics as structured in a form still dictated 
by generative syntax”. GS, therefore, was still aiming at giving a formal explanation of 
meaning: but, Koerner (2002: 127) remarks, “ ‘the study of meaning’ […] may elude a 
formal treatment by linguists”. This is the reason, Koerner implicitly suggests, why GS 
eventually failed. In recent years, however, “the field of linguistics generally was well on 
the road to recovery from the Chomskian hegemony, even in North America” (ibid.).
One can therefore conclude that according to Koerner GS failed on account of its 
internal weakness, which was not, however, restricted to GS alone, but belonged to the 
generative paradigm as a whole. Furthermore, another important remark by Koerner 
about GS is the following one: “even on the metalevel of their argumentation, one can-
not find many common denominators among the leaders of the GS school” (Koerner 
2002: 120). In other words, GS lacked a unitary ‘research program’. Koerner also lists 
other facts that could have been responsible for the collapse of GS, namely the ‘external’, 
sociological factors already stressed by Huck & Goldsmith, to which he adds this fur-
ther one: “the late 1960s and 1970s witnessed the creation of many linguistics programs 
and departments […], and more often than not the jobs were filled by M.I.T. graduates” 
(Koerner 2002: 125–6). This fact had as its consequence that Chomskian “orthodoxy” 
became increasingly widespread, while the followers of other trends, such as the former 
GS, had to take refuge in other departments or to develop other new frameworks, such 
as “Relational Grammar […], Generalized (or Head-Driven Phrase Structure Gram-
mar) […], Cognitive Grammar […], or, more recently, Optimality Theory” (p. 126).
Let’s now attempt to summarize the discussion so far. First of all, it is self-evident 
that Newmeyer is more or less isolated, in his “anti GS” and “pro IS” position, with 
respect of the other scholars we have quoted. On the other hand, some assessments 
are apparently shared by all. One such assessment is, so to speak, tacitly assumed: 
no scholar taking part in the debate (including Newmeyer) restates Chomsky’s 
 characteristic slogan in the epoch of the “linguistic wars”, namely that the larger 
part of GS proposals were no more than “notational variants” of EST proposals (see, 
e.g., Lakoff 1971a: 265–7; Chomsky 1972: 74–5). Furthermore, there is a general 
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 agreement on the  outcome of the “war”: GS “lost” and EST “won”. It must also be 
added that several scholars converge on other points: for example, the lack of an aca-
demically institutionalized basis is considered one of the causes of GS’s defeat both 
by Newmeyer and by his opponents; and the fact that the GS leaders lacked a unitary 
research program is also stressed by Koerner. Furthermore, Koerner (diverging on this 
topic from G. Lakoff) also espouses the view that GS tried to constrain every aspect 
of meaning into a formal framework, not dissimilar from that of “classical” generative 
grammar; and this, although in different terms and, obviously, with a different aim, has 
also been maintained by Newmeyer.
Hence, we are now faced with the basic historiographical problem raised at the 
beginning of the present paper, namely which the main reasons were for the fall of GS: its 
empirical falsification or sociological factors? To solve this problem, some preliminary 
remarks have to be made. First of all, it should be noted that the debate on the “linguis-
tic wars”, being mainly of US origin, tends to be consistently biased by personal views. 
For example, a large part of the observations by the scholars we have just reviewed deal 
with Chomsky’s personal attitude and behavior, and/or with the problems of US acad-
emy (see especially R.T. Lakoff and Murray; the other critics of Newmeyer’s approach 
are also full of anecdotes about Chomsky’s unfairness). Such facts are undoubtedly 
important (although I will not even attempt to discuss them here): but it might be 
asked whether anything more substantial, or at any rate anything new, could possibly 
be gained by adopting a more “distant” point of view. As Koerner (2002[1983]: 154) 
reminds us, “[i]deally, the historian should be at a certain distance from his subject, in 
the sense that he should have no personal stake in the outcome of his research but be 
guided by a desire to set the record straight”. This ideal is very difficult to attain if the 
matters the historian tries to assess are more or less contemporary to him: this is the 
case with the “linguistic wars”, and therefore no one who witnessed them (including 
the author of the present essay) can pretend to be totally unbiased. Nevertheless, the 
point of view of scholars geographically distant from the topics dealt with can at least 
soften such a bias. I will therefore aim to contribute to the assessment of the GS/EST 
debate by showing how it was perceived and what its outcome was from a “peripheral” 
country, in this case Italy. In so doing, it should be possible to “put on hold” the more 
specifically US aspects of the debate and to give a more neutral answer to our “basic 
historiographical question”.
. Generative grammar in Italy between the late  
    1960s and the early 1970s
When the “linguistic wars” broke out, generative grammar had just arrived in Italy 
and it had hardly penetrated any academic institution. Indeed, the Italian academic 
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establishment (with very few exceptions) was hostile to any kind of theoretical linguis-
tics, generative or of any other type. Until the 1960s, (almost) the only kind of linguis-
tic research done was in the field of historical linguistics, in the Indo-European and in 
the Romance or (more seldom) Germanic domain, which was taught under the spe-
cifically Italian label of glottologia (i.e., “science of language”): the first chairs of Gen-
eral Linguistics (linguistica generale) were created only in 1967 and were assigned to 
scholars who were not generative linguists. At the end of the 1960s, the only real group 
of generative linguists was to be found at the Institute of Psychology of the Italian 
Research Council (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, “CNR”) in Rome; this group was 
made up of some young researchers led by Domenico Parisi (b. 1934). An “external” 
member of the group was Annarita Puglielli (b. 1941), who graduated in Rome with a 
thesis in English language and literature and subsequently obtained a Ph.D. at Cornell 
University, under the guidance of F. Agard, with a dissertation entitled The Predicate 
Phrase in Italian. This group was, however, strongly active, and in 1969 it organized 
a conference explicitly devoted to “Italian transformational grammar”. Since the early 
1970s, some other small groups of young scholars interested in generative grammar 
began to gather in other places as well: one of them was the University of Padua, mainly 
due to the initiative of Lorenzo Renzi (b. 1939), at that time an associate professor of 
Romance Philology. Another group was forming at the Scuola Normale Superiore of 
Pisa, around Alfredo Stussi (b. 1939), a professor of History of the Italian Language. To 
these small groups some other more or less isolated scholars could be added (for more 
information about the beginnings of generative grammar in Italy, see Graffi 1990). At 
any rate, all these more or less scattered linguists had one feature in common: very few 
of them held any permanent academic job, and those of them who did, like Renzi or 
Stussi, were not professors of linguistics, but of other disciplines. It must be added that, 
despite their interest in generative grammar, most of their research did not deal with 
theoretical linguistics, but with other topics, namely those they were professors of.
It should be plain that, in such a situation, the preference for one or another con-
testant of the “linguistic wars” could hardly have any impact on the academic career 
of any of these linguists: the majority of the Italian linguistic establishment of the time 
distrusted theoretical linguistics in general, and generative grammar in particular. To 
present oneself as a “Generative semanticist” or as a “Interpretive semanticist” would 
have made no difference at all. Nevertheless, the splitting of the generative school had 
its effects in Italy too: in general, the Rome CNR group opted for Generative Seman-
tics, and this choice was maintained until about the mid 1970s by most scholars inter-
ested in generative grammar. Later, as we shall see, other linguists preferred to follow 
the EST path, among them even some who had initially chosen GS. In general, the 
debate between the two diverging approaches was followed quite attentively by the 
small Italian generative community. Since one cannot believe that Italian genera-
tive linguists would have opted for one or another “party” out of academic interests, 
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this is the  reason why Italian interventions in the matter could represent a more bal-
anced witness of the “linguistic wars”. I also believe that several of these interventions, 
although they date back almost forty years, are still more useful than some more recent 
treatments when it comes to understanding the issues which really brought about the 
“wars”. Let’s therefore examine some of these interventions.
.  “Chomsky’s two souls”: the assessment of the GS vs. EST  
debate by some Italian linguists during the 1970s
The CNR-group headed by Parisi (see above) adopted the Generative Semantics frame-
work since at least the late 1960s. Within this framework, it developed many original 
views, the best presentation of which was a volume written by Parisi and his collab-
orator Francesco Antinucci (Parisi & Antinucci 1973). In the same year, Parisi and 
another member of the CNR-group, Cristiano Castelfranchi (b. 1944), gave a talk at the 
7th Congress of the Italian Linguistic Society significantly entitled “I limiti di Chomsky” 
(“Chomsky’s limitations”; Parisi & Castelfranchi 1975). Before presenting such limita-
tions, the authors also listed major Chomsky’s attainments: the working out of the con-
cept of ‘linguistic competence’; the choice of the sentence as the basic grammatical unit; 
the recognition of a ‘deep’ and a ‘surface’ level in the organization of language and the 
necessity of connecting both levels; the choice of the speaker’s judgments as the basic 
empirical data; and the view of linguistics as part of a more general science of mind 
(cf. Parisi & Castelfranchi 1975: 339–40). On the other hand, Chomsky’s major limita-
tions are the following ones, according to Parisi and Castelfranchi: (1) the insight that 
linguistics is a part of psychology is not actually implemented (id.: 340–1). (2) Chom-
sky’s nativism (namely, his assumption that language is to some degree inborn) is little 
more than an assertion of principle. In particular, it does not even attempt to refer to 
biology or to ethology: where this last point is concerned, it especially suffers from the 
self-imposed limitation of not comparing human with animal communication systems 
(id.: 341–2). (3) Chomsky’s rediscovery of traditional ‘rationalistic’ grammar is only partial 
and superficial. Chomsky and his strict followers did not actually revive the way of 
thinking of people like the Port-Royal scholars and others following this same tradition, 
namely a trend where grammar, logic, rhetoric and philosophy join together (id.: 342). 
(4) Chomsky overstates linguistic uniformity, while he understates the phenomena of 
linguistic diversity (id.: 342–3). (5) Meaning receives only a marginal role in Chomsky’s 
system of grammar and syntax is autonomous from semantics. This point, the authors 
maintain, is strictly connected to the preceding ones: the purely programmatic charac-
ter of Chomsky’s nativism and of his statements that linguistics is part of psychology are 
due to the fact that his linguistic universals are purely formal, wholly disconnected from 
universals of cognition.  Furthermore, the assumption of the autonomy of syntax and the 
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correlative neglect of semantics, pragmatics and communicative intentions cannot help 
but produce a break with the study of animal communication. Traditional rationalis-
tic grammar, by contrast, attempted at strictly connecting grammar and logic, namely 
syntax and semantics (id.: 343–4). Besides these limitations concerning Chomsky’s gen-
eral theoretical framework, Parisi & Castelfranchi listed five further ones more strictly 
connected with Chomsky’s system of grammar, namely: (6) discourse units larger than 
sentences are not taken into account; and (7) grammatical categories and functions are 
defined in a formalistic way, given the lack of attention to semantics. This too “surface-
oriented” approach has other consequences: (8) transformational rules are wholly arbi-
trary; (9) the so-called ‘deep’ structure is very similar to surface structure; and (10) 
the linguistic universals proposed by Chomsky at most describe a regularity, without 
explaining it (id.: 344). According to Parisi & Castelfranchi (p. 345), all these limitations 
have a single source: “the never superseded belief, typical of structuralism and which 
still conditions the development of linguistic studies, that linguistics is a thing in itself ”. 
Their conclusion, therefore, is that “we have to cut the last ties which continue to hold 
Chomsky in the tradition of structuralism and to be more Chomskian than Chomsky 
himself ” (p. 346).
As the attentive reader has surely realized for himself, the bulk of Parisi & 
 Castelfranchi’s arguments about Chomsky’s “limitations” are very close to criticisms 
of Chomsky made by several generative semanticists we have presented in Section 
1, and especially to those of R.T. Lakoff. The major difference is perhaps that Parisi 
&  Castelfranchi’s criticism is essentially of a scientific nature, with very little or no 
personal attack. Actually, they also raise a criticism to Chomsky expressly qualified 
as a “more ad personam” one, namely “the fact that he [Chomsky] has never accepted 
a real confrontation with the criticisms raised against him” (Parisi & Castelfranchi 
1975: 345). There is not in their paper, however, any hint to the “warlike” attitude 
which would seem to have characterized generative grammar since its beginnings in 
R.T. Lakoff ’s reconstruction (see above). Moreover, while R.T. Lakoff seems to disagree 
with the violent critical attitude of Chomsky and his first followers towards structural-
ism, Parisi & Castelfranchi’s explicit goal, as has just been seen, is to “outdefeat” struc-
turalism, so to speak, and to fully implement what they consider to be Chomsky’s more 
fruitful ideas. At any rate, their paper presented the common core of Chomsky and 
the followers of GS as well as the disagreements between them in a startlingly clear 
way that has no match in any contemporary intervention from the other shore of the 
Atlantic (to my knowledge, at least).
Another member of the CNR-group, Francesco Antinucci (b. 1947), investigated 
the causes of the “linguistic wars” in a paper which appeared shortly after that of 
Parisi & Castelfranchi (Antinucci 1976). Once again, these causes are not traced back 
to academic and/or personal factors, but to (often hidden) conceptual disagreements. 
The title of the article alludes to “Chomsky’s two souls” (“le due anime”): the author’s 
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goal, in his own words, “is to show that two deeply different views of language and 
of the tasks of linguistic theory coexist within T[ransformational] G[rammar]” and 
that “both such views originate and coexist since the beginnings of TG in the work of 
Chomsky himself ” (Antinucci 1976: 168). Antinucci does not give any specific label 
for these different views: however, one could dub the first view a “formalistic” and the 
second a “cognitive” one. To illustrate them, Antinucci starts from Chomsky’s first 
published book, Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957). Antinucci (1976: 169) main-
tains that the formalistic view is expressed by a quotation such as the following one, 
which can be found in the initial pages of Chomsky (1957):
From now on I will consider a language to be a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, 
each finite in length and constructed out of a finite set of elements. All natural 
languages in their spoken or written forms are languages in this sense, since 
natural language has a finite number of phonemes (or letters in its alphabet) and 
each sentence is representable as a finite sequence of these phonemes (or letters), 
though there are infinitely many sentences. Similarly, the set of ‘sentences’ of some 
formalized system of mathematics can be considered a language. The fundamental 
aim in the linguistic analysis of a language L is to separate the grammatical 
sequences which are the sentences of L from the ungrammatical sequences which 
are not sentences of L and to study the structure of the grammatical sequences 
(Chomsky 1957: 13).
According to Antinucci (1976: 174), the psychological-cognitive view appears much 
later in Chomsky’s book, specifically in Chapter 8, where Chomsky announces that 
“[w]e shall now proceed to formulate the linguist’s goals in quite different and inde-
pendent terms, which, however, lead to very similar notions of linguistic structure” 
(Chomsky 1957: 85). Chomsky (id.: 87) also states:
What we are suggesting is that the notion of “understanding a sentence” be 
explained in part in terms of the notion of “linguistic level”. To understand a 
sentence, then, it is first necessary to reconstruct its analysis on each linguistic 
level; and we can test the adequacy of a given set of abstract linguistic levels by 
asking whether or not grammars formulated in terms of these levels enable us to 
provide a satisfactory analysis of the notion of “understanding.”
Commenting on both views, Antinucci (1976: 176) remarks that we have to deal “with 
two very different ways of characterizing language and the tasks of linguistic theory”. 
The essential task of the former one is to develop “the most general and simple sys-
tem to reach the goal of enumerating the possible combinations” (p. 172). The sec-
ond one, which Antinucci (p. 176) qualifies as “more traditional”, aims at “building a 
theory which accounts for what Chomsky calls ‘understanding a sentence’. But to do 
this “means to study that capacity which allows one to pass from the phonetic form of 
a sentence to its meaning” (ibid.). It must also be remarked that
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...the theoretical machinery developed to solve the first task also works with 
the second one. It is however fundamental to realize the casual character 
of this coincidence, if one aims at a correct understanding of what subse-
quently happened during the development of Transformational Grammar. 
(ibid.; original emphasis)
The chance character of this coincidence, Antinucci goes on, began to be neglected 
in Chomsky’s subsequent works, especially in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax  (Chomsky 
1965), where such a coincidence “is no longer casual, but definitive and no longer 
called into question” (Antinucci 1976: 177). “In a nutshell, it can be said that Chomsky 
(1965) represents a much more precise and detailed formulation of the point of view 
presented in Chapter 8 of Chomsky (1957), without however rejecting (pay close 
attention to this fact!) the point of view presented in Chapter 2–6” (id.: 178). In Anti-
nucci’s reconstruction, the splitting of the generative school into GS on the one hand 
and EST on the other has its origin in this ambiguity of Chomsky’s view of language. 
The cognitive view of linguistics was pursued by GS to its extreme consequences: GS 
identified deep structures with semantic representations, complicated the transforma-
tional machinery in order to account for the relation between semantic representa-
tions and surface structures and, to attain this goal, also had to enrich this machinery 
with a new and more powerful device, the so-called “global derivational constraints” 
(id.: 179–80). Chomsky, instead of accepting this development of his cognitive view of 
language, reacted against GS by recovering the formalistic point of view, not explic-
itly but de facto. Together with Jackendoff, he worked out a new theory (EST) where 
deep structure is no longer the only input to semantic interpretation and the task of 
transformations is not that of directly relating sound-meaning pairs. The motivations 
for taking this step, Antinucci maintains (p. 181), can only be of a syntactic-distribu-
tional nature; that is, they come from the formalistic view of linguistic theory, the first 
one adopted by Chomsky (1957), “where such devices were indeed motivated wholly 
independently of the problem of accounting for the notion ‘understanding a sentence’ 
(p. 183). GS and EST therefore represent the respective developments of “Chomsky’s 
two souls.” Hence the arguments by means of which each school attempts to show its 
superiority over the other “can hardly achieve their goal, since they presuppose agree-
ment on how to approach language and therefore on the fundamental tasks of linguis-
tic theory” (p. 186). This is Antinucci’s conclusion.
In a paper more or less contemporary with Antinucci’s (Graffi 1975),2 the 
author of the present paper (b. 1949) came to a very similar assessment of the GS 
. The title of the paper means “Equivalent or incompatible?” Although it appeared in the 
proceedings of the 7th Congress of Italian Linguistic Society, actually it was not presented on 
that occasion (June 1973), but rather was written and completed some months later (Spring 1974) 
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vs. EST debate: far from being mere “notational variants” of each other (cf. above: 
p. 15). GS and EST actually showed a very different conception of language and lin-
guistics. Comparing the respective treatment of four different phenomena by GS and 
EST (quantifiers, negation, pronominalization, and those related to focus, topic and 
presupposition), I noticed that the GS analyses were led by the aim to make logic, 
linguistics and psychology coalesce; whereas EST analyses (especially, Jackendoff ’s) 
kept these three disciplines clearly distinct from one another (cf. Graffi 1975: 329). 
Of course, Chomsky had explicitly defined linguistics as “a branch of psychology”, but 
I remarked from the start (p. 288) that Chomsky’s actual work was conducted in an 
“almost exclusively formalistic perspective”. Just like Antinucci, I therefore found the 
real point of opposition between GS and EST in their respective views of linguistics: 
“cognitive” vs. “formalistic”. At the end of the essay, I addressed the topic of the distinc-
tion between  competence and performance, which the latest GS papers (e.g., G. Lakoff 
1971b; McCawley 1972) tended in fact to obliterate. I depicted this last step taken by 
generative semanticists as a real turnabout within contemporary linguistics:
...what was the greatest pride of structuralism, the proposal of an idealizing, 
abstract, description of linguistic facts (a proposal certainly received by Chomsky) 
is being labeled as an unpardonable error (Graffi 1975: 335)
It now seems to me that, by making such remarks, I was pointing to what was then 
becoming the most typical feature of GS in its “last” period, namely around the mid 
1970s: the desire to jettison abstraction and to investigate linguistic phenomena even 
in their most minute details.
In 1979, an anthology appeared in Italian containing translations of some essays 
by generative semanticists (G. Lakoff, R.T. Lakoff, McCawley, Postal, Ross), edited 
by Guglielmo Cinque (Cinque 1979). The editor (b. 1948), after graduating at the 
University of Padua with a dissertation in the History of the Italian language, spent a 
considerable time in Berkeley, where, among other things, he took part in a research 
project on semantics and pragmatics jointly headed by C. Fillmore, G. Lakoff and 
R.T. Lakoff. In the opening lines of his introduction, Cinque (1979: 11) states that Gen-
erative Semantics “[…] can by now be considered as definitively ended”. Hence, Cinque 
attempted to describe “the essential reasons which led to its abandonment” (ibid.). In a 
nutshell, Cinque sees these “essential reasons” as lying in the contrast between the aims 
and was published in July 1975. At the time of its composition, I was a graduate student at 
the “Scuola Normale Superiore” of Pisa; since I graduated in Philosophy, I was interested in 
linguistics especially as a source of epistemological and methodological problems. Antinucci’s 
paper appeared in June 1976 and it was completed, I suppose, several months before (at that 
time, the journal “Lingua e Stile” had a long waiting list). These are the reasons why the two 
papers, while sharing several similar conclusions, do not refer to each other.
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of GS on the one hand and its explanatory power on the other. Cinque sees the aim of 
GS as its attempt to account for any linguistic phenomenon, be it syntactic, semantic, 
pragmatic, social or whatsoever, by means of the same theoretical machinery (essen-
tially, “abstract structures” and transformations governed by “global derivational con-
straints”). According to Cinque (1979: 32),
a logical flaw underlies this assumption. To keep fields separate which show 
properties and principles that are very different from each other does not mean 
we deny the obvious relationships existing between such fields. It simply means 
that we tackle what naturally comes together while dealing separately with 
phenomena which appear to be essentially unhomogeneous from each other.
Another typical assumption of late GS was that of the “squishy” nature of linguis-
tic categories: there would be no definite boundaries between, e.g., nouns and verbs, 
rather all parts of speech would lie on a “continuum” (see, e.g., G. Lakoff 1973; Ross 
1972). “It is difficult to imagine an end point more distant than this one from any 
degree of explanatory adequacy that is found in any of today’s most advanced sciences” 
(Cinque 1979: 33). The essential flaw of GS, in Cinque’s view, lies exactly in this lack 
of restrictiveness:
Successive theories within the evolution of the GS research program have 
characteristically been theories each with less empirical content than the preceding 
one: both because of their increasingly diminished restrictiveness in specifying 
the notion of possible grammar and because of the continuous increase in the 
kinds of phenomena which were considered to fall under their domain; moreover 
this occurred without any corresponding increase in the explanatory depth of the 
theory (Cinque 1979: 36).
This situation, according to Cinque, was the reason why, around 1974–75, GS was 
abandoned, at least as a unitary research program. Cinque closes his essay by listing 
some important “historical merits” of GS, such as the following ones: the stress on the 
necessity of distinguishing between the syntactical form of sentences and their logical 
form, as well as some empirical observations and generalizations which EST capitalized 
on (e.g., the “island phenomena” of Ross 1967; the “surface structure constraints” of 
 Perlmutter 1970; G. Lakoff ’s 1968 and McCawley’s 1971 remarks about pronominaliza-
tion phenomena; Postal’s 1971 treatment of the so-called “cross-over phenomena”).
.  Conclusion: What lesson can be drawn from the Italian reception  
of the “linguistic wars?
Let’s try to summarize how the “linguistic wars” were perceived by the Italian gen-
erative linguists during the 1970s. As has been seen, the adoption of GS tenets was 
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fairly widespread: moreover, this confirms Seuren’s statement (see above: 12) that by 
1970 GS was the dominant linguistic trend. In fact, people like Castelfranchi, Parisi 
or Antinucci explicitly worked within a GS framework. Cinque, as has been said, had 
been a collaborator of G. Lakoff and other generative semanticists. As for myself, I 
was looking at the debate from an outsider’s position (that of a young philosopher 
interested in methodological questions) and I was therefore “neutral” between the two 
opposing parties. As has been said in Section 2, at that time generative linguistics of 
any tendency was very weak, in Italy, from the academic point of view: hence the 
option for either of the two conflicting schools, GS or EST, could hardly have any 
consequence for anyone’s academic career. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that 
the assessment of the debate by all the linguists we have quoted looks essentially fair 
and unbiased, also with some deep insights into its conceptual roots. Such roots were 
seen by all interveners as lying in “Chomsky’s two souls”, the formalistic and the cogni-
tive ones. From this starting point, the commonly shared conclusion was not that GS 
and EST were merely “notational variants” of each other, but that they represented, on 
the contrary, two quite different ways of conceiving linguistics. This was essentially 
the conclusion drawn by Antinucci and myself. Parisi & Castelfranchi, on the other 
hand, explicitly opted for the “cognitive soul” and therefore considered Chomsky’s 
work as a fundamental step in the development of linguistics which had, however, 
to be surpassed. Nevertheless, GS eventually declined in Italy more or less as in the 
USA: Parisi and the CNR group developed a kind of cognitive linguistics along their 
own paths, which shared very few similarities with the original GS, although it was 
certainly inspired by it (more or less as happened with G. Lakoff). Antinucci first dealt 
with questions of linguistic typology, producing a very original book on the subject 
(Antinucci 1977); later, he devoted himself, more than to linguistics, to general ques-
tions of cognition, also studying the primates from this point of view. In 1979, as has 
already been seen above, a former generative semanticist such as Cinque explicitly 
maintained that the research program of GS had already come to its conclusion. In 
subsequent years, Cinque adopted the research program which was the most direct 
offshoot of EST, Chomsky’s “Government-Binding Theory,” and made many impor-
tant contributions to it (see, e.g., Cinque 1995).3
What lesson can we draw from all these facts concerning the issue we are pres-
ently dealing with, namely the assessment of the “linguistic wars”? In a nutshell, that 
the collapse of GS was not essentially due to external, academic or sociological rea-
sons, but mainly to the impossibility for it to reach the goals it had set itself. Such 
. I also adhered to the Government-Binding paradigm, and published some papers and 
textbooks within this framework, before devoting myself almost entirely to the history of 
linguistics.
1 Giorgio Graffi
goals were, as has been seen, the construction of a system of cognitive linguistics 
able to account for every aspect of meaning, including the pragmatic and social ones: 
but these were impossible to reach with a system like that which characterized GS, 
namely the machinery of tree diagrams and transformational rules essentially inher-
ited from Chomsky’s early work. Actually, a similar conclusion has already been drawn 
by G. Lakoff, in his interview with Huck and Goldsmith (see above: 401). As will be 
remembered (see ibid.), Lakoff rejected the criticism of having attempted to reduce 
every linguistic fact to syntax, but the point seems to me rather marginal: what really 
matters is Lakoff ’s recognition that, whatever the outcome of the “linguistic wars” may 
have been, he would have abandoned formal logic and transformational derivations 
for cognitive linguistics. Therefore, GS’s fall was due mainly to “internal” reasons, in 
the USA as in Italy, and, no doubt, all over the world. However great Chomsky’s aca-
demic power, his rhetorical ability, and M.I.T.’s organizational strength may have been, 
these cannot have been the real reasons for the decline of the generative paradigm 
dominant at the beginning of the 1970s.
At this point, one could reasonably raise an objection: Lakoff is right, neither GS 
nor EST could “win”, since both were basically wrong; nevertheless, the former disap-
peared as such, while the latter consistently developed, first becoming Government-
Binding Theory and eventually the Minimalist Program, without any significant break 
between such different phases and under Chomsky’s constant leadership. Is this not a 
sign of Chomsky’s rhetorical ability and M.I.T.’s organizational capacity?
I would like to give to this objection a historiographical answer, not a theoretical 
one. In other words, I will not discuss the merits, or the flaws, of Chomsky’s research 
programs since the 1970s, which probably would involve an overall assessment of his 
work. I will therefore take an “agnostic” position: whether Chomsky’s theory is the 
most insightful view of language of any time, or whether it is the dirtiest trick in the 
history of linguistic studies, one has to explain why it recovered, after a period of cri-
sis, during which GS was dominant. Besides, I do not mean that generative gram-
mar, in any of its variants, has ever been the universally accepted form of linguistics: 
many trends developed and are still developing independently from it, some with a 
critical attitude towards it (think, e.g., of sociolinguistics, or of the several kinds of 
functionalism, etc.). The historiographical problem we are investigating is restricted 
to generative linguistics: namely, why did EST eventually survive and develop while 
GS disappeared?
The answer I am going to propose is the following one: Chomsky recovered from 
the crisis he undoubtedly suffered between the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s by 
asserting an explicit reconciliation of his “two souls”, namely the formalistic soul and 
the cognitive one. This recovery began with a very technical essay, written in 1971 and 
published as Chomsky (1973), and found its first systematic presentation, technical as 
well as popularizing, in Chomsky (1975b). In these essays, Chomsky’s most challenging 
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idea was to substantiate his former claims that linguistics is part of psychology (Chom-
sky 1965), which until then had seemed merely programmatic, by asserting that some 
apparently purely linguistic theoretical constructs are really psychological hypotheses. 
Actually, this step had already been taken in the preceding years: but it was difficult to 
convince anyone that phrase structure or transformational rules have real psychologi-
cal content. The so-called “Derivational Theory of Complexity” worked out by some 
psycholinguists in the late 1960s, initially seemed promising in this sense: sentences 
derived by means of more transformations apparently took longer to process than 
other ones derived by means of less transformations. But shortly after its formulation, 
such a theory faced several conclusive counterexamples. Chomsky never disavowed 
his former views, and always maintained that the problem of “psychological reality” 
is a pseudo-problem: to say that a theory is psychologically real, in his view, means 
no more than to say that it is true (cf. e.g., Chomsky 1980: 107). Nevertheless, this 
position sounded unconvincing to most linguists: as has been seen in the preceding 
section, both scholars inspired by GS (like Parisi, Castelfranchi and Antinucci) as well 
as those who were essentially “neutral” (like myself) felt unsatisfied with Chomsky’s 
statements about the psychological character of his linguistic rules.
Chomsky’s strategy changed with his 1973 article. Instead of presenting a whole 
system of phrase structure and transformational rules, as he had done in works such 
as Chomsky (1957) or Chomsky (1965), he focused his attention on the conditions on 
rules. In so doing, he developed some ideas that he had presented in some of his earlier 
papers, like Chomsky (1964), but he especially capitalized on Ross’s (1967) detailed 
work on “syntactic islands”. As is well known, Ross had shown that the application of 
transformational rules, like those which form wh-questions or relative clauses, does 
not always generate grammatical sentences, being blocked in some given contexts (the 
“islands”). Chomsky (1973) started a research program attempting to explain Ross’s 
“island conditions” by deriving them from some very abstract principles (the labels 
and nature of which we can pass over here). Such principles, together with another 
feature of transformational rules, namely their “context-dependency,” were assumed 
by Chomsky to form part of what he called “Universal Grammar” (UG), which is to 
say, in his own words:
the system of principles, conditions and rules that are elements or properties of 
all human languages not merely by accident but by necessity — of course, I mean 
biological, not logical, necessity. Thus UG can be taken as expressing “the essence 
of human language”. UG will be invariant among humans. UG will specify what 
language learning must achieve, if it takes place successfully (Chomsky 1975b: 29).
This “psycho-biological” interpretation of linguistic theory was therefore arrived at 
starting from the investigation of the formal tools of transformational grammar: the 
empirically observed result that transformational rules are subject to given constraints 
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was used to draw the conclusion that such constraints are of a biological nature. The 
formalistic and the cognitive “souls” of Chomsky no longer coincided by mere chance, 
as happened in Chomsky (1957) and as was noted by Antinucci (1976), but the first one 
had become the key to discovering the other. Of course, this passage was considered 
by many critics as unjustified, and many scholars still today reproach Chomsky’s lin-
guistics for only alleging its “psychological reality.” On the other hand, several linguists 
found the possibility that transformational generative grammar, which until then had 
been felt to be of a purely abstract, formal nature, could have a cognitive impact, very 
attractive. Furthermore, this linking of the formal approach with the cognitive one had 
been reached in the opposite way of that of GS: while GS attempted to give a whole pic-
ture of the mind-language relationship by continuously enlarging its empirical domain 
and providing its technical machinery with new devices (see Cinque’s remarks pre-
sented in the preceding section), EST’s trademark was the reduction of the generative 
power of transformations. Of course, it can be debated whether this step taken by 
Chomsky was a real scientific discovery or simply a new rhetorical move devoid of 
significance: but at any rate it made EST appear to be a research program deserving 
to be further developed and deepened, which was not the case with GS, as G. Lakoff 
himself bore witness. This can explain, in my view, why GS was later felt as the “loser” 
and EST (and its descendants) the “winner” of the “linguistic wars”.
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The past and future directions

British empiricism  
and Transformational Grammar 
A current debate
Jacqueline Léon
Université Paris-Diderot, Histoire des Théories linguistiques
Our aim in this paper is to show, that, although Chomsky’s interest in 
empiricist British linguistics was always very limited, and the controversy of 
Transformational Grammar against British empiricism was led more by Neo-
Firthians against Chomsky than by Chomskyans against Firth and his followers, 
the debate has gone through different phases since the 1950s, and is not yet over. 
It was very vivid in the 1960s, when British empiricist linguists, such as Randolph 
Quirk and M.A.K. Halliday, discussed mostly grammaticalness and competence 
versus performance acceptability and gradience. Contrary to what happened 
with the Neo-Bloomfieldians, the debate did not touch on the validity of corpora. 
After a decline of several decades, the discussion was revived in the 1980s–90s 
with the rise of large computerized corpora. At this point the debate concerned 
mostly new topics still pertaining to TG, such as corpora, statistics, and creativity. 
It was carried out within the area of computational linguistics and is still currently 
vivid. The issue is to investigate whether this debate with TG is still relevant, in 
particular for corpus linguistics, or whether these arguments are past their time 
and are revived only for strategic reasons, in pretending to justify the emergence 
of a new linguistics.
0. Introduction
One of the first Ph.D.s supervised by Chomsky bore on Firthian linguistics. However, 
Chomsky’s interest in empiricist British linguistics was always very limited, if not 
totally absent, and the controversy was led more by Neo-Firthians against Chomsky 
than by Chomskyans against Firth and his followers. Yet, it should be said that this 
mostly unilateral debate is worth investigating. It has gone through different phases 
since the 1950s, and is not yet over. This debate concerns mainly the views of the ‘first’ 
Chomsky before 1965, that is, Transformational Grammar (TG).
Our aim in this paper is to show, that as early as the 1960s, there was a debate 
among British empiricist linguists about TG assumptions which referred mostly to 
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grammaticalness and competence versus performance acceptability and gradience. 
Contrary to what happened with the Neo-Bloomfieldians, it did not touch on the 
validity of corpora. The strength of the arguments raised in the 1960s diminished in 
the following decades while the Neo-Firthians’ works evolved into the creation of cor-
pora and grammars. There was a revival of interest in the 1980–90s with the appear-
ance of large computerized corpora. At this point the debate concerned mostly new 
topics still pertaining to TG, such as corpora, statistics, and creativity, and is still cur-
rently vivid. We will discuss whether this debate with TG is still relevant, in particular 
for corpus linguistics, or whether these arguments are past their time and are revived 
only for strategic reasons.
1. Chomskyans and British empirical linguistics
1.1  Chomsky’s answers to Halliday’s remarks at the 9th International 
Congress of Linguists in 1962
It seems that the 9th International Congress of Linguists was the only encounter 
between Neo-Firthians and Chomsky (Chomsky 1964a). In his reaction to Chomsky’s 
presentation, Halliday (b. 1925) first praised TG, saying, “The view of language as ‘rule-
governed creativity’ is especially to be welcomed” (Chomsky 1964a: 987). He then 
criticized Chomsky’s hegemonic stance rejecting all other models, and challenged TG 
on fourteen points which can be summed up as the interdependence between systems 
(negation and aspect for instance), the role of intonation in grammar, the levels above 
sentences, particularly texts, the theoretical status of intuition, lexicalness and gram-
maticalness, texts as situational context, and variety of language according to use. In 
other words, he addressed the issue of how a theory of contextual meaning can be 
adapted to the transformational model.
These points were ignored by Chomsky, who asserted that the only model to be 
considered as an alternative to TG was the structural distributionalist model. Actually, 
in 1962, the Neo-Bloomfieldians were the only opponents worthy of being fought and 
defeated, and the Neo-Firthians were regarded as absolutely inoffensive.
1. Postal against Halliday
Neo-Firthians seemed to become more dangerous in 1966 when Halliday published 
his paper ‘General Linguistics and its application to language teaching’ (McIntosh & 
 Halliday 1966). This paper, which reprised some views of Halliday’s paper “Categories of 
the theory of grammar” previously published in 1961 in Word, was strongly criticized 
by Paul Postal (b. 1936) in his 1969 review in Language. In his review, Postal attempted 
to assimilate Halliday’s approach to that of the Neo-Bloomfieldians, fighting both 
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movements as a single enemy.1 Halliday was viewed as a behaviourist and a physicalist – 
“noise is said to be the substance of language” (Postal 1994[1969] : 150) – advocating a 
positivist and antimentalist philosophy of science. The Firthian assumption that texts, 
written or spoken, was the basic linguistic material for the observation and study of 
language, was interpreted by Postal as
Halliday’s failure to make an explicit distinction between language and speech, i.e. 
between the system of internalized linguistic knowledge, which is the language, and 
the actual use of this to produce linguistic performances. (Postal 1994[1969] : 149).
1.3 Langendoen, Firth and Robins
According to the lists of Chomsky’s Ph.D. students (Koerner et al. 1986; Otero 1994), 
Terence Langendoen (b. 1939) was the first who obtained his Ph.D. supervised 
by Chomsky (1964b). With respect to Chomsky’s indifference to British empiri-
cal  linguistics, it may seem strange that his first Ph.D. student focused on Firth and 
 Neo-Firthians.
Actually, Robert Lees (1922–1996) was Chomsky’s first Ph.D. student.2 As he 
finished before the Department of Linguistics was created at M.I.T., his degree was 
in Electrical Engineering. On the other hand, Langendoen was the first to complete 
a degree in linguistics. Here are the circumstances explaining how he came to work 
on Firthian linguistics. In January 1964, Chomsky had been asked by Bernard Bloch 
(1907–1965), then chief editor of Language, to review Studies in Linguistic Analysis 
edited by Firth (1890–1960) in 1957. He “could not make sense” of the book and 
apparently felt relieved when Langendoen proposed that he would write the review 
(Langendoen 1964a).
It was not surprising that Langendoen was involved with this book mainly deal-
ing with prosody and Indian languages, as he had done fieldwork in India studying 
the phonology of Mundari, a language of Bihar. For personal reasons, Langendoen 
had to obtain his Ph.D. very rapidly. He had access to the British linguistic literature at 
the Kennedy School of Mission where he worked as a visiting lecturer, and Chomsky 
accepted the supervision of his dissertation on Modern British Linguistics which was 
1. In order to to launch an attack on the current enemy of the mid-1970s, i.e. generative 
semantics, Katz and Bever (1994[1976]) used the same device consisting in assimilating the 
new approach to Neo-Bloomfieldian empiricism in order to disqualify generative semantics 
and position TG as a revolution marking the defeat of empiricism.
. I am grateful to Terry Langendoen for giving me the precious pieces of information 
 appearing in this paragraph. Responsibility for the use and interpretation of them in this 
paper is of course mine.
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completed the same year (Langendoen 1964b). The other committee members were 
Peter H. Matthews (b. 1934), and Morris Halle (b. 1923) who said he was quite inter-
ested in Firth’s analysis of prosody, but particularly liked the chapter on Malinowski 
(1884–1942).
Therefore, although the fact that Langendoen worked on Firthian Linguistics had 
little to do with Chomsky’s current interests or strategies, his dissertation, published 
in 1968, probably constitutes one of the most fruitful discussions by Chomskyans on 
British empirical linguistics of that period. Besides, it led into an interesting exchange 
with the Neo-Firthian Robert Robins (1921–2000).
Langendoen read Firth with the new Chomskyan glasses of rationalism and innate 
structures. He considered Firth to be a behavioristic distributionalist making “catalogs 
of ‘observables’ neatly arranged in tables” (Langendoen 1964a: 308), who only differed 
from Bloomfield (1887–1949) in that he asserted that the study of meaning was central 
to linguistics. Langendoen (1968) pursued his criticism of Firth’s ideas on meaning 
based on the notion of context of situation, which ran counter to Chomskyan creativ-
ity: “his view is based on the opinion that language is not ‘creative’ and that a per-
son is totally constrained essentially to say what he does by the given social situation” 
 (Langendoen 1968: 3).3 In his review, Robins (1969) reproached Langendoen for having 
left aside Firth’s works on the history of linguistics as well as many Neo-Firthian works 
on collocations, context of situation and prosody. Taking up the long controversy, 
 dating back to antiquity, of whether word meaning or sentence meaning should have 
priority, Robins pointed out that Firth and Malinowski were on the side of the priority 
of sentence meaning, from which word meanings were derived by abstraction. On the 
contrary, Langendoen, following semantic options favoured by TG linguists, chose to 
start with word meanings.
Robins questioned Langendoen’s interpretation of Firth, asserting that Firth did 
not deny creativity in language. On the contrary, according to Firth, creativity is per-
formed within the essential diversity of socially and contextually determined language 
in use. More specifically, Robins related infinite creativity to the Firthian notion of 
‘renewal of connection,’ which, he said, Langendoen seemed to have misunderstood. 
The notion of ‘renewal of connection’ appeared in Firth’s work in 1952 as a strong 
empiricist point, urging the constant reapplication of the linguist’s abstractions to the 
flux of experience :
The linguist must be clearly aware of the levels at which he is making his abstractions 
and statements and must finally prove his theory by renewal of connection with 
3. Conversely, Langendoen praised the dissertation of John Lyons (b. 1932) on semantics, 
completed under the direction of W.S. Allen (b. 1918) and R.H. Robins in 1961, which made 
use both of Firthian semantics and Chomskyan theory (Lyons.1963).
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the processes and patterns of life. Without this constant reapplication to the flux 
of experience, abstract linguistics has no justification (Firth, 1968[1952]: 19).
The direct controversy between British empiricists and Chomskyans stopped there. 
Facing the growing success of TG, the Neo-Firthians tried to take up the challenges it 
presented in order to assess their own assumptions.
. Challenging TG in the 1960s: Quirk and Halliday
In the 1960s, British linguists shared common views inherited from the British tradi-
tion such as interlocked levels of lexis and grammar, the importance of text and context, 
the crucial role of use, and the centrality of applied and descriptive linguistics. Some 
of them were more particularly Firth’s views: meaning by collocation and restricted 
languages. The two main figures who challenged Chomsky’s TG were  Randolph Quirk 
(b. 1920) and MAK Halliday.
.1  Quirk: Eliciting linguistic performance as the source of evidence 
for theories of language
By his training and his attention to syntax, Quirk’s career is rather singular. He claimed 
a multifaceted affiliation, combining British empiricism and American structuralism. 
After a degree in Old English, he chose to complete his Ph.D. in syntax, and spent a 
post-doc year (1951–52) in the United States where he met Bernard Bloch at Yale, 
Freeman Twaddell (1906–1982) at Brown, Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) at Harvard, 
and Kenneth Pike (1912–2000) and Charles Fries (1887–1967) at Ann Arbor. Obvi-
ously, he did not belong to Chomsky’s earlier followers.4
Though his interest in grammar moved him away from the Firthian concern with 
meaning and lexis, Quirk remained linked to the British empirical tradition with the 
importance he gave to Henry Sweet’s inheritance of “lexicographical syntax,” use, and 
search for grammatical patterns. One of his main mentors was Fries, to whom he owed 
the idea of working on recorded conversations, which was coherent with the British 
phonetic tradition.
His diverse sources partly explain why his notion of use changed over the years, 
particularly when he faced TG approach. When he started the Survey of English Usage 
. In his autobiography, he tells how he was dismayed by the ‘fascistic’ intolerance of the 
Young Turks who, in 1962 at the International Congress in Cambridge, deserted American 
structuralism to become fanatical about TG, after having used structuralism against their 
senior teachers (Brown & Law 2002).
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(SEU) in 1960, his aim was to describe English syntax from the study of use. His aim 
was to provide “descriptive analysis – systematic and as complete as possible – of English 
grammatical usage, so that a body of data can be available for a new and objectively 
based prescriptivism.” (Quirk 1968[1960]: 49). As the SEU subtitle indicates, he 
attempted to describe the “full range of co-existing varieties and strata of educated 
English, spoken as well as written at the present time.”
In his early work in the early 1960s, use is defined as ordinary language. Language, 
he said, “is rooted in the ordinary events of every day and in ordinary men’s usage” so 
that linguists “need to pay special attention to language in its most ordinary, everyday 
manifestations” (Quirk 1962: 66). Very early, however, he envisaged elicited data in 
addition to attested corpus data for his investigation of use. In particular, he aimed at 
accounting for the discrepancy between what one will accept as a hearer and what one 
will produce as a speaker. In his early study on restrictive relatives, Quirk observed 
that educated English speakers used who much more frequently than that when the 
antecedent was human, while they did not make any distinction between who and that 
in an acceptance test (Quirk 1968[1958]).
Attempting to develop tests accounting for these phenomena, he criticized dis-
tributionalist methods, most notably Harris’s substitution techniques and acceptance 
tests, which, he said, “investigate what is barely possible rather what than is actual and 
normal in linguistic behaviour” (Quirk 1968[1960]: 81).
On the other hand, considering Chomsky’s nonsensical sentences in Syntactic 
Structures, he claimed that it is only with corpora of natural usage that collocations 
can be distinguished, enabling us to deny the linking of colourless and green, or green 
and ideas, despite the fact that such linking is permitted at the level of basic syntactical 
structure. At this stage, he remained an empiricist and advocated inductive methods. 
Rules can be formulated from the patterns emerging from a corpus of natural usage 
(that is, numerous, attested recorded or transcribed data), while paying attention to 
variation.
After the publication of Aspects, Quirk and Svartvik (1966) expressed great inter-
est in the double dichotomy of competence/performance and grammaticality/accept-
ability. Although they did not deny the idea of competence, they aimed at investigating 
it experimentally by testing performance. They opted for the study of acceptability and 
performance.
While there can be little doubt that there is something called ‘competence’ which 
underlies but has by no means a necessary one-for-one correspondence with 
‘performance’, there must remain a very great deal of doubt as to whether it is 
accessible to experimental investigation. We would hope, however, that light can 
be thrown on this deeper faculty by the study of performance … and at any rate 
it is with performance, via acceptability, that we shall be concerned in the present 
study.” (Quirk & Svartvik 1966: 11)
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They adopted a psycholinguistic approach, challenging Chomsky’s wariness concern-
ing performance, which could be only defined negatively as “whatever the grammar 
does not account for” (Abney 1996: 5).
It should be noted that Quirk and Svartvik’s approach was more cognitivist than 
behaviouristic and they compared their inquiry with GA Miller’s perceptual one. For 
Quirk, acceptability is a multifaceted phenomenon which cannot be reduced to a strict 
judgment of yes or no. This view rests on his distrust of intuition; that is, introspec-
tion into one’s own usage. Quirk assumed that, very often, there was no relationship 
between the speakers’ beliefs about their own usage and their actual use (as observed 
in a corpus for example). Therefore he distinguished between performance tests elicit-
ing a subject’s use and judgment tests eliciting his attitude. Thus, testing acceptability, 
Quirk & Svartvik (1966) and Greenbaum & Quirk (1970) came to the conclusion that 
gradience can be shown at this level.5
The application of judgment tests showed that very few sentences are considered 
by the speakers to be either wholly acceptable or wholly unacceptable. Performance 
and judgment are in a deliberate reciprocal relation, so there is a deliberate recipro-
cal relation between corpus and elicitation. Therefore, one cannot rely upon corpus 
alone or upon introspection alone. Both need to be supplemented by experimental 
evidence.
Quirk also discussed Lees’ views on adjective structures, and did not hesitate to 
challenge ‘generalized grammatical transformation,’ considering that gradience and 
 Halliday’s delicacy are more easily applicable to certain type of phenomena. Like  Halliday, 
he questioned the need to regard such divergent theories as mutually exclusive.
Chapter 12 of the second edition of The Use of English, published in 1968[1962], 
may be considered as the most Chomskyan part of Quirk’s work. He addressed the 
Chomskyan issue of creativity, acknowledging the extreme complexity of its mecha-
nism: “we have decoding devices in our linguistic faculty that enable us to under-
stand ‘new’ sentences and new interrelations of sentences and their parts” (Quirk 
1968 [1962]: 208). He also proposed the investigation of selection rules controlling 
the formation of acceptable linguistic sentences, accepting the even if rules should 
be recursive, linguists are nevertheless far from agreement on the types of rules they 
should be.
. The idea that acceptability can be gradient is compatible with Chomsky’s views. Con-
cerning grammaticality, the issue is more questionable. According to Katz & Bever (1976), 
Chomskyan grammaticality cannot lead to gradients. They argue that, even if Chomsky pro-
posed a theory of degrees of grammaticality (Chomsky 1964b), this does not imply gradience. 
Actually, as each ungrammatical string is assigned to some category representing the nature of 
its departure from grammaticality, such a theory involves absolute categories, not a gradient.
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As seen in this section, Quirk did not reject Chomsky’s TG but attempted to chal-
lenge it in the area of performance, conceived of as use. Contrary to Katz and Bever 
(1994[1976]) who denied any empirical character to linguistics (Sampson 2001), 
Quirk attempted to combine a cognitive approach with inductive corpus-based meth-
ods. Recognizing creativity and some TG properties of rules such as recursivity, he did 
not work outside the Chomskyan paradigm. On the contrary, he tried to widen it by 
investigating performance on cognitive bases.
From the diversity of his data (artificial data produced in an experimental situ-
ation, and written and spoken data attested in a corpus of usage), the first corpus of 
usage systematically built by a linguist was developed. In fact, the SEU was the first 
sampled and representative corpus of variation in English.
. Halliday : Lexicality vs. grammaticality
Halliday’s profile, marked by World War II, is more common for British linguists 
of his generation. Mobilized in the army during their studies, these linguists had to 
 contribute to the war effort with their knowledge of several non-European languages. 
Halliday had learnt Chinese at the SOAS, was mobilized in the Intelligence service, and 
eventually prepared his Ph.D. on Chinese, supervised by Firth, Wang-Li and  Robins 
(Brown & Law 2002).
In the 1960s, Halliday’s work, clearly claiming his Firthian affiliation, focused on 
collocation meaning (Firth 1951), collocation investigation from corpus data, and the 
continuum between lexis and grammar (lexicogrammar). Contrary to Quirk’s concern 
with corpora of ordinary usage, Halliday’s corpus is a corpus of texts, and his concep-
tion of language is language in activity; that is, as a social object. He developed Firth’s 
pioneering sociolinguistic notion of “speech community” into the notion of “regis-
ter” in the 1960s, and into sociosemiotics through collaboration with the sociolinguist 
Basil Bernstein.
Additionally, he claimed that linguistics belongs to natural, empirical sciences, 
just like physics. Linguistics, he says, is a mixture of natural sciences, logic and mathe-
matics, and social behavioral sciences: “Language … can be thought of as …organized 
noise used in social situations or in other words ‘contextualized systematic sounds’ ” 
(McIntosh & Halliday 1966: 3).
Unlike some of Quirk’s views which could be regarded as compatible with Chomsky, 
Halliday’s empiricist approach was totally inconsistent with Chomsky’s cognitive 
views. Instead of investigating “ragbag” performance, he challenged the competence 
notion of grammaticality.6
. “Competence (in its original sense) refers to the natural language in its idealized form; 
performance refers to everything else – it is a ragbag including physiological side-effects, 
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After asserting in his paper of 1961 that “colourless green ideas sleep furiously” 
is “unlexical,” Halliday proposed the supplementation of grammaticality with the 
notion of lexicality which can be conceived in terms of degrees (see his remarks at 
the 9th Congress of Linguists in 1962, §1 above). As a nondiscrete notion, lexicality 
can be interpreted probabilistically. Linguists have to deal with language events and to 
describe languages as predictions according to oppositions such as possible/ impos-
sible for grammar, but as likely/unlikely for lexis.
Many points here are incompatible with Chomsky’s theory: regarding language 
events and lexis as linguistic objects, taking into account context of situation, prob-
abilities as a property of lexicogrammar, and finally, the fact that the limit between 
‘very unlikely’ and ‘impossible’ is often difficult to determine. Continuum as a key 
notion in Halliday’s approach is completely irreconcilable with Chomsky’s view. See 
the following excerpt:
The patterns can be thought of as predictions about language events, predictions 
which first distinguish between what is possible and what is impossible, and then 
within what is possible, show what is more likely and what is less likely; but the 
line between impossible and very unlikely is often difficult to draw… in English, 
for example ‘easiest’ is more likely that ‘most easy’ although both are possible. 
(Halliday et al. 1964: 137–138)
See, by contrast, Chomsky’s views on the inconsistency of an approximate conception 
of grammaticalness:
Evidently, one’s ability to produce and recognize grammatical utterances is not 
based on notions of statistical approximation and the like. The custom of calling gram-
matical sentences those that “ can occur, ” or those that are “ possible ”, has been 
responsible for some confusion here. It is natural to understand “ possible ” as meaning 
“ highly probable ” and to assume that the linguist’s sharp distinction between gram-
matical and ungrammatical is motivated by a feeling that since the ‘reality’ of language 
is too complex to be described completely, he must content himself with a schematized 
version replacing “ zero probability, and all extremely low probabilities, by impossible, 
and all higher probabilities by possible. ” (Hockett, A Manual of Phonology, 1955: 10). 
We see, however, that this idea is quite incorrect, and that a structural analysis cannot 
be understood as a schematic summary developed by sharpening the blurred edges 
in the full statistical picture. If we rank the sequences of a given length in order of 
statistical approximation to English, we will find both grammatical and ungrammati-
cal sequences scattered throughout the list ; there appears to be no particular relation 
between order of approximation and grammaticalness. (Chomsky 1957: 16–17).
mental blocks, statistical properties of the system, subtle nuances of meaning and various 
other things all totally unrelated to each other.  (Halliday 1978: 37).
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3. Transformational Grammar and corpora: A current issue?
3.1 Transition phase: 1970–80s
In the 1970–80s, the British linguists carried out corpus-based grammars and col-
location searches without any new challenges to TG. Quirk’s psycholinguistic experi-
ments and performance testing gave way to the constitution of corpora on variations 
of English, following the pattern of the SEU and its immediate descendent, The Brown 
Corpus. These corpora no longer questioned competence and performance directly. 
Instead, they addressed the issues of corpus representativeness and of genres as 
 variation factors, evolving into the making of grammars based on actual usage (Quirk 
et al. 1972).
Following Halliday, Sinclair undertook corpus-based studies on collocations. 
While Halliday’s line was more lexicogrammar-oriented, Sinclair was more interested 
in lexis itself. His conception of corpora was quite different from the views of Quirk 
and his followers about representative corpora based on samples and genres. For Sin-
clair, corpora should be made of authentic and integral texts that can be expanded 
indefinitely. Every text is the sample of a whole language. However, his theoretical and 
methodological options encountered technical limits as they required huge amounts 
of data which largely exceeded computer capacities in the 1960s. So he was forced to 
stop collocation studies and devote himself to Discourse Analysis until large comput-
erized corpora became available in the late 1980s.
As for Halliday, he developed his systemic functional grammar and social semiot-
ics in connection with the ethnography of communication (Dell Hymes) and sociolin-
guistics (Basil Bernstein), which were on the rise in the USA. Meanwhile, he went on 
with his critiques of Chomsky’s TG. While acknowledging that Chomsky was the first 
to show that natural language could be dealt with as a formal system (1978), he pointed 
out the cost of its very high degree of idealization, which led Chomskyan linguistics 
to a certain kind of reductionism: “If you are interested in linguistic interaction, you 
don’t want the high level of idealization that is involved in the notion of competence; 
you can’t use it, because most of the distinctions that are important to you are idealized 
out of the picture” (Halliday 1978: 37).
It should be said that Halliday’s and British linguists’ work contributed to the gen-
eral functionalist trend of the period. They attempted to show that grammar cannot be 
studied in an isolated way, pointing to the necessity of describing language in context. 
In particular, variation in actual usage (as attested in corpora) may be determined by 
grammatical, lexicogrammatical and discursive features. It can be said that their works 
constituted some of the attempts at the recontextualization of grammar, which TG 
endeavoured to decontextualize (Geeraerts 2003).
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3. Chomsky’s arguments on corpora revisited in the 1990s
With the rise of large computerized corpora appearing in the 1990s, TG issues were 
newly challenged by corpus linguists, in order to legitimate their claim of making Cor-
pus Linguistics an autonomous and unified linguistic field (See Léon 2005, 2008). Two 
types of questions were discussed: the relevance of corpora, and language creativity, 
which originated from the two trends generally acknowledged among British corpus 
studies: corpus-based and corpus-driven trends. Corpus-based linguists, Quirk’s fol-
lowers, hold the view that corpora are example sets devised to test existing theoretical 
assumptions. They tried to revive Chomsky’s arguments against corpora and statistics 
dating back to the 1950–1960s in order to contradict them and legitimate corpus-
based research as a new linguistics. They claimed a theoretical program, systemati-
cally opposed to the Chomskyan model : performance against competence, linguistic 
description against universals, use of quantitative methods in addition to qualitative 
methods, empiricist approach against rationalist approach.
Conversely, the corpus-driven approach, held by Sinclair’s followers, does not 
involve any a priori theoretical view as it assumes that theory is induced from the 
corpus: “large quantities of ‘raw’ text are processed directly in order to present the 
researcher with objective evidence” (Sinclair, 1991: 1).7
3.3 Chomsky’s arguments against corpora
As seen before, arguments against corpora, Markov chains and statistics did not belong 
to the British empirical debate in the 1960s. It was a controversy between Chomsky 
and the Neo-Bloomfieldians. However, according to Quirk’s followers of the 1990s, 
Chomsky had crushed the first generation of corpus linguistics. His criticisms against 
corpora, statistics, and the Markov model of the 1950–60s are put forward to account 
for the decline of corpus studies: “the impact of Chomskyan linguistics was to place 
the methods associated with Computer Corpus Linguistics in a backwater, where they 
were neglected for a quarter of a century” (Leech 1992: 110).
This statement involves two assumptions which would turn out wrong. First, the 
early computerized corpora should be regarded as the revival or the continuation of 
the American Structuralists’ conception of corpora. As we saw, this is contradictory 
with the proper British tradition of corpora which flourished in the 1960–70s. Second, 
. It should be said that Halliday did not share this rather positivistic view. For him grammar 
does not emerge from corpora: “the corpus does not write the grammar for us. Descriptive 
categories do not emerge out of the data. Description is a theoretical activity” (Halliday, 
2002: 406).
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Chomsky’s criticisms were actually equally concerned with every statistical model, 
but were virulent enough to stop any corpus researchers. We will examine this point, 
limiting ourselves to reporting Chomsky’s arguments against the use of corpora and 
statistics.
Chomsky’s conception of corpora, developed in 1956–59, involved several points: 
language is infinite, unlike the Neo-Bloomfieldian conception of language as a finite 
set of utterances; any corpus should be projected by the grammar; grammaticality is 
not a probabilistic notion; and lastly, language is innovative according the principle of 
linguistic creativity. See the following excerpts:
On what basis do we actually go about separating grammatical sequences from 
ungrammatical sequences ?… First, it is obvious that the set of grammatical 
sentences cannot be identified with any particular corpus of utterances obtained 
by the linguist in his field work. Any grammar of a language will project the finite 
and somewhat accidental corpus of observed utterances to a set (presumably 
infinite) of grammatical utterances. In this respect, a grammar mirrors the 
behavior of the speaker who, on the basis of a finite and accidental experience 
with language, can produce or understand an indefinite number of new sentences. 
(Chomsky 1957: 15).
  The notion “ grammatical in English ” cannot be identified in any way with the 
notion “ high order of statistical approximation” to English. (Chomsky 1957: 16)
  If we rank the sequences of a given length in order of statistical approximation 
to English, we will find both grammatical and ungrammatical sequences scattered 
throughout the list.  (Chomsky 1957: 17)
  We constantly read and hear new sequences of words, recognize them as 
sentences, and understand them. It is easy to show that the new events that we 
accept and understand as sentences are not related to those with which we are 
familiar by any simple notion of formal (or semantic or statistical) similarity 
or identity of grammatical frame. Talk of generalization in this case is entirely 
pointless and empty. It appears that we recognize a new item as a sentence not 
because it is generated by the grammar that each individual has somehow and 
in some form internalized. And we understand a new sentence, in part, because 
we are somehow capable of determining the process by which this sentence is 
derived in this grammar. (Chomsky 1959: 56).
The debate between Chomsky and the Neo-Bloomfieldians, which took place in 
1958 when he was invited by Archibald Hill (1902–1992) to the University of Ari-
zona, is very enlightening. Corpora appear twice in Chomsky’s hypothetico-deductive 
machinery: first as the input which should be analyzed by the theory, and second as the 
output generated by the grammar. Only the first corpus is ‘natural’. To study a language 
which he does not know, the linguist should start from a natural corpus of sentences 
provided by an informant. The second corpus, containing ill-formed as well as well-
formed sentences, should be tested by the informant in order to validate the grammar, 
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and therefore the linguistic theory. Chomsky disagreed with the Neo-Bloomfieldians 
on the adequacy of generating natural corpora. Any natural corpus is skewed and can-
not be generated, since it may produce non-sentences (ill-formed sentences) or be 
incomplete :
Hill: It seems to me that if I were working with transformations, I would first select 
a representative sample of English sentences for my corpus. I would then try to 
see if by selection of kernel sentences within the corpus I could then generate the 
whole of the corpus. This is all that I would do.
  Chomsky: It is almost impossible to generate a corpus without going beyond 
it. Any natural corpus will be skewed. Some sentences won’t occur because they 
are obvious, others because they are false, still others because they are impolite. 
The corpus, if natural, will be so wildly skewed that the description would be no 
more than a mere list.
  Hatcher:8 I have a corpus of about one hundred and twenty-five thousand 
sentences, and I do not find that it is skewed.
  Chomsky : But you do not have a machine which generates all of your 
sentences. I don’t believe you could get a machine which would generate just 
these sentences. If you want to generate just the corpus and nothing beyond it, 
it would be a miracle if you could give any description shorter than the corpus 
itself. (Chomsky, 1962: 159f.).
Further arguments against this kind of procedure, and more generally against empiri-
cist methods, were developed later in Aspects (1965), by the time Chomsky introduced 
the distinction between competence and performance. Corpora are useless to study 
competence. Neither observed data nor inductive procedures from observed data will 
provide reliable information on the linguistic intuition of the speaker.
Note that Quirk was the only British linguist to have taken into account this cri-
tique in the 1960s. Deciding that the Survey should include not only a corpus of natu-
ral usage but also elicited data, he said that Chomsky’s “objections to corpus studies 
(for example, that they can provide rules only for the generation of an identical cor-
pus) are unsoundly based.” (Quirk 1968[1965]: 168)
Another aspect pointed out by Chomsky is that he doubted that some sentences, 
although simple, might be found in any natural corpus, so that probability and gram-
maticality should be distinguished:
Chomsky : … I think ‘John ate a sandwich’ is a highly unusual sentence that I 
would be unlikely to say in a lifetime. Just as I would be unlikely to say ‘grass is 
green’ or ‘birds fly’. These sentences have zero probability. Maybe in talking about 
probability of sentences you mean grammaticality.
. Anna Granville Hatcher (1905–1978).
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  Stockwell:9 You might say ‘John is eating a sandwich’ but not ‘John eats a 
sandwich’.
  Chomsky: Probability has to do with the number of times you find a given 
item. If we take a sentence like ‘John ate a sandwich’ I would bet that you would 
not find it in all the sentences recorded in the Library of Congress. (Chomsky 
1962[1958]: 180)10
The idea of grammar as a set of rules generating a set of sentences was probably quite 
difficult to understand for the linguists of that time. In particular, it seems that the 
misunderstanding stemmed from the fact that Chomsky spoke of types — abstract 
entities, i.e. sentences as they are generated by the grammar — while empiricists dealt 
with tokens — attested occurrences which can be observed in natural corpora (see 
Bundy 1999 on this point).
The argument that well-formed and (above all) simple sentences may never occur 
in any natural corpus was taken up by Sinclair (1984) when he distinguished well-
formedness from naturalness: “Well-formedness and naturalness are independent 
variables” (Sinclair, 1984: 95). In a way, his view could be seen as an attempt to restate 
and solve the opposition of type vs. token. A simple sentence, such as ‘Prince Charles 
is now a husband’ can be syntactically well-formed, and yet native speakers may still 
feel that it is unnatural. Sinclair suggests that naturalness will always be probabilistic 
and therefore distinct from well-formedness, which is absolute; the textual evidence 
for naturalness is probabilistic.
3. Chomsky, statistics and probabilities
As for statistical properties of language and the use of probabilities, significant varia-
tions can be observed in Chomsky’s position. As early as 1956, he rejected any statisti-
cal definition of grammaticality in terms of Zipf ’s law:11
There is no significant correlation between order of approximation and 
grammaticalness. If we order the strings of a given length in terms of order of 
approximation to English, we shall find both grammatical and ungrammatical 
strings scattered throughout the list…” (Chomsky 1956: 116).
. Robert Stockwell (b. 1925).
10.  This argument has been completed by the contrast between grammatical sentences and 
meaningful sentences exemplified by the famous ‘Colourless green ideas sleep furiously’. The 
significant point here is that Chomsky refers to very simple sentences.
11.  According to Zipf ’s law, empirical data on word frequencies may by represented by a 
harmonic law: when the words of a text are ranked in order of decreasing frequency, the fre-
quency of a word is inversely proportional to its rank. Benoît Mandelbrot (b. 1924) developed 
a statistical model which provided a theoretical explanation for Zipf ’s law.
 British empiricism and Transformational Grammar   3
Actually, as far as they do not concern syntax, he did not deny the interest of statistical 
studies:
Given the grammar of a language, one can study the use of the language 
statistically in various ways; and the development of probabilistic models for the 
use of language (as distinct from the syntactic structure of language) can be quite 
rewarding. (Chomsky, 1957: 17, note 4)
His main opposition centered on finite-state grammars and Markov’s model, which 
involve syntactic issues,12 as they regard the sentence as a left-to-right finite state 
Markov process or verbal chain in which the probability of a word’s occurrence is 
determined by the occurrence of the words preceding it. Chomsky used several argu-
ments against this model. First, unlike phrase grammar and transformational grammar, 
finite-state grammar is unable to deal with recursivity. Secondly, Chomsky rejected 
Markov’s model because it is unable to generate the set of grammatical sentences and 
will generate non-sentences as well.
However, when discussing Markov’s model more thoroughly in their paper, 
Chomsky and Miller (1963) agreed that, though it cannot be implemented for syntax 
to provide the set of grammatical sentences, it can be applied for lower-level produc-
tion, such as phonemes, letters and syllables. They agreed that Zipf ’s law as well as 
Mandelbrot’s work, dealing with probabilities and word length, have to be taken seri-
ously, and their results discussed and verified.
In short, Chomsky did not deny statistical studies but excluded them from his 
realm of interest. Counter to what is argued by current corpus linguists, his critiques 
had no bearing on early corpus-based studies which were mainly dedicated to word 
frequency counts.
3. Linguistic creativity, memory and innateness
Linguistic creativity appeared in 1956 and was defined by Chomsky as the ability of a 
native speaker to produce or understand new sentences and to reject ungrammatical 
sentences. Furthermore, Chomsky claimed that frequency of use does not have any 
role in the recognition of grammatical sentences. In other words, linguistic creativity is 
independent of frequency. Later, in his review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1959), 
he specifies that the faculty of recognition of grammatical sentences is not formal, 
1.  This is also Abney’s position: ‘ … the inadequacy of Markov models is not that they are 
statistical, but that they are statistical versions of finite — state automata! Each of Chomsky’s 
arguments turns on the fact that Markov models are finite — state, not on the fact that they 
are stochastic. None of his criticisms are applicable to stochastic models generally. ’ (Abney 
1996: 20)
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nor semantic, nor statistical, but belongs to infinite linguistic creativity where remem-
brance is of no use. However, it was only in 1962 at the 9th International Congress of 
Linguists that his views on linguistic creativity became central to his linguistic theory. 
Some fundamental aspects of Chomsky’s linguistic theory are linked to linguistic cre-
ativity, such as the infiniteness and the innateness of the faculty of language. Besides, 
Chomsky insists on the ability of hearers not only to identify deviant sentences and 
but to give them an interpretation.13 Later in the same text, he specified that creativity 
refers to ‘rule-governed creativity’ by means of an explicit generative grammar, and 
not ‘rule-changing creativity’ which is involved in the ordinary everyday use of lan-
guage (Chomsky 1964a[1962]: 921). For Chomsky “the ‘creative’ aspect of language” 
was associated with “the system of generative rules that assign structural descriptions 
to arbitrary utterances and thus embody the speaker’s competence in and knowledge 
of his language.” (Chomsky 1964a[1962]: 922). This argument was repeated in Aspects 
where the role of remembrance is denied in the use of language.
Sinclair’s idiom principle puts into question Chomsky’s concept of creativity. 
 Sinclair (1991: 109) speaks of two complementary ‘principles’, namely the ‘open-choice 
principle’ when speakers choose words in rule-governed sequences, compatible with 
Chomsky’s views and generally adopted by linguists, and the ‘idiom principle’ when 
they choose semi-preconstructed sequences, such as idioms, phrasal verbs or colloca-
tions. As Kennedy (1998) points out, TG tends to downplay the use of ready-made 
sequences of words, although there is no reason why many sentences cannot be treated 
as partially lexicalized rather than purely syntactically generated. He gives the example 
of at the moment which can be treated as a prepositional phrase or as a lexicalized 
unit. Kennedy claims that the use of partially lexicalized elements does not restrict the 
innovative property of language. A similar argument has been put forward by histori-
ans of linguistics, such as Joseph (2003), to show that Chomsky’s conception of infinite 
linguistic creativity obliges him to reject any ‘collocational’ model, while for Sinclair 
and his followers, collocations do not involve a lack of creativity.
For corpus linguists of the Sinclair tendency, the use of high frequencies of pre-
constructed segments, such as collocations, gives new relevance to memory in lan-
guage learning and production. Collocations reintroduce probabilities as a property 
of language.
13.  See Joseph (2003) for his analysis of the asymmetry of Chomsky’s linguistic creativity 
focusing on the speaker’s production rather than the hearer’s understanding. Hearers can only 
register passively what speakers have created. Furthermore two mechanisms of interpretation 
are at work in the hearer’s understanding: for well-formed sentences, the interpretation is 
generally automatic and straightforward. For ill-formed sentences, a mechanism of imposing 
interpretation is often at play.
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3. Intuition, use and corpora
As early as 1958, Stockwell (Chomsky 1962[1958]) pointed out the circularity and 
the confusion between speaker’s intuition and grammaticality in Chomsky’s Syntactic 
Structures. Remember that intuition played a double role in his hypothetico-deductive 
method : intuition is the object of study and, at the same time, it permits the discovery 
of new linguistic knowledge.
In the 1960s, Quirk attempted to address this difficulty by using experimental 
tests which could take into account the discrepancy between speakers’ intuition and 
their production. Contrary to intuition and corpus data, observations obtained by 
experimentation are repeatable.
Chomsky (2004[1982]) envisaged the issue of use only to state that our current 
cognitive knowledge makes investigation on this topic quite impossible, such as was 
performance in the 1960s :
The use of language is a result of interactions of the language faculty with 
other cognitive systems that govern thinking, intention, articulation, sense 
and so on… given the current situation that so little is known about the 
other cognitive systems that interact with the language faculty, it is not 
entirely clear whether a scientific theory of language use will ever be possible. 
(Chomsky 2004 [1982]: 8–9)
Current corpus linguists, and more generally tenants of empiricism in linguistics, 
question the opposition systematically claimed between attested data from corpora, 
and intuition, on behalf of use. Sinclair (1991) criticized the sole recourse to intuition 
as unable to deal with language use. First, properties such as grammaticality do not 
exist for the lexis. Besides, in large texts, the meaning of the most frequent words is not 
the meaning given by intuition. Language use seems to delexicalize the most frequent 
words by reducing their distinctive contribution to meaning. Kennedy (1998) assumes 
a mixed position associating intuition and corpus work. He acknowledges that corpora 
are not able to account for some aspects of language, such as the distinction between 
possible and impossible. Unlike many corpus linguists, Kennedy does not seem to 
advocate the sole recourse to attested data, considering that an element not occurring 
in a corpus does not mean that this element does not exist. Conversely, the occurrence 
of an element in a corpus does not establish its grammaticality:
Whether utterances which involve phonetic or syntactic reductions such as 
where you going?, wannanother one?, or Good that you got here early have to 
be accounted for grammatically will probably depend in the final analysis 
on frequency of occurrence and intuitive judgments as to what is ‘normal’. 
(Kennedy 1998: 271f.)
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According to Sampson, the issue of possible/impossible cannot rely on intuition alone 
because of the impossibility of observing ‘negative evidence’.14 Linguistics is an empiri-
cal science. In the 1950–60s it was considered progress to replace crude observational 
evidence with intuitive data. But nowadays, with the availability of large amounts of 
computerized data, “there is really no good reason why linguistic research should be 
pursued in a less empirical manner than any other science.” (Sampson 2001: 139)
3. Large amount of data : A scientific status for linguistics ?
The availability of large amount of data is a crucial issue. Until the 1990s, linguistics 
had hardly any data and “was about where physics had been at the end of the fifteenth 
century, before technology had evolved to enable physicists to observe and to conduct 
experiments.” (Halliday 2002: 7).
Halliday was always eager to include linguistics among experimental sciences. For 
Halliday et al. (1964), linguistics did not become a laboratory subject till the 1950s, 
with the appearance of tape recorders and computers, catching up with phonetics, 
which became a laboratory subject in the 1920s.
In the introduction of the first volume of his Collected works, Halliday (2002) 
returns to this point, considering that the evolution of the computer and of record 
instrumentation in the 1990s has revolutionized linguistics, as it makes large amounts 
of data available. Computerized corpora allow linguists to undertake quantitative anal-
yses on a statistically significant scale. Additionally, the computer enables us to study 
sound waves and to test descriptive generalizations so as “to crack the  semiotic code”:
From all this it should be possible in the next decade or two to crack the semiotic 
code, in the sense of coming fully to understand the relationship between 
observed instances of language behaviour and the underlying system of language. 
(Halliday 2002: 8)
. Conclusion
With the increasing power of computers and the availability of huge amounts of data, 
unthinkable in the 1960s, the debate between British empiricists and Chomskyans has 
known a revival. However, a shift can be observed, and it can be said that most of the key 
issues separating TG and Neo-Firthian empiricist approaches has become encompassed 
1.  Milner (1989) adopts the very opposite view: language data may be possible materially, 
that is, attested, and impossible in grammar 〈〈le possible de langue et le possible matériel sont 
disjoints〉〉 (Milner 1989: 83).
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into the more general opposition between computational formal linguistics, and corpus 
empirical linguistics.
Some corpus linguists, belonging originally to the Quirk and Leech group, have 
used some of early Chomsky’s arguments against corpora and statistics, as mere strategic 
device of legitimation a contrario, sometimes attempting to found a “new – computational 
corpus – linguistics” (see Léon 2007). Some linguists even advocate the emergence of 
probabilistic linguistics challenging formal linguistics (Bod et al. 2003).
Some old issues are still vivid such as the double dichotomy competence/per-
formance and grammaticality/acceptability. Some are on the rise such as the issue of 
variation, already tackled by Quirk in the 1960s and which TG still cannot account for. 
On the other hand, some linguists advocate reconciliation between both approaches. 
Finally other issues have been renewed such as the status of data for languages sciences 
and of linguistics as an experimental science (See Cori & David 2008 for a critical 
analysis of corpus linguists’ arguments).
While some aspects of empiricist methodology, worked out in the 1960s, have 
been abandoned, such as Quirk’s psycholinguistic tests on performance as supple-
mentary data for the study of variation, other aspects of the British tradition are still 
flourishing.
When he questioned grammaticality with the idea of “lexicogrammaticality” in 
1962 (see discussion published in Chomsky 1964a) , Halliday raised the issue of con-
tinuum versus absolute values of yes or no. Continuum and gradation for grammati-
cality and acceptability, promoted by Quirk and Halliday, are still advocated by current 
corpus linguists against the Chomskyan view of strict binary judgment. Through 
oppositions between possible/impossible or likely/unlikely, the debate between proba-
bilistic properties of language and discreteness of grammar is still alive.
Contrary to Chomsky’s claims in Syntactic Structures, Bod et al. (2003) consider 
that speaker’s judgments on well-formedness of sentences are well-predicted by proba-
bilistic methods.
Moreover, continuum between lexis and grammar or any other categories can still 
have descriptive or explanatory power for certain languages, and surpasses the mere 
Firthian/TG opposition.
The old opposition between competence and performance still gives rise to diverse 
options, even though for some corpus linguists the dichotomy is not so clear. In major 
cases, the generalization of computational language processing had a shifting effect on 
the dichotomy, insofar as it permits to handle both competence and performance and to 
use either formal or statistical methods. Competence is computable since it can be dealt 
with using discrete rules, whereas performance is not computable and is better handled 
with probabilities and continua. In doing so, these corpus linguists try to reconcile both 
positions. In fact, while some of them claim a clear distinction, others argue in favor of 
the complementary of both approaches (Habert & Zweigenbaum 2002; Pereira 2000).
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The availability of data is a further key issue in the opposition between Chomskyan 
and empiricist approaches. For some authors, such as Halliday, huge quantities of com-
puterized data equipped linguistics with laboratory (or observatory) instruments, which 
bestow it with the status of a real experimental science. In the same line of thought, 
Abney (1996) and Manning (2003) argue in favor of large amounts of corpus data, con-
sidering that generativists work on a very narrow class of artificial data, only produced 
on the basis of intuition, so that explanatory hypotheses are disconnected from verifiable 
linguistic data.
From the opposite point of view, formal computational linguists discuss the valid-
ity of attested data. The fact that new instruments make attested data more available 
does not imply that they make it grammatically possible. Moreover, new attested data 
are not necessarily new linguistic facts. As to the status of linguistics as an experi-
mental science, it can be considered that it is the properties of examples, which can 
be easily manipulated by linguists, that bestow the status of experimental sciences to 
linguistics, and not the availability of huge amounts of data.
In some way or other, this diversity of positions shows that the discussion on TG 
principles based on Neo-Firthian views, far from being outdated, is still vivid. It is 
worth mentioning that whereas the debate was one-sided in the 1960s, it is now more 
balanced between formalists inspired by Chomskyan TG and corpus linguists coming 
from British empiricism. Even though it has mainly shifted to the debate on the rel-
evance of corpus-based methods between computational formal linguists and corpus 
empirical linguists, it still raises current issues for language sciences.
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Given the rich, multidisciplinary developments that have influenced linguistic 
theory and practice over the past fifty years, we historiographers are uniquely 
positioned to provide some much needed theoretical integration for the discipline 
in these post-Chomskyan times. We do so when we shift from practicing 
historiography as a subdiscipline to deploying it as a method of theoretical 
intervention. The goal of this essay is to sketch the results of a historiographically-
informed critique of introductory linguistics textbooks — all of whose formats 
extend back to Leonard Bloomfield’s Language (1933) — and to offer the outline 
of a newer developmental linguistics which is: (a) reframed pragmatically by 
establishing from the beginning an embodied brain embedded in a context; and 
(b) organized not around the questions: What is language? or What do we know 
when we know a language? but rather around: How is it that hearing a sequence 
of sounds (or seeing a sequence of signs or reading a sequence of words) have the 
effects that they do? This conceptual shift entails addressing two new questions: 
How does a living being become a languaging living being? and How do we 
become the particular languaging living beings that we do? In order to answer 
these questions, both a phylogenetic script and an ontogenetic script need to be 
provided. Such an approach avoids the problem of the linguist who inherits a 
construct (e.g. Universal Grammar) and then must retrofit it to contemporary 
evolutionary and neurological research. It offers instead to our students — the 
future of the field — a theoretical account of our subject matter (language/
languaging) whose evolutionary and neurological plausibility have been factored 
in from the beginning.
Professor Konrad Koerner’s contribution to linguistic historiography can hardly be 
overestimated. Given the quantity and quality of his scholarship, the range of subjects 
he has investigated, and his formidable editorial and organization skills, it is not too 
much to say that he has done more than anyone else to put linguistic historiography 
on the international intellectual map. On the occasion that we honor his extraordinary 
contribution to our scholarly field, it seems fitting to consider, in turn, the contribution 
that our scholarly field makes to the discipline that constitutes our subject matter.
 Julie Tetel Andresen
In these past thirty years and more, since the first ICHoLS meeting that Professor 
Koerner hosted in Ottawa in 1976, we historiographers have plunged into the histori-
cal record of the discipline with great energy. We have worked to recover forgotten ori-
gins, to explore unknown or undervalued schools of thought, and to make sometimes 
surprising connections between scholars and ideas past and present. This is the kind of 
research that gives any discipline richness and depth. During these same decades, vari-
ous groups of linguists — e.g. child language researchers, discourse analysts, neurolin-
guists, psycholinguists, syntacticians — have turned some very broad and sometimes 
disparate corners. We historiographers are uniquely positioned to provide some much 
needed theoretical integration for the discipline in these post-Chomskyan times. This 
is where we leverage our understanding of the discipline’s past in order to open a path 
to the discipline’s future. This is where we shift from practicing historiography as a 
subdiscipline to deploying it as a method of theoretical intervention.
Reading into the history of the discipline is a way of understanding our subject 
matter by reviewing the variety of ways it has been approached and theorized over 
time. It is also a way of finding the places in the old bones of linguistic theory that 
might need adjustment today. With something of the flavor of the good news and the 
bad news all at once, I note that the study of our subject matter can be undertaken 
from many different perspectives: e.g. artificial intelligence, biology, cognitive science, 
cultural anthropology, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, philosophy, primatology, 
psychology, sociology. Given this, and in addition to all the recent within-discipline 
developments, linguistics is currently suffering from an embarrassment of riches. As a 
result, the twentieth-century theoretical skeleton inherited from Saussure and Chomsky is 
bearing a larger load than it was intended to handle, and it is now subject to the pressures 
and misalignments due to this excess weight. In short, it is out of whack. These days I 
see my job as a disciplinary chiropractor. In order to facilitate a future for the field in 
which the incorporation of the latest findings from the social and biological sciences 
will be a matter not of concern but of course, not all my adjustments can be gentle. The 
goal of this essay is to sketch the results of a historiographically-informed chiropractic: 
namely, the outline of what can be called a developmental linguistics.
1. What changes now that linguists have (re)discovered context?
Linguistic historiography is not akin to mining for gold, that is, its interest does not 
derive from the possibility that reading the historical record of linguistics will yield 
truths about our subject matter that have been forgotten. Nevertheless, there are nug-
gets of wisdom to be gleaned from the old texts, one such gem being Ferdinand de 
 Saussure’s remark in the Cours de linguistique générale that “it is often easier to dis-
cover a truth than to assign to it its proper place” (1959 [1915]: 68). That observation 
 Historiography’s contribution to theoretical linguistics  
came to mind some years ago, upon encountering a good third of the way through 
such a standard introductory text as An Introduction to Language, the unremarkable 
yet startling statement: “Actually, every utterance is some kind of speech act” (From-
kin, Rodman, Hyams 2003: 215). The question immediately arose: What would a lin-
guistics textbook look like if the central insight of J.L. Austin’s How To Do Things With 
Words (1962) were found not on page 215 but rather on page one? And the reason to 
worry about intro texts is that they expose the very real difficulty that linguists have 
had in integrating an understanding of context in the theoretical arena since Noam 
Chomsky exiled the examination of the conditions that contribute to the production 
of any given utterance from so-called hard core linguistics research, beginning in 1959 
with his review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1957).
John Searle has put the matter nicely. “Often,” he writes, “we can find out more 
about what is going on in a culture by looking at undergraduate textbooks than by 
looking at the work of more prestigious thinkers. The textbooks are less clever at con-
cealment” (1998: 20). Searle most likely means that these texts, in presenting mate-
rial whose complexities must necessarily be sifted out for beginning students, more 
readily expose to experienced observers the bare bones of a discipline’s theoretical 
problems. This is certainly the case in linguistics. Our introductory linguistics text-
books attempt to do too much by trying to survey the increasing number of legitimate 
topics, e.g. Language and Brain, Language and Evolution, Language and Society, while 
at the same time, they do too little in that they do not pause to reimagine the whole. 
Thus they expose the distortion of the discipline recognized already decades ago by 
William Labov who resisted the term sociolinguistics, “since it implies that there can 
be a successful linguistic theory or practice which is not social” (1972: xv). In fact, 
there is a successful linguistic theory and practice which is not social, and it is called 
philology. In any case, Labov’s resistance does not seem to have had much effect on 
the way introductory textbooks present the discipline. So-called sociolinguistic phe-
nomena continue to be discussed in a separate chapter or chapter section, just as are 
so-called pragmatic phenomena. And syntax traditionally gets its own chapter, one 
with a Chomskyan spin, never minding the fact that everything in that chapter clashes 
with what is presented in the pages devoted to socio-pragmatics.
Now, the format of all introductory textbooks on the market today can be seen 
to exist in a lineage that extends to Leonard Bloomfield’s masterful Language (1933). 
And here is where historiographic perspective becomes useful. When we take the long 
view of the discipline, we can see that one of the many things Chomsky changed about 
American linguistics was the shift in research agenda from: How do we (linguists) 
describe our subject matter? to What is the best way for us (linguists) to theorize how 
speakers have language organized in their heads? The previous generation of linguists, 
the Bloomfieldians, were interested in describing the structure of particular languages, 
and their relationship to the speakers of those languages was one of precedence and 
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of perspective: precedence in that a linguist could only observe, record and/or describe 
after the fact what a speaker produces; and perspective in that a linguist was not lim-
ited to observing, recording and/or describing the productions of any one speaker 
but could take a more global view. However, Bloomfield acknowledged that this sup-
posedly global view itself would always be limited, since no one observer (or group 
of observers) could have access to all utterances that all speakers of a language have 
uttered. In the case of English, the classes of nominative expressions and finite verb 
expression are so large — in fact, Bloomfield says that “the possibilities of combination 
are practically infinite” — that he cannot say for sure whether, for example, the sen-
tence “a red-headed plumber bought five oranges” has ever been uttered (1933: 275).
Chomsky altered the descriptive and methodological landscape by arguing that 
“the possibilities of sentential combinations,” while indeed “practically infinite,” are 
not, in fact, infinitely variable. They too exhibit patterns. However, these patterns are 
not to be read off surface structures, that is, they are not to be found directly in the 
surface strings of the practically infinite set of sentences themselves. Rather, they are 
more abstract in that they are results of the actions and the interactions of two types 
of sentence-patterning rules, namely the phrase structure rules and the transforma-
tional rules. The methodological change that accompanied this theoretical innovation 
was the move away from scouring stodgy old surface structure corpora and toward 
a reliance on the linguist’s own native speaker intuitions to relate the deep structure 
of sentences to the surface structure. For many years a kind of glamour clung to the 
activity of linguists’ indulging these intuitions. However, with fifty years’ hindsight, 
we can see that the practice eliminated all the surrounding phenomena — i.e. con-
text — that contribute to the instantiation of any single utterance, not to mention the 
fact that intuitions about correctness do not necessarily coincide with actual natu-
ralistic data. The variationist linguists among us have shown that introspective judg-
ments about language, especially syntax, are often highly unstable and at variance with 
attested behavior (Rickford et al. 1995: 127). The point to make here is that Chomsky’s 
approach to syntax was easily incorporated into the Bloomfieldian textual template, 
requiring only an updated chapter on syntax to replace the one Bloomfield entitled 
“Sentence Types.”
In stepping away from corpora and into abstraction, the Chomskyan methodol-
ogy identified structures that could be viewed retrospectively and from the point of 
view of the linguist-speaker. Thus was formal syntax brought into existence, for only in 
retrospect and in isolation from all surrounding utterances could the structure of any 
particular utterance be seen to pre-exist its appearance in discourse. The Chomskyan 
construct competence — often defined as the mental system that underlies a person’s 
ability to speak and understand a given language and often identified as the proper 
object of linguistics — served as the harbor for the sentence pattern templates as they 
awaited instantiation. In their pre-existence, then, the abstract rules were theorized to 
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represent the speaker’s ability to produce sentences. Just as the observer/linguist and 
the speaker had merged, so the linguistic description of so-called non-surface regular-
ities, seen from the perspective of the linguist-observer now inside the speaker’s head, 
doubled as the mental explanation of that behavior. The approach that posits a lan-
guage faculty as an autonomous, genetically determined, brain/mind module reflects 
what can be called cognitive philologism.
This label is clearly not meant as a compliment. However, it is also not meant to 
disparage philology or philologists as traditionally understood. Nineteenth-century 
philologists, as we all know, were motivated to reconstruct protolanguages as a repre-
sentation of what the original language must have been in order to have given rise to 
the daughter languages said to have derived from it. Written records of the daughter 
languages, when available, were valuable guides, and the older the record, the poten-
tially more valuable. The exact contents did not matter to the philologists, however, 
since they were interested in the records only as monuments of the languages they 
were studying, and they could study them precisely as if those monuments had been 
created for that kind of study. These written records are extremely useful, and they per-
fectly well serve the purposes of scholars who have nothing to do with the languages 
they study except study them, e.g. philologists.
Although there are certainly differences between nineteenth-century historical 
and comparative philology and twentieth-century structural linguistics, the structural 
linguists transferred the nineteenth-century philological understanding of ancient 
languages to the twentieth-century study of living languages. No moment can be iden-
tified when this transfer occurred; it had already happened by the time introductory 
twentieth-century linguistics textbooks identified nineteenth-century philology as 
part of the history of what they were doing. No authors consciously made the trans-
fer. In fact, linguists at the time were quite sure they were breaking from philological 
tradition. When, in the early decades of the twentieth-century the focus of linguistic 
activity shifted from historical to structural perspectives and the nineteenth-century 
philologists were retroactively dubbed linguists, the bond between them was secure, 
and the die was cast as to what would count as linguistic methodology and purpose. 
Structural linguists deciphered and analyzed living monuments produced by native 
speakers that were severed from contexts just as historical linguists before them deci-
phered and analyzed ancient written monuments whose contexts were long gone. For 
the goal of reconstructing a language family or writing a grammar, the philological 
method is entirely appropriate. However, for the goal of providing a theory of what 
goes on in people’s heads with respect to linguistic processing and production, the 
method is inappropriate.
Generativists created databases from their native speaker intuitions composed solely 
of what V.N. Vološinov indicted already eighty years ago as the “isolated, finished mono-
logic utterance.” These were sentences floating in contextless space on the page, standing 
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open not to any possible sort of active response but only to passive understanding on the 
part of an analyzer. This is philologism, the inadvertent forgetting of context. The insuf-
ficiencies of the methodology were compounded by the generativists’ allergy to anything 
that hinted of behaviorism and thus they were left to pursue a research agenda that has 
come to be associated with Chomsky’s phrase poverty of the stimulus. One implication 
of the phrase involves the idea that certain surface features underspecify the properties 
of the grammar which produces them, thus making it difficult for learners to learn those 
properties. An example of such a feature would be the notion of structure dependence.
Chomsky introduced the idea of structure dependence as a hypothetical lan-
guage universal by asserting that children create only structure-dependent grammars 
although no feature of the input eliminates structure-independence. Chomsky argued 
that English-learning children do not form structure-independent questions such as 
*Is the man who ___ tall is in the room? in spite of the fact that they are not exposed 
to structure-dependent examples upon which they could model their own linguis-
tic behavior. That is, there are supposedly some grammatical mistakes that children 
might logically make on the basis of so-called simple induction but do not (Chomsky 
1988: 7–12). Such a structure-independent example of the non-occurring form *Is the 
man who ___ tall is in the room? eventually became the “the ‘parade case’ in discus-
sions of the poverty of the stimulus” (Thomas 2002: 56). These days, however, with 
large databases only a google away, the revival of the use of corpora both in formal 
theoretical linguistics and in language acquisition studies provide ample evidence that 
children are, indeed, exposed to examples of the kinds of complex grammatical struc-
tures that Chomsky said children never hear or virtually never hear, which required 
him to posit the existence of inborn knowledge of very abstract features of language 
(Tomasello 1995: 144; Tomasello 2003: 288; Pullum 1996; Pullum & Scholz: 2002).
The forgetting of context in generative syntax has led: (i) to an elaborate feed-
forward machinery that has no room for feed-back, and this is only one of the reasons 
that it has produced mental models that have nothing to do with psychology, as psy-
chologist Michael Tomasello (2001) has so cogently pointed out; and (ii) to various 
iterations of a theory of grammar that has now dead-ended in the Minimalist Pro-
gram. When generative grammar began, pragmatics and discourse analysis hardly 
registered on the radar screen, but now we have a richly-elaborated, more psychologi-
cally and pragmatically-informed construction grammar that extends back to Ronald 
Langacker’s Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (1987) and extends forward to Adele 
Goldberg’s Constructions at Work. The Nature of Generalization in Language (2006). 
Goldberg places herself in a lineage that includes Lakoff (1987), as well as Kay and Fillmore 
(1999). Even well-known proponents of generative grammar such Steven Pinker 
and Ray Jackendoff have stepped away from the Minimalist Program and tentatively 
embraced (at least some aspects of) construction grammar (Goldberg & Jackendoff 
2004; Jackendoff & Pinker 2005; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005).
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In general, constructionists understand constructions to be form-meaning pair-
ings, e.g. the ditransitive construction SubjVObj1Obj2, which has a counterpart expres-
sion employing ‘to’ or ‘for’. The two possibilities are exemplified by: Mary sent John a 
book and Mary sent a book to John. For constructionists such as Goldberg, the interest 
in this pair of utterances does not lie in the fact that they are paraphrases. Rather it 
lies in the many, often subtle ways they differ from one another either semantically or 
pragmatically (or both). One such difference involves the pragmatic conditions that 
determine whether the recipient argument (here: John) and/or the theme argument 
(here: a book) is likely to be pronominal or not. It is remarkable to discover that, in 
both corpus and experimental studies, the theme argument of the ditransitive strongly 
tends to be new information, that is, it is not already given in the discourse context, 
and this tendency stands in contrast to the recipient argument which is typically pro-
nominal. In other words, “the recipient argument of the ditransitive construction rarely 
introduces a new argument into the discourse” (Goldberg 2006: 139). This observation 
accounts for why She gave him a book is fully acceptable and why She gave a man them 
sounds so odd. The alternative construction with to is not so constrained. She gave a 
book to him and She gave it to a man are equally good.
In addition, for constructionists, it is the construction itself that is the primitive unit 
of syntactic representation, not so-called rules, nor grammatical categories such as verb, 
noun, adjective, subject, object, etc. Now, aspirant language-users (i.e. young children 
acquiring English) tend to exhibit verb-centered conservatism, meaning that they will 
readily substitute new nouns into particular and preferred general purpose verbal frames. 
There is also evidence that adults retain much verb-specific knowledge. However, one of 
the many reasons to like construction grammar is that it can be shown that construc-
tions are sometimes better predictors of overall meaning than verbs. Goldberg notes that 
“when get appears in the VOL [verb-object-location] pattern, it conveys caused motion, 
but when it appears in the VOO [verb-object-object] pattern, it conveys transfer:
 (1) a. Pat got the ball over the fence.
   get + VOL pattern →‘caused motion’
  b. Pat got Bob a cake.
   get + VOO pattern →‘transfer’ ” (Goldberg 2006: 106)
It is pertinent to note that the strings VOL, VOO, and Subj V Obj Obj2 exist for ease 
of notation only, as nothing more than a way to represent a semi-abstract cognitive 
schema. The point here is that our judgments about She gave a man them and how we 
interpret one kind of get-phrase as opposed to another do not come from consulting 
an internal grammar that operates on sentences out of context; rather we are respond-
ing to the match or mismatch of a construction in comparison to the large experience 
we have had of similar constructions heard in contexts that have built up semi-abstract 
schemata to which cling chunks of semantic and discursive triggers.
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The question can now be answered: What changes now that linguists have (re)
discovered context? The answer is: Everything. A responsible introduction to the 
discipline of linguistics for the next generation of students requires not merely that 
the chapters on syntax and pragmatics be recast, but rather that the statement “Actu-
ally, every utterance is a speech act” be put on page one and the entire textbook be 
rewritten from there.1 This is because the rediscovery of context changes not only the 
way we approach syntax/pragmatics but also the way we study children and language — 
beginning with Jerome Bruner, the first one to put “pragmatics in the middle of things” 
in Child’s Talk (1983) — to neurolinguistics, psycholinguistics, the evolution of lan-
guage, and all the rest. Most linguists have learned the lesson that no linguistic phe-
nomenon can be fully understood apart from context; and this same lesson renders 
the  long-conventional organization of introductory textbooks to be little more than a 
 convenient pretense.
When the dynamic life of our subject matter in all its situatedness is restored in 
our theory of language, a new relationship of linguist to subject matter becomes pos-
sible and new descriptive terrains open up. Bloomfield, like any good scientist, desired 
completeness, but he recognized a dual limitation, that of descriptive and observa-
tional inadequacy: no linguist could hope to list all the items a grammar could contain 
“since the possibilities of combination are practically infinite,” just as no linguist could 
hope to have access to all utterances whose characteristics should be accounted for in 
a grammar. Chomsky collapsed the observer into the speaker and solved the problem 
of limitation by putting the conditions for generating a complete grammar inside every 
human being, along with a complete knowledge of the (linguistic) environment that is 
“evoked,” as Chomsky says, at the appropriate time. In the kind of linguistics advocated 
here, by way of contrast, the drive for completeness is transformed into a taste for thick 
descriptions of individual development and an attention to historical trajectories — 
the phylogenetic and the cultural — in all their detail.
. From language to languaging
The last fifty years of Chomsky-inspired theorizing has steered our thinking about our 
subject matter — language — toward a dress covering the body of the mind. In this 
1. Needless to say, I have put my money where my mouth is and done just that; and 
having done so, I can say that I sympathize with those authors who have chosen the addi-
tive strategy: “Hey, let’s just add a new chapter and call it ‘Psychological and Pragmatic Ap-
proaches to Grammar’.” Even I did not want to write Linguistics Reimagined. What an awful 
lot of trouble!
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framework, all the dresses, i.e. languages, in the world may look different, but they are 
all understood to be cut from the same cloth, i.e. they are products of and covers for a 
universal mind and language is a system that is everywhere the same. More precisely, 
they are projections of the human mind which is, indeed, The Human Mind, common 
to all. One of the more recent pronouncements by Chomsky is the following:
Going back to language, what you have is a system that is, as far as we know, 
essentially uniform. Maybe there was some speciation at one point but only one 
species survived, namely us; there seems to be no variation in the species. True, 
we find Williams’ syndrome and Specific Language Impairment. But that’s not 
variation in the species in any meaningful sense: those are deviations from the 
fixed system that occur now and then, but the basic system seems to be uniform. 
(2002: 147)
Please note that for Chomsky Williams’ syndrome and SLIs are not seen as possibilities 
in human variation generally speaking, but rather as not counting as variation “in any 
meaningful sense.” He has long identified his intellectual pedigree as one belonging to 
Descartes (Chomsky 1966), and he has remained true to it.
Clearly, several things have to happen at this point. First, we need a twenty-first-
century linguistics that is inspired not by Descartes but by Darwin, one that recognizes 
that all variation is meaningful, for selection does not operate on essences, only on 
variation. Secondly, we need to abandon the idea that linguistics needs an object of 
study. Recall that Saussure was prompted to propose langue as the object of study in 
order to give linguists a province of their own that would not seep into sister disci-
plines, such as psychology and sociology. Chomsky acknowledged the importance of 
Saussure’s move but proposed Humboltian-inflected competence instead and reiter-
ated the need for such an object “if [linguistics] is to be a serious discipline” (1965: 4). 
Whatever uses the constructs langue and competence may have had, they have out-
lived their usefulness. They were never intended to have anything to do with neurol-
ogy or psychology, and so it is no wonder that linguists have inherited a theoretical 
framework that is psychologically and neurologically uninformed and, worse, implau-
sible. Third, in order to help effect the transition from one theoretical framework to 
another we are going to need some new metalanguage. The term languaging can help 
effect the transition.
In the developmental linguistics described here the need for an object of study is 
replaced with a multi-layered description of the instantiation, development, and main-
tenance of the languaging network in the species and the individual. Now, although 
our languaging activities and abilities are not coextensive with the whole of human 
cognition, it is nevertheless becoming evident in recent neuro- and psycholinguistic 
literature that one cannot turn too many corners in the brain without running into 
a structure or procedure that does not affect and has not been affected by the (at the 
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very least) several hundred thousand years of languaging in the species as well as by 
the languaging experienced throughout the lifetime of an individual. More precisely, 
languaging can be understood:
i. to scaffold the cognition of human beings and to be an activity through which 
certain cognitive and conceptual developments are induced. In other words, the 
term languaging suggests deep-down cognitive as well as pervasive cultural effects 
that the term language is not currently theorized to have. One of those deep-down 
cognitive effects of languaging pertains to the ways different frames of reference — 
intrinsic, relative and absolute — organize the spatial domain and thus literally 
orient languagers to particular spatial relations on the horizontal axis. Psycho-
linguist Stephen Levinson’s remarkable Space in Language and Cognition (2003) 
demonstrates how deeply different orienting frames of reference penetrate non-
linguistic cognition and affect significant aspects of cultural life;
ii. to span the troublesome distinction between the terms language and speech  
that some theorists maintain. This embrace of the language-speech continuum 
expands the brain part of the brain-culture orientation of point (i) and highlights 
the importance of the basic sensory, perceptual and motor abilities that sup-
port languaging activities but are not speech specific. Their functioning comes 
crucially into view when they malfunction. For instance, individuals who are 
impaired in identifying and producing rapidly successive stimuli — elements 
occurring within 10s of milliseconds embedded in ongoing speech, which is a 
critical time frame in terms of phonetic contrasts — will have various compo-
nents of their languaging behaviors disrupted; and these disruptions extend to 
all their languaging behaviors, including reading and writing (Tallal & Benasich 
2002). Similarly, people with developmental stuttering have problems with motor 
tasks other than speech (Packman et al. 2007). One upshot of this general point is 
that the term Specific Language Impairment is a misnomer, since the deficits of 
most SLI children are not specific to language. More recently, the term language 
learning impairment (LLI) has been gaining currency to reflect that more global 
visual, auditory and motor problems that can disrupt language learning (Tallal & 
Benasich 2002);
iii. to allow, precisely, for multimodality. This means that, even in the processing of 
speech, languaging is not solely an auditory activity. Two classic studies bring 
attention to the importance of vision in the ordinary linguistic processing of 
speech. McGurk and MacDonald (1976) show the degree to which visual infor-
mation can affect auditory perception, while the work of Tanenhaus et al. (1995) 
stresses the role of vision in the processing of syntax;
iv. to include, crucially, gesture as a dimension of its multimodality. The dramatic case 
of IW comes into play here. At age nineteen, IW lost all sense of touch and prop-
rioception below the neck. That meant that he lost all motor control that depends 
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on bodily feedback. He slowly relearned to walk and eat and do everything else, not 
by his lost proprioception and spatial position sense, but rather by using cognition 
and vision. Of interest is that his speech and gesture (in the service of languaging) 
were not lost, while instrumental gesture was. That is, he cannot pick up a brick if 
he cannot see his hands. However, he can and does gesture while speaking, even if 
he cannot see his hands (Goldin-Meadow 2003: 242; McNeill 2005: 234–245;
v. to ease open the flattened space of the view of language held by those who imag-
ine it to be a mapping between meaning and sound or, in updated Chomskyan 
terminology, between the sensory-motor and conceptual-intentional systems. 
This point furthers (i) and (ii), above, and is made in order to give linguists and 
neurobiologists room to move around in. We need richer ways of understanding 
the relationships between (what the Chomskyans presume to be the pre-given) 
sensory-motor and (what the Chomskyans presume to be the pre-given) concep-
tual-intentional systems than in terms of (presumably straight, two-dimensional, 
static, one-to-one) lines. The investigation of the ways that these dynamic systems 
intersect, interact, and affect one another is a significant part of the project of a 
developmental linguistics. Tomasello recognized the insufficiencies of this flat-
tened space when he requested, with some exasperation, “Could we please lose 
the mapping metaphor please?” (2001);
vi. to orient the linguist and language/ing theorist to the over-richness of contexts, 
as Austin has taught us, in which all languaging occurs as well as to the under-
specification of utterances in the sense that they can never fully convey all that 
is meant. As for the underspecification of utterances is concerned, what is taken 
to be meant always exceeds what is said. This is sometimes called the principle 
of ineffability. As for the over-richness of contexts, this would mean at the most 
mundane level that, for any given speech event, while it might be true that the sun 
is shining, it is four o’clock, and three chairs are present, none of these (or any of 
the almost infinite other aspects of the context of a speech event) may rise into 
pertinence. Nevertheless, those contextual resources are present and available;
vii. to underscore the idea, given the over-richness of contexts and the underspeci-
fication of utterances, that languaging is an orienting behavior. This means that 
each languaging living being in any given languaging situation will respond dif-
ferently and will thus be oriented differently in his or her cognitive domain. This is 
so despite the fact that languaging living beings with long histories of interactions 
often manage to coordinate their behaviors very well. This is also so despite the 
fact that certain languages may tend to reliably induce certain cognitive and con-
ceptual developments rather than others. The point here is that the brain organi-
zation that is created by and supports languaging activities (as well as other higher 
cognitive functions) may vary widely across individuals and in “idiosyncratic 
 patterns that are as unique as their finger prints” (Elman et al. 1996: 248). This is 
to note once again that all variation is meaningful, in the sense, of “counts”;
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viii. to foreground the intersubjective nature of the activity, such that languaging is not 
a personal possession; and
ix. to be extendable to the term languaging living being, which is meant to replace 
the misleading terms speaker and listener and to move us out of the code theo-
retic framework in which they operate — hereby invoking Roy Harris’s critique 
of Saussure’s (in)famous picture of the talking heads. The term languaging living 
being is maximally flexible in that it does not specify a particular role, disposition 
or activity of the languaging living being at any given time, e.g. if a languag-
ing living being is eavesdropping, then it can be said that the languaging living 
being’s living is intertwined with the activity of eavesdropping. That is to say that 
eavesdropping — deliberate or inadvertent — is often a part of many of our daily 
activities, whether we are standing in line at a bank, eating lunch, or strolling 
through a mall.
Introducing an orientation toward languaging uncouples the study of our subject mat-
ter from a focus on the speaker. When this occurs, previously overlooked phenomena 
can come into view. For instance, although it is widely believed that children can-
not learn a language by merely overhearing it, newer studies suggest that adults who 
regularly heard their heritage language during childhood but spoke only the majority 
language were able to acquire a more native-like accent when they came to learn the 
language later in life than those adults who had no exposure to the target language as 
children (Au et al. 2002). Another study demonstrates how second-born children at 
age 21 months and 24 months have more advanced pronoun production than first-
born children at those ages, although their general language development is not differ-
ent. The idea here is that “children may discover the relations between pronouns and 
speech roles more easily from overheard speech and be more likely to make correct 
generalizations about the meaning of pronouns” (Oshima-Takane et al. 1996: 623). 
These findings remind the linguist how pervasive languaging is in our lives, how much 
of our lives are lived in a linguistic bath, even when we are not involved in the active 
production of an utterance or even active participants in a speech event. Overhearing 
is as much a linguistic activity as any other, a very particular one whose characteristics 
and consequences have only begun to be explored.
An orientation toward languaging also helps us reinterpret not only the massive 
neuro- and psychological literature that now exists but also the equally large amount of 
research on children and language that has been produced. Instead of thinking of lan-
guage in terms of taking information in from the outside world in, languaging opens 
up not only a developmental space within the individual but also an intersubjective 
one where vocal and non-vocal activity can be seen as continuous. A decade and a 
half ago, Pinker could confidently state that “grammar development does not depend 
on overt practice, because actually saying something aloud, as opposed to listening to 
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what other people say, does not provide the child with information about the language 
he or she is trying to learn” (1994: 280). Now, however, there is plenty of research to 
suggest that practice is important; children can and do use their own productions as 
the basis for further development (Nelson 2007). Goldstein and West (1999) simi-
larly challenge the traditional view of articulatory development as being a matter of an 
internal program of physiological and cognitive maturation and offer instead a model 
of vocal development that relies on both proprioceptive and social feedback. Going 
even further beyond the listen-to-learn model, Goldstein, King, and West (2003) 
show how babbling both regulates and is regulated by social interaction. They thereby 
expand on the traditional view that foregrounds imitative learning when they demon-
strate the (perhaps surprisingly) robust influence of non-auditory social stimulation 
on infant babbling. These two studies underscore how a more complete understanding 
of vocal ontogeny becomes possible when the total social environment of the infant is 
taken into account. For too long, linguists have overlooked not only the effect of the 
total social environment on aspiring languagers but also aspiring languagers’ influence 
on their environments, which, in turns, affects development.
A fuller understanding of the term languaging will now unfold within a discussion 
of the constructivist epistemological framework.
. On constructivism
The term constructivism is seemingly everywhere these days. Constructivism has arisen, 
in part, as a response to what is often called the rationalist-realist (think: Descartes) 
account of cognition, truth, science, and the world, generally speaking. Theorists 
involved in articulating a constructivist account of things are cognitive scientists, epis-
temologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, psychologists, and historians of science, and 
they are interested, in particular, in understanding and describing the processes and 
dynamics of cognition. The key idea is that organisms’ experiences of the world are not 
prior to and independent of their sensory, perceptual, motor, and manipulative activi-
ties, but rather emerge from or, as it is said, are “constructed by” those activities. When 
it comes to human perceptual, conceptual and behavioral experiences, the role of lan-
guage is seen to be a crucial part of that which needs to be understood and described.2
. The terms constructivist and constructivism used here are not to be conflated with the 
concerns of social constructionism, which is also known sometimes as social constructivism. 
As Barbara Herrnstein Smith has pointed out, social constructionism is a critical stance that 
has been taken by cultural anthropologists, feminists and gender theorists, among others, 
in order to challenge frameworks in which racial categories, gender biases or certain sexual 
behaviors are deemed to be biological, natural, or even scientifically proven. These cultural 
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One way to understand the constructivist framework and languaging as an ori-
enting behavior is in contrast to a different approach to our subject matter that can 
be called “language as solving the serial interface problem.” In this approach, the 
design features of language reflect the purpose for which it was designed, namely “the 
 transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface” (Pinker & Bloom 
1990: 707). This statement about the design and purpose of language coheres in a 
larger epistemological framework most often known as rationalist realism whose parts 
may be schematized thusly:
i. there is an independent observer set over and against the world;
ii. science is an uncovering of a truth already there;
iii. social conditioning is an obstacle to understanding truth;
iv. mind/thought and language are personal possessions;
v. language is generated by a set of a priori rules or operations; and
vi. the purpose of language is to provide an objective match between our statements, 
thoughts, beliefs, descriptions or models and a fixed reality.
Although it is not at first evident, it is nevertheless the case that this framework car-
ries with it a particular perspective on our perceptual apparatuses, most particularly 
vision, so that another point may be added here, namely:
vii. the purpose of vision is to provide an accurate reconstruction in perception of the 
physical world.
This last point carries with it the idea that vision, as such, is an exemplar of nature 
(rather than, say, nurture), that is, it is a specific pre-wired, innate capacity. The fact 
that stereoscopic vision is not present at birth but develops gradually and is not always 
achieved is explained by another innate mechanism, an “installation sequence” that 
programs the wiring to occur after birth (Pinker 1997: 238). This framework is the 
most familiar to most people, and standard introductory linguistics textbooks tend to 
assume some or all of the above points.
By way of contrast, the Chilean epistemobiologists Humberto Maturana and Fran-
cisco Varela, who introduced the term, have said: “Languaging [an activity and not a 
thing] is an orienting behavior that orients the orientee within his/her cognitive domain 
and that arises, both in phylogeny and ontogeny, through recurrent interactions with 
conspecifics” (1972: 30). And Tomasello has said: “In the current theoretical perspec-
tive, learning to use linguistic symbols means learning to manipulate (influence, affect) 
the interest and attention of another intentional agent with whom one is interacting 
intersubjectively” (1999: 131). These statements about languaging as an orienting 
theorists typically stress the social side of human activity, speak of certain practices as being 
socially constructed, and often acknowledge deliberate political engagement (2005: 4–5).
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behavior cohere in a larger epistemological framework most often identified as con-
structivism whose parts may be schematized thusly:
i. the observer is a part of that which s/he is observing;
ii. science provides an explanation of a phenomenon that is acceptable to a body of 
observers;
iii. social conditioning is a key to understanding truth;
iv. mind/thought and language are intersubjective;
v. the patterned regularities to be found in the activity of languaging are a result of 
the history of recurrent interactions among conspecifics through which these reg-
ularities are instantiated, developed, and maintained both in sociocultural  history 
and individual ontogeny; and
vi. in our languaging togther we tend to produce an effective coordination among 
statements, beliefs, assumptions, observations, practices and projects, all of which 
are independently mutable but mutually responsive.
For the constructivist, the workings of our perceptual apparatuses are not about taking 
an outside world in. Rather, in the domain of vision:
vii. what we see is a probabilistic manifestation of the past rather than a logical analy-
sis of the present.
Although the following seems at first counterintuitive, recent work in vision theory 
directs our understanding toward the idea that the percepts that are entertained accord 
with the accumulated experience of what the retinal stimulus in question has typically 
signified in the history of the species and the individual (Purves & Lotto 2003). In this 
framework, the development of stereoscopic vision after birth is, precisely, a develop-
mental result which is explained in terms of both genetic and epigenetic factors.
In A Mind So Rare, psychologist Merlin Donald has an interesting chapter titled 
“Condillac’s Statue” in which he asserts that Etienne Bonnot de Condillac in his Trea-
tise on the Sensations (1754) is the first Constructivist (with a capital C in Donald’s 
version). The gist of Donald’s overall argument is the following:
Condillac proposed a much stronger, Constructivist version of Empiricism, one 
that … asserts that the very structure of the mind is set up in experience and that 
many of its highest capacities are not innate, in the sense of being implanted at 
birth, but instead are generated by the appropriate sequencing of early experience. 
In this view, the developing mind emerges in adulthood with a specific structure, 
not necessarily because that structure was innate but because it flowed naturally 
and inevitably from particular sequences of experience (2001: 215)
Indeed, constructivists emphasize the importance of development, and this stands in 
contrast to anti-developmental models of human cognition that assume everything to 
be innate and that growth is merely an unfolding of structures that are already within. 
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It is also true, as Donald says, that a central idea of constructivism is that “action 
begets self-knowledge” just as Condillac’s statue3 gained knowledge through active 
exploration (2001: 226).
Maturana and Varela put the matter of continuous interaction with the environment 
in terms of “an unbroken coincidence of our being, our doing, and our knowing” 
(1992: 24). Evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin, for his part, similarly outlines 
a constructivist view of development when he states: (i) that environment and organ-
ism are causally linked; (ii) that organisms “not only determine what aspects of the 
outside world are relevant to them by peculiarities of their shape and metabolism but 
they actively construct, in the literal sense of the word, a world around themselves;” and 
(iii) that organisms are in a constant process of altering their environment (2000: 54–55). 
This is to say that constructivists are concerned with agency. We get a taste of this 
in construction grammar and discourse analysis as well, where situated individuals, 
in particular discursive situations, are engaged not only in constructing utterances 
but also in constructing interactions over time, meaning that they are responsive. The 
concern for agency can be seen to have arisen to fill in a gap perceived in alternative 
models which comes into clarity, if, for conceptual effect, we reduce Skinner to Mr. 
Rats and Chomsky to Mr. Wires. The agentive dimension of how individuals assert 
identity through their linguistic and cultural practices is also at issue in the work of 
many anthropologically-inclined linguists, e.g. in the sociophonetics investigated by 
Norma Mendoza-Denton (2007), to name but one.
The first section of this essay ended with the idea that, in a developmental linguistics, 
the drive for completeness present in Bloomfield and Chomsky is transformed into 
a taste for thick descriptions of individual development and an attention to histori-
cal trajectories in all their detail. I invoke it here in order to emphasize the idea that 
descriptions characteristic of constructivist accounts of phenomena are generally long 
and sometimes complicated. This is so for two reasons: (i) constructivist accounts are 
less consolidated in certain disciplines than other accounts, e.g. those of rationalist real-
ism, because the latter has a longer history in scientific discourse and is more widely 
assumed; and (ii) constructivists refuse succinct accounts that rely on a dualist frame-
work where nature and nurture are viewed as causal alternatives, for those accounts 
short-circuit the details of the developmental story that needs to be told.
. In his famous thought experiment, Condillac imagined an originally inanimate and 
insentient human being (a “statue”) and wondered what it could come to know were it to 
acquire each of the senses in isolation from the others, or each in combination with just one 
or two others. Condillac pondered, for instance, what such a being endowed with only a sense 
of smell would think upon acquiring the power of hearing. His goal was to play out a scenario 
where his statue was able to learn everything it needed through experience acquired through 
the various senses (smell, hearing, vision, touch, taste).
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There is certainly a bond between the constructivists and Condillac in this taste 
for thick description, for Condillac was never one to stint on description. However, it 
is difficult to tell whether Condillac would have subscribed to any of the points listed 
for constructivism above and that distinguish it from rationalist realism. Donald notes 
that Condillac did not, for instance, realize the obstacles his statue faced to achieve 
symbolic cognition, and he did not question “the myth of the isolated mind,” thus 
leaving his statue disconnected from society (2001: 227). However, Donald’s claim is 
only that Condillac foreshadowed constructivism in some important ways, and this 
is an assertion that might warm many a linguistic historiographer’s heart. First, it 
may well be that we historiographers are in part responsible for making this preemi-
nent grammairien philosophe known to a wider audience. Second, Donald’s reading 
reminds us that our interest in old texts does not put us completely out of touch with 
the present.
For the record, many constructivists, whether they know it or not, owe an intel-
lectual debt to developmental psychologist Susan Oyama, particularly to her ground-
breaking The Ontogeny of Information (1985). She is the one who has most clearly 
pointed the way out of the nature-nurture dilemma conceived in terms of nature as 
push from the genes and nurture as pull from the environment. Her developmental sys-
tems theory reformulates an understanding of development that does not collapse back 
into the old opposition in which nature and nurture are seen as alternative sources of 
causal power. Instead, she understands such things as genes and cultural environments 
to be inherited, and such things as nervous systems and table manners to be con-
structed results of interactions in the various environments in which they develop.
. A developmental linguistics begins
The pragmatic reframing of the discipline requires directing the introductory expo-
sition away from a theorized object of linguistic inquiry and toward an emphasis 
on what languages do. Thus, the organizing question will no longer be What is lan-
guage? or What do we know when we know a language? but rather: How is it that 
hearing a sequence of sounds (or seeing a sequence of signs or reading a sequence of 
words) has the effects that they do? This conceptual shift entails answering two new 
questions, namely: How does a living being become a languaging living being? and 
How do we become the particular languaging living beings that we do? In order to 
answer those questions, both a phylogenetic script and an ontogenetic script need 
to be produced.
Because living beings belonging to the lineage homo sapiens sapiens are the most 
likely living beings to become languagers — acknowledging that there are human 
beings with severe abnormalities who do not and that there are enculturated apes who 
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do, to some degree — the story of the emergence and development of languaging in 
the species needs to be addressed. Although the topic of language and evolution has 
generated so much attention that no one individual could possibly master all that has 
been written on it, it is still possible to define a field of possibilities. In short, explana-
tions congenial to a Chomskyan model of language (Pinker & Bloom 1990; Pinker 
1994; Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002) do not explain the appearance in the hominid 
lineage of the so-called faculty of language as emerging from non-linguistic abilities 
or behaviors. In fact, they do not see the faculty of language as any kind of behav-
ior at all. By way of contrast, explanations congenial to languaging as an orienting 
behavior (Maturana & Varela 1972; Maturana & Varela 1987; Maturana & Mpodozis 
1992; Tomasello 1999) do explain the appearance in the hominid lineage of languaging 
behavior as emerging from non-linguistic abilities and behaviors, namely the ability of 
one conspecific to affect the attention and behavior of another.
It is characteristic of Chomsky-inspired explanations — and unsurprisingly so, 
given its Cartesian cast — that the function of language is the transfer of informa-
tion from one head to another, thus requiring that the story of the emergence of lan-
guage be told in terms of some kind of prior cognitive development in the species. The 
story of that advance requires, in turn, some kind of cognitive leap, which used to be 
 identified with the appearance of reason in the species. It is now identified with recur-
sion – the center of the center of cognitive functioning that powers language — and 
how it might have become part of the human cognitive repertoire. To the extent that 
the faculty of language, theorized to be uniform in the species, is a modular faculty, it 
follows that particular languages do not affect individual human cognition any more 
than do particular clothing styles affect the body underneath.
It is characteristic of explanations in terms of languaging as an orienting behavior 
that no prior cognitive advance need be made in order for to humans to have entered 
the linguistic domain, which is understood as an expanded domain of behavioral 
coordination. In this framework, developments in human cognition have occurred 
as a result of developments in languaging abilities over the long haul and so much so 
such that the behavioral coordinations humans experience even before the moment of 
birth now have profound effects on their cognition as it develops over their lifetimes. 
And, of course, developments in human cognition have, in turn, an effect on the kinds 
of behavioral coordinations that can be made in languaging. This kind of explanatory 
framework has been called ecological (Hill 1974) in order to emphasize the idea that 
the languaging environment (my terminology, not Hill’s) is the water in which humans 
swim. This kind of framework also favors the view that different languages can and do 
affect non-linguistic cognition differently, as Levinson’s work on the varying spatial 
frames of reference in the world’s languages strongly confirms.
Acknowledging linguistic relativity, however, is not to deny that human cognition 
has features that are shared by other, non-languaging primates. Take, for instance, the 
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well-known semantic congruity effect. When asked to compare two large animals, such 
as a cow and an elephant, adult humans are much quicker to respond when the ques-
tion is Which is larger? rather than Which is smaller? When asked to compare two 
small animals, such as an ant and a rat, they are much quicker to respond when the 
question is Which is smaller? rather than Which is larger? Recently it has been shown 
that there is a similar semantic congruity effect that appears when monkeys are asked 
to make numerical judgments. It thus seems to be that this effect is a consequence of 
the comparison process rather than stimulus encoding, that is, in the latter case whether 
or not the being in question possesses symbols to represent numbers precisely (Cantlon & 
Brannon 2005; Cantlon & Brannon 2006). In humans, the semantic congruity effect 
appears when we language but it is not caused by our languaging. One of the goals of a 
developmental linguistics is to sort out the nature of this hybrid human cognition.
The literature containing proposals for the originating scenario of the emergence of 
language in the species is too vast to review here. Those researchers who do not propose 
scenarios as such suggest instead associations or correlations between the development 
of certain behaviors in early humans and the emergence of language. This list of associa-
tions includes: the shift from arboreal to ground-dwelling life that required cooperation 
for defense, for the gathering of fruits and other vegetables and for hunting; the forma-
tion of coalitions or alliance for deceptive purposes; bipedalism in general; canine tooth 
reduction; tool use; and more accurate use of weapons (ability to aim). Bipedal locomo-
tion, for instance, plays a critical and perhaps surprising role in vocal evolution, in that 
bipedalism frees the thorax of its support role during quadrupedal locomotion, and this 
freedom permits the uncoupling of breathing and striding necessary for the subsequent 
selection for vocal virtuosity and speech. It also plays a role in the expansion of the 
brain, for as humans lost body hair and moved to life in the savannahs of East Africa, 
they moved more in the hot sun and evolved more sweat glands. More sweat glands 
allowed the brain to cool and grow, with the result that humans are now the sweatiest of 
all mammals and have one of the largest brain-to-body ratios. In addition, the earliest 
fossil records of bipedalism in the hominid line are always accompanied by the reduc-
tion of the projecting canine teeth. In certain primates decreased tooth use is associated 
with increased stick use for finding food. That is to say that stick use for food foraging 
could double as a defensive weapon as well, one even more effective than canine teeth. 
So, it is possible, that the need for carrying such a dual-purpose tool may well have 
contributed to the development of habitual bipedalism. Lieberman associates syntactic 
abilities with our ability to put one foot in front of the next (2006).
A developmental linguistics understands the emergence of languaging in the spe-
cies as an interlocked set of circumstances that involve the human body from the soles 
of the feet (bipedalism) to the top of the head (the prefrontal cortex) and many places 
in between (the larynx, the lungs, the sweat glands) and in continuous interactions 
with fellow humans: from the moment of birth in the way babies that are born (the 
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birthcanal-babyhead ratio is far narrower in humans than any other primate’s, thus 
suggesting that humans have required assisted births for several hundred thousand 
years), to the way babies are held and interacted with, to the way they are conceived 
(face-to-face sexuality, along with a shift in the female from estral cycles to nonseasonal 
sexuality). The particulars of the human way of living that have been conserved over 
many hundreds of thousands of years have necessarily produced and reflect human 
particulars in the cognitive domain, with the result that any human living being born 
and raised in the human world will be (more rather than less) ready to becoming a 
languaging living being. In addition to inheriting many primate-wide cognitive skills 
such as pattern recognition, categorization, and social relationships, they also come 
ready to be oriented. Tomasello (1999, 2003) has called this the capacity to understand 
conspecifics as intentional/mental agents like the self, and he argues that this biologi-
cal adaptation is the only one necessary to account for all the species-unique aspects 
of human cognition.
Turning to the next question: How do we become the particular languaging living 
beings that we do? we will need an ontogenetic account of the individual’s lifetime, 
which can easily begin at five months’ gestation when hearing typically develops in the 
womb. Clearly this topic is as large and has an equally extensive literature as the topic 
of language and evolution. However, given the constraints of space, only one small 
aspect of it will be invoked here: namely, the between-group differences in humans 
regarding number, and it presents another dimension to the subject of numerical 
cognition, discussed above in terms of what humans and other primates share with 
respect to comparing large and small quantities. Numerical cognition is as good a 
topic as any other to suggest how a developmental linguistics theorizes the issue of 
linguistic relativism.
Although it is becoming rarer and rarer to find previously undiscovered languages, 
such languages sometimes have features that lie outside expectation and thus their 
discovery can affect the theoretical landscape. Two relatively recent reports on two 
relatively small groups in the Amazon, the Pirahã (c. 200 people) and the Mundurukú 
(c. 7000 people) are doing just that. The issue concerns the presence — or, more pre-
cisely, the absence — of a counting system and its effect on numerical cognition. These 
studies thus provide a new wedge into prying open the relationship between language 
and thought/cognition.
The Pirahã use a “one-two-many” system of counting which consists of the words 
hói (“one” or even “roughly one”), hoí (“two”) and baagi or aibai (“many”). Hói can 
also mean “small” and can contrast with ogii (“big”). The researcher, Peter Gordon, had 
his participants perform tasks that involved nonverbal numerical reasoning and that 
required some combination of cognitive skills such as the need for memory, speed, and 
mental-spatial transformations. The opening task required that they match in one-to-
one correspondence a linear array of AA batteries with another set of AA batteries. The 
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tasks then progressed to, e.g., matching nuts to the battery line and to matching a bat-
tery line that was unevenly spaced. In these experiments, “participants responded with 
relatively good accuracy with up to two or three items, but performance deteriorated 
considerably beyond that up to eight to ten items.” Other tasks involved the researcher 
putting, say, up to eight nuts in a can and then withdrawing them one by one. The 
participants were asked, each time a nut was withdrawn, whether any nuts were left in 
the can. Again, performance accuracy fell off when numbers over three were involved. 
Gordon notes that the nonverbal numerical abilities of the Pirahã are greatly affected 
by their limited counting system and states that “the present study represents a rare 
and perhaps unique case for strong linguistic determinism” (2004: 498).
For the Mundurukú, the first task that Pierre Pica et al. asked of their partici-
pants was to state how many dots were present in displays of one to fifteen dots. In 
this way they were able to determine that the Mundurukú have set terms only for 
numbers one to five, that these expressions are long and that they often have as many 
syllables as the corresponding quantity. Predictably, Mundurukú do not perform well 
on tasks involving exact arithmetic with numbers larger than four or five. It seems 
that they do not use their numbers for counting sequences but rather for approxima-
tions. Thus, the word for five can be translated as “one hand” or a “handful” and was 
used to refer to six, seven, eight and even nine dots. Pica et al. then were interested 
to study whether the lack of a Mundurukú counting system above five affected their 
ability to apprehend large numbers. Here the answer seems to be No. That is, they 
succeeded in consistently identifying the more numerous set when asked to compare 
two sets of, say, twenty to eighty dots. Pica et al. conclude, further, that the Mundu-
rukú can mentally represent numbers beyond their naming range and that they do 
not confuse number with other variables such as size and density. They are also able 
to add, subtract, and compare their approximate representations. Pica et al. state that 
“approximation is a basic competence, independent of language, and available even to 
preverbal infants and many animal species. We conclude that sophisticated numeri-
cal competence can be present in the absence of a well-developed lexicon of number 
words” (2004: 503). The idea is that their study provides a qualification to Gordon’s, 
in that the lack of a number lexicon does not completely limit the ability to work with 
abstract number concepts.
Yet Gordon acknowledges the general consensus that there seem to be two kinds 
of numerical abilities: (i) an ability to enumerate accurately small quantities up to three 
(2004: 498) — in their fascinating book Where Mathematics Comes From. How the 
Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being, George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez state 
that this ability is called subitizing, from the Latin word for “sudden” (2000: 19), and 
they acknowledge that newborn babies along with a range of species from primates to 
pigeons are able to subitize, to estimate numbers, and to perform the simplest addition 
and subtraction; and (ii) an ability to estimate rather accurately large quantities without 
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overt counting. Pica et al.’s point of contention with Gordon seems to be one of emphasis, 
of how strongly we wish to interpret the influence of language on cognition.4
The purpose here is not to deny the Pirahã and the Mundurukú the numerical 
abilities they have. Neither is it to collapse obvious differences into some instance of 
“the same” numerical abilities to be found in all languaging living beings in the world. 
Now, the potential for more elaborated forms of arithmetic and mathematics may be 
present in all humans. Indeed, it is reported that Pirahã children easily learn number 
words in Portuguese, but, as one might expect, Pirahã adults, who are farther along in 
their ontogenic drifts, are not similarly adept. It is reported that they lose interest in 
such number lessons.
However, this losing of interest is not only related to an individual’s age, it also 
involves other aspects of the environment that either would or would not support an 
interest in number lessons, e.g. the existence of a counting routine or the custom of 
counting on fingers, which the Mundurukú do not have. As is evident from the case of 
the Pirahã and the Mundurukú, not all human groups have found it useful, desirable, or 
necessary to develop more elaborated forms of arithmetic and mathematics. Another 
way of saying this is that the more elaborated forms of arithmetic and mathematics 
that are commonplace in many parts of the world today have long cultural histories, 
the particular effects of which can be felt in the places where they have been important. 
The kind of mathematics that is used in today’s computer technology, for instance, is 
not the invention of a single human but is rather the result of a complex tradition that has 
taken its course in a variety of social settings and as a result of many cultural contacts. It is 
a commonplace to note, for instance, that it took Western mathematicians many centuries to 
fully grasp the benefits of the Arabic numeral zero and that the zero radically transformed 
Western arithmetic.
In The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Tomasello engages, in several pas-
sages, with a range of historical and cultural in mathematical practices in an effort to 
show, precisely, how social those practices are, despite the fact that “nothing seems 
. Needless to say, the case of the Pirahã has caused quite a stir, and a back-and-forth debate 
on it occupied a good ninety pages in a recent issue of Language. One of the central points 
of contention concerned whether or not Pirahã exhibits recursion. What the debate seemed 
to boil down to was what definition of recursion one was going to use to determine the issue, 
either one from an earlier generative grammar understood as “the ability for one phrase 
to reoccur inside another phrase of the same type” or a more recent one understood as 
the “general ability to build phrases that contain phrases as subparts” (Nevens et al. 2009: 
366–367, n. 11). Although Nevens et al. who are arguing against Pirahã exceptionality, take 
Pirahã researcher Daniel Everett to task for failing to distinguish between these two senses, 
it still should be pointed out that the terminological slippage is less Everett’s problem and more 
symptomatic of a universalist approach trying to hold itself together in the face of counterevidence 
(see also Evans and Levinson, forthcoming).
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less social than mathematics” (1999: 185). Lakoff and Núñez, for their part, have a 
similarly multilayered view of mathematics as a “product of the neural capacities of 
our brains, the nature of our bodies, our evolution in our environment, and our long 
social and cultural history” (2000: 9). Their particular emphasis is on mathematics as 
a systematic extension of the mechanisms of everyday cognition, conceptualizations 
that involve, e.g. collections of objects in a bounded region of space (class), repeated actions 
(recursion), rotation (complex arithmetic), and motion and approaching boundaries 
(calculus) (2000: 28–29). As I stated earlier, the mechanisms of our everyday cogni-
tion have been significantly shaped by our languaging together, and it follows that 
thus so should our mathematics. It also follows that an individual’s mathematical cog-
nizing will be affected by the environment in which that individual’s being, doing, and 
knowing is realized.
This brief sketch is intended to convey some of the richness and promise of the phy-
logenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural account of the multidimensional and multimodal 
phenomenon of languaging as it unfolds in a developmental linguistics framework.
. What to do next
When I was a graduate student, I realized that what I wanted to do in life was to read 
the historical record of linguistics.5 I remember looking at the stacks of books on the 
shelf in the library, those thick German tomes proclaiming that linguistics began with 
Bopp and Grimm, and thinking, “Man, if I want to change how people think about the 
history of our discipline, it is going to take a lot of doing.” It seemed quite a weighty 
undertaking back then. Now, all these years later, we historiographers — with Profes-
sor Koerner either leading the way or indicating important directions to take — have 
altered how our fellow linguists, historians of science, and researchers in various dis-
ciplines who have a stake in language theory think about the history of our discipline.
As I now make the chiropractic intervention in linguistic theory to allow room for 
the term languaging and the epistemological framework of constructivism, I cannot help 
but think, “Man, if I want to change how people think about our discipline, it is going 
to take a lot of doing.” And that is not all. To change how most linguistic departments 
— or even any, besides my own! — present their introductory linguistic course will no 
doubt be a far more difficult undertaking than the labor of writing and rewriting Lin-
guistics Reimagined over the last five or six years and probably even much more than 
the twenty years I spent inventing endless numbers of odd-ball linguistics courses so 
that I could get a new perspective on things and write the book in the first place. For 
. Well, it takes all kinds.
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some reason, however, this time around the prospect of effecting change does not feel 
so oppressive. Perhaps that is because I have already experienced “been there, done 
that” with respect to the discipline’s history. Or perhaps this is because historiography 
is flourishing, and I know I do not have to do it all alone.
Historiographers subscribe to the idea that intellectual parentage is bestowed by 
the children. We, the current practitioners of a field, get to identify who our intellectual 
forbearers are; and we the historiographers get to write that history. Long ago, at the 
first ICHoLS in Ottawa, some of us proclaimed Condillac to be a significant part of the 
discipline. And so he is, now in more ways than one. As I look back over the last one 
hundred years and more of linguistic activity, I can see that reconstructing languages 
and writing grammars are fine things for linguists to do — even necessary things for 
them to do — but they are not the only things that someone who merits the name 
linguist or language theorist can or should do. There exists a long line of thinkers — phi-
losophers, psychologists, semioticians — who have understood our subject matter it in 
all its situatedness: It includes, among others from the historical record, Pierre Bourdieu, 
Michel Foucault, William James, Humberto Maturana, B.F. Skinner, Francisco Varela, 
V.N. Vološinov, and Lev Vygotsky. As I and others write them into the historical record, the 
creaky old skeleton limbers up and the possibility of a renewed theoretical integration in 
twenty-first-century linguistics improves. In now moving toward an account of lan-
guage/languaging that derives not from Descartes but from Darwin, we can pause 
to appreciate Chomsky for having brought questions about the biological nature of 
language to the fore and then turn the page.
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It is not unusual for contemporary linguists to claim that “Modern 
Linguistics began in 1957” (with the publication of Noam Chomsky’s 
Syntactic Structures). Some of the essays in Chomskyan (R)evolutions examine 
the sources, the nature and the extent of the theoretical changes Chomsky 
introduced in the 1950s. Other contributions explore the key concepts and 
disciplinary alliances have evolved considerably over the past sixty years, 
such as the meanings given “Universal Grammar”, the relationship of 
Chomskyan linguistics to other disciplines (Cognitive Science, Psychology, 
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